On the whole, Hitler agreed with the application of the troops envisaged for the breakthrough and the method of attack of the Army, and he gave up the long preparation by artillery fire. Now it was only to last for 30 – 60 minutes, and the fire along the entire front of the Army Group was not to begin before 0530 hrs. Consequently, the attack of the infantry would have to begin between 0600 and 0630 hrs.
Corresponding to the suggestions made by my Army it was also decided that in selecting our bridgeheads we need not rigidly keep within our lines of demarcation. The line of demarcation to the right adjoining army was fixed in such a way that the crossing site at Huy fell to the 6.SS-Panzer-Army, consequently, the combat sector of my Army was extended to the south as far as Givet. If according to the development of the situation it proved to be more favorable to cross the Meuse south of Namur my Army was also permitted to do so. But in this case, it also had to cross the Sambre River in this sector. I supposed that strong resistance was not to be expected on the Sambre, on the whole flowing from the west to the east, and in the area west of Namur, if my Army succeeded in crossing the Meuse south of Namur. The use of both Panzer Corps spread out on a broad front toward the Meuse included consideration of this. The decisive questions about the condition of the troops were not solved. Further, it was not decided with what combined-arms units my Army could reckon. The condition of the troops likely to be taken into consideration was so bad that to FM Mödel I expressed my doubts as to the prospects of success. He agreed with me, but for the time being, he was unable to get satisfactory information about improvements in making the troops and bridge columns mobile, and about the speeding up of supplies, all of which were decisive and urgent problems.
(4) Further it was difficult that the Headquarters of the 47.Panzer-Corps and the 58.Panzer-Corps were not yet available, and that the Staff of the Army was still employed. But it was withdrawn on Nov 23, transferred to Manderscheid, and could devote all its time to the preparations. In the concentration area, I found the Headquarters of the 58.Panzer-Corps in Eisenschmit; the Staff of the 47.Panzer-Corps, however, was not withdrawn here from the Roer sector until Dec 5, where, from Dec 8 on, it was available completely staffed. Previously this headquarters had detached a duty staff and transferred it to Kyllburg as my Army had done.
(5) Very useful were the discussions of the plan with the staff of the Army Group and the adjoining armies. Besides FM Mödel, the Commanders of the 5.Panzer-Army and of the 7.Army with those of their officers who had received instructions, the Staff of the Army Group, and in addition some experts were present. (The Commander of the 6.Panzer-Army (SS-Obertgrüppenführer Joseph Sepp Diettrich) did not take part in any of the following fundamental conferences, but was represented by SS-Obergrüppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich of the Waffen-SS. Dietrich was not even present at the map maneuver of his own army, held in Bruehl and conducted by Bittrich.
These discussions took place: Three times with the Army Group, once at the Staff Headquarters in the neighborhood of Krefeld, twice at Muenstereifel, and once with the 7.Army (Muenstereiffel), once with the 5.Panzer-Army (Krefeld) and once with the 6.Panzer-Army at Bruehl. In all conferences deficiencies were stressed which would make success doubtful. Therefore FM Mödel and I welcomed the opportunity of reporting personally to Hitler on the development of the preparations. This conference took place in the afternoon of Dec 2, in the Reich Chancellory in Berlin and lasted several hours.
Although I had been to many conferences in the Führer Headquarters and although I have reported to Hitler myself several times, I do not remember any conference as clearly as this one. As usual, Mödel was very well prepared and assisted by his excellent G3, Lt Col Reichhelm of the General Staff, who had all the data at hand. His speech was short and clear, made in the concise language of the experienced aggressive soldier, and everybody in the large conference room listened with respect. He had givens his position frankly, courageously, and vigorously. Hitler was also strongly impressed. Of persons who interested me the following were present: Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, General August Winter (Deputy Chief of Staff OKW), General d. Infanterie Walter Buhle (Chief of Staff OKH), SS-Obergrüppenführer Hermann Fegelein (6.Panzer-Army) as well as Killer (Chief of Staff Luftwaffe), Burgdorff (Chief of the Army Personnel Office), Obstlt Reichhelm of the Gen Staff, and Gen Westphal (Chief of the Gen Staff of the Commander in Chief Wast).
Nothing was changed in the principles of the operation. (Although Mödel, in his own characteristic way, had cautioned me ahead of time not to be too abrupt in emphasizing to Hitler my lack of confidence in the infantry’s ability to effect a breakthrough against this enemy while it was still daylight and my consequent desire for an advancement of the time of attack, it was plain to see that he was glad I had been summoned too and could lend hiM my sunport if need be). Consequently, the great problems remained unsolved. The objective was still Antwerp. No decision was made as to the second attack to be launched from the northern wing of the 15.Army. The 7.Army did not get reinforcements as envisaged in the original plan. The question remained still open whether the forces and equipment promised would arrive in time before the attack.
It was impossible to learn whether or to which extent feint attacks and especially containing maneuvers of a tactical kind would be carried out in other sectors of the front. Further, the following problems were discussed: the defective refitting of the units, particularly in regard to making the artillery, bride-building columns, and the maintenance and towing service of the Panzer troops mobile, the considerable gaps in the supplies, which now turned up and proved impossible to fill, clarifying the doubts and worries about the probable lack of men and material in the depth, and in consequence of this the doubts about being able to feed the attack. Hitler agreed to the change in the hour of the attack and gave up the preparation of artillery. The fire preparation was limited to about one hour, but a large amount of ammunition was to be allotted for the purpose. As the 6.Panzer-Army did not agree to the clock time suggested, I must briefly state my attitude, also because on Nov 29, in opposition to the Nov 26, decision of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht the Commander in Chief West once more suggested that the beginning of the attack be postponed until 0800 hrs, referring to the probability of heavy fog at 0530 hrs, which would prevent our artillery from. reaching its full effect; furthermore, he was of the opinion that the troops were not sufficiently experienced in night combat, which required more than the ability to find one way.
These doubts are fully justified. But the whole situation of the enemy opposed to my sector directly invited an infiltration, which demanded two requirements of battle technique: (a) complete preservation of the element of surprise, (b) daring unhesitating assault troops, not intimidated by unexpected resistance, but pursuing the attack with gusto. At numerous points, this infiltration is bound to bypass the enemy fire, which cannot completely cover a thin line of security. But if the enemy is located in permanent fortifications an infiltration is impossible. Only in a carefully prepared and conducted infantry attack carried out in close cooperation with all supporting arms will it be possible to overpower such fortifications. As I do not know the situation of the enemy troops as opposed to the 6.Panzer-Army, I am unable to judge whether or to what extent a similar method of attack on individual points or along the entire front of the Army would have been successful. There is no doubt that the situation of the enemy, his behavior, and the terrain has a decisive influence on the method of attack. In the area of my Army, much was decided by this. It is equally correct that our first moving forward and the opening Of fire had to be fixed uniformly for all three armies because with this the element of surprise would disappear and the entire enterprise be disclosed to the enemy. Therefore – despite a completely different method of attack – I could agree to the suggestion of opening the fire at 0530 hrs without jeopardizing the plan of attack of my Army. I permitted attempts at infiltration as of 0400 hrs, at points where resistance was not to be expected.
The fixing of the clock time of the attack at 0800 hrs in the area of my Army would have had an unfavorable influence on the building of the bridges, and consequently on the moving forward of the Panzer Divisions and the following of the artillery. As to clock time for the opening of the fire we stuck to 0530 hrs. December 13 was figured on as the date for the beginning of the attack. We could not learn anything certain about the kind and extent of the support to be given by the Luftwaffe. In reply to my question on this Hitler said to me when I left, You can count on 2000 planes for the attack and added, 1000 for Dietrich and 1000 for you.
Because of the fact that Mödel reported, and that he and I answered questions and suggestions, Gen Siegfried Westphal, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief West, was never asked and did not get an opportunity to speak to Hitler. As Mödel did not think the information given by the Chief of the Staff OKH, Gen Buhle, sufficient, in our presence Hitler several times telephoned director Sauer, deputy of minister Speer, who was on a duty trip, to gather information from him about the amount of equipment and the possible date of delivery. The result of the conference as a whole was consequently unsatisfactory. I returned to my Army Headquarters on Dec 4 at noon.
For the benefit of my Army I evaluated the results of the conference as follows: As both static divisions (the 18.VGD and the 26.VGD) were included in the four infantry divisions made available by the High Command of the Wehrmacht, we had to throw in two Panzer Divisions in the first wave, that is to say, they had to take part in the breakthrough and the combat in the depth (the 2.PD and the 116.PD). This already meant a great loss to the offensive strength of the Panzer Divisions, but they were still more weakened by the fact that the 7.Army was given neither a fast division nor a good mobile advance detachment. Consequently, already before the beginning of the attack, we could foresee that they and the forces made available to them would not be strong enough to carry out their mission – the protection of the southern flank of the wedge of attack, reaching from the Meuse as far as the area of Luxembourg. This circumstance was bound to influence the movements and engagements of the 47.Panzer-Corps, which now lacked the protection that only a mobile division with plenty of fighting power would have been able to give, considering the excellent roads and the proportion between our forces and those of the enemy. As a matter of fact the weak elements of the almost immobile 5.Fallschirmjaeger-Division just adhered to the left wing of the 26.VGD. The situation reports of this division did not fully correspond to the facts I had ascertained concerning the situation south of Bastogne, and the reports of the Commanders of the Panzer-Lehr-Division and the 26.VGB confirmed my opinion.
As there were no chances of any real improvement in making the artillery and the bridge-building equipment mobile before the day of the attack, we decided only to have half of the artillery and the smoke brigades leave their jump-off positions, in order to save motor vehicles for the remaining portion of the artillery, its ammunition columns, and the bridge-building equipment. To my special regret, I hardly got time to take care of my troops – which, indeed, were my tools. Both static divisions were instructed as to their missions at a very late moment. They just got time enough to organize their assault companies and give them a short training. As these divisions had very broad sectors to defend, I no longer had time for this reason too to speak to the commanders of the regiments and battalions. Not until the first week of December did the first elements of the 62.VGD arrive by train in the area of my Army. At the beginning of the attack only about 2/3 of the 560.VGD had arrived, and one infantry regiment and portions of the artillery and engineer troops completely failed to come.
The commanders of the 2.PD and the 116.PD had at least been able to take part in the map maneuvers of their Commanding Generals. The new Commander of the 2.PD did not arrive at the Army Staff Headquarters until Dec 14. Only the 2.PD was able to give its troops a short training as it had been withdrawn for five weeks for freshening up. On Dec 9, the 116.PD gradually arrived by train, after having been heavily engaged for weeks. This division had plenty of freshening up to do before being marched off to the assembly area. There was hardly time left for training. The Panzer-Lehr came from the action with Army Group G and was en route until Dec 15. The late arrival of the Führer-Begleit-Brigade was bound to have serious consequences. On Dec 15, it was still not fully assembled, and owing to an automobile accident, its commander was not quite in form. My serious apprehensions in this respect came true. With the orders of the Army Group for the attack (Nov 30), the final form of the instructions of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht arrived.
According to Schramm, they ran approximately as follows: Utilizing the darkness, the 5.Panzer-Army (Manteuffel) breaks through the positions of the enemy in the sector Golzheim – Gemünd, and pushes forward as far as the Meuse River. This river is to be crossed on both sides of Namur and activities of the enemy in the rear of the 6.SS-Panzer-Army (Dietrich) on the line Antwerp – Brussels – Namur – Dnant are to be prevented.
In a conference with the 3 Commanding Generals, the Plan of Operation of my Army was once more carefully gone over, and after the completion of the map maneuver, which I conducted, it was put down in the final form. On the whole, it was a compilation of all that for weeks and in the course of successive instructions had been discussed and arranged in all details between the Army Staff and the subordinate commands. Nothing had to be changed in the principles fully discussed above. As far as I am able to recall my Army issued the following instructions: orders for the assembly of the troops for action, supplemented by a very detailed schedule of routes of march, times of march, resting places, and moving into position.
Orders for the moving into position and the attack, supplemented by a special battle directive. Special directives as usual. In the orders of attack of my Army, issued on Dec 10, 1944, the Corps Headquarters were assigned the following missions:
66.Army-Corps was to atLack the enemy in the district of the Schnee Eifel, enveloping him from both sides, capture St Vith, and then deeply echeloned either push forward to and across the Meuse River sector, on both sides of Andenne, or join the left wing of the Army.
58.Panzer-Corps was to gain possession of the Our River sector over a broad front on both sides of Ouren, push past Houffalize across the Meuse River in the sector Andenne – Namur and capture bridgeheads.
47.Panzer-Corps is to take the crossing Our River along a broad front in the sector Dasburg, Gemünd, push through the Clerf River sector, seize Bastogne and arranged in a deep echelon the formation, push across the Meuse River at Namur and south of it.
Panzer-Lehr-Division & and Führer-Begleit-Brigade are, primarily, to be available as a reserve of the Army in order to exploit the first breakthrough of one of the corps and to join in a quick thrust to the Meuse River. As the first objective of the attack the orders of the Army designated bridgeheads across the Meuse River. The point is to push incessantly through past all enemy resistance, regardless of zones of movementand if necessary dismount and continue on foot.
