5.Panzer-Army – Ardennes Preparation (Gen Hasso von Manteuffel)

5. Employment of Forces:

– a. To the right, the 6.panzer-Army, is the 15.Army (von Zangen), to contain the British-American possible attacks at Aachen and Düren. Until the crossing of the Meuse River, it was responsible for the protection of its own right flank. The left neighbor was the 5.Panzer-Army, likewise attacking, to the right in the sectors: Schleiden, Monschau, Hohes Venn, Verviers, Liège, Tongres, Hasselt, Albert Canal. To the left: Prüm, Vielsalm, Huy. West of the Meuse River, the line of demarcation was open to the right; to the left, it was intentionally not fixed as the development of the situation was to decide here.
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– b. The 5.Panzer-Army, was situated between the 6.Panzer-Army (Dietrich) and the 7.Army (Branderbergerà in the sectors: to the right of Prüm, Vielsalm, Huy; to the left: Neuerburg, Wiltz, south of Bastogne, St Hubert, Rochefort, Namur, east of Brussels.

– c. The 7.Army (Branderberger) was situated between the 5.Panzer-Army and the 1.Army in the sector. To the right: see the left line of demarcation of the 5.Panzer-Army to the left, according to the resistance of the enemy, the nature of the terrain, and the forces available, but in any case located as far south, southwest, and west as possible, at least as far as the line: Diekirch, Neufchateau, Givet.

6. General Principles for the method of attack.

The carrying out of the breakthrough: The breakthrough along the entire front of the attack was to be carried out by the static divisions. For this purpose, they had to form combat groups, which were to tear up the front of the enemy. For their support, they had assault guns and the firepower of all kinds of guns and in addition mortars’ smoke shells. When gaps were opened they had to run the Panzer units through, and then turn aside and attack the remaining enemy in the flank and rear to annihilate him completely so that finally the road was open along the entire front.

The armies themselves were to select points suitable for attempts at a breakthrough. The same was true of the points of crossing the Our River, to be gained by the 5.Panzer-Army. Thus, the following missions had to be carried out for the attack: The 6.Panzer-Army is to move forward with one corps (two Panzer Divisions) in front and one corps (two Panzer Divisions) as the second wave, advance through the gaps, opened by the infantry, as fast as possible to the Meuse River, establish bridgeheads. Then the second wave is to move forward, and, after having received fresh supplies, both corps were to launch the attack on Antwerp. At the same time the army had to protect its own right flank and – for this purpose build a line of resistance along the general line: Monschau, Verviers, Liege.

For both Panzer Armies, it was of the utmost importance not to get stopped in their advance to the Meuse River. Consequently, they had to go around strongly defended villages and positions which could not be taken at once, and proceed despite open flanks. The task of capturing these villages and positions and of repulsing counterattacks, expected to come, had to be taken over by the infantry divisions so that the Panzer Corps might reach the Meuse as speedily and ­with as small losses as possible. With a view to capturing the Meuse bridges undamaged, the corps had to form advance detachments, commanded by officers particularly suitable for such surprise operations.

The 7.Army was to capture the Our River sector, turn off to the southwest, capture the Sauer River sector and establish a line of defense, pointing to the south and covering the 5.Panzer-Army. The exact course of this line was to be decided by the extent of the counterpressure of the enemy and the nature of the terrain. In case of a critical situation, the Army was to have one Panzer Division assigned to it. As to the clock time of the start of the attack Gen Hans Krebs, at the conference on Nov 2, announced as directives given by Hitler that it would depend on the fire preparation of the artillery, mortars smoke-shell (Nebel Werfer), antiaircraft guns employed in fighting on the ground, and other supporting weapons, as well as on the possible employment of the Luftwaffe, subject to the weather conditions.

As the opening of the fire, this whole enormous fire power, would of course disclose the entire operation all three armies had to open fire at exactly the same time. Also not until the opening of the fire of the artillery were formations of the Luftwaffe to be permitted to cross the Rhine River in the direction of the west. By a fire, preparation lasting about two hours, and under circumstances in closest cooperation with the Luftwaffe, the artillery was to clear the passage for the assault detachments. The Highest Command would supply the artillery, etc, with such an amount of ammunition that they would be in a position to attain a thorough effect. Out of consideration of the visibility conditions for the observation, carried out by the artillery and the Luftwaffe, the attack would then have to be launched sometime between 1030 and 1100 hrs. Without any doubt, the start of the attack – the fire preparation and the moving forward of the infantry – had to take place at the same time along the entire front line in order not to uncover the operation prematurely by measures taken by one army that might here or there be to the purpose and consequent1y justifiable. I had my misgivings as to the fire preparation as such and the duration of it, and I also doubted – with regard to the consumption of ammunition, visibility conditions the nature of the terrain, and its protection, and last, but not least, with regard to our own estimate of the enemy – if it would achieve the effect expected by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. I did not at all reckon with possible support given by the Luftwaffe, as a period of bad weather was a condition for the attack.

I had my own opinion as to the clock time of the attack. My attitude to this problem and Hitler’s decision, which had a decisive influence on the operations plan of the Army, has been fully discussed. The problem, repeatedly broached by me, whether parachute units should be employed in order to capture the bridges across the Meuse undamaged and keep them open, Hitler decided in the negative – and in my opinion, he was quite right – as he did not think that the Luftwaffe would be able to carry out the operation successfully. Furthermore, as bad weather was a condition for the attack it was a matter of course that the dropping of parachutists would be next to impossible.

7. Clock A_me of the attack.

In Hitler’s instructions to the chiefs of the General Staff of the Commander in Chief West and Army Group B on Oct 28, both of the latter pointed out that Nov 25, which had been told to be the day of the attack, was too early. Otherwise, this day was favorable with regard to the moonlight. There would be a new moon, and consequently, the lack of moonlight would give further protection to our concentration of troops, especially against the night reconnaissance of the enemy air force.

8. The concentration of troops for the action.

The main idea was to carry out the bringing up of the troops and initial supplies in such a way that the reinforcements arriving would be pretended to be operational reserves, to be thrown in in case of a breakthrough towards the Rhine River in the Aachen area, and their presence thus sufficiently accounted for. Above all the units arriving (Panzer Army, Volks Grenadier Divisions, Volks Artillery Corps, and Rocket Projector Brigades) were all to be concentrated behind the western front with two points of gravity, that might also be of use to the defense in case of a critical situation on the front.

– a. The majority of the reserves were placed in the area on the left side of the Rhine behind the inner wings of the 1.Fallschirmjaeger-Army and the 15.Army.

– b. One Panzer Corps with 2 to -3 Panzer units of Army Group B, was concentrated in areas located in Traben, Trahach, Trier, St Wendel, Kaiserslautern. In addition, two new Volks Grenadier Divisions were to be brought up to this group. From the same motives supplies of ammunition, fuel, signal, and engineer equipment brought up to particularly threatened sections of the front remained as reserves belonging to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The preparations for these measures of defense were likewise to be made only by a very small circle of experts. They were known under the pseudonym Wacht is Rhein. So much about the written statement of the leading ideas of the High Command of the Wehrmacht as they were transmitted to the Commander in Chief West and the Commander in Chief of Army Group B on Nov 1. With this, then after the conference on Nov 2, the Army Commanders were put in authority for the first time.

9. Starting position of Army Group B.
(Note: The essential of this paragraph was taken from Schramm’s work)

In an estimate which the Commander in Chief in West submitted to the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht on Nov 2, on the day when the Chiefs of Army Group B and the 5. and 6.Panzer-Armies got their instructions about the plan of the offensive, he calculated that at the time 1/4 of the 80 large combined-arms units of the enemy was employed in action: the main strength thus was still in process of marching up and for them, everything available was first being brought up. The strongest increase was ascertained to take place in the vicinity of Metz. Compared to this the increase of the forces in the combat area around Aachen and on the Roer River was smaller, but the forces were here concentrated in a narrower area. The Commander in Chief West, therefore, reckoned with a new attack on the Rhine River, launched by American forces supported by Units of the British 21-AG. The Commander in Chief West did not consider the bulk of the British forces ready for action at this time. He supposed that the British 21-AG would not attack to the north, but this time to the east, and turn off to the southeast in order to join the American forces on the Lower Rhine.

In connection with this he took into consideration the possibility of a renewed dropping of air landing troops west of the line Duisburg – Duesseldorf, or even for the purpose of forcing a Rhine crossing. The Commander in Chief West expected the attack to start during the first half of November. This was also the reason why the Staff of the 5.Panzer-Army, assigned here, remained in command in this sector where the point of gravity was expected to be. It remained an open question whether the enemy would attack earlier at Metz than at Aachen. The Commander in Chief West also considered it possible that the enemy would attack simultaneously at all three points of gravity Metz, Aachen, and at the central course of the Meuse.

As it could be foreseen already at this time that the battle of the Schelde Estuary would soon be lost, the troops fighting here were withdrawn by sections to the river, and on Nov 9, we evacuated the bridgehead at Moerdijk. As it was unlikely that the enemy would launch further attacks in this extremely difficult terrain, Hitler, on Nov 17, consented to a release of forces in Holland in order to build up reserves and gain forces for other fronts. On the front held by Army Group B, fighting during the first two weeks of November was limited to local but very tenacious and, for both sides, costly attacks east of Aachen between Würselen and Stolberg. No doubt the American forces intended to broaden the gap they had previously knocked in the West Wall at Vossenack, 25 KM southeast of Aachen, in order to capture the two dams along the Roer River and the Urft River. If we opened these dams on the German’ side the water level would change further down the valley in a way that would render our crossing of the Roer and its marshy banks a difficult task, in the face of an enemy who had erected an extensive system of positions directly on the other bank of the river. The intentions of broadening the gap in the West Wall were frustrated by counterassaults and counterattacks. But we could with certainty expect the attacks to be renewed soon in the very same place and with the same intensity.

The large-scale attack was indeed started on Nov 16, and during the three days following its spread to the entire sector Geilenkirchen, Eschweiler, Stolberg. Eschweiler stoutly defended by the fine 12.Volksgrenadier-Division in conjunction with the oft-proved 3.Panzergrenadier-Division, was lost on Nov 22. But the continuity of the front was maintained. Farther north the troops on both sides fought with the same tenacity for every inch of ground. But here too the American forces advanced slowly on the Roer River, pushing our troops back. On Dec 5, the battle seemed to decrease in the sector. But from the old gap at Vossenack, the enemy launched a successful secondary thrust, and from Dec 8, the battle developed again in the main sector. On Dec 11, we occupied the Roer River line between Jülich and Düren; west of Düren we still held a small bridgehead. The situation at Vossenack and in the elevated terrain adjoining on both sides remained extremely critical.

In the middle of December, the result of this third battle of Aachen, lasting for more than one month, can be summed up as follows. The gain of ground of the American forces in the tactical area was keenly felt by Army Group B because the enemy had here pushed his front further into the law plain of the Rhineland, had partly occupied the hills, commanding the Roer position and the terrain as far as the Erft river, and had advanced further on Koln. But on the whole, the development of the battle can be regarded as a success, because the main objective, the breakthrough, was not achieved. First of all the Roer River was an obstacle, but not so easy to jump, particularly because of the opening of the dams and the continuous rain had rendered the terrain extremely marshy, a fact which was now a great help to the defenders, and for the same reason, the enemy was not able fully to develop his superiority with regard to tanks. But both sides had suffered heavy losses. In the case of the enemy, such was the case because we were able to ascertain the bringing up of one new combined-arms unit after the other in or behind his front, and the shrinking of his operative reserves.

In connection with the offensive plan this development was very welcome because as long as the enemy High Command was considered to have strong reserves available we had to reckon with fast, strong counterattacks of unpredictable origin. Now the battle on the Roer together with combat in the southern part of the western front – contained already so many forces that the unknown quantity X, calculated rather high at the start by German leadership, had already diminished considerably, and great surprises by reserves brought up from. the rear needs no longer be provided for. In view of the fact that further divisions were arriving from the states, the operational reserves were set up with only 3 to 6 large units.

Another advantage resulting from this development was that the enemy committed several divisions (the 2, 4, and 28th Infantry Divisions) which had been badly mauled in the battle on the Roer, in the very sector, envisaged for our attack. This was bound to improve our possibility of achieving success, and – according to Schramm, the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht considered it an indication of the enemy’s temporary lack of forces. But on the other hand, German forces were severely strained by this favorable development.

As early as Nov 21, the Commander in Chief West reported that defensive combat in the Aachen area was depleting considerably the forces of Army Group B. Two, perhaps even three, Volksgrenadier Divisions, were drawn into the battle, and the 12.Volksgrenadier-Division (Maj Gen Gerhard Engel), selected by Hitler himself to cover the right flank of the 6.Panzer-Army, could not be extracted. For the duration of the battle four fasts mobile units – all of them envisaged for the offensive, the 9.Panzer-Division, the 116.Panzer-Division, the 3.Panzergrenadier-Division and the 15.Panzergrenadier-Division – would be contained. Considering the development of the situation in Army Group B, the Commander in Chief West took it for granted on Nov 21 that four Volksgrenadier Divisions and nine fast mobile units would be unavailable for the time being as reserves and drew the conclusion that the forces left were not sufficient to ensure the success of the attack planned.