5.Panzer-Army – Ardennes Preparation (Gen Hasso von Manteuffel)

The situation on the eastern front did not allow us to transfer any considerable number of reserves to the West, as the Red Army was likewise engaged in a full-scale attack on Germany. Very well equipped with regard to men and material, under the protection of an air force in the proportion 1:25, and no doubt having excellent leaders, the highly motorized’ Allied Armies thus succeeded in pushing rapidly through France to the east in the direction of the German Border. The 7. and the 1. Armies fought their way back to the West Wall. There was a danger that the enemy would breakthrough at Aachen, which since Sept 17, had been under fire from his artillery.

Thanks, to the steadfastness of the troops the German leadership succeeded in intercepting the enemy and establishing an oblique front line that for weeks resisted all attacks. Exerting all our efforts, we finally succeeded in establishing a protective wall on the western frontier of Germany. As its wings rested on natural obstacles and in the middle of the West Wall the defense was facilitated. It also made the enemy carefully prepare for his future preparations.

Aachen fell on Sept 21. We had to reckon with a continuation of the fighting in this combat area. At this moment, when both sides made their preparations for the battle of the West Wall – according to Schramm after the fall of Antwerp at the end of September – the idea of an attack on an operative scale, launched – after a thorough reconstitution of the Army – and careful preparations – from the West Wall positions on some weak point of the front line of the enemy had already so far taken the form that the Eifel Front was chosen as the area of attack and Antwerp as the objective (Schramm). The origin of the plan of such an offensive will be described trenchantly and in detail by Schramm later in this text.

The month of September had taught us that the local attacks, launched in various forms, never carried successes that would lead to an offensive on an operative scale: the initiative was nowhere regained. With the forces at our disposal in the West, it was impossible to achieve more than a closing of the gaps in the front, at many points softened up. After a breakthrough of the positions of the enemy, the front, therefore, was to be put in motion with the help of tank forces in order to achieve in the open field a definite change in the situation in this theater of war or even in the fortune of the war.

Based on statements available concerning the forces of the enemy and the number of men and material which Germany could put at the disposal of the western front, Hitler thought it still possible to bring about a change. What was impossible in front of the West Wall, must be possible to achieve through an attack starting from the same … Further, to the old axiom that the attack is the best defense could be added the experience that an attack leading to warfare in open terrain is less costly than defense. (Schramm)

It is not the task set by the author of the present work to define in detail his attitude to the ideas on the origin of the offensive and, further, it would go beyond the limits set for the composition. But to me, it seems important to point out that Schramm, who gives, a detailed description of the individual phases of the planning and preparing of the offensive, nowhere shows any ideas revealing a connection with a possible political solution (an ending to the war), all Germany’s endeavors to achieve a military victory has so far been without success.

2. The Purpose and Objective of the Offensive Planned, Described According to the Intentions of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

On Dec 2, 1944, the purpose and objective of the offensive were thoroughly explained by Hitler to a small circle of military leaders, among them the author of the present work, assembled in the Führer Headquarters in the Reich’s Chancellery in Berlin, in a conference lasting several hours. (Cf. also II.1.D.80 and after). On the occasion of the issuance of orders to the generals concerned the explanation was repeated on Dec 11 in the Führer Headquarters at Ziesenberg (Cf. also 111.1.p.90 and after). As Schramm has given a thorough description of the contemplation of a German counteroffensive and the various phases of the development up to the completion of the plan of attack, carried out by the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht, here only follows -concerning the purpose and objective of the attack – what the present writer remembers from the conferences mentioned and his first issuance of instructions on Nov 2 (Cf. also p.36 and ‘after).

What Hitler said… I give the gist of it… was: In the western theater of war the month of September has taught us that the repeated attacks with a limited objective, launched as thrusts into the flanks of the enemy, only carried local successes. The attacks have, indeed, been able to relieve the western front of pressure at certain points, but they have nowhere and at no time given possibilities of an operative change of the war. Through the month of October, the Wehrmacht had been forced everywhere to defense warfare. The offensive now ordered is to force the breakthrough of a position with the purpose of gaining the ‘open terrain’ this term is used in the sense of German command regulations. As the forces available only permit us to start an offensive at a point where a breakthrough is sure to be achieved only a sector can be taken into consideration in which the enemy has stationed fewer forces – both ‘in position’ and in reserve – but, which on the other hand, must be such that a successful breakthrough can be broadened to such an extent that the overall situation on the Western Front will be changed in favor of Germany. The result of these considerations is the fixing of the Eifel Front as the area of attack.

The Highest Command considered the sector between Monschau and Echternacht as most suitable for an attempt at a breakthrough as the enemy troops holding it are weak. Because of the thin occupation of the front and the fact that the enemy would not expect German attacks – if any at all – in this terrain, we could here, sooner than anywhere else reckon with a rapid breakthrough by our forces if the attack were kept a complete secret and the weather is unfavorable to the air force of the enemy. With this, freedom of movement is achieved for the tank units, which then in a quick thrust are to establish bridgeheads across the Meuse River between Liège and Namur with the objective of a further uninterrupted advance in the direction of the northeast, east past Bruxelles, to Antwerp.

We supposed that the attack of the tank units after the crossing of the Meuse River would cut off the rear lines (the roads of supplies) of the First American Army, probably located in the Valley of the Meuse. As soon as we reached the vicinity of Bruxelles – Antwerp the rear lines of the British 21-AG would also be decisively jeopardized and if Antwerp were captured, they would be cut off too. At present Antwerp is the only completely working Sea Port which till now has fallen into the hands of the Allies. If this objective were reached the conditions for an attack from all directions on the First American Army and the 21 British Army Group, cut off from their supplies, would be given. With this 25 to 30 divisions would be annihilated and the successful attack must further lead to the destruction and the capture of an enormous amount of material of all kinds, which ordinarily – and especially now considering the imminent Allied offensive against the West Wall – were stored in the area cut’off.

Further, according to Hitler, a successful offensive on this operative scale must at any rate thwart the plans of the Allied Forces for a long time and confront the Allied leadership with decisions that had to be agreed upon by the political leaders (Roosevelt and Churchill). This might lead to a fatal postponement of the necessary countermeasures to be taken by the military leadership. Hitler even went so far as to suppose that because of the failures differences of opinion would develop among the military leaders and even among the political leaders of America and England. These differences would be further aggravated as Canada would keep out of the war for a rather long time owing to the fact that the majority of her forces would have been annihilated in the pocket.

On Dec 2, Hitler said among other things: that the distant objective Antwerp was a risky enterprise and there seemed to be a certain disproportion between it and our troops and their condition. But nevertheless, he would put all his eggs in one basket because Germany needed a breathing space. In my opinion the mentioning of the disproportion between our forces and the objective, by the way only mentioned once by Hitler as far as I know – was made with conscious emphasis as a reply to FM Walter Model’s suggestion for a so-called small solution. To me, it seems worthy of notice that Hitler himself probably had some doubts as to the objective, after we had been compelled to reduce the troops envisaged in the original plan. He expected that even partial success would delay the carrying out of the plans of the enemy for 8 to 10 weeks, which he thought would result in the necessary breathing space for Germany. “With this, the situation on the Western Front would be stabilized for the time being and the Highest Command ­would be able to withdraw forces and transfer them to the jeopardized sectors of the eastern front.

Hitler had a very high estimate of the strong psychological effect of such a success on German leadership, homeland, and the front and also on public opinion of the Allied countries and their armies. According to Schramm, Hitler signed the orders for the concentration of troops and the moving into position on Nov 10. Because of the connection with the above already include here some extracts of the order. The beginning of the orders said: “The objective of the operation is to achieve a change of the whole Campaign in the West and with this perhaps of the whole war by annihilating the enemy forces north of a line Antwerp – Bruxelles – Luxemburg. Hitler declared, It is my firm resolution to insist, at any price, on the carrying out of the operation even if the attack of the enemy on both sides of Metz and the coming assault on the Ruhr District should result in great losses of terrain and positions.

It would go beyond the limits set for this work if the author were to state his attitude to Hitler’s military and political statements. The original text of the orders for the attack and all other orders given by the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the Commander in Chief West, and the Herresgruppe B are not at my disposal any more than the orders and proposals of the Army are. The following statements are therefore based on the work of Schramm and on what I am able to recall. On Nov 1, the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht for the first time informed in writing the Commander in Chief West and the Commander in Chief of the 3.Army-Group about the leading ideas of the Highest Command. Previously, on Oct 28, Hitler had personally instructed the Chiefs of the General Staff of the two Commanders in Chief mentioned above. On Nov 2, the Commanders in Chief of the 5. and 6.Panzer-Armies had their instructions. Until the four Commanders in Chief mentioned got their instructions on Nov 2, the directives of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht covered:

1. Purpose and objective of the offensive, see above.
2. Missions:

-a The 6.Panzer-Army was to rush forward on the crossings of the Meuse River on both sides of Liège and on the Vesdre River (a tributary of the Meuse) and build a strong line of defense in the eastern fortified positions of Liège in order to gain, first of all, the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Antwerp and the area north of Antwerp.

-b The 5.Panzer-Army was to cross the Meuse River between Amay and Namur and along the line Antwerp – Brussels – Namur – Dinant and prevent the activity of the reserves of the enemy from the west against the rear of the 6.Panzer-Army.

-c The 7.Panzer-Army was assigned the task of covering the flank to the south and southwest with the objective first of all of reaching the Meuse River and the Semois River and in the area, east of Luxemburg establishing a contact with the Moselle River front and by means of demolitions gain time to build up a strong line of defense further back in the rear.

-d Further, the Highest Command disclosed its intention of launching a secondary thrust in connection with the main attack in the Ardennes. It was to be launched by Army Group H from the bridgehead west of the Roer River, starting from the sector or the XII.SS-Corps between Sittard and Geilenkirchen as soon as the enemy began to throw strong forces against the flank protection to be established by the 6.Panzer-Army.

In a letter from the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht, he pointed out to the Commander in Chief West what was to be considered unchangeable in the plan of attack: the distant objective, the organization took as a whole and the broad jump-off line.

3. Point of Attack:

Ensued from the purpose and objective of the offensive in connection with an estimate of the situation of the enemy. The lines of demarcation are to be deduced from the strips of attack or movement assigned to the armies. The width of the front of attack is accounted for by the fact that the wider the front the smaller the immediate threat to the flank at the root of the area of the breakthroUgh and especially to so important points as for instance the take-off points of the military highways. Therefore an extension of the front of attack to the south as necessary in order to eliminate the protruding bulge of the Sauer River sector at Echternach – Wasserbillig by the very first attack. Because there was grave danger in that the enemy had the possibility of crossing the Sauer River and thus blocking the advance of the 7.Army by a thrust into the rear.

4. Estimate of Forces:

– a. To the right: the 6.Panzer-Army (Dietrich) with four SS Panzer-Divisions for the assault and five Infantry Divisions for the covering of the right flank. Total: nine large uni(ts.
– b. in the middle: the 5.Panzer-Army (Manteuffel) with four Panzer-Divisions for the assault and three Infantry Divisions for the covering of the left flank. Total: seven large combined arms units.
– c. To the left: the 7.Army (Branderberger) with six Infantry Divisions for the protection of the left flank of the 5.Panzer-Army. One Panzer Division as a possible reserve. Total: six to seven large combined arms units.
– d. Secondary thrust: by Army Group H later, on the sector of the 15.Army: no estimate of forces yet made.
– e. Reserves: available to the Highest Command about three Panzer Divisions and three to four Infantry Divisions. Total: about 28 to 30 large combined arms units.