5.Panzer-Army – Ardennes Preparation (Gen Hasso von Manteuffel)

Re (7): In case a period of bad weather did not set in, or did not last, our gaining superiority in the air above the combat area as far as the Rhine as the condition for a successful carrying out and continuation of the attack. The demand for the Luftwaffe convinced everybody who had fought in the west during the past months. It is unnecessary here to comment on this. The above-mentioned considerations brought me to the following conclusion at the end of my discourse: the condition for the entire operation is that the gap must be opened successfully and speedily. As a period of bad weather was a prerequisite for the start of the offensive, it must be further considered that the difficulties brought about by the terrain, weather, and season would affect well-equipped troops in quite another way than badly equipped ones. Allowing for losses caused by this, and by the ensuing battles (dropping out and delays on the march, the greatly increased strain on men, horses, and equipment, heavy losses, etc.), I calculated the wear and tear to be felt already when we reached the Meuse. Consequently, at this point the attack had, in any case, to be reinforced from the depth. But it was impossible to learn with what forces this was to be brought about. The critical situation on all fronts made me doubt whether this reinforcement would be any good.

This normal wear and tear on divisions and units will occur just the same if the operation is speedily carried out, but, apart from losses in men, the effect will be twice as great, or even greater, since the time for returning knocked-out tanks, armored vehicles of all kinds, guns, bridge-building equipment, etc., to the troops, will be the longer the speedier the moving forward takes place. I drew the conclusion that our forces would not be sufficient for the successful continuation of the attack across the Meuse, if not sooner, where te had to expect strong enemy forces. As an operation is influenced by the number of forces, and the time allotted for the concentration of the troops and the carrying out of the operation, the result of the above-mentioned considerations must be supplemented by a computation of the time probably needed for the breakthrough to the Meuse and the crossing of the river. I computed the time needed to amount to 3 x 24 hours after our troops had moved across the Our River (this actually occurred on Dec 16 at 1600), taking into consideration the maneuverability of the troops in the winter season, and during the period of bad weather presupposed for the attack. I rejected all other computations, repeatedly referring to the above-mentioned considerations because certain notions of time cannot be set aside. Accordingly, the spearheads of the attack advance detachments or armored spearheads could be expected on the Meuse about Dec 19, and if conditions were favorable, with bridgeheads across the river. But, on the other hand, at this point, we would have to reckon with the first, strong resistance of the enemy. In this case, it was urgently desirous that the advance detachments beyond the Meuse be reinforced.

First of all, I did not expect any enemy activity east of the Meuse River from the north, and I believed that Dietrich’s 6.Panzer-Army would be about in a line with us. As no enemy reserves worth mentioning were expected behind the static divisions there was a chance that after our breakthrough to the Meuse only weak forces would confront us, if we managed to penetrate the area before enemy reserves were brought up. But I reckoned much more with a strong enemy activity from the south. These reserves might either arrive from the zone of operations in the district of Champagne through Reimns, Chalons, Charleville, Sedan, Montmedy or from the southern sector of the western front (Patton’s Third American Army) through Nancy, Metz, Luxemburg, Arlon. In any case, if their intervention was to take place east of the Meuse then their movements with strong elements or the majority pointed to Bastogne, in which town the first forces would be able to arrive on the evening of the third day of the attack.

We supposed that only portions would be sent in on both sides of the road Luxembourg, Diekirch to cover the northern flank of their own army (the Third American Army) and Luxembourg, and that the majority would be moved forward via the line Arlon, Neufchâteau in order to attack the southern flank of our wedge of attack. The Highest Command was inclined to suppose that the enemy would rather attempt to meet the attack head-on, instead of harassing the flank of it, that is to say, that the resistance proper could be expected on and behind the Meuse (Schramm). Fine roads, great maneuverability, and adequate supplies in my opinion favored a speedy intervention of the reserves. Consequently, by this time, and until the intervention of the reserves, the Branderberger’s 7.Army had to have completed an effective covering of the bulge westward protruding, caused by the breakthrough. I did not consider its forces and tank weapons sufficient for this task, nor were they mobile enough, consequently the 5.Panzer-Army had to take care of the covering of its own left flank, behind which all its roads of supply were situated.

I was of the opinion that Antwerp, the objective, was too distant for the forces promised compared to the estimate of forces, even if all conditions were fulfilled, and I believed that it would be possible to reach the Meuse and, under favorable conditions, establish one or two bridgeheads on the opposite bank. As to the clock time of the attack I was unable to give my attitude until I had gained information about the details. In any case, I was against a long fire preparation. Having had my say, I was able to ascertain the existence of a complete agreement with the ideas of FM Mödel, who as I now perceived, had been informed several days ago, and had studied the entire enterprise thoroughly in his own characteristic way. I also observed obvious sighs of relief in him at our agreement, as he had suggested another solution if not yet in the detailed farm, to FM von Rundstedt, which I have reasons for believing with certainty, and now he felt sure that I would back a similar suggestion of his to Hitler. We also completely agreed as to the date of the start of the attack, even if to subordinate the command he insisted on Dec 1, being the date of the attack. During the time following he several times both verbally and in writing suggested a postponement of the start of the attack (on Dec 1), for, as soon as the orders of the Operations Section of the Wehrmacht were issued numerous difficulties and obstructions turned up, leaving their mark on the work during the weeks following, and oppressing every responsible soldier with misgiving and doubt, as to whether the requirements could at all be met. FM Mödel fully shared my feelings, even if it was not to be known by his manner. It much more corresponded to his methods to strain every nerve to hasten the preparations, so that the attack might start at the earliest date, in order not to increase the risk.

Likewise, to subordinate commands he never expressed any doubt nor allowed any to arise as to the objectives ­Antwerp and Brussels – put by Hitler, and during conferences, map exercises, etc., he emphasized that they were the total objective of the successful operation carried in the direction of the Meuse. But it is a fact that since Nov 2 and 3, he has never discussed an operation west of the Meuse with me. Estimating our real situation and that of the enemy correctly, he nevermore took the operation into consideration with me, all the less, as week after week the Operations Section of the Wehrmacht canceled promises, which also by him were considered absolute conditions for success. FM Mödel then explained his ideas about a possible solution: considering the forces envisaged in the plan and the circumstances and facts pointed out by me, it would be better because more promising to advance across the Meuse, but, having successfully broken through and reached the open terrain, to turn off to the northwest or north with both Panzer Armies, so that the left wing of the 5.Panzer-Army would be protected by the Meuse. This main thrust, which had to be covered by the 7.Army in the south, was to be launched in cooperation with the 15.Army, pushing forward from Sittard, in such a way that both jaws of the pincer met in the vicinity of Tongres, northwest of Liège.

Thus a pocket would develop, encircling the British-American forces fighting between Sittard and Monschau; their number was estimated to amount to 25 to 30 divisions. How the operation was to be carried on after our arrival on the Meuse remained questionable, and could be discussed later on. If the situation developed favorably, then the attack envisaged on Antwerp could still be launched. It is evident that the carrying out of this plan would change the disposition of forces and, implicitly, the location of the points of gravity. We still had time to take this into consideration. This solution, which in my opinion should include large bridgeheads west of the Meuse, from which to conduct further operations, in our opinion corresponded better to the forces envisaged in the plan of attack. The result of this was the suggestion of the so-called small solution. How Mödel pictured from this the development of the required goal and the contribution of the operation, he did not tell me.

We made an appointment for the following day. In the evening of the same day, I instructed my Chief of Staff. In this conference, I based my opinion on the following considerations: (1) The breakthrough must be successful, as it is the condition for the entire operation. (2) The method of attack must, with absolute certainty, guarantee that the assault troops will gain the banks of the Our River at numerous points as possible. Their tactics will be to obtain control of the western bank to an adequate extent in order to prevent the enemy from covering our bridge-building spots and crossings with observed fire. Furthermore, the method of attack must guarantee that our penetration into the enemy lines of resistance, including combat in the depth of his disposition, takes place speedily, so that the Panzer Divisions, being the backbone of the attack, could cross the Our in good tiffie on the very day of the attack. Utilizing the effect of the shock, they were to move forward to the west without delay, in order to penetrate through the gaps knocked into the defense system of the enemy by the assault troops, and thus achieve a breakthrough. Further, the deep penetration of the assault troops had to be carried out rapidly so that the inevitable concentration, arising when the Panzer Divisions and the supporting arms – artillery, antiaircraft artillery, smoke battalions, etc. – were brought up, would not be covered by artillery fire from the depth (that is to say, from the area east and west of the Our). Probably only one road of advance would be available to each of them to and from the crossings. (4) The penetration into the depth cannot be considered successful until we have gained the line Lascheid, Heinerscheid, Roder, Hosingen. At the same time this line is the one the infantry takes to prevent the enemy from observing our movements towards the Our, and the line where the Panzer Divisions will pass them when they advance.

The following is to be pointed out and emphasized again and again: the entire enterprise must be kept a secret at any cost. Everything had to be subordinate to this. These four demands influenced the organization and employment of the forces, which in general – were determined by the objective of the operation, the tasks of the Army, the terrain to be taken, and, for the rest, were to some extent decreed in the instructions given by the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht. Thus, very definite bases for the attack were given and it was difficult to decide which consideration was to be put in the first place and thus get a decisive influence on the organization and employment of the forces.

The four demands mentioned by me were interrelated, and to my opinion, they were very closely connected with the method of attack, which – as I have pointed out – was to produce the conditions for penetration and breakthrough. The method of attack, decisive for the organization and employment of the forces, must be explained in more detail here, as my suggestions considerably changed the original orders of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht. I explained to my Chief of Staff that we had to use the method of attack which most speedily and most certainly would lead to success, as put forward by me in my four demands. The following had to be taken into consideration.

a. The organization and distribution of the forces of the enemy, his activities in his positions, and the possible effect of the weapons, in relation to estimating the terrain.
b. The fighting qualities and abilities of our own troops and the possibility of support for the assault troops from interdependent weapons, according to kinds, number, and ammunition as announced. The supporting weapons were: their own heavy weapons, assault guns used as assault and antitank weapons, artillery of all kinds including smoke-shell mortars, and the Luftwaffe.
c. The terrain with regard (a), to the battle and the movements of the infantry and its supporting weapons and (b) how high we could estimate the effect of these supporting weapons in this terrain.
d. The time necessary for the assault troops to get from their jump-off position to the line Laschied, Heinerscheid, Roder, Hosingen.

The following details can be added to this:

Re (a): The distribution of the forces of the enemy and his conduct. In the morning they had been described by Gen Krebs on the basis of the daily report of the 7.Army which at the time was in the sectors of the 6.SS-Panzer-Army and the 5.Panzer-Army. The various results of reconnaissance in the tactical area (according to the situation on Dec 15) gave the following picture of the First American Army: opposed to the attacking 6.SS-Panzer-Army, on the southern wing was the US V Corps including the 99th Infantry Division in the sector Losheim, Olef River, adjoining in the south were two divisions in the sector as far as Konzen (incl.). In the sector of the 5.Panzer-Army, the following units were employed: in the area of the Eifel the US VIII Corps including the 106th Infantry Division (opposed to the 18.VGD and the 62.62VGD). The 28th Infantry Division from Luetzkampen as far as the Sauer River at Wallendorf (opposed to both Panzer Corps); the Fourth Division opposed to the northern wing of the 7.Army). In the tactical area of the sector mentioned above we did not expect reserves worth mentioning, and behind them no lange units either.

According to our estimate, east and west of the Our the enemy only seemed to have outposts, partly equipped with heavy infantry weapons, and more or less fortified positions alongside the roads; furthermore they had strongpoints at field strength standard, in which the presence of relief forces and reinforcements for the outposts and heavy supporting weapons was partly ascertained, partly supposed. When it was dark this thin line of outposts was secured by contact patrols. Protected by the darkness our own reconnaissance patrols could still penetrate the foremost outpost line of the enemy and they reported the presence of a firmer line of security in the contour line repeatedly mentioned above, which at the same time covered the quarters of the troops not employed. We supposed that smaller armored groups (Panzerrudel) supported the fighting of the outposts and in the line of resistance – the above-mentioned line, we had repeatedly observed their movements. Until midnight, the enemy was vigilant and alert, and his reconnaissance patrols were lively until early in the morning. But from four or five o’clock their alertness and care decreased considerably. The activity of the artillery was until now limited to harassing fire and to occasional sudden concentrations.

From all this, we could draw the conclusion that the enemy felt pretty safe. Because it was contributing factor in deciding the method of the attack it must be kept in mind that, according to reports given by our patrols, the individual outposts had good communication with each other by means of radio or telephone, and partly also by means of acoustic alarm installations, so we could take it for granted that communications to the rear were as well organized. As the installations of the West Wall were situated along the Our River and the front line of the combat sector of the 58.Panzer-Corps ran east of same, the installations were partly in our hands, partly in those of the enemy. As combat positions, however, they were of no importance to either of us.

The artillery was emplaced in such a position that it was able to cover the roads leading to the Our and the crossing point, partly even with observed fire. The troops holding the district of the Eifel were considerably stronger and more compact and more exposed forward. They presented a greater number of strong and well-protected strong points – some of them German installations – around which other islands of resistance were grouped. The contour and vegetation of the terrain to some degree limited the possibilities for observation along the banks of the Our. Only the high-angle weapons reached their full effect, that of the flat fire weapons was limited. The river itself and all accesses to it could be very effectively covered by fire.