As treated during the conferences and the map maneuvers, these directives also applied to localities that were defended. According to the directives issued by the Highest Command the mopping up of the area should be left for the units following: the reserves in the hands of the Higher Command to be brought up later were envisaged for this task. Actually only Bastogne came within the sphere of the Army, although the attention of the 66.Army-Corps was several times called to the significance of St Vith. As the center of a very extended road net , Bastogne was of special importance. I did not expect St Vith to play the important role as a strong point of resistance which it actually did during the operation.
The indication of the Headquarters of the 36.Army-Corps of Possible employment on the left wing of the Army originated in our concerns about a possible long southern flank of both Panzer Corps and the 6.Panzer-Army should speedily succeed in reaching the Meuse. The possible diversion was only superficially discussed by the Staff of the Corps, as I took it for granted that the Infantry Corps would be more urgently needed for mopping up duties in the vast wooded district of the northern Ardennes, located between the zone of the advance of the 58.Panzer-Corps and the southern flank of the Panzer-Army, and unfavorable for the employment of armored units.
On Dec 10, my Army took over the command of the sector formerly held by the 7.Army, its later zone of attack; that is to say mainly the sector of the 66.Army Corps and that of one regiment of the left adjoining corps. The Army Headquarters remained at Manderscheid until Dec 15, when it was transferred to Dackscheid, northeast of Waxweiler. On Dec 7, orders were issued to the effect that the attack was to begin on Dec 14, but on Dec 11, it was postponed to Dec 15, and finally on Dec 12, to Dec 16. On Dec 11, and Dec 12, Hitler called together all higher and intermediate commanders concerned in the attack at the command post Adlerhorst near Ziegenberg (Hesse). Together with the commanding generals of both Panzer-Corps, I was ordered to report on Dec 11. I here met FM von Rundstedt, FM Mödel, SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich (6.Panzer-Army), and almost all my subordinate division commanders.
Before the issuance of the orders, three division commanders, whom I had recommended for decorations, reported to Hitler (Gen Freiherr von Elverfeldt, Gen von Waldenburg, and Gen Engel). Open-heartedly and frankly these three generals spoke to Hitler about their misgivings and apprehensions. Schramm has given a correct and detailed description of the reception. Hitler was unwilling to discuss any further arguments or details as his decision was final. It was not the first time that I was ordered to and took part in a conference with Hitler. The physical setting of these conferences, the atmosphere prevailing there, and the personal deportment of Hitler was nothing new to me. And now this conference excited me in a curious way. Contrary to my expectations it was not likely to relieve me of the apprehensions I still had about the impending decision-seeking offensive. The only positive thing in it was Hitler’s description of the situation of the enemy.
Coming from this source which had all information at his disposal, it depicted a situation that was rather favorable for the task ahead of us.
The setting was full of contrasts. Among the generals reporting was a great number of responsible, battle-tried commanders of all ranks, who had a name at the front and knew their job. They possessed the full confidence of all their subordinates officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. In contrast to them was the highest military commanders of the Wehrmacht: one (Hitler) a broken man, with an unhealthy color, a caved-in appearance in his manner with trembling hands, sitting as if the burden of responsibility seemed to oppress him, and, compared to his looks in the last conference at the beginning of December, his body seemed still more decrepit and he was a man grown old, completely overworked and tired. He was no longer as strict and disciplined in his facial expression as he used to be due to the mental and physical burden resting upon him. Jodel seemed irritable and touchy during the discussion. In his whole behavior, Keitel showed that he had not taken as great a part in working out the plans and in preparations for the offensive as Jodi had.
Schramm gives an accurate and detailed description of the receipt of the orders. The majority of the generals of the Army were disappointed in the speech of the Highest Commander of the Wehrmacht because he did not say one word about the matter in which the audience was most interested during this phase of the preparations: how can the leadership remedy the defects and insufficiencies still to be found in the undertaking a few days before its starts?
Specifically from the Dec 2 conference in Berlin and from two visits of minister Speer to my Army Headquarters, I had no doubt that the Army Group, destined for the attack, was given every support in respect to kind, quantity, and quality as well as to the amount of time available, which under the prevailing circumstances could be given by the besieged fortress of Germany. On Dec 11 however, I could not help thinking that our own power – taken as a
I, as well as my men, were prepared to strain every nerve to successfully carry out the mission assigned to us by the Head of the State and the OKW. The troops and their Commanders tackled their tasks with unparalleled initiative. Before I finish this paragraph I want to offer some remarks, on the timing – time of the offensive under optimum conditions: the timing of the breakthrough in the sector of the two Panzer Corps was made on the supposition that we are in the possession of the line Weisswampach, Heinerscheid, Roder, Hosingen, where we expected the first strong resistance of the enemy. If we held this line, the enemy would be unable to observe or counteract (on the ground) our advance toward the Our River and the crossing of the Panzer Divisions. Consequently, the line of resistance had to be in our hands early on the day of the attack; for this reason, we had to move into position while it was still dark. I hoped that we would have possession of this line about noon, so that the first elements of the Panzer Divisions could cross the Our between 1400 and 1500 hrs, after having left their assembly areas about one hour earlier. After establishing and developing readiness for action, the advance detachments could move forward from the abovementioned line at about 2000 hours and the bulk of the forces at about 2400 hours.
In the evening of the second day of the attack I assumed the majority of the Panzer Divisions would have reached the line Petit Tailles (on the road Grandmenil Houffalize) Houffalize – Bastogne – and the advance detachments attacking Marche-en-Famenne St Hubert. In the afternoon of the third day of the attack, the majority of the Panzer Divisions could have reached the elevated terrain about Marche with their northern flank, and the area of Rochefort – St Hubert with their southern one, and could then, on the fourth day of the attack, attack towards and across the Meuse River, on the banks of which, in this event, the advance detachments were assumed to be ready during the night of the third day of the attack.
I expected the right corps to capture St Vith on the first day of the attack and hoped that in the evening of the second day its advance detachments would be engaged west of the Salm River and the bulk of its forces at Vielsalm. Whether the 66.Army-Corps should continue its advance to the west or whether it should entirely or in part turn off through Houffalize – Bastogne for the protection of the southern flank depended on and was here to be decided by the resistance with which the Panzer Divisions had met so far, on the situation on the southern wing of the 6.Panzer-Army, and the resistance which the Corps expected ahead of its own spearheads. This has always been my notion of the time, and my Chief of Staff had the same ideas. In my opinion it takes account of the condition of the troops, the terrain, and the difficulties produced by the season, and after the capture of the line of resistance it did not suppose a strong enemy facing the front of the Army during the first four days of the attack.
When the plan of the attack was produced at the end of September the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht – according to Schramm – reckoned with being able, if possible already on the second day, to establish bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the Meuse. Antwerp, the objective, could then be reached in 7 days. According to the same source, the Commander in Chief West still on Nov 21, believed that we could reach the Meuse already on the first day. On Dec 15, FM Mödel (again according to Schramm) reported to Hitler that according to facts he had ascertained himself, double the time would be needed in the Eifel.
2. Terrain, Roads and Railroads
The description of the terrain applies to the entire area of attack of Army Group B and not only to the zone of attack of the 5.Panzer-Army, because the general, overall features of the terrain influenced the operations of my Army. First of all, I will enumerate the crossing sites that the attacking units of my Army were to try to gain. The attention of the reader is especially called to this list which is according to reconnaissance results on Dec 15.
(Our) – (Clerf) – (Salm) – (Ourthe) – (Meuse)
66.Army-Corps (axe of penetration)
Andler (2 KM north of Schönberg), Salmchâteau,Vielsalm, Huy
Our River at Schönberg, bridge intact.
Our River at Steinebrück, bridge needs repair.
Salm River at Bovigny, bridge needs repair.
(Our) – (Clerf) – (Salm) – (Ourthe) – (Meuse)
58.Panzer-Corps (axe of penetration)
Burg Reuland, Ulflingen, Houffalize, La Roche, Andenne, Namur
Our River at Ouren, intact (small capacity).
Our River at Kalborn, (new construction).
(Our) – (Clerf) – (Salm) – (Ourthe) – (Meuse)
47.Panzer-Corps (axe of penetration)
Dasburg, Gemünd, Clerf, Draufeld, Encherange, Namur, Givet
Our River at Dasburg (new construction)
Our River at Gemünd (new construction)
Clerf River at Clerf, bridge intact.
Clerf River at Draufeld, bridge intact.
Clerf River at Encherange, bridge intact.
Concerning the nature of the area envisaged for the attack, the following must be kept in mind (the essentials of this description of the terrain were taken from Schramm’s report). The area was divided by the Meuse into two parts of about the same size. Because of its breadth and depth and steep banks, this river represents a considerable obstacle. It had to be considered a precarious enterprise to build a bridge in full view of the enemy; consequently, the bridges which already existed were highly important – the more so because their number was very limited. In case the zone of attack at Namur should be extended to the south, the forces which were to cross the river up-stream had in addition to cross the Sambre, which flows into the Meuse at Namur. But on the other hand, the Meuse might mean strong protection, when the attack had reached the bank and the enemy started his counterassaults.
The area between our front and the Meuse is somewhat undulating, with hills rising to a height of more than 700 M; here and there it is mountainous. Characteristic of the nature of the terrain is, on one hand, many forests and, on the other hand, its deep ravines, worn by numerous small rivers and streams. The Ourthe River is the most important, coming from the south and forming an S curve it flows into the Meuse at Liège; it cuts the strip of attack almost vertically and had consequently to be considered a serious obstacle if the enemy should manage to gain a hold on the opposite bank. Among other tributaries, the Semois, flowing also into the Meuse between Givet and Charleville, was also rather important as it offered excellent support for the protection against attacks from the south. But unpleasant on the other hand was the presence of the Sauer River, which likewise flows in the same general direction east-west but opposite to the Semois, thus, obliquely cutting the area of the advance of the 7.Army. At Wallendorf, the Our flows into this river; from Dasburg it runs along the frontier between Germany and Luxembourg, and at the same time along our front line. The presence or the group of mountains south of Echternach compels the Sauer to describe a curve to the east-southeast of Wallendorf before it flows into the Moselle at Wasserbillig.
Owing to the fact that the enemy had occupied this curve he had here a position that was a threat to the flank of our jump-off position. The deeply incised Our River, accessible only on hair-pin curves, to be crossed by both, the 5.Panzer-Army and the 7.Army right at the start of the attack. But no bridges of adequate capacity were available and what made a crossing very difficult, was its water level changed very rapidly after the beginning of autumn; from one day to the other, its width can increase considerably. No matter where, and how we started the attack – on the left flank of our strip of attack (7.Army) we would meet very definite difficulties caused by nature.
On our right-wing (6.Panzer-Army) the district of the Hohe Venn, a barely accessible swampland, presented a serious obstacle to our attack, especially to our tank attack; but on the other hand, once captured it could be held by weak forces. In order to capture this district, however, it was necessary, first, to take possession of the hills at Elsenborn south of Monschau. In tile middle (5.Panzer-Army) of the district of the Schnee Eifel blocked our advance, the one half of which the enemy held, making it very difficult to launch a frontal attack. A comparison between the intended zones of attack of the two armies would show that up to the Meuse the sector of the 6.Panzer-Army was shorter than that of the 5.Panzer-Army. Right at the outset, the 6.Panzer-Army would have to contend with the two dangerous positions of Elsenhorn and the Hohes Venn. During this phase of the battle the 5.Panzer-Army would have the easiest job, if it managed to pass the Our without difficulty. But for this army, the difficulties would arise during the second phase, during which the other one would already have prospects of reaching better terrain. For the 5.Panzer-Army would now have to fight its way through the Ardennes, which lay diagonally across its road of advance.
Through the attack in 1940 and the withdrawal in the autumn of 1944, the German leadership had acquired a detailed knowledge of the terrain. Consequently, we were fully aware of the difficulties, if not dangers, which the narrow, winding roads could present to an offensive, particularly to one which had to be carried out in winter under bad weather conditions. Unless completely surprised, it would be an easy thing for the enemy to delay our advance considerably by blasting bridges, as a crossing at other points if possible at all – would require long preparations, owing to the steep banks of the rivers. Consequently, the condition of the bridges had to be reconnoitered repeatedly. But then again this meant there was a danger that a too regular air reconnaissance might arouse the suspicion of the enemy.
It is true that the system of asphalt roads was not a tightly knit one, but there was an actual scarcity of roads only in some places. The difficulties lay rather in the fact that even the main roads had many steep slopes and shapp hairpin curves. Owing to these we had to unhook the guns of the artillery and the antiaircraft artillery, the bridge equipment ponton trailers, and those carrying bridge building lumber, and haul them around the curves separately by means of winches. (Further the roadway on many of the highway curves was so narrow that every tank had to back up first before it could make the turn) The steep slopes, when covered with ice, increased the danger of skidding, and because of this very often our vehicles left the road. The result was that our march was delayed and very often considerable road jams developed, which offered excellent targets to the planes of the enemy. It was often impossible to take cover in the adjacent woods during air alarms because we were unable to leave the roads whose bordering terrain was either mountainous or steeply sloping. Furthermore, the condition of our vehicles and prime movers was such that this could not be expected of them. In addition the craters in the roads and the demolitions and abatis, made during our retreat in 1944, delayed our march and caused road jams because we could not leave the road to avoid them.
