5.Panzer-Army – Ardennes Preparation (Gen Hasso von Manteuffel)

The method of attacking over a broad front made it necessary and possible to provide for building so many bridges that one could be assigned to each of the four assault divisions of the two Panzerz Corps. The advantage was obvious: the movements of the Panzer Divisions, ordered to cross the Our as speedily as possible, were not hampered by those of the infantry divisions artillery, antiaircraft artillery, etc, as the movements of march were performed independently of each other. From the method of attack and the advantages which could be obtained for further conduct of the battle and the moving forward of the Panzer Divisions across the Our River, we could already note a number of key points for the organization and employment of the forces of the Army. But we had also to take the terrain of the large area into consideration: the district of the Eifel and the wooded area in the northern part of the Ardennes which were less suitable for the movements of the Panzer Divisions. It was necessary for them to use the southern part of the sector of the Army, where they first of all had to cross the Our and the Clerf, but where on the other hand they could be expected to advance speedily, because of the excellent roads, and utilizing the shock-like effect on the enemy. In the southern sector the possibilities for evading strong local resistance, when met with, were more favorable than in the vast wooded district of the northern Ardennes, which possessed few, however excellent roads.

As to the conduct of battle in the district of the Schnee Eifel the original plan of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht was to bypass it, and leave the annihilation of the enemy forces holding this district to the units following. The estimate of forces and the assignments of missions to the Army took this into account: we were to push through with one corps in the first wave, and the second corps and the infantry divisions were to follow. As I supposed that the enemy would hold the Schnee Eifel in any case, and as it was impossible to get any information as to which of our forces were supposed to annihilate him – for, only in this way did the operation in the district of the Schnee Eifel, so easy to defend, have any prospect of success – from the outset I made preparations for taking care of this sore spot myself. My first visit to the 66.Army-Corps confirmed this resolution to eliminate from the very start all possibilities for an attack on the flank of the tank wedge of the Army and that of the right neighbor. As long as a strong group of enemy forces remained in the district of the Eifel the left wing of the 6.SS-Panzer-Army was hampered, in its advance as this enemy group by making use of the woods and ravines adjacent to the north was able to support its own forces, attacked by the southern wing of the 6.SS-Panzer-Army. The cleaning out of this district was moreover necessary for the capture of St Vith, which together with Malmedy had to be regarded as a strong point (with regard to men and material) of the combat sector in Monschau, and being a center of excellent roads, was favorable for the transfer of enemy troops behind their front, and thus again a harassing of the advance or the flank of the 58.Panzer-Corps was made possible.

The combat in and through the district of the Eifel was definitely not so easy. In my opinion, we could not entrust this task to just anybody, considering the possible disadvantages consequent for any Army. I envisaged, therefore, the employment of the Corps Headquarters’ 66.Army-Corps together with the front line divisions (the 28.VGD), which knew the conditions well, and an additional division. It was necessary to assign this many forces because, according to the organization of the enemy in his positions, and considering the terrain, support by artillery, and small groups of tanks the Corps considered the probable resistance so strong that one division would not suffice. As it was important for me to capture St Vith on the first day of the attack, I wanted to ensure success by superiority in numbers and corresponding conduct of battle. Our reconnaissance patrols had reported on artillery emplacements in the area of Auw and Bleialf and strong garrisons in Bleialf and Schönberg. Consequently, I incorporated the annihilation of the group of forces round Bleialf into the plan of the attack, as I did not believe the infantry to be able to push through by Auw and Schönberg on St Vith or by Steinebrück on St Vith, if and as long as a strong group of enemy forces, supported by artillery and small armored groups, remained round Bleialf to destroy them later with attacks on the flanks and the rear.

I made it therefore a condition that the Bleialf attack group (about a reinforced regiment) be subordinated to the commander of the right division, even if taken from the left division, as they operated in a common cause. For, the enemy troops in the area of Bleialf were only able to withdraw along the roads through Schönberg – St Vith. On the other hand, the task was made easier for the reinforced regimental group. The speedier the attack through Auw on Schönberg or through Winterspelt on St Vith was carried forward. The point of gravity of the Corps was to be placed to the right, and the best divisions from the point of leadership and fighting qualities, had to be sent in there. These considerations led to the following conclusion: (1) we had to employ the Army over a broad front to be absolutely sure to achieve the penetration; (2) the Infantry Corps, with 2 divisions, is to be thrown in on the right wing with the mission of annihilating the enemy and (3) the two Panzer Corps had to be thrown in in the southern sector of the Army with two Panzer Divisions and one Infantry Division to each (for this purpose we had to propose an Infantry Division to be brought up from the reserves of the Highest Command), with the mission, in cooperation with the Infantry Division and the Panzergrenadiers of a Panzer Division, of making a deep penetration and taking advantage of the darkness during the night of the first day of the attack, with the Panzer Divisions completing the breakthrough in the direction of the Meuse River.

For the employment of the Panzer Corps it had to be considered that each Corps should have a possibility of building one bridge across the Our for their heavy equipment, and if possible, a second, lighter one to enable the Panzer Divisions to advance speedily in such a way that their march movements did not interfere with those of the infantry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, etc. As it was only possible to build the bridges in continuation of the roads the location of the bridges across the Our, the roads east and west of the river, and the possibilities for a crossing of the Clerf and the Ourthe already gave clear indications for the lanes of movement of the two Panzer Corps: furthermore, the system of roads leading to the Meuse and the crossing sites were decisive. In fixing their zones of movement and combat we had to take this into consideration, but without making the lines of demarcation too rigid.

Division of labor was ordered in the staff. As the staff of the Army was still employed and a continuation of the British-American large-scale offensive against the Rhine could be expected to start in a short time, the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff could. not be dispensed with. Consequently, the G3, Obstlt Neckelmann of the General Staff, one special mission staff Officer, and one clerk were detached and formed a duty staff, which was sent to Manderscheid (Eifel), the future Headquarters of the Army. The work of this party was extremely important as, first of all working independently, it had to procure all the material upon which the Army leadership was to base all its decisions. Experienced in practical service with troops and with the general staff of panzer troops this industrious and circumspect general staff officer put the mosaic together in an excellent way. In his work, he got eminent support from the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the Staff of the 7.Army, who rendered all necessary documents available to him. The 7.Army had further to reconnoiter the situation of the enemy keeping full secrecy. On the whole the correctness of the reports were confirmed when the Army attacked and broke through on Dec 16-17.

Every day we expected the attack against the Roer to start and with this the offensive against the Rhine, consequently I kept in close connection with FM Mödel, and we kept each other informed as to all details about the offensive. First of all I met him in a command post of my Army on Nov 3, in order to discuss the underlying principles of the conduct of the attack, as fully discussed above. Even as a commander of an Army Group, Mödel had not lost sight of the requirements of the intermediate commands; he was open to suggestions when they were justified by the facts and presented with determination. It is proof of his willingness to accept the responsibility that he at once sanctioned my suggestions, which formed the basis of all future work and consequently were urgent. They concerned the following, which was in opposition to the former orders issued by the Operations Section of the Wehrmacht: (a) the employment of all three corps in the front line; (b) the subordination to the Army of an additional Infantry Division so that each Panzer Corps would have one Infantry Division for the breakthrough; (c) the start of the attack (clock time) to be made dependent on the method of attack, and no long fire preparation in the area of the Army; (d) a change in the zones of movement leading to the Meuse, to the effect that the Army was not obliged to use just the crossings between Amay and Namur, but was free to cross, at any place as the development of the situation offered. The employment of the Army over a broad front took this into consideration; (e) the postponement of the start of the attack until Dec 10.

We then once more discussed the operative solution, and Mödel told me that he would submit his suggestions to the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht on the same day. His suggestions would not alter my plan as the intended breadth of the front line of the Army with the point of gravity on the southern wing already prepared the way for his solution.

On the following day, I and the G3 went to the Headquarters of the 65.Army-Corps – the stationary corps – at Gerolstein. The district of the Eifel was already covered with snow. No officer there had been instructed. The correctness of our estimate of the enemy and the terrain, as described by Gen Krebs on Nov 2, was confirmed. The commanders of the 18.VGD and the 26.VGD told me details about the conduct of the enemy. At the same time, I managed to get a personal impression of the terrain envisaged for the concentration of the troops. In addition, the G3 reported several times to me, driving from Manderscheid to Koenigshoven for this purpose. The Army was also well furnished by the Staff of the Army Group with documents, although aerial photographs of the terrain and the banks of the rivers, were impossible to obtain. As no agents were left behind after the withdrawal of the Wehrmacht in the autumn of 1944 details about the enemy in his deeper positions were unobtainable. But the Army Group was well informed at all times about the enemy organization as a whole and the location of the large combined-arms units.

The following details about the period of preparation are noteworthy:

(1) An antiaircraft brigade in the communications zone experimented with floodlighting the terrain, with the purpose of supporting the advance of the infantry through the difficult terrain during the darkness. The second experiment, already, confirmed my opinion that the infantry ought to start the attack when it was still dark and, providing atmospheric conditions were favorable, that the assault troops should be supported in finding their bearings by means of searchlights. This actually happened, as I learned from the troops on Dec 16.

(2) The Higher Artillery Commander (Gen Metz the Commander of the Army Engineers (Obst Bujard), and the Commander of the Army Signal Service (Obst Steininer) got their instructions about the Nov 20. This was absolutely necessary as – while still keeping full secrecy – they had to procure the data necessary for the employment of the arms in their charge. Of their instructions given orally, for the most part, the following are worth mentioning.

The conduct of the battle of the artillery: Artillery reconnaissance had to be carried out at once in cooperation with the 7.Army in accordance with the present plans of attack of the Army. No long preparation by artillery or smoke-shell mortars before the start of the attack is possible, as: (a) the targets are not adequately reconnoitered; (b) our amount of ammunition does not permit an effective reduction of the enemy; (e) the suspicion of the enemy should not be awakened. A short, but very concentrated, preparation by artillery is to take place, the fire of as many guns as possible to be directed on favorable targets. The opening of the fire will be uniformly fixed for the entire front of the Army. The artillery will be directed by Corps Headquarters (ARKOS); they must have some batteries available in order to be able to take unreconnoitered strong points or artillery emplacements with effective fire. Order of procedure of the artillery: good mobile artillery generally that of the divisions, is to follow the advance detachments and spearheads. Only a portion of the Volks Artillery Corps and smoke brigades is to follow, owing to the lack of prime movers. What is left of artillery, etc., will, later on, be brought up by echelons. Thorough planning of all details is necessary; it is to be born in mind that the artillery gets adequate space for its ammunition echelons to ensure a safe bringing up of supplies of ammunition, also over long distances. The ammunition situation: The Arko is strictly to supervise the equipment with ammunition in the different phases and the bringing up of supplies, which must be adjusted according to the situation.

Command of the engineers: On bridge for all types of loads across the Our River, and later one across the Ourthe and the Clerf in the lanes of movement of the Panzer Corps is necessary. If possible only make-shift bridge-building equipment will be used on the Our, as mobile equipment is necessary on the Clerf and the Ourthe as well as on the Meuse. The engineers are to be commanded by the Corps Headquarters with strict cooperation of all engineer forces available – including the engineer battalions of the divisions. The Army directs the bridge-columns, orders their bringing up and employment, is also in charge of the Organization Todt detachments and their employment. The Production of make-shift equipment for the crossing of the Our is to be started at once. The constant changes in the water level, and the replacements necessary in case of losses owing to the activity of the enemy will be taken into consideration. Unloading Unloading areas in the neighborhood of the crossing sites will be reconnoitered.

Command of the antiaircraft artillery: Held by the Higher Antiaircraft Commander of the Army Group, considering the wishes of the Army. Heavy and light antiaircraft detachments will be assigned.

(3) The still open questions about the date of the attack, method of attack, application of the forces, the rendering mobile, and the supplying of them, number and condition of the engineer troops, and the clock time of the attack were repeatedly discussed in detail with FM Mödel. These discussions resulted in the making of numerous suggestions. I still remember them, but I do not think it necessary to give a detailed account of them here. The offensive of the enemy, which started on Nov 13 west of the Roer, compelled us to resort to the ammunition and fuel reserves of the High Command of the Wehrmacht destined for the attack. In addition, the capacity of the railroads decreased, and thus the bringing up of supply and the reorganization of the troops were hampered. All this made the High Command of the Wehrmacht first postpone the deadline for the attack to about Dec 1. Then, after the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht returned to the Führer Headquarters from a conference with the Commander in Chief West on Nov 25, Hitler decided on Nov 27, that the attack would begin on Dec 7.