This estimate of the troops only concerns men, material, and morale, and it is not meant as an estimate of the skill and abilities of the men or their leaders. The behavior of the majority of the commanders, officers and men was excellent; they were keennon fighting, the march capacity of the infantry was good, the supply services worked well, and the medical corps personnel acted in an almost self-sacrificing way.
(4) Measures for camouflage, deception, and the preservation of secrecy.
With a view to the element of surprise, the preservation of secrecy as decisive for a successful carrying out of our plans. The regulations were very strict in this respect, and we had to put up with all disadvantages which this involved for our preparations. The briefing, therefore, only comprised the number of persons which was considered to the purpose during each phase of the preparations, and to each person was only given the information which was absolutely necessary for him to have in order to be able to carry out his task. We only wrote down what was absolutely necessary to have in writing.
Camouflage, deception and the preservation of secrecy were consequently closely connected. The Principal means of preserving the secrecy was that the briefing was given at as late a moment as possible. It was echeloned. First of all the following members of the Staff of the Army were briefed: The Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff, but not their personal escort officers, the G3 and two special-missions staff officers and one clerk who was to take care of the entire correspondence. The following persons were not briefed: the Oberquartiermeister, the G2, the higher Artillery Commander, the engineer and signal commanders of the Army. As of Nov 25, tile circle was enlarged. The Commander in Chief of the Army was to make the decisions, and he had the responsibility. The Commanding Generals and their Chiefs of Staff were initiated on the Nov 23-25 conference and the Division Commanders at the beginning of December.
The following measures were taken to achieve a strategic camouflage of the attack and wibh this a deception.
1- The Highest Command announced that it could be taken for granted that the enemy would continue his large-scale offensive in order to break through the West Wall, cross the Roer River, and advance on the Rhine on both sides of Koln, further, he would probably extend his base of operations to the south as far as the area of the First American Army (about as far as Monschau) with the object of capturing the two dams and power stations situated on the Urft River and north of Schleiden. In consequence of this, the reserves of the High Command of the Wehrmacht were to be moved into position behind Army Group B. These reserves consisted of newly activated and freshened up divisions from Gernany, the 6.Panzer-Army, and a number of newly activated Volksgrenadier Divisions.
2- As we could expect the attack in the sector of the British 21st Army Group to be continued at the same time or immediately after a part of the reserves were assembled farther in the north almost as far as Krefeld.
3- The privileged freshening up, given the Panzer and other divisions stationed west of the Rhine River, was accounted for by the fact that the majority of them had already been engaged in this sector, and it was therefore probable that they would be sent in again in the first line of resistance.
4- The insertion and the preliminary employment of a new tactical party – and actually the supposed staff of the 25.Army, under Maj Gen Gause, worked later on according to directives given by the Commander in Chief West was nothing unusual according to German principles of leadership, and it was often used in order to have on organization control a center of gravity. Consequently this was given credence, like all other deceptions mentioned above. The supposed 25.Army was represented by small working parties and radio stations. Billets were made available to them, and the reads of the billet areas got directions posts with feigned names which were mentioned in the deceptive radio messages, transmitted by the 6.Panzer-Army.
5- As we could reckon with a continuation of the enemy attacks in the near future, an adequate supply of war material, motor fuel, and food rations had to be brought up as soon as possible. These movements were mainly carried out east of the Rhine to make this defensive measure look more probable. Even if such measures were bound to result in decisive delays during a successful operation we had better put up with it according to the opinion of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. An adequate number of Speer transport columns were available in case the capacity of the railroads proved to be too small.
6- The Staff of the 5.Panzer-Army spread a rumor, telling that in the spring of the coming year we would launch an attack through Trier east of the Moselle River with the object of recapturing the district of the Saar. The attack was to begin when we had finished the formation of new divisions and given Panzer units a complete freshening up. The rumor seemed probable to everybody because the areas of assembly were assigned to the 5.Panzer-Army and the 7.Army were placed in the area south of the Moselle, in order not to arouse the suspicion in the troops that they might be employed elsewhere. For reasons of deception a General Staff Officer, whose activities were well known by the Staff of Army Group G, was actually sent to this Army Group to establish communication and carry out reconnaissance. He spent two days there.
7- Several times it was suggested and requested on the day of the attack to contain parts of the western front at many different points. This could be done by means of preparations by fire, increased patrol activity, and numerous raids, carried out by strong forces.
8- The relief of the Army Staff, which had control of the sector west of the Roer, took place by echelons. (The 15.Army relieved the 5.Panzer-Army). Until the day of the attack the Staff of the 15.Army kept its actual name, whereas the Staff of the 5.Panzer-Army concealed its identity under the name of Feldjaeserkommando zu besonderer Verfuegung.
III The following measures of camouflage and deception were ordered and taken in the tactical area:
1. We were not permitted either to reinforce or change our patrol activity. As of about Dec 1, it was cancelled in order to prevent PWs or deserters from jeopardizing our plans. Alsatians, Lorrainians, and Luxamburgians were withdrawn from the front as they, more than all others could be suspected to desert to the enemy.
2. At the outset our attack troops had to leave reconnaissance out of coconsideration because, they were not initiated until a very late moment. But also after the initiation (as of Dec 13), which took place by echelons, only regimental commanders and above were permitted to reconnoiter accompanied by an officer of the static divisions. For this, they and the officers of higher staffs had to possess an identification card, signed by the Commanding General. The static divisions and the units which arrived later on got the explanatioh that the Highest Command wanted to have some initiated units available as reserves.
3. When reconnoitering, the Commander in Chief of the Army and his officers did not wear their special uniforms but changed before they started.
4. Thanks to the numerous woods in the district of the Eifel, it was not difficult to camouflage the various sorts of vehicles and equipment, which could not be pIaced under shelter within, the area.
5. Charcoal was issued, so that the smoke from the fires, over which they cooked their food, should not betray the presence of the troops.
6. A road service, supplied with sand, prime movers, and recovery equipment was established at difficult points. The wrecked motor vehicles, tanks, artillery guns, etc, had to be sufficiently camouflaged, so that the enemy should not be able to draw any conclusions in case he discovered them.
7. The marking of the roads of march, or sideroads into shelter areas, as well as signs indic.ating shelters of troops, command posts, telephone and radio stations, etc, were strictly forbidden. The officer in charge of the camouflage measures, the road commander, and the post commander controlled within their spheres of authority that this order was carried out.
8. As a measure taken against deserters, the moving into jump-off positions was arranged in such a way that the troops launched the attack after short stay in the main line of resistance.
9. About 8 KM behind the main line of resistance we fixed a limit beyond which motorized vehicles could not go. From there horsedrawn vehicles transported the atillery and antiaircraft artillery guns, ammunition, and bridge-building equiment to their emplacements.
10. During the last two nights preceding the attack we emplaced our artillery, antiaircraft artillery, searchlights while noise camouflage was produced by airplanes.
11. All fire activity extending the normal amount was forbidden as well as adjustment fire by artillery, smoke shell mortars, and heavy infantry weapons; the firing data of the batteries which were already emplaced had to be used. The antiaircraft batteries intended to support the attack were strictly forbidden to fire before the attack except in case, they would be attacked by the enemy.
12. Each unit was to charge one of its officers with the control of all measures bf passive air defense.
13. Marches, and preparations for same, were forbidden during the daylight hours; marches still unfinished at dawn had to be discontinued. The tracks outside the roads had to be obliterated. (The artillery, therefore, was to some extent emplaced in the immediate vicinity of the roads) During the daylight hours, elements of the arriving units pretended to march to the north and the east.
14. All transmissions of communication by telephone or radio concerning the offensive was forbidden. Radio traffic was in no case permitted to exceed the normal extent.
15. During the last 14 days before the before the beginning of the attack feigned reports on a concentration of the supposed The staff of the 25.Army northeast of Aachen were transmitted by radio.
16. The day of the attack was not in the traditional way called X-Day but had another letter of the alphabet. The days preceding the day of the attack were designated by a letter preceding in the alphabet. Thus if the day of attack was called K-Day, E-Day was five days before the attack. The designation for the same day according to the old system was X-5 Day. A special code was also fixed for the designation of time.
17. The camouflage names, chosen for our correspondence, differed in the correspondence between Army Groupe B and the Commander in Chief West from those used between Army Group B and the Armies or the Corps Headquarters subordinate to them. The names were changed every 14 days. The system seems somewhat complicated, but in reality, it is quite simple, since the offices only had to use two names for the same thing, one in the correspondence with superior commands and one in that with lower ones. From the very beginning, the strategic camouflage had the motto Wacht am Rhein.
18. Not until the evening before the attack was the camouflage removed and the troops informed about the operation. All these measures resulted in a complete preservation of the element of surprise. The enemy had not reckoned with an attack on such a scale and what is decisive in a terrain offering such difficulties, especially for the Panzer troops.
IV The camouflage measures, however, caused numerous difficulties.
a. During the last two nights before the attack the troops had to leave their former shelters, which at the same time served as assembly areas for the offensive, and concentrate on the action. In case they were employed in the first wave a relief of the static troops was involved too. The latter had to depart for their own jump-off positions or assembly areas (the troops in the assembly areas were available for the local commander as reserves). This was true of elements of the 18.VGD and the 26.VGD, who had to march long distances. During two nights the troops were marched into their jump-off positions, as shown in the first part of this text.
The march plan was made by the G3. It worked well and took all difficulties into consideration, as for instance, distances, the quality of the roads, timing, etc, I mention this in order to stress the fact that it is decided that the General Staff works well and that this work can only be perfect if it is based on experiences gained during practical service with the troops. A successful concentration of troops for action can only be achieved if the work of the G3 is successful. He had to solve almost all problems himself because only a very limited number of officers were initiated at that time. It can be said that his work was a complete success. In spite of all this, friction could not be avoided. Some portions of the troops did not arrive early enough to relieve the static troops in time. The latter had to march into their jump-off positions through unknown terrain, they had to be rested there, briefed as to the terrain, and supplied. In some cases, the artillery and antiaircraft artillery did not find their emplacements, and some advanced observers did not find the artillery to which they were assigned. They arrived with delay. These frictions, however, are not due to the march plan. They are explained by the fact that the war had lasted six years, and that the condition of horses, vehicles, and equipment did not meet the requirement. Finally, I want to point out that the decision not to move the troops forward until during the last two nights preceding the attack was up to the point since everything had to be subordinated to the element of surprise. If we had had fresh troops and our level of mobility had been good – as the case was in the Allied armies – these difficulties would not have existed.
b. A slow course of affairs, since all messages, orders, etc, were to be transmitted by officers serving as couriers. The extraordinary amount of work to be done by the small working parties of the superior headquarters.
d. The excessive demands on the horses, owing to increased use for the bringing up of artillery, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, motor fuel, equipment of all kinds and other things necessary for the troops.
V. The strict measures of camouflage and deception prevented.
a. An adequate control of our information about the enemy the organization of his area of security, troops, etc.
b. Complete information about the enemy in his positions at various times, about the quality of his strong points and outposts, the roads used by his relief detachments, reconnaissance patrols, contact patrols, etc.
c. A detailed briefing of the attack troops, above all the assault companies, as regards.the terrain.
d. An expert control, carried out by engineers, of the water level and the banks of the Our River. Owing to high water these factors changed every day.
e. As I mentioned earlier in the text, we stored our supplies along and east of the Rhine for purposes of camouflage and deception. These measures led to serious difficulties, and they were increased because the Oberquartiermeisters of the Army Group and the Armies got their directives too late, and consequently were unable to plan the bringing up of supplies in advance.
The stores were placed along or even east of the Rhine. No disadvantaes would have arisen from this if the troops had had an adequate supply of equipment and motor fuel. If sufficient transportation facilities had been available, we might have been able to bring up these supplies, when they were needed. But we did not have the facilities. The divisions did not dispose of sufficient column space for the transportation of supplies for the first days. Neither did the Quartiermeisters and Oberquartiermeisters dispose of vehicles enough to have the supplies follow the troops. In addition, the capacity of the railroads was very low owing to damages caused by the enemy air force, which especially attacked rails, bridges and stores. The result was that the troops had to fetch their supplies far away, and the bringing up was decisively hampered when, as of Dec 22, even single motor vehicles could hardly travel on the roads during daylight hours.
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