It is true that the amount of motor vehicles at our disposal was inadequate, but still worse was the fact that the condition of the vehicles at hand was such that it was absolutely necessary to exchange them for better ones. The motor vehicles used for towing the guns and trailers and all trucks had been employed for years in all theaters of war. For the old fashioned vehicles of various types (71 types in one division) we had hardly any spare parts and had to patch up with inferior material; in addition, we had a large number of private vehicles which could only travel on good roads. Without support from the highest commands my Army would not be able to alter the situation. In order to improve it we ordered to: (a) diminish the amount of impedimenta, that is to say only the most nebessary baggage would be transported; (b) that only vehicles fit for the terrain would be used; (c) that the number of types of vehicles was to be diminished in order to improve the supply of spare parts. The radio operators were generally inadequately trained except those of the armored forces; the result of this was that the radio service was bad and the messages delayed. The reasons for all this were: too many types of radio equipment, the radio silence necessary for the preservation of the element of surprise, and the lack of radio sets for training purposes.
b. Details:
Infantry weapons and their ammunition. The Volksgrenadier were equiped with the Sturmgewehr 44. The 62.VGD and the 560.VGD got their weapons shortly before they were marched off to the assembly area, and consequently the carriers were unable to acquire an adequate firing technique. After the unloading in the assembly area we had neither ammunition, time, nor opportunity for training, officers and men, therefore, were completely unacquainted with firing technique and the cooperation betwen riflemen or groups. The supply of ammunition for our heavy mortars was scanty and remained so. The regiments and battalions mostly lacked trained engineer troops, and the engineer battalions of the divisions had to take over their tasks. This meant a scattering of our forces which repeatedly had a decisive influence on our operations.
The equipment of the engineer forces of the divisions was incomplete, and their rendering mobility inadequate, considering the numerous tasks they would have to fulfill duibing the coming operations. We then transported so-called engineers by truck, but the same vehicle had to return to pick up their quipment. The absolutely inadequate equipment of the bridge-building columns was discussed in the conference with Hitler on Dec 2. A great number of men and vehicles from the Organization Todt were promised, but the promise was never kept. The men, moreover, were too old to endure the hardships. Thus it took us considerably longer time than planned to clear the mines, remove roadblocks, make the roads passable by filling up the craters, and clear passages through destroyed towns and villages (Houffalize, La Roche).
The artillery of the Volksgrenadier Divisions and even that of the Panzer Divisions were equipped with type East caterpillar tractors. This vehicle was in itself vulnerable, and no spare parts could be obtained in the west. Furthermore, the drivers were inexperienced in driving because of the lack of fuel. Artillery units made mobile in such a way can never keep pace with a Panzer division. Betimes the divisions, therefore, exchanged the tractors for captured trucks, and the 62.VGD used horses. In general, the artillery lacked signal equipment, especially portable radio sets and wire. Shortly before the beginning of the attack, the most urgent need was met by an extra supply. A reserve of material did not exist. The enormous boxes were difficult to handle, they were fragile and therefore not suitable for use by the troops. That was the opinion of everybody who had to use them on the battlefield. This is also my opinion.
The rendering mobile of the artillery was so insufficient that, highly to the disadvantage of the attack, I resolved to leave a considerable part of the Army artillery and the mortar brigades in their jump-off positions, in order to put all the tractors at the disposal of the artillery of the divisions and the bridge-building columns. To me it seemed to be more to the purpose to give the artillery which was sent in together with the divisions a good slupply of ammunition than to have many guns with little ammunition available. This reserved artillery was to be brought up later on. When we needed it there was no fuel left. A pronounced lack of ammunition only occurred temporarily during the battle of Bastogne, but here and there, there was a certain scantiness of it. It was we help to us when we captured three ammunition dumps (two with American ammunition and one former German dump east of Marche). During the entire offensive, we lacked ammunition for our smoke-shell mortars.
The slight capacity of the columns in the Army’s batteries together with the long distances prevented the troops serving in the dumps from replacing the consumed ammunition. For the same reasons, the supply of ammunition for the tactical employment of the artillery could not be kept at such a high level of mobility as the artillery units desired. The antiaircraft artillery had an adequate supply of ammunition and whenever its tasks permitted it willingly offered support to the artillery in combat on the ground. Its level of mobility was good. Both artillery observation battalions were only partly mobile; one of them was even horse-drawn. On Dec 16, the Panzer troops moved into position with the following numbers of tanks (Mark IV and Mark V):
– 116.Panzer-Division: (+/-) 70
– 2.Panzer-Division: (+/-) 60
– Panzer-Lehr-Division: 70 to 80
– Führer-Begleit-Brigade: 70 of the 100 it had.
– 26.Volksgrenadier-Division: 14 assault guns
– 18.Volksgrenadier-Division: 42 assault guns
– 62.Volksgrenadier-Division: 14 assault guns
– 560.Volksgrenadier-Division: 14 assault guns (arrived on Dec 19)
– Total: (+/-) 350 armored vehicles.
The utilization of the armored forces cannot be separated from the organization of the supply services. In the armored forces, they belong to the field forces for instance the off horses belong to the cavalry. Therefore they also needed tactical leadership. The campaigns in the east and in Africa had taught us this golden rule, but during the offensive in the Ardennes we could not act according to this rule, because the repair and recovery services were insufficiently equipped with spare parts, traveling cranes, etc., and because the level of mobility was absolutely inadequate. In addition, the lack of fuel prevented them from closely following the armored forces. The high number of tanks demolished during our retreat in January 1945 is due to the inadequate repair service and the lack of fuel. I remember that we lost five times as many tanks because of the lack of recovery vehicles than through enemy fire.
The armored forces, also, lacked columns for transport of fuel. In view of the mission, the nature of the terrain, and the season I had asked for a quintuple issue of motor fuel, but the divisions only got from 1.50 to 1.75 of a single issue. It was not a matter of shortage of fuel really, but of transport space for it. It was impossible by now to smooth out the difficulties of supply. On the contrary in fact: when the enemy air force was sent in we suffered losses on the roads and railways which decisively in the true sense of the word – influenced our operations.
The 18.VGD: had 90% of its material refitted. One assault gun brigade was subordinated to it. The mobile detachment was partly equipped with bicycles. The horses were overworked. The 62.VGD: was up to strength as to material, but had no antiaircraft company. The rifle company (reconnaissance company) was on bicycles. The 560.VGD: was up to strength as to material but lacked supply services. The horses were too weak. The 26.VGD: was up to strength as to material. Its mobile detachment was partly equipped with bicycles. In the Panzer Division, two of the four Panzergrenadier Battalions had bicycles as motor vehicles were lacking. One battalion was to be transported on armored personnel carriers; only the Panzer-Lehr-Division had complete equipment, elsewhere there was a scarcity of these special vehicles. The armored reconnaissance detachments were very scantily equipped with track-laying vehicles.
I regret to say that not until May 1945 was I informed, by the report of Schramm, that Hitler had issued orders to the effect that the Panzer divisions of the Waffen SS be given double the normal number of tanks and armored vehicles (on Dec 24), the 6.SS-Panzer-Division, therefore, got 250 new tanks. Nobody told me this in Berlin on Dec 2, although I urgently begged Hitler to bring my Panzer divisions up to strength, he refused.
The Signal Regiment of the Army, which at the same time had to serve the Artillery Commander of the Army (Heeres), was not up to strength as to material. The Luftwaffe Liaison Officer and his staff were very well equipped. An adequate amount of maps was at our disposal. Despite repeated requests, only a limited number of aerial photographs arrived at the Headquarters and the Army on the day before the attack. The Photographs only covered the terrain of the combat area to a very limited extent. As to quantity and quality, the articles of clothing correspond to the limitations of the sixth year of the war. The divisions which were to be freshened up could not be adequately replaced. The field troops had an adequate amount of winter clothing and camouflage equipment at their disposal. The food supply was likewise in accordance with the limitations which were imposed on the fortress of Germany. Captured US rations were therefore always very welcomed by the troops. It is not true that the leadership took captured food supply into consideration, nor did we reckon on captured motor fuel. The campaigns in the east, Africa, and Italy had cleared shown how easily such stores are destroyed by the enemy. Moreover, we did not know of such stores as for instance the big one at Stavelot.
c. Morale
Apart from personnel and material, morale must be taken into consideration when an evaluation of the fighting qualities is to be given; morale is subjected to mental and physical influences. To me it seems necessary to give an outline of the morale of our troops, in order to be able to investigate the reasons for the fact that troops possess extraordinary fighting qualities shortly afterward declined to such a degree that they hardly offered any resistance, and many of them ceased to fight. Among other things can mention the following exerted an unfavorable influence on the physical strength of the soldiers. Although the zone of interior and the superiors in the front line did their utmost for the field troops the general state of health was, declining particularly for the young age classes owing to inadequate food rations. It is true that at the outset such cases were exceptional, but later on the number of those sick or otherwise incapable of action increased considerably, since the replacements were undernourished. The army of the interior zone had for months had considerably smaller food rations than the field troops, and they arrived at the front in a state of health that did not allow as to supplement their incomplete training. An increasing number of soldiers belonging to old age classes were called to service in the infantry, Panzergrenadier, or engineer units. Their state of health caused serious concern, and naturally, they were in no way equal to the task. A high percentage was constantly sick or otherwise incapable of action.
As regards, the young soldiers of the troops were either sent in or kept in reserve the officers were anxious to give them an opportunity of getting adequate rest. But the tasks of the resting commands were so numerous that the time for resting was rather. limited. Serious consequences did not fail to appear. The state of health was also unfavorably influenced by the extreme scarcity of underwear, clothing of all kinds, boots, etc., and the impossibility of having the underwear, etc., cleaned. Physical exertion (for instance marches, combat, digging of positions, nights without sleep) and the inclemencies of the weather gradually broke down the health of the men. But apart from those actually sick, we had a large number of malingerers. No doubt, experienced officers and NCOs took care of their troops in a more experienced way, so that the general state of health in their units did not sink to the same low level as in those having inexperienced commanders, but their number was small. Thus the state of health caused grave concern, and it was doubtful whether the soldiers were equal to their future tasks. But the influences on the morale of officers and men gave me much more reason for grave concern. As they are important factors in an estimate of the fighting qualities, I here give an outline.
The continuous commitment had undermined the confidence of the front soldiers – officers and men – in the Highest Command. They did not more believe in the reserves and reorganized units so often announced. He served continuously in the front line, and remained there, and his neighbors and men on leave from other fronts told him that the same was true of them. Where were the reserves, and when would they arrive at this front, which had to be withdrawn whenever it was seriously attacked? The official communique – which he had learnt to read thoroughly and catch the sense thereof – reported on the situation on the other fronts of the fortress of Germany, and just spoke about disengagement. In his own world, that is to say, his company, village, or sector – he found a confirmation of his doubts as regards reserves and reinforcements, etc. The gaps were insufficiently filled up with young men – combed out or retrained, or rather they should have been retrained – with old men of the police forces, people who had been picked up from straggler points; beside them battalions composed of men who had returned from leave, one battalion composed exclusively to consist of people having stomach discases, also young men of the Luftwaffe came to the infantry, which astonished him as he had volunteered for the Luftwaffe. Did the Luftwaffe not need them? Why not? Had the Luftwaffe an adequate number of crews available, and would voluntarily give up these young men, despite an increased production – report had it that we had begun a mass production of jet aircraft. Something was wrong. His doubts were confirmed by what he saw in his world. The Luftwaffe was not there any longer.
Thus these incompletely trained, young volunteers of the Luftwaffe came to their outfit. And they did not only feel depressed but they were also disappointed. The world in which they were now placed and to which – so many of them hoped and believed at the outset – the young people would soon become acclimated was heterogeneous in every respect: great differences in years, few seasoned soldiers – where were they? – few officers but very many NCOs, a part of them serving as Privates; most of the latter came from staffs, other arms or branches of the Wehrmacht: and they cursed and swore at the soldiers. And what was worse, these people had for 3, 4 or even 5 years served in staffs, security, guard or Police detachments, and they cursed because now they had come to the front, which they did not want at all, and at a moment when the war was practically over. Until now they had occupied safe positions, and there they wanted to stay. Whether young or old, experienced or not, all men understood this: a part of the officers and the NCOs did not know what they could be expected to know as leaders of platoons companies, etc. They were combed out themselves, too old or, if they were young, without a careful training for their tasks as leaders an the battlefield. The seasoned soldier who could keep the gang together was lacking. They were not animated by the fighting spirit which binds a fighting unity together. They lacked all moral stamina, there was no esprit de corps, although the company was called a unit the men did not feel and think and act as one.
In addition he saw and heard many things: the weak troops holding our own positions, the insufficiency of the West Wall, the stripping of which the rank and file could understand (all wire entanglements, all weapons, almost all appointments, armored doors, etc. were removed), further the excellent equipment of both the British and American PWs.
Were the submarines, the modern weapons on which the official communique repeatedly reported, and the V weapons after all not so successful? Because of their great success in different theaters of war the old divisions (among them the 12.VGD and the 25.VGD, and most of the Panzer Troops) had traditions which exerted a favorable influence on morale. They were held in honor by the soldiers who had served for a long time with the units and where stimulated by the recovered who returned from the hospitals. In the replacement units of the Panzer Troops the divisional traditions were especially cultivated, and they were also stressed in the schools of this branch of the Army. The better and more complete special service equipment, which the newly activated units had to do without, had a favorable influence upon the soldiers of the old divisions. The slowly and unreliably working mail service had an unfavorable influence, especially because the men heard about the bombing of their homes, and saw the enemy planes making for Germany in broad daylight without being effectively attacked.
The uncertainty as regards the fate of their families was more keenly felt by the married soldiers than by the young unmarried ones; but they too, were mentally excited. Of course the cancellation of leaves affected each soldier, even if leave was occasionally granted to one and another of the company. Individual leaves in urgent cases did not change the feelings of the soldiers.