In Germany proper, the offices of the road surveyors had been instructed to help us. But very soon it turned out that, owing to numerous inductions. into the Wehrmacht, they had only very few people available, and consequently, we had to help ourselves. The actual help which we received consisted of the rendering available of sand staking off of dangerous lengths of road, and shoring up the edges of the pavement, where there was a danger of skidding. The large junctions, for instance Marche, St Hubert and Bastogne, were of great, though not decisive importance, as they could be bypassed if necessary. The small forces, opposed to us, show that owing to the nature of the terrain, the enemy did not expect a German large-scale operation in the sector of the Eifel. On the whole, it can be said that the area selected for the attack offered great strategic advantages, but also as far as the terrain was concerned numerous natural obstacles, which would affect our armored forces especially – and it being winter – perhaps to such a degree that our success would be rendered doubtful. It was indisputable that very extraordinary demands would be put on the troops, equipment, (tanks, prime movers, motor vehicles, etc.), and horses.
Considering the general features of the terrain with its woods and ravines we presumed that, until we reached the open terrain after we had broken through the enemy positions the engagements would take place for the most part on and along the roads, and around the crossings of passes and rivers, because the dense forest would definitely diminish the possibilities for reconnaissance and, consequently, the effect of our weapons. Further, we resued that It would be difficult for the artillery and the antiaircraft artillery to select and occupy their emplacements, as hills and trees would limit the full effect of their guns. On the other hand, the forests offered excellent camouflage possibilities for marching up along secondary approaches, for the assembly into position, and for the parking of motor transport columns of all kinds. Material for the repair of roads and bridges was to be at hand everywhere, and the troops were to be equipped with tools for this.
Once more the course of the engagements proved that good training of the troops and direction by experienced leaders cannot be estimated highly enough: the troops successfully overcame all difficulties produced by the terrain or the season. The majority of the officers, a high percentage of the NC0s, and very many drivers had fought in Russia under similar or even worse conditions. They were always able to contrive ways and means for less experienced soldiers, and thus contributed definite prerequisites for success. The following railroads west of the Rhine were at our disposal for the bringing up of supplies. (I underline the names of the principal loading stations): Koln, Bonn, Euskirchen, Balnkenheim, Stadkyll. The Ahrtal Railroad: Ahrweiller, Hillesheim, Gerolstein, Prüm. The Moseltal Railroad: Koblenz, Trier, with a brand line to Bitburg. The railroads had been destroyed by air raids to such an extent that the trains were completely stopped or had to be rerouted.
During the air raids, we used numerous tunnels for protection of the trains but at last, they were jammed full with trains, and often we could not get urgently needed supplies because the tracks were blocked by other trains or by bomb damage. Often it took several hours to find the whereabouts of whole trains because the railroad officials – eager to help – started off as many trains on the above-mentioned stretches from the Rhine to the west as the situation in the air or the darkness permitted. Officers, sent out by the Oberquartiermeister, then found them hidden somewhere, usually in the tunnels. Not until the trains were found could the motor transport columns be brought up and consequently it was impossible to plan their movements beforehand. The result was that the most urgently needed supplies were brought up with extraordinary, severe delays (Thus, it was inevitable that the responsible headquarters of the Army command had to keep exact track of every carload of supply until it reached the troops). The greatest efforts were made to keep strategic railroad lines and most important through stations open, and actually amazing results were achieved. But it could not be prevented that the wheels of the German war machine turned slower than they used to.
For three reasons it was impossible to employ motor transport vehicles on a wide, grandiose scale to relieve the railroads: (1) All roads were threatened during daytime and moonlight nights. (2) The lack of fuel compelled us to measure every cubic meter of it. (3) The scarcity and the bad condition of available vehicles. The bringing up of the troops proceeded better than we had expected, considering the increasing air raids on the railroad system, especially on junctions and large switching yards. In the area to the right of the Rhine, we could only carry out our movements during the night and on rainy days – in as far as the roads were passable at all; but thanks to the close railroad system in the west, and still more to the work of the railroad personnel and the repair columns our efforts were crowned with success. But this is only true of the troop transports. We could not prevent many of the trains with material from being either considerably delayed or getting completely stuck. As both the training of the troops and their fighting power depended on the arrival of these trains, the delays had a doubly unfavorable influence upon all units which were to take part in the offensive.
3. The Qualities of the Fighting Units
For the estimate of our own situation as well as that of the enemy the fighting qualities of the units play just as important a part as, for instance, the abilities of leaders and troops, the use and manipulation of modern weapons, etc. Organization, strength, armament, and equipment all of which together make up the personnel and material bases do not alone determine the fighting qualities of a unit; the spiritual forces, which in turn are subject to physical and intellectual influences, also play a role. Owing to the long duration of the war and the consequent exhaustion of forces the fighting qualities of the units of the German Army varied in every respect (personnel, materiel, spiritual) with the Wermacht and also within the Army. This was also the case in peacetime – I will show this later on – but it was not so perceptible as now that our soldiers were to undergo the hardest test. Owing to the heavy losses it was no longer possible to keep the bulk of Army Forces on the highest level with regard to the combination of Personnel, quality of officers, men, armament, equipment, etc. So during World War One, we now also proceeded to organize a number of units, at the disposal of the Highest Command, which were excellently equipped in men and materiel compared to the majority of the Army. We tried to keep these first-class units on the same original high level during the time following and on the whole, we managed to do so.
To these troops belonged, as far as this report is concerned, the armored troops of the Army, that is to say the Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions, the units of the Waffen SS, and according to the opinion of the Highest Command – the newly established Volksgrenadier Divisions, the latter mainly because of their composition and armament. As the fighting qualities of the troops constitute one basis for all planning of operations and constitute a contributing, often even a decisive, factor, it is necessary to determine what the fighting qualities of the units were which took part in the atack.
(a) Personnel
Among the divisions definitely placed at our disposal the 18.VGD and the 26.VGD were to be employed as permanent divisions in the future sector of attack under the 66.Army-Corps commanding there. Both divisions had to defend broad sectors, and consequently were only able to detach a small number of local reserves, which hardly got any training because the tasks of forces such as these, stationed so near the front and alerted for action would not permit it. The reserves were assigned to the divisions from the field replacement battalions. The 18.VGD had good personnel replacements, an adequate number of young people, many of them of the Kriegsmarine or the Luftwaffe without an infantry training. Most of the subordinate commanders had been in action on the eastern front, the others came from various arms of the Wehrmacht or were combed out of the Reserve Army, only very few were from the good army schools. The officers corps represented a good average, but part of them with no front experience. The young reserve officers had combat experience.
The 32.VGD was a newly activated division having an incomplete training owing to the slow arrival of weapons and equipment. It had practically no training in firing with live ammunition; its heavy infantry guns did not arrive until the last day. It was up to strength, but only 16% instead of 40% of the personnel consisted of young men, 15% of the men belonged to the Volkstums Gruppe 3, and their orders were given in Polish or Czech. The 560.VGD, was also newly activated and made from occupatibn troops in Norway and had had a three weeks training in Denmark. The training was absolutely inadequate as fire arms of all sorts only arrived at the last moment. Consequently they got no training in firing with live ammunition, and we could not make up for this later, as they were sent in as soon as they left the train. On Dec 16, one Armored Infantry Battalion and one Engineer Company had not arrived at all yet. As this Volksgrenadier Division too was equipped with MP-44 (Sturmgewehr) the lack of training in firing influenced the operations of the division unfavorably, despite the fact that every man was keen on fighting. The diviion was up to authorized strength.
Until Dec 5, the 116.Panzer-Division had been repeatedly employed in the Roer Sector and its worth often proved that it needed a complete freshening. But the march into the
assembly area abd the preservation of secrecy necessary there allowed neither time nor orpprtunity for it. It had only a theoretical training, but got along with a small, excellent cadre of officers, NC0s, and privates. It was almost up to strength.
The condition of the 2.Panzer-Division, also a division of the first wave, was more favorable. It had been almost completely destroyed in Normandy; a small detachment was afterwards employed with the 7.Army north of Dasburg, and since Nov 6, it had been withdrawn for freshening up. It enjoyed all advantages of a division withdrawn from the combat line, with the following limiations as apeared later, a lack of possibilities of training, partly owing to the fact that the troops were quartered in the immediate neighborhood of the front line, partly out of consideration for the preservation of the element of surprise; a slow, very delayed arrival of weapons and equiment that were lacking a scarcity of fuel; very crowded quarters. During the freshening up a small combat group was temporarily sent in in the Roer Sector and suffered heavy losses. The division was up to authorized strength.
After having suffered heavy losses in Normandy, the Panzer-Lehr-Division was sent to Germany for freshchning up, and remained there from the middle of September to the beginning of November. Ever since its formation it had been specially favored by the Inspector General of the Armored Forces. It could be considered almost fully reorganized. But from Nov 22 to Nov 24, it was sent in northwest of Saargemünd in the area of Army Group G for a limited objective attack and because of this at the beginning of the offensive this unit had not regained its full fighting power.
The Führer-Begleit-Brigade arrived, although behind time, at full strength with regard to both men and material. Organization and numerical strength, however, do not give a true (because it is too optimistic) impression of the fighting qualities of the division as they differed from each other considerably in regard to age classes, combat experience, condition of training, and this alone made them differ in combat strength, to some extent quite considerably.
Within the framework of this report I am only able to give the facts without discussing details or pointing out reasons and defects or ways and means to remedy the defeats that brought about this situation. The main point is that the Wehrmacht had now been waging war for five years. The infantry – in this case also part of the Panzergrenadier Divisions is to be included – was too old. The average age of the men was 35 years. We were unable to make up in kind for the losses at the front, and this forced us to improvisations, which were subject to all the disadvantages improvisations are always subject to. We raised the age limits, for instance, and combed the units in the rear, the staffs, other arms of the Wehrmacht, security divisions, the polite, etc, because of general commitment of all troops in the field it was impossible to give these men an adequate training. It was still more fatal that the replacements were unacquainted with infantry operations and had not received an even approximately adequate arms training. The high number of NC0s, whom we had to enroll in the troops, could not be employed at the front according to their grade as the companies were small. A great number of the NCOs lacked training and combat experience, consequently we could not employ them in practical service with troops as leaders of groups, etc., and they had to serve as privates.
Even for a makeshift this measure was wrong. The NCOs felt depressed and degraded, and became psychologically maladjusted. Their neighbors were young people still prepared to learn and adjust themselves and who, even with their level of training, placed within the secure framework of a group or assault detachment, would have fought, but they found neither this framework nor security among their neighbors. Thus this measure had an unfavorable effect on both NCOs and privates. In some divisions the condition of the training of the troops no longer met the requirements necessary when facing an enemy numerically and materially superior, rested, and well nourished.
The estimate I give of the fighting qualities of the troops, discussing wether they were qualified for the attack or not, makes it necessary, in connection with the foregoing, to point out that not all divisions were fit for an attack on this scale, and consequently it could be foreseen that an attack on this enemy would lead to situations such as are comprised only in an offensive operation envisaged to cover several days, to be driven deeply into the enemy lines, and having a distant objective. It is possible that the Highest Command – Hitler particularly – did not consider this fact sufficiently; this is the only way I can explain their calculations of timing for the development of the offensive. Any higher commander who knew the troops were aware of this defect and did not find my view strange. Since 1942 the Army had not carried out such offensive operations, and the officers who were now battalion commanders served as platoon or company leaders during the war of movement in Poland, France, and Russia in 1939- 1941. At that time they had specific tasks to perform within their company or battalion. Now they were to act independently, and master combat situations which in themselves already carried the germ of failure if they failed to find the necessary initiative in the subordinate commanders during the swift battles and the ever-changing combat situations, not to mention the golden rule of leadership: He who waits for orders on the battlefield will be too late.
A large number of regimental commanders, particularly of the infantry, Panzergrenadiers, and the artillery, lacked this faculty of being able to act by themselves, but it was generally true of the company, platoon, and group leaders. Static and defensive or withdrawing warfare had paralyzed, to some extent, even killed their initiative. When it has been maintained in answer to this that the Panzer Divisions of the Army and the Waffen-SS, and a part of the old divisions of the Army, had repeatedly taken part in offensive operations later and thus gathered experience, this objection does not invalidate the fact since all these operations had more or less been attacks with a limited objective, and consequently can not be compared to protracted mobile warfare, because they cannot give us the same experience. All their higher are the activities of all the superior commanders, up to the commanding generals, to be raised, whose appearance and intervention on the battlefield assured the cooperation of the whole. Owing to the fact that all units and their commanders arrived at the very last moment it was utterly impossible to give the commanders (from Battalion to Division Commanders) theoretical schooling. The unrepeated map maneuvers could only explain the main principles and illustrate their application to the offensive; it was not possible to give the subordinate commands a part in this knowledge.
The condition of the training of the replacements taken as a whole – likewise no longer met the demands which had to be put on the soldiers during this phase of the war. Considering the fact that the majority of the replacements would be sent in as soon as they arrived, the aim of the arms drill ought to have been to enable us to present the combat troops with soldiers well prepared for active front-line service. We endeavored to attain this object, but the difficulties were so great that we generally failed to overcome them.
These shortcomings were ascertainable both in officers and NCOs, and consequently, there was not always a real feeling of solidarity and voluntary service on the part of their men when they came into contact with the enemy. Although numerous officers, NCOs, and men of every age, rank, and seniority showed excellent military qualities, it cannot be denied that the absolute confidence that the men up till then had had in their superior officers in accordance with their preparation, selection, level of training, etc., was dwindling away.
The Panzer Divisions of the Army and some old infantry divisions (among them the 12.Volksgrenadier-Division and the 26.Volksgrenadier-Division) managed to get along with an excellent – however small – cadre of war experienced personnel.
