3-A Troops celebrate the capture of St Avold. L-R: Pvt. Frank Manzi, Cpl Carl Cipriano, Cpl Luke Kowalcheck, Pvt Rocci Jacullo, Pvt Al D’amore and Cpl Philip Ellamore- Dec 6 1944
According to Schramm , this picture is too pessimistic; as, after all, three Volksgernadier Divisions and four fast mobile units of those mentioned – that is to say the majority, took part in the offensive. On the other hand, it must be earnestly considered that they only got a very short time – or no time at all – for freshening up and refitting, and consequently they had to be thrown in with a diminished fighting power.

Schramm then makes the following estimate: If the defensive combat along the Roer River is seen in connection with the preparation for the offensive in the Ardennes, this combat was by far its most difficult phase. This is correct in every respect. According to Schramm, the result of the battle on the Roer, which influenced the strategy and the forces of the entire Army Group B, was: that our own forces were diminished, individual divisions were rendered useless for the attack, and others were only inadequately freshened up, consequently, our initial estimate of forces for the offensive could not be maintained. But the operational reserve of the enemy, at the end of September 1944, still considerable, had melted away to a large extent, and his units employed in or behind the front could be considered as exhausted as the German ones.

I will later on state my attitude to this. The effect of this battle on material allotted for the offensive is a special question. During the offensive combat, we resorted to the ammunition and fuel reserves, stored for the offensive, but the full amount was restored; in this respect, the offensive was not influenced by the defensive battle on the Roer. But of course on the other hand the allotments of weapons and equipment of the attacking units were subjected to extensive wear and tear caused by the battle, lasting for weeks.

On Nov 25, the final decision on the objectives and the extent of the offensive were taken as a result of the estimate of the enemy as Hitler and the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht saw matters. The instructions said (I give what is of interest in this connection) among other things: Since the start of the defensive battle the enemy picture has confirmed our conditions for the attack. The wear and tear on the enemy forces are considerable, the majority of enemy reserves are tied up near the front, or they are already affected. His supply difficulties are increasing. The front of the gap as before is thinly occupied. Despite the unwelcome containing of certain of our own troops the Führer nevertheless maintains steadfastly the objective and extent of the attack planned. Further, he sharply rejects the idea of a small solution.

Pfc Victor Henry fires his machine gun through a hole in a wall, at Germans in a barn 300 yards away, beyond Kohlscheid, Germany (Oct 16 1944) King Co, 3-119-IR 30-ID

III – THE ARMY PLAN
1. Operational Plan of the Army. Preparation Period.

The breakthrough has to be achieved as soon as possible, and with this, the freedom of movement for our Panzer units, further, in a quick thrust, bridgehead has to be established across the Meuse between Liège and Namur, and then a thrust must be launched to the northeast, east of Brussels and beyond it, in order to reach Antwerp. The 5.Panzer-Army, moves forward with one corps (two Panzer Divisions) and, in the second wave, with another corps (two Panzer Divisions), a breakthrough is to be achieved as far as the Meuse, this river is to be crossed between Amay and Namur, and along the line Antwerp, Brussels, Namur, Dinant. The activity of the enemy reserves from the west in the rear of the 6.Panzer-Army, is to be prevented. (Extract from the written statement of the leading ideas and objectives of the offensive as it was submitted from the High Command of the Wehrmacht together with a letter from the Chief of the Operations Section of the Wehrmacht to the Commander in Chief West and the Commander of Army Group B on Nov 1).

FM Gerd von Rundstedt - 1940The first instructions were given to the Chief of the Army on Nov 2 in the Staff Headquarters of Army Group B. It was announced moreover that FM Gerd von Rundstedt and his Chief of the General Staff would be present to discuss the development of the situation with the Commanders of the Armies. For this reason the Commanders of the 1.Fallschirmjaeger-Army, the 6.Panzer-Army, the 7.Army, and the 15.Army was present too. At the end of the conference the Commanders of Army Group B, of the 5.Panzer-Army, and of the 6.Panzer-Army were ushered into the office of FM Walter Model to FM von Rundstedt, where the Chief of his General Staff, first of all, demanded a written statement to the effect that orders had been received from the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He demanded the strictest secrecy regarding the discussion and threatened capital punishment if it were broken.

After an introductory speech by FM von Rundstedt, Gen Krebs, Chief of the General Staff of Army Group B, announced the extent and date of an attack to be started from the area of Army Group B towards the end of November. During the speech, I was astounded to hear that the High Command of the Wehrmacht had issued very detailed orders, based on conditions of the actual fulfilling of which in regard to extent, kind, and date – in my opinion – everything depended, but the fulfillment of which could not be taken for granted – according to my knowledge of the facts. Likewise, it surprised me that after the speech of Gen Krebs, FM von Rundstedt called on me as the first to state my attitude. This is explained by the fact that some days before FM Model had got his instructions through his Chief of Staff.

For, together with the Chief of the Staff of the Commander in Chief West, Gen Krebs had received his orders from Hitler in the Führer Headquarters on Oct 28, and before the conference, FM von Rundstedt and FM Mödel had conferred with the aid of the aforegoing written orders received from the High Command of the Wehrmacht (accompanied by a letter from the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht) on Nov 1. Of course, it was not possible to take a thoroughgoing position towards an operation on this scale without having sufficient details. I gave the following answer, based on my knowledge of the enemy and the organization of his forces and reserves, thoroughly explained by Gen Krebs, and, further, on my knowledge of the fighting qualities of our own forces (in general), and what I knew of the terrain to be taken, though I was not well acquainted with the combat area, as I had not taken part in the Campaign in the west: only on the condition that the following ‘promises’ are fulfilled could I make my forces strong enough to reach the Meuse and establish bridgeheads on the opposite bank.

A US soldier hands over his German prisoners to the Military police (MP) in the Hürtgen Forest, December 1944

I wanted it understood that I thought it possible on the following conditions:

– a. Local and temporary superiority in the air above the combat area, the supply bases, and the roads of supply from the day of the attack, and the period following, as soon as the bad weather period – a condition for the beginning of the offensive – had changed into weather conditions permitting the full employment of the air force of the enemy.
– b. The units promised had to be available at full strength, freshened up, and in time.
– c. The mobility of the fast mobile units, the advanced detachments of all divisions, the artillery, the antiaircraft artillery, and the bridge-building equipment of all kinds had to be definitely improved.
– d. The assignment of forces, also to the 7. Army, was not to be altered, considering the fine roads available to the enemy leading in and out of the combat area in which I expected the greatest threat to my army, namely, the district of the Champagne.
– e. The supply of arms and ammunition, signal equipment, fuel, spare parts, etc., had to be in the hands of the Army at the start of the attack.
Walter MödelAs to the clock time of the start of the attack I was unable to give my opinion until after having got an idea of the behavior of the enemy, the fighting qualities of our own troops, and the terrain. I considered that the earliest date possible for the attack was Dec 10. The Commander in Chief West did not state his attitude towards this. During the speech of his Chief of Staff, fluently and convincingly delivered in his own characteristic way, FM Mödel seemed to me to have his doubts. The Commander of the 6.Panzer-Army did not give his opinion at all. After the end of the conference FM Mödel told me that he wanted to discuss the whole matter with me once more. This second conference took place in the afternoon of Nov 2, in the presence of Gen Krebs.

During the conference, Mödel said by way of introduction that on the whole, he agreed with me in what I had told FM von Rundstedt in the morning, and he called on me to explain in detail how I came to the conclusion that only to reach the Meuse and establish bridgeheads on the opposite bank. My doubts as to the plan of an attack on this operative scale were the following, I arrange them according to their importance and urgency. I was not at all able to imagine how the announced conditions for the attack, repeatedly mentioned by Krebs as promises, could be available in time, at the right place, and up to strength. I considered the fulfillment of these promises decisive. They concern: (1) the participating units, their condition, and fighting qualities; (2) the assignment of forces to the 5.Panzer-Army and the 7.Army; (3) the punctual arrival, by the beginning of the attack, of the units described as reserves in the hands of the Highest Command, so that the attack could be reinforced from the depth; (4) the prompt and priority delivery of motor vehicles from the factories and repair shops, or given up by other units (Organization Todt, etc) for equipping fast mobile troops, advanced detachments, artillery, antiaircraft, bridge building equipment of all kinds and engineer forces; (5) the pinning down of the fronts not attacked to a large extent as possible, that is to say, at many spots with the greatest effect; (6) the safe bringing up of adequate supply, above all ammunition and fuel; (7) effective support given by the Luftwaffe.

General d. Panzertruppen Hasso Eccard Freiherr von Manteuffel with Oberst NiemackI came to these conclusions on the basis of the following reflections:

Re (1): I had a detailed knowledge of the condition of our troops, taken as a whole, some of the units promised I did not know. This knowledge did not only concern the panzer troops, which, if they had been employed in the western theater of war, had often been subordinate to me during the past months, but also the fighting power (numerical and material) of the infantry, artillery, engineer units, antiaircraft artillery, and the condition and efficiency of the troops of supply. With the exception of the new Volksgrenadier Divisions, the majority of the units the Army had been uninterruptedly promised, employed on the western front for weeks or even for months, consequently, a complete refitting with regard to men and material under adequate training provisions were the conditions for a successful employment.

But time is necessary for such refitting. I had my doubts if adequate time were available, as in a short time we would certainly have to reckon with the continuation of the large-scale enemy offensive in the entire sector from Sittard, Geilenkirchen and as far as Monschau. This defensive battle would require all the forces of the Army Group, a great part of whom were destined in the plans of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to take part in the attack, namely the 12.VGD, the 340.VGD, and the 560.VGD, the 3.PGD, the 15.PGD, and the 25.PGD, the 9.PD, the 11.PD, the 21.PD, and 116.PD, the 10.SS-PD, and finally, the 17.SS-PGD. Further, it was doubtful whether or when these divisions would be available, and if they would be adequately reorganized as demanded by an attack on this scale. Not until the battle started would it be possible to decide if the new Volksgrenadier Divisions could meet the requirements of the unusually difficult conditions, having a weaker infantry than the former divisions and as they were to be employed for the first time in the coming offensive.

For Hitler these men are 100% Combat Ready - Reality: these are prisoners

Re (2): The less time available for the complete refitting, and for giving the units the most comprehensive training, that is, in the cooperation of all arms on the battlefield, the more it had to be stressed that no change could be permitted to take place in the assignment of the forces promised. This referred both to the forces of the assault armies and to the number of units envisaged for the 7.Army. Concerning the estimate of our own forces, this had to be brought into harmony with the distant objective and the probable wear and tear that every attack on this scale causes, which must be greater during this phase of the war than at the beginning, because the condition of the troops, vehicles, horses, armor and other equipment, spare parts, supply, etc, no longer meet all requirements with regard to quality and efficiency. Further, the wear and tear increased because of the difficult terrain and the influence of the weather, the season being advanced. My experiences from my service in the eastern theater of war impressively taught this.

Considering my estimate of the enemy, his manner of acting, and his numerical and material forces I was of opinion that the four panzer divisions provided, envisaged with 100 tanks each, only under very favorable conditions would be able to continue the attack successfully after having reached the Meuse and established expanded bridgeheads. Among other things, I considered the following to be favorable conditions: (1) that the 6.Panzer-Army would have reached and crossed the Meuse at the same time; (2) that my own Army would not meet strong resistance on its way to the Meuse and thus avoid heavy losses in men and material, and (3) that we would not need to give up rather strong forces for secondary tasks. But this last presupposed that the adjoining armies would be fairly equal to us in their tasks, and especially that the 7.Army would be able to undertake the full securing of my long, left flank. For this reason, I was not in favor of deducting any forces from the assignment to the 7.Army, and wanted it provided with a fast mobile unit, able actually and effectively to cover the long southern flank of the 5.Panzer-Army until its infantry, following, would be able to reinforce the securing.

The trooper is at the end of his strength. Many of them are exhausted, and no longer have the sacred fire, and the news from the interior of the country is not good either, especially when it comes to the bombardment

Re (3): With a view to the fact that it did not seem possible completely to reconstitute the first and the second waves, the bringing up of the reserves of the Highest Command in the promised numbers was urgently desired so that we could reinforce the .attack from the depth.

Re (4): FM Mödel was sufficiently acquainted with the condition of mobility of the mentioned units, which needed immediate priority, freshening up. Motor vehicles of all kinds, especially the heavy prime movers of the artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and the engineer units were no longer at all able to meet the requirements of the difficult terrain in winter weather. Salvage and maintenance service for Pz troops was most inadequately equipped. Sweeping measures were urgently and decisively required in order to achieve success.

Re (5): It was necessary to tie up the adjoining sectors in order to prevent the enemy from transferring troops from them to the attacked ones and to deceive him: the stronger the actual effort and deception the more successful the result. The containing would pin down the forces in the positions and the enemy reserves for several days, and perhaps so long that our attack would have reached and crossed the Meuse.

Re (6): An adequate and absolutely safeguarded supply, particularly of ammunition and fuel, and a provident, continuous, and prompt bringing up did not only concern the movements of the panzer troops, being the carriers of the breakthrough, but all possibilities for operating depended on it, the motorized units of all kinds and their auxiliary weapons being the tools of the operation, as for instance: Panzer Divisions and Panzergrenadier Divisions, advance detachments of all kinds, artillery smoke battalions, antiaircraft units, etc. Only if an adequate and prompt supply was sure to arrive would the Commander in Chief be able to operate as the development of the situation demanded. Otherwise, the farming of points of gravity, the maneuverability on the battlefield in manifold and fluctuating situations, and the covering of deep and open flanks would be utterly impossible, facing a highly motorized enemy.

I did not consider the prompt and provident bringing up of supply guaranteed unless the troops and the leadership had the supplies in their hands at the start of the attack. I stressed this strongly in order to compel the Highest Command to make adequate additional supply columns available with a view of making the bringing up of supply as independent of the railroads as possible, the repair of which would certainly take a long time – also in this respect had my experience.

1944, with the Allied Bombardements in Germany, destroyed equipment can not be replaced anymore



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