5.Panzer-Army – Ardennes Preparation (Gen Hasso von Manteuffel)

Re (b): The fighting qualities and ability of our own troops regard fighting qualities, I repeated to my Chief of Staff what I had told FM Mödel, in the morning. My Chief of Staff had a thorough knowledge of the troops, their condition, and the limits of their ability. About using the new Volksgrenadier Divisions, to be sent in for the first time, I had my doubts, because: (a) in my opinion they had too high a percentage of personnel from the Navy and the Luftwaffe with no infantry combat experience whatsoever; and (b) because they did not have adequate means and time for their training, nor subordinate commanders who could give them suitable instructions. Decisive for the choice of the method of the attack was for me the fact that I no longer believed it possible for the majority of the infantry (in this case also including the dismounted Volksgrenadiers) to penetrate by day – it was supposed to take place between 1000 and 1030 hrs – into the depth, and do battle with an enemy, well prepared for resistance, well equipped with everything including vehicles, and consequently very mobile. I had all the more reason for considering this impossible: (a) after the enemy would be awakened by a more or less extended preparation; (b) in one of the sectors of the Army we had to cross the Our in the face of the enemy, and gain the control over a sufficient portion of the western bank, and (c) the combat in the depth for a long time would have to be carried on without assault guns and tanks, which for the time being could not be taken to the opposite bank, because of the lack of undamaged bridges.

Considering the calibers of the weapons, issue of ammunition, the results of our previous reconnaissance (in general and with regard to the emplacement of the artillery), and the terrain, I further doubted that the two hours of preparation of the heavy infantry weapons, artillery, and smoke-shell mortars would be as effective as the Highest Command imagined.

Re (c): The terrain with regard to the combat activity, the movements of the infantry, and the possibilities for the effect of the supporting weapons: As mentioned above the assault guns, tanks, and artillery could not for the time being be taken across the river. The support given by the artillery and smoke-shell mortars was very limited, because of the nature of the terrain. This limitation affected our possibilities of watching the terrain occupied by the enemy, as well as the choice of gun positions and the efficacy of operations in the vast wooded terrain, full of ravines. Decisive for successful support of our infantry by the artillery was (a) a strong, maneuverable fire with the object of eliminating the islands of resistance of the enemy, which prevented us from crossing the Our; and (b) an adequate fire and the possibility for strong concentrations in and behind the oft-mentioned contour line. For a large number of batteries, it was a hard job to find gun positions for the carrying out of the first task, owing to the fact that the terrain on both sides of the Our was very steep, but it was much more difficult to find positions for the second task, as, in the wooded terrain and in the ravines, only very limited space was available for emplacements having a favorable range. On the other hand, we could not concentrate too many guns in favorable positions.

West of the Our a successful – because in all phases observable – support to the infantry could, first of all, only be given by the heavy machine guns and heavy mortars. Consequently, if the enemy were willing to defend his position – defend to be understood in the sense of the German Command Directives – tedious time-consuming fighting would probably develop throughout the depth of his system of defense, the outcome of which appeared the more dubious to me the earlier the enemy was awakened. We would not only have to capture one island of resistance after the other, but also to gain control of the terrain, which here has a mountainous character, overgrown with trees, under-woods, and brush. This would take our time. And time was also needed for the movements of the small detachments which would mostly have to carry the attack, and for the following up of the supporting weapons, light and heavy machine guns, ammunition carriers, signal communication men, etc. The terrain also had a decisive influence insofar as the district of the Eifel with its vast woods and numerous ravines was very unfavorable for the employment of the armored units, consequently, infantry corps had to be sent in here. In the northern part of the combat sector of the Army, the Ardennes cut across our direction of advance, and limited the movements of the armored units to a few, however excellent roads. This rendered attacks on the flanks and the roads of supply of the penetrating armored units easier than did the more open terrain in the southern part of the sector, as the enemy, if penetrated into the vast and almost impenetrable forests and ravines, would be able to hide here and organize a resistance behind our front line.

Re (d): Estimated time for the breakthrough. In fixing the time for the attack it had to be kept in mind that the infantry, operating more or less independently west of the Our, up to this point had to be supported by observed artillery fire of all calibers and smoke-shell mortars when it came to overcoming the first serious resistance. If this were not the case the support would be unsuccessful (But this observation was possible only up till 1700, if one reckoned with the date Dec 10, for the day of the attack, as I did. I looked for this resistance in front of or in the aforementioned contour line. If, as planned, the attack began between 1000 and 1030, there would be only 5 to 6 hours in which to get from the Our to the contour line. Thus, shortly before dark, the infantry would be facing its hardest job.

We could not expect the infantry to fight during darkness without effective support by all kinds of weapons, and direct cooperation with its own assault guns, as opposed to an enemy, fully prepared for defense and having 9 to 10 hours at his disposal for setting set. The time at the disposal of the infantry was not sufficient. These considerations of a technical nature led to the following conclusion: the attack during the daytime after the fire preparation, as envisaged by the Highest Command, does not with absolute certainty guarantee a penetration and breakthrough. The reasons for this have been fully discussed above: the situation of the enemy, the fighting qualities of our own troops, the terrain, and the estimate of time. We have to choose a method of attack commensurate with the capacities of the infantry, from which it must be demanded that it take the line, repeatedly mentioned, as soon as possible in order to run the Panzer Divisions through, which then have to exploit the night of the first day of the attack for achieving a breakthrough. I saw a possibility for this in the method of infiltration of assault troops and the infantry, following closely, over a broad front still under cover of darkness, a method often successfully employed by us and the Red Army in the east, considering the above mentioned, this method had the following advantages:

(1) Previous conduct of the enemy and the organization of his forces with scattered outposts and, in addition, the terrain definitely favored an infiltration. We could hope to push through the forward line of outposts and go around the strongpoints in the rear without the enemy’s noticing it if we aid it in the early morning or still during the darkness when the enemy slackened his alertness, and selected suitable crossing points along the Our and roads through the terrain west of the river. Consequently, the instructions of the Army also said that recognized strong points, sentry positions, etc, had to be bypassed, and that we had to push through, regardless of our neighbors, until an effective resistance would prevent our advancing on our own account without the support of observed artillery fire. Numerous forward observers of the artillery, instructed to cooperate with us, were to accompany our troops, and thus the artillery standing by, would be able to support this battle for the strong points in the depth with observed fire. If everything could be considered successful up to this point, it was also bound to be light or getting light, which did not exclude the possibility that some daring assault troops might succeed in further advancing. The attempt at infiltration would presumably be started at 0100 hr, according to our estimate of time needed for the infantry, equipped for combat, and the heavy supporting weapons to cover the necessary distance during the night and in completely unknown terrain.

(2) The fire preparation, in the form envisaged, is given up. The enemy is not to be awakened. I wanted this understood literally. On the other hand, the support by artillery and smoke-shell mortars is to be prepared in such a way that it can be started at any time when requested by the assault troops. This case may occur if the assault troops should unexpectedly meet strong resistance, impossible to overcome by means of their own weapons in close combat. Indisputably recognized strong islands of resistance and gun positions were allowed to be covered by fire in individual cases from a certain time on, still to be fixed, providing the caliber of the weapons, consumption of ammunition and terrain indicated a successful outcome. In general, an effort was to be made to observe a maximum of silence in order not to arouse the suspicion of the enemy.

(3) If we advanced in this way on numerous points, we could further hope that the infantry would be able to find many gaps of this kind. But even if some of the detachments did not succeed in penetrating through the extreme line of outposts and strong points in the rear because the enemy prevented them from advancing, if we disposed of our forces widely, if possible along the entire breadth of the front, we would still have some troops left which, commanded by daring men, might prepare the deep penetration by their advance or fire on the deep flanks, or even by attacking in the rear of the outosts of the enemy. Further, the advancing on numerous points had the advantage that the line of resistance of the enemy would be shattered in several places. The fire of the smaller units – companies, battalions, regiments, divisions – would have to be distributed over a broad front as, under the first impression of being attacked from all directions, the enemy would often be tricked into giving up his fixed plan of fire. Further, under the impression of the reports from the surprised troops, the local reserves are often sent in earlier than desired, and in the still confused situation under the shock-like effect on the troops attacked, the number, direction, and missions of the tactical reserves will often be fixed when it is still impossible to perceive what is the main thrust and which direction it will take. Thus an advance on a broad front throws the enemy into confusion.

(4) By an advance on numerous points the Our River would be crossed an a broad front. This was desirable so that we could quickly reconnoiter crossing points and start the bride-building at as many points as possible. The bridge-building at many points was also desirable for the opening of other possibilities for crossing in case the enemy destroyed one bridge.

(5) At the same time this method of attack would save a great amount of ammunition, which would now be available for the artillery for the second part of its task, to be carried out on the same day, that is the support for the battle for the line repeatedly mentioned.

(6) By attacking in this way, the cooperation of the Luftwaffe in the tactical area was unnecessary. In order to feel still more sure that a penetration and breakthrough would result in any case and quickly, we had to see to it and give instructions to the effect that the assault troops which at numerous points wanted – as put it – to be let in, be made so strong that they would be able to obtain admittance by force when attempts at preventing them from entering were made. These assault troops then, were to be made so strong that, in cooperation with their supporting arms, they would be able to overcome any resistance no matter what its strength. Their composition and organization, especially the selection of leaders, were just as important as reliable communications with an adequately strong artillery support.

As an orientation would no doubt be very difficult in the wooded and bushy terrain full of ravines, and these difficulties would be further increased by the fact that: (a) we could not instruct the troops as to the enterprise, and (b) the permanent troops did not have available enough leaders of reconnaissance patrols to lend to the attacking troops to lead them through the terrain, it was proposed that from a certain moment the terrain be floodlighted. So I hoped that, if not all, at least many assault troops, which were to be followed closely by the infantry, would have reached the line Lascheid, Heinerscheid, Roder, Hosingen late in the morning, and I thought it possible that some assault troops might even have already penetrated. At this time of the day the artillery would be able to support them with observed fire when requested, and if the situation further developed favorably we could already start the building of bridges.

These bridges were to be built in continuation of the large roads leading to and from the Our. These roads were the only accesses to the river, as the terrain alongside the roads was completely impassable because of lack of bridge equipment it was furthermore necessary to utilize the abutments, supports and remains of the destroyed bridges. In such cases much could be done by means of prefabricated makeshift equipment, and the real equipment, especially the motor-transport equipment, could be saved for the bridges across the Clerf River, the Ourthe River and the Meuse River, or if temporarily used, it could speedily be brought up, after having been replaced by temporary equipment.