Brainwashed and Endoctrined Kids - from the Hitler Jugend to the Waffen SS and from the Waffen SS to the Prisoner of War Cage

The attitude of the German population west of the Rhine shed a glaring light on the possible attitude of the population in the zone of the interior if they were to be submitted to a fateful, soul-trying crisis. They were sick of the war and they openly expressed their sentiments to the divisions stationed there. Neither was the attitude of the Volkssturm suited to confirm the belief of the field troops that Germany was ready to fight to the bitter end. Moral strength, which is sustained by bodily and spiritual influences, was insufficient as I have pointed out. So it is no wonder that these spiritual influences which should have strengthened the moral strength had no effect and proved lacking in most cases, in some cases even harmful, because they rested on insufficient or false assumptions: I have in mind here the work of the National Socialist Guidance Staff of the Wehrmacht which, with all its organizations, reached to the lowest echelons. Their message and methods were misguided. The confidence in the Highest Leadership disappeared rapidly, and no credence was given to the promises, no matter how cleverly they were disguised as assertions.

The morale of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions were at that time: generally more uniform and firm than that of the majority of the Army. This fact is due partly to exterior circumstances and partly to historical development: better reinforcements, excellent weapons, a large number of volunteers, traditions, better special services, an pmany soldiers of various ranks who returned from the hospitals. As the units of the Armored Forces (not only of the tank weapon) had their own replacement units in Germany and received a large number of recovered soldiers – as I have already pointed out they, too, were generally more homogeneously organized than other units of the Army. The knowledge that the Panzer units had to lead the attack, and consequently had to be committed at all critical points, produced a healthy pride in that branch of the service, a keen consciousness of responsibility, a strong devotion to duty, and an extraordinary eagerness for action, which were further strengthened by the fact that the Panzer divisions (or elements of them) received privileged treatment from the leadership of the Army or the Corps in the distribution of artillery guns, smoke-shell mortars, and airplanes. These feelings were strongly supported by the excellent way in which officers and NCOs behaved on the battlefield. The men had confidence in the abilities of their leaders of all ranks.

Two men of the 82nd Airborne Division bringing in a young German SS Trooper captured while on reconnaissance patrol during the Battle of the Bulge, 1944

Furthermore, the fact that the Panzer units were employed as a fire department made the static divisions in many cases considered deliverers of evil. They were popular and respected. This again increased the self-confidence and consciousness of responsibility of the Panzer units. The old men of the divisions, the combat experienced corporals and sergeants, set as fine, an example as the majority of the NCOs and officers. These again had confidence in their superiors (regimental or division commanders); the selection of whom was easier in the Panzer units than in other branches of the Army since they had a greater number of suitable personalities at their disposal. About the majority of these commanders, it can be said that they knew their job. But the war had lasted very long, and this fact was clearly felt when one considered the commanders of almost all units of the Army – except the Panzer units. No wonder, the Wehrmacht had been organized rapidly and rashly, and at the beginning of the war and during the same, the organizations had been puffed up when all the new units were activated. With this branch of the service, which was called fast mobile troops, later on, the term was changed to armored troops, and a new idea of leadership came into existence.

It originated in the Panzer troops and proved its truth in all theaters of the war. This arm developed in its leaders of all ranks a keen consciousness of responsibility, and the ability to think and act independently, and the success it achieved during, the years 1939-1941 produced eagerness for action, and joy in making decisions. When facing the enemy on the battlefield there is no indecision, and here leaders were developed. Owing to the small number of units, these leaders could be found easier and more surely in the Panzer troops than in the main body of the Army. The knowledge that they would always be sent in at decisive points compelled the leaders to give their troops thorough-going and careful training. The officer corps showed fairness in the effort, thought, and action. Their candor was clearly shown in their reports. If therefore, in the sixth year of the war officers and men of the Panzer troops were still excellent, the reason for this was that the men firmly trusted their superiors and comrades, and they knew that they would not let them down. He gave little credence to the high-sounding phrases about the miracle weapons and a strategy that would change the war. For the rank and file, the behavior of the officers on the battlefield was decisive and set an example.

Statements given by members of the former Wehrmacht after the unconditional surrender cannot shake my opinion, and above I have stated what my soldiers told me when I was among them. Despite many unfavorable influences on morale, the successful resistance in the Roer Sector against a much superior enemy gave the men the consciousness that their Watch on the Rhine still stood fast, and that they helped their comrades, who were heavily engaged on the eastern frontier of Germany and, furthermore, they knew that by their endurance the Highest Leadership gained time to make new decisions. This consciousness strengthened them.

Captured Fallschirmjaeger 1944

To my opinion, the following will explain the reasons why the men, the detachments, and the battalions were able to achieve such results as proved by the attack and the breakthrough:

(1) The belief that Hitler would master the situation, in any case, , since the official information spoke about modern weapons, a large-scale commitment of new types of German aircraft, a great number of new submarines on all oceans, increased industrial production. etc. He – the soldier himself had nothing to lose; since the fall of 1944 there was hardly any family in Germany which had not lost some of its members. He, too, believed the official propaganda, which told him that in all probability the enemy would enslave the German people in case of a victory.

(2) The man in the frontline would not be inferior to the civilian population of Germany, where young and old worked in the most difficult conditions, risking their health and even their lives. This obliged every man to strain every nerve.

(3) His confidence in his leaders and their skill. Until now they had not demanded impossibilities from him, they shared his fate, and they never gave orders that they were unable or not ready to carry out themselves.

d. Freshening up – Brief freshening up.

Unlike the divisions of the Waffen SS, which were employed with the 6.Panzer-Army during the attack, the attacking divisions of the 5.Panzer-Army got no breathing space for a ­freshening up of men and material, despite the fact that they had been heavily engaged for weeks. The freshening up of personnel was generally carried out by the replacement training battalions, which were the training centers of the divisions. In the Division Combat Schools they had a means of training that passed on to the replacements the experiences made during the last engagements, and which gave them the last combat drill. During the last year of the war, the critical situation at the front more and more often compelled the leadership of the divisions to transmit the replacements, which were assigned to them by higher commands, to the units as soon as they had had a superficial training in the replacement training battalions; during the last months, they even had to give up this training and transmit the replacements immediately to the units.

A pertinent, that is a systematic, training according to branch and time available for the training in the replace­ment training battalions definitely depended on the availability of adequate training personnel, local training facilities (suitable terrain, two or three schoolrooms), and an adequate amount of time. Experienced division commanders always kept a cadre of training personnel in the replacement training battalions; along with this, they could grant some of the combatants a possibility of getting rest and relaxation after the heavy engagements.

Battle of the Bulge

But in the course of time training material (ammunition, hand grenades, entrenching tools, motor fuel) became so scanty that not even improvisations were of any use. When sheltering replacement training battalions, suitable terrain, schoolrooms, and good shelters must be taken into consideration because these factors are indispensable for successful training. In the west and in the combat zones of Germany the number of these necessary facilities decreased considerably in 1944 so that the training of our scanty replacements was considerably hampered. In addition, the troops spent much time and energy carrying out of tasks assigned to them by higher commands. I here enumerate some of them: The digging of positions in the rear. Generally, this had to be done during darkness because of the danger of air raids. Briefing, training maneuvers, or alarm exercises in various cases of supposed landings of airborne enemy troops. In the western and eastern areas, bordering on the Rhine, where the main body of the replacement training battalions was stationed, maneuvers – even with very small detachments – were almost impossible, owing to the danger of air raids.

The bad physical condition of the men, caused by the scanty food rations, limited the possibilities of training them. As long as the training had to be carried out in the rear, the perceptible and serious deficiencies of the training in firing could not be smoothed out, as no terrain suitable for combat practice firing was available there. Despite the industrious work of staff and commanders, as of 1944, it was no longer impossible to transfer men and material to the divisions, which were to be freshened up, at so early a time that they were ready when the divisions arrived. Especially for the divisions which were to get a so-called brief freshening up, this was a severe blow, they could be expected to be employed again shortly after their arrival. Many of the divisions which had just had a freshening up lacked very important equipment. The same was true of many of the newly activated units, for instance, the Volksgrenadier Divisions. But also many other things, which make a freshening up what it ought to be, were lacking clothing, underwear, boots, patching, food reserves, etc.

The Bulge - German Side

Owing to all this the fighting qualities of the units were bound to sink to a seriously low level if the troops were not enabled to incorporate their replacements according to the table of organization. This would be impossible during the engagements. As the situation was serious on all fronts and in all sectors the divisions could not be withdrawn for a fairly long time but had to be submitted to the so-called brief freshening up. As signified by the term, this was, only an improvisation with all its disadvantages. But it might have been of some advantage if – apart from time – we could meet all other requirements which are necessary for a systematic, however short, freshening up. But generally, this was not the case. Transports of replacements arrived slowly, and generally, the troops were inadequately equipped with weapons and materials. Training material, as well as motor fuel, was not supplied. Terrain suitable for maneuver exercises and offering fields of fire was not available. In addition, these units had also tasks to fulfill as reserves, and thus their leaders with all their organizations and staff were fully occupied with carrying out briefing, reconnaissance, and establishing communication; they could not, therefore, attend to the training and freshening up of their troops to the extent which was necessary, considering the great deficiencies.

Furthermore, elements of the unit, intended as combat groups, had to hold themselves ready for employment within two hours, and consequently, their training was practically rendered impossible. Finally, I must point out the fact that the units of the Army (Heeres) had not been freshened up, provided they did not come from the German zone of the interior. More or less all of them lacked forces in men and materiel. These forces were not only desirable but also necessary. Necessary because we endeavored to achieve a success which was to be the objective of the attack; a change of the war in the west. The main point of the training for the offensive was combat practice, above all training in firing. In the first place counterattack with the supposition that the enemy had penetrated into our own positions had to be practiced. This additional supposition was made with a view to the measures of camouflage.

In using the method of attack, which I described elsewhere, the commitment of the assault comnanies, played a very important part. Consequently the training of them during the whole period of preparation was particularly necessary. Such companies were organically incorporated into the Volksgrenadier Divisions, one to each regiment. By order of the Army they were activated in the Panzer divisions for the offensive. They consisted of one assault, one engineer, and one reconnaissance platoon. They were equipped with Sturmsewehr 44 but had no machine guns. The engineer platoon had explosives, detonation agents, and flame throwers. The reconnaissance platoon was equipped with bicycles. The comnanies were composed of selected men, who got a special training. At least once a week a battalion maneuver had to take place, in order to train each battalion commander in the leading of his battalion.

Night maneuvers and training in orientation in the dark were especially stressed, likewise the camouflage of marching, fighting, and resting troops. In the shelter area accumulation of troops and vehicles had to be avoided, unless they were camouflaged. Training in digging had to take place very often, in order to teach the men how to increase the effectiveness of their fire by making a rest for the weapons, and how to limit that of the enemy fire according to the axiom that fighting and digging form an entity. The infantry should be given a systematic march training, and during nightly rests the men should be taught how to improvise protection against the inclemencies of the weather. The leaders did their best not only to further the training of the troops but also to harden them. But at the same time, the necessary rest and relaxation should be granted them. The lack of fuel limited the possibilities of training considerably. March training could not be carried out, at least not to the necessary extent. Impossible to carry out were above all combat exercises of the units with tanks, and drills in cooperation of the assault guns with the mounted Panzergrenadier or the infantry.

Trooper of the 99-ID takes 5 in Muringen

The practical training of the troops was supplemented by a theoretical one of officers and NCOs in map maneuvers. By this, intended combat exercises were carried out on a map with good results. Shortly before the beginning of the offensive, certain phases of the tasks assigned to the units could be displayed on the map, by which valuable suggestions of the best way of carrying out the orientations were made. But the numerous limitations as regards time terrain,
and material rendered systematic training impossible, and the excellent improvisations made by the commanders could not smooth out the deficiencies.

e. A final estimate of the fighting qualities of the units sent in.

General der Panzertruppen Hasso Eccard Freiherr von ManteuffelI estimate the fighting qualities of the units sent in to be the following at the beginning of the attack:

66.ARMY-CORPS
18.Volksgrenadier-Division suitable for attack. 90% men-material freshened up.
62.Volksgrenadier-Division fully suitable for attack. 90% men-material freshened up.

58.PANZER-CORPS
560.Volksgrenadier-Division Newly activated, the fighting qualities of which could not be estimated. Agreat number of young men without any combat experience. 90% men-material freshened up.
116.Panzer-Division very suitable for attack. 80% men-material freshened up.

47.PANZER-CORPS
26.Volksgrenadier-Division suitable for attack. 90% men-material freshened up.
2.Panzer-Division very suitable for attack. 80% men-material freshened up.
Panzer-Lehr-Division very suitable for attack. 90% men-material freshened up.

ARMY RESERVES
Führer-Begleit-Brigade very suitable for combat. Men and material freshened up.



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