Pursuit, now became the 14th Army’s primary mission, and, for the first time, was undertaken despite the monsoon, though at the reduced rate dictated by muddy roads and trails and the exhausted condition of the battle-scarred troops. Stilwell meanwhile had forged steadily ahead, probably, however, with one eye fixed anxiously on the 14th Army front. After a grueling 70-mile march in rugged mountain rain forests, the Marauders descended upon Myitkyina and seized the airstrip before the surprised Japs could put up an effective defense.
However, the inability of the Marauders to follow up their initial success (due to exhaustion and sickness) resulted in the hurried commitment of green American and Chinese troops who fled in panic in their first encounter with the enemy garrison of Myitkyina town. The Japs, taking advantage of the temporary confusion, brought in reinforcements and dug themselves in sufficient strength to withstand the Chinese-American attacks until Aug 3. Thereafter, Stilwell, too, went over to the pursuit but also on a limited scale due to the necessity for regrouping and refitting his forces. The first seven months of 1944 were the decisive months in the campaign to retake Burma; and August, as the month in which the British, Chinese, and Americans stood victorious on the north-central, northwest, and southwest battlegrounds, was the turning point in the campaign.
The crucial battles, which by odd coincidence had taken place practically simultaneously on three fronts, swept away the misconceptions, prejudices, and archaic military doctrines which had stood in the way of a vigorous concerted attack on the enemy ever since the grim days of 1942. Now, for the first time, all military leaders in CBI were willing to accept a few fundamental truths, namely: that the Chinese and Indians, when properly led, could match the Japs man for man and gun for gun, and beat them; that hoary tradition to the contrary, troops could, and should, fight on through the monsoon rather than move back into the hills and face the prospect of fighting over the same ground again with the return of each dry season; that the logistical headache imposed by hyper-secret agencies was one known as the OG (Operational Group) Command. This command, with headquarters located in Washington, was charged with the responsibility for the recruiting and training of military personnel, both officer and enlisted, for assignment to small, well-integrated platoons whose mission would consist of long-range penetrations into enemy areas for purposes of destruction, straight reconnaissance, or a combination of both. Whatever the specific mission of a specific OG platoon, however, it was manifest that the platoon survival would depend exclusively on the intelligence, resourcefulness, and courage of the men comprising it; where it was to go, there would be no supporting arms, no friendly adjacent units, and no reserves to succor it when it got into trouble.
For that reason, the recruiting board made every effort to appraise candidates accurately via personal interviews, mental and psychological tests, and physical fitness tests. Since long-range planning by the OG Operations Officer envisaged the use of such platoons in Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Holland, Belgium, France, China, Thailand, Malaya, Bunna, and the East Indies, the assignment of a recruit to a particular platoon was based mainly upon the foreign language requirement for that platoon, which, of course, in turn, was based upon the foreign country in which that platoon was expected to operate. The foreign country, in its turn, determined whether a platoon was to be trained for parachute invasion or amphibious invasion. Units scheduled for operations in Yugoslavia, for example, were given parachute training, whereas Greek OG’s were trained amphibiously.
The OG Platoon which eventually arrived in Burma was trained originally for employment in the East Indies. The color of the native population, lack of definite pro-American reception parties, the distance of the islands from friendly air bases, and the presence of strong Jap ack-ack batteries and interceptor squadrons in these islands dictated a submarine-LCR (Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Holland, Belgium, France, China, Thailand, Malaya, Bunna, and the East Indies) combination as the only sound means of penetration. Accordingly, the platoon was given amphibious training on Catalina Island before leaving the United States. In June of 1944, it arrived in Galle, Ceylon where the LCR landing and launching techniques were subjected to surf conditions generally heavier than any that might be encountered anywhere in the Indies. Towards the end of July two circumstances arose that completely changed the original objectives of the GO Platoon.
First, OSS Headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon, received orders from Washington to rescind all plans for operations in the East Indies and to concentrate instead on Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. Second, the XV Corps’ plans for renewed and greatly intensified attacks on the Arakan Front created a definite need for a number of small, specially trained, highly skilled amphibious units.
Reasons for the reconnaissance on the Arakan Front have already been stated in previous paragraphs. But why the need for amphibious units? The answer to this question lay, of course, in the missions assigned to the XV Corps. These were briefly as follows: (1) The seizure of forwarding airstrips to support the British 14th Army troops who would be out of the economical air-support radius of North Burma airbases by the time they reached Mandalay; (2) The seizure of an advanced naval base suitable as a staging area for an amphibious assault on Rangoon; (3) The isolation and destruction of the Japanese forces defending the Arakan in order to prevent their diversion to the 14th Army front. (Jap Arakan coastal forces consisted of the 55th Division plus Coast Artillery Units).
Mission (1) implied the seizure of Akyab whose all-weather airfield could be repaired and put into operation in a short time despite the heavy bombings it had received from American and British planes. Since Akyab was an island whose best beachhead lay in its northwest corner 8 water miles from Foul Point (the tip of the Mayu Peninsula), an amphibious operation was indicated. Ramree Island, 60 miles farther to the south offered ground for several fighter strips, but it was more important as the objective for the Mission 2.
Mission (2) Its harbor, and the channel between it and the mainland, offered protected anchorages for all types of craft and ships, from LCT to light cruisers and 3000-ton freighters. Finally, due to the nature of the terrain and the tactics to be employed, the accomplishment of Mission 3.
Mission (3) necessitated amphibious landings on the Arakan Coast. Gen Christison, XV Corps’ Commanding Officer, taking a leaf from Stilwell’s book of strategy, decided to use the 81st and 82nd West African Divisions and the 25th Indian Division as a frontal attacking force and to give the 26th Indian Division the role of the maneuvering element, committed to wide flanking movements which would place it in the Jap rear. Wide flanking movements in the Arakan area southeast of Akyab could be made in only one direction, however, and that was to the west and, hence, by way of the sea.
Analysis of the missions assigned to him had therefore prompted Gen Christison to accumulate a variety of amphibious units under his command. One of his organic divisions, the 26th Indian, was, at this very time (Sept.), undergoing amphibious training on the coast of India.
The 3rd SS (Special Service Commando) Brigade, already well-versed in amphibious assaults, was placed under XV Corps command early in September after a period of jungle training in Ceylon. Three motor launch flotillas, each composed of six 110-foot Families, had been placed in direct corps support. In addition to the conventional army units, there were a number of small, highly specialized teams that were scheduled to play an important part in the forthcoming operations.
Among these were the following: two Special Boat Sections, each consisting of two officers and ten enlisted men, and six Mark 1A-1 Kayaks (a collapsible, two-man, canvas canoe, propelled by means of double-bladed paddles) for employment on pre-invasion reconnaissance missions; the ‘COPPS’, combined army and navy personnel organized into balanced technical teams capable of making pre-invasion hydrographic studies of tentative beachheads, and limited terrain studies of the areas immediately behind the beaches; D-Force, a unit with lithe equipment (recordings of battle noises, amplifiers, firecrackers, which simulate machine gun bursts, shell whistles, etc) and personnel (a regular T/O Battalion of Indian Infantry) necessary to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main landing effort; E-Force, an air-sea rescue unit which operated a flotilla of small, fast P-boats.
