In the course of the landing, a Japanese float plane unsuccessfully attacked the convoy, again missing the target by a narrow margin. Shortly after the ships departed, another Japanese plane appeared, circled the landing beach, and dropped two bombs that landed just offshore. One platoon accompanied the boats to Zinoa Island and camouflaged them, while the rest of the battalion made an early morning move less than a mile inland to a mountain hideout that would serve as its patrol base. Local natives had already blazed a trail through the jungle and now provided bearers to assist in moving supplies. The parachutists created a dummy supply dump of empty boxes on a beach two miles to the north to invite enemy attention to the landing. To back up the diversion, on October 30, Halsey’s command released to the press news of the invasion by paratroopers. At least one newspaper illustrated the story with fanciful drawings of parachutists floating down from the sky. In the afternoon a small Marine patrol moved west along the seacoast to investigate possible sites for a PT base. Two other native patrols working farther away from Voza provided the battalion with information on the nearest Japanese dispositions. Approximately 200 enemies were guarding a barge station at Sangigai to the southeast, while another force was 18 miles to the northwest beyond the Warrior River. Krulak decided to attack Sangigai on the 30. On October 29, he sent out several patrols and personally led one to reconnoiter the objective. Krulak’s reinforced squad encountered 10 Japanese unloading a barge near Sangigai and killed seven of them. Later in the day an outpost drove off a Japanese platoon and killed seven more enemy soldiers. Some of the patrols observed considerable barge traffic moving along the coast.
On October 30, two companies reinforced by machine guns and rockets moved overland toward Sangigai. Easy Co continued down the beach trail while Fox Co split off and moved inland to take the base from the rear. Early in the morning, a prearranged airstrike of 12 torpedo bombers had hit identified enemy positions just outside Sangigai. When Easy Co approached the same area at 1430, it executed a bombardment with its mortars and 36 of the experimental rockets. The Japanese retreated to the interior after being hit by the barrage, with the apparent intent of occupying prepared defensive works located there. They arrived at their destination at the same time that Fox Co was approaching the area. The Marines, still in a single-file approach formation, were almost as surprised as the enemy; they received only the briefest warning from the accompanying native scouts. The lead platoon of parachutists reacted immediately and attacked; the next platoon in line moved out to the right of the route of march to flank the Japanese. The enemy occupied their positions and responded with rifles, machine guns, and knee mortars. After 15 minutes of heavy fighting, the parachutists were making slow progress when the Japanese suddenly launched a Banzai-style attack. Marine machine guns cut them down and stopped the charge in short order. Fox Co’s 3rd platoon then moved out to the left to cut off the enemy’s retreat, but the Japanese ran headlong into the 2nd Platoon instead and lost yet more men. About 40 escaped the net, but they left 72 dead on the battlefield.
While that fight raged in the jungle, Easy Co entered Sangigai unopposed. It destroyed supplies, installations, defensive positions, and one barge. Captured documents included a chart pinpointing minefields off Bougainville. The company then linked up with landing craft and made it back to base that evening. Casualties slowed the movement of Fox Co through the dense jungle and it ended up spending the night near the coast before getting boated back to Voza the next day. The cost of the victory was 6 dead, 1 missing, and 12 wounded, the last figure including Krulak, who suffered wounds in his face and arm from fragments. A flying boat evacuated the severest casualties and picked up the invaluable mine charts.
On November 1, Maj Warner T. Bigger, the battalion executive officer, launched an operation in the other direction with the goal of destroying barges in Choiseul Bay and bombarding enemy installations on Guppy Island. Maj Bigger and a reinforced George Co (less one rifle platoon) rode landing craft to the Warrior River, where they left their sole radio and a security team before moving overland toward their objective. Things began to go wrong thereafter. The native scouts were unfamiliar with the area and the patrol soon found itself going in a circle. Bigger and his force bivouacked for the night, but he sent one squad back to the Warrior River to make a report to the battalion by radio.
At dawn on November 2, the squad and radio team awoke to find a Japanese platoon in the immediate vicinity. After a firefight, the Marines broke contact and joined up with the boats, which were waiting along the coast at Nukiki. On the way back to Voza they observed eight Japanese barges at Moli Island, which indicated there was an even larger enemy force between the two wings of the 2nd Battalion. Concerned that Maj Bigger’s force might be cut off, Krulak requested air and PT support from 1-MAC and ordered the landing craft to return to the Warrior River. George Co had moved out for Choiseul Bay at 0630 and met up with a local native who guided them to the coast. They encountered an occupied bunker on the beach and killed five Japanese, then set up their 60-MM mortars and fired 142 rounds onto Guppy Island. (To obtain a clear area to fire the mortars, the Marines had to set up their weapons in the sea with only the upper half of the tubes projecting above the surface of the water).
The bombardment started several blazes, one obviously a burning fuel dump. The enemy replied with ineffective machine-gun fire from the island and farther up the coast. Maj Bigger and his main body returned to the Warrior River at 1600. They expected to meet the landing craft there but found none. When they attempted to cross the river to reach the radio team (unaware that it was gone) they came under fire from Japanese forces. After 90 minutes of fighting, three boats appeared, with Marines on board firing their weapons. The Japanese fire died down in the face of this new opposition and George Co embarked in the midst of heavy rain and high seas. One craft hit a reef after retracting from the beach and began to take on water. Then its engine died and it drifted toward the enemy-held beach. Two PT boats, one commanded by Lt John F. Kennedy, finally came on the scene and took aboard the men on that boat. Three aircraft appeared at the same time and covered the operation by strafing the shore. The combat patrol had killed 42 Japanese in several firefights and inflicted undetermined casualties and damage with its mortar fire. Marine losses were 2 killed, 1 wounded, and 2 missing (natives later recovered the bodies of these two men).
While Maj Bigger operated to the northwest, Krulak dispatched platoon-sized patrols to the southeast toward Sangigai. Two of them made contact with smaller enemy units on November 1. They dispatched at least 17 Japanese at the cost of one Marine killed. Intelligence gathered by Marine and native patrols indicated that the Japanese were moving from both directions to recapture Voza and secure their barge lines and the important coastal track (the only trail for movement to the northwest). There were an estimated 1800 enemy troops to the southeast and possibly 3000 in the opposite direction. Krulak assumed that the Japanese were becoming aware of the strength and limited mission of his force given the Marine withdrawals from Sangigai and Choiseul Bay. On the afternoon of November 2, he informed 1-MAC of developments and stated that his battalion could handle the enemy for a week, though increasing Japanese activity would hamper Marine patrol operations. In the meantime, he took steps to strengthen his defenses. He placed a platoon-size outguard on each flank of Voza, put his demolition platoon to work laying mines, and requested that PT boats patrol the coast to hinder the approach of Japanese forces by barge.
The corps staff had considered expanding the operation on October 30 by inserting the rest of the parachute regiment. Now they radioed Krulak and asked him for his ‘frank suggestion whether we should remove your outfit tomorrow night’. The message ended with a straightforward assessment: ‘Feel your mission accomplished’. The parachute commander responded that he expected a strong Japanese attack within 48 hours and recommended withdrawal in light of 1-MAC’s view that nothing further could be gained by continuing operations. Two days into the Empress Augusta Bay landing, it must have been obvious to the Japanese that the west coast of Bougainville was the main target and Choiseul was a diversion. In the afternoon of November 3, the battalion moved to the beach at Voza and established a perimeter pending the nighttime arrival of four LCIs (one of them a gunboat version to provide covering fire). The demolition platoon placed hundreds of booby traps on avenues of approach, including a rocket suspended in a tree and double-edged razor blades worked into palm trunks (to discourage snipers from clambering into their habitual perches). As darkness fell, native scouts reported that Japanese forces were moving closer and enemy patrols began to reach the Voza area near midnight, as evidenced by exploding booby traps. The three transport LCIs arrived just prior to that and beached by 0130. The parachutists were completely loaded in less than 20 minutes and were back at Vella Lavella by 0800. As the battalion marched to its camp, coast watchers were reporting the occupation of Voza by the enemy, who still was having difficulty with the varied devices left by the Marines. At a cost of 11 dead and 14 wounded, the 2nd Battalion had killed a minimum of 143 Japanese and seriously disrupted the movement of enemy forces from Choiseul to points northward.
The minefield chart also provided valuable assistance to naval operations in the Northern Solomons. Halsey ordered mines laid in the clear channels and they eventually sank two Japanese ships. In retrospect, 1-MAC may have staged the operation too late and with too small a force to serve as a good diversion, though it did have some effect on Japanese actions. The enemy apparently shuttled some troops from the Shortlands to Choiseul and on November 1 sent a heavy bomber strike to attack the task force they assumed would be located off the Voza beachhead. In any case, the raid kept the Japanese high command guessing for a time and certainly must have given them a reason to be concerned about the prospect of future attacks of a similar nature. Col Williams later would call the Choiseul operation ‘a brilliant little bit of work’.
Bob Burn’s Bazooka and the Bazooka
The Bazooka (Rocket Launcher) is a shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher that was developed by the United States during World War II. The initial design of the Bazooka was based on a combination of concepts and innovations from several sources. The key individuals involved in its development were: Dr. Robert H. Goddard: A pioneering rocket scientist who held patents for various rocket designs. His work laid the foundation for the development of early rocket technology; Edward Uhl: An engineer at the US Army’s Ordnance Department, who worked on a project known as the Super Bazooka, which aimed to develop an anti-tank rocket launcher. Lt Col Leslie Skinner: He played a significant role in combining Goddard’s and Uhl’s work to create the M-1 Bazooka (Rocket Launcher 2.36-inch (60-MM); and US Artist Bob Burns (photo above) who nicknamed his Rocket Launcher Music instrument Bazooka, a name that was finally used by the troops and later everyone in the Army while talking about this weapon.
The M-1 Bazooka, officially designated “Launcher, Rocket, 2.36-inch, M-1”, was the first version of the Bazooka used by the US Army during World War II. It fired a 2.36-inch (60-MM) rocket-propelled grenade designed to penetrate armored vehicles. The weapon was relatively simple to operate and played a crucial role in providing infantry units with a portable anti-tank capability. The Bazooka’s success led to the development of improved models, such as the M-9 then the M-9-A1, which were used in subsequent conflicts. Over time, more advanced anti-tank rocket launchers replaced the Bazooka, but it remains an iconic weapon of World War II.
In June 1942, the US Army officially adopted the Launcher, Rocket, Antitank, M-1. General Electric built the first 5000 weapons in a crash program to equip Army troops for the North African Campaign. When Soldiers first got their first look at the rocket launcher, they dubbed it ‘the bazooka’ after a musical instrument developed by entertainer Bob Burns. In June 1943, the 1st Corps (USMC) Experimental Rocket Platoon was formed with the mission of testing and evaluating the new bazooka. A detachment from the platoon participated in the Choiseul diversion with the 2nd Parachute Battalion from October 28 to November 3, 1943.
M-1 & M-1A-1 Rocket Launcher 2’36 (60-MM)
This was the first time Marines used the bazooka in combat. A detachment for the experimental rocket platoon went in with the Marine forces during the Bougainville operation in October 1943. The official history made note of this deployment – The 2.36-inch antitank bazooka was used on enemy emplacements on Hellzapoppin Ridge, but the crews were unable to get close enough for effective work. In the Pacific, Marines encountered many problems with the new bazookas. The battery-operated firing circuit was delicate and the rocket motors often failed because of high temperatures and humidity. But the weapon showed promise as a bunker buster for the infantry Marine. Lessons learned both in the Pacific and in North Africa were used to develop and field an improved version—the M-1A1 bazooka. New rockets were also fielded. These had improved motors that were less prone to failure due to environmental factors. By mid-1944, the bazooka was in general service in the Fleet Marine Force. The F-series Table of Organization, effective from May 5, 1944, authorized 172 bazookas in the Marine division. Each of the division’s three infantry regiments was equipped with 43 bazookas; 16 in the regimental weapons company, and nine in each of the infantry battalions. The rifle company had three bazookas under the F-10 Table of Organization. These weapons were assigned to the headquarters section and under the T&O, did not have assigned bazooka men. Instead, the weapons could be issued as the company commander saw fit based on the tactical situation.
M-9 Rocket Launcher 2’36 (60-MM)
The first widespread use of the bazooka in combat was during the Marianas Campaign in the summer of 1944. They proved extremely effective against Japanese field fortifications and tanks. For example, early in the morning of June 17, 1944, the enemy launched a tank attack with infantry support against the 2nd Marine Division on Saipan. About thirty tanks crashed into the Sixth Marine Regiment’s defensive positions. Bazooka teams hunted Japanese tanks in this intense, close-quarter fight. The Bazooka teams usually won, for Japanese tanks are weak. In October 1943, the Ordnance Department adopted a new model of bazooka, the M-9 & M-9A-1. This new launcher incorporated many improvements over earlier models. A trigger-operated magneto replaced the battery ignition system and a safety switch made the new model much safer. The tube could be broken down for easier carrying, an important consideration for the infantry Marine. New, more reliable rockets were also introduced. In a global war with competing demands and priorities, it was many months before the M-9 reached the Fleet Marine Force. These weapons were used in combat in the final campaigns of the Pacific War on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Once again, bazookas were frequently employed to knock out reinforced defensive positions. The bazooka’s main ammunition was a high explosive antitank round. The M-6 HEAT (High Explosive AT) rocket was standardized as the primary round in 1944. An earlier version—the M-6 HEAT rocket remained in service throughout the war. A practice rocket was also available. Late in the war, the M-10 white phosphorous smoke rocket was fielded, but this round did not see widespread combat use.
During World War II, almost 500.000 bazookas were produced to meet the demands of American and Allied forces. Although the 2.36-inch bazooka was a capable tank killer against Japanese armor, the same was not true in Europe. German tanks proved much harder to kill with bazookas. In late 1944, the Army Ordnance Department began work on a new, larger rocket launcher based on the M-9-A1. This weapon, the M-20 ‘Super Bazooka’ did not enter service until after the war was over. The M-20 would see combat service with Marines in Korea and other wars.
