Regarding the St Vith episode, I believe that enemy resistance at a time when the brigade started advancing was considerably underestimated. The brigade began to move as ordered and in the formation ordered, that is with light units in front as the advance detachment. This formation was intended for the expansion of an operational breakthrough, for such a breakthrough was the main objective of the mission issued by the army and corps. I was told to avoid a battle for St Vith, and again shown on the map the various advanced routes leading to the Meuse River. If after the arrival of the first units of my brigade at noon on December 19, I had had my armored group instead of the advance detachment, I would have made a tank assault on St Vith in spite of the adverse terrain west of the Wallerode Mill, 4000 Meters east of St Vith. This was impossible because the armored group was completely wedged-in on the road. Hence I decided to bypass St Vith on the north despite the unfavorable road conditions. It was soon made clear that the enemy knew how to exploit the events around St Vith during this delay.
In addition to the adverse weather conditions and terrain difficulties, the brigade was beset as early as the third day with a lack of fuel. This was even more detrimental because the only way to get fuel vehicles to the front was to have them towed by track vehicles. The fuel ran short so soon owing to the road conditions; twice as much as expected had been used. As I noted above, the brigade had to start its advance with half the allocated fuel. Another reason for the late arrival of fuel supplies lay in the distance that the supply columns had to cover. Still, another factor was the activity of enemy aircraft, which prevented more and more movement by day. Not enough distance could be covered by night. The fuel depots were not moved forward as the field units advance. It was reported that for reasons of secrecy the agencies in charge of supplies had been notified too late to procure the supplies west of the Rhine River, but I cannot comment on this report.
After Christmas, except for a few days, the enemy air activity prevented almost every movement of whole units on the roads. Assemblies and major operations were also attacked with increasing severity. Units had been directed to do their marching transferring and part of their fighting by night. Experience also showed that little enemy action could be expected for one to two hours after daybreak and one hour before sunset. There were three other essential factors that caused the failure of the entire Ardennes Offensive, (a) a smaller number of combat units were available than had been planned. Some of the units originally provided were probably needed at other endangered sectors of the front; others probably were not dispatched at all after the command realized that the Meuse River would not be reached and crossed in the period of four to five days planned; (b) the personnel and material status of many and said that reached the anticipated standards. The panzer divisions were all sorts of tanks. Some of the Volksgrenadier divisions and the Volks artillery Corps were short of horses. Consequently, there was no substantial support by corps or army artillery at the focal points of fighting, for example as St Vith and Bastogne. The brigade never received additional artillery support and always depended on its own single battalion. The extremely flexible enemy artillery, on the other hand, with its large expenditure of ammunition, was always superior to ours. This cost us much blood in difficult attacks. Furthermore, it must be considered that a number of divisions and partial units had been newly activated and had no combat experience and experience with teamwork; (c) there was no notable support by our Luftwaffe. The complete lack of their support on the one hand and the continuous enemy air activity on the other had a considerable effect on the morale of our troops.
Conclusion Every officer in every soldier to part in this operation knew of its significance. Through a lightning-like advance across the Meuse River in four to five days, to Antwerp in about fourteen days, it was to lead to the destruction of about half of the invading armies and the elimination of the import supply port of Antwerp. Hitler’s warning, that we would either take Antwerp or in 1945 be faced with a war of material, which we would not be equal to, clearly defined the stakes. The Supreme Command’s goal, to induce the west through a clear offensive victory to step out of the war or agree to negotiations that would allow a free hand in the east, had failed. Another reason for a speedy success, and also a reason for the early beginning on December 19, 1944, even though preparations had not yet been completed, was that the date of the beginning of the Russian offensive out of the Baranov Bridgehead was known.
By that date, the Eastern Front, which according to Hitler had been weakened to the limit in favor of the Ardennes Offensive, was to be furnished the bulk of the panzer divisions no longer needed in the west. Instead, the departure of the divisions earmarked for the east was delayed by weeks after the failure of the offensive for a lack of fuel. It was further hoped that this offensive would diminish attacks on Germany and her paralyzed key industries. The industries could again attain their full capacity output of armaments in the construction of new types of airplanes, production of synthetic gasoline, etc. But these hopes were also frustrated. The optimism wakened by the first success of the Ardennes Offensive both at home and with the men at the Eastern Front turned into dejection. Among the units participating in the offensive, the initially excellent psychological attitude of the soldiers was profoundly shocking.
When I reported to Hitler on January 30, 1945, I frankly stated that the frustration of hope had had a paralyzing effect on the troops, that with the decimated units I had seen everywhere after the offensive, the race could no longer be won. With the great hopes of the offensive abandoned, we all now hoped that the Government would find a political solution for ending the war. If the German officer, like any soldier, continued to do his duty true to his oath and resigned himself to fight on in compliance with orders, he did so in the belief that at any hour a political solution would come. On the Eastern Front, however, he fought with the knowledge that every yard of German soil trodden and defiled by Bolshevism signified the annihilation and destruction of German and Occidental culture.
/s/ Remer
