The Eleventh Day – High Water Mark
The high water mark was reached on December 26, when Gen Ernest N. Harmon’s 2nd Armored Division defeated its German counterpart, the 2.SS-Panzer-Division, and the German advance was halted. The enemy had reached a point seventeen miles from Dinant, Belgium. Now, Patton’s column had reached Bastogne and the enemy, facing possible disaster, slowly withdrew. By this time also the real threat of assassination had ended. To many CIC’s sensitivity to the possibility of such action had seemed overly zealous. Eisenhower, in his Crusade in Europe, was critical of the Extraordinary Fears of the Security Corps. I was irritated he wrote, at the insistence of the Security Corps that I definitely circumscribe my freedom of movement, but I found that unless I conformed reasonably to their desires they merely used more men for protective measures. His naval aide, Commander Harry C. Butcher, titled the entry in his journal Saturday, December 23, 1944, Prisoner of Security Police and wrote as follows: There are all sorts of guards, some with machine guns, around the house, and he (Eisenhower) had to travel to and from the office led and at times followed by an armed guard in a jeep. He got some satisfaction yesterday in stepping out for a walk around the yard in deep snow, in the eyes of the security officers probably quite the most dangerous thing for him to do.
SS-Obersturmbannfürer Otto Skorzeny Denies the Plan
Otto Skorzeny, perhaps the only man who would know whether he had ever planned an attack on the Supreme Allied Commander, has never admitted to it. In his megalomaniacal account of his victories and defeats, Skorzeny’s Secret Missions, Skorzeny protested greatly against any claim of his participation in an assassination plot. He suggested that such an attempt, if successful, would have been a frihtful crime. Perhaps he protested too much.
Exit German Intelligence Service
The Panzer-Brigade 150 and the Einheit Stielau had attempted small commando-type infiltration, deceptive reconnaissance, and full-scale tactical warfare. At each turn, they had been beaten. Skorzeny, upon his capture, claimed only two successful missions for his Einheit Stielau but amended the number to four in his book. The four, he stated, offered such clear and precise reports that their veracity could not be suspects. He added that two or four more teams may have crossed the lines, two being captured. Skorzeny gives no account of the other two teams.
Reasons for Failure
The German deception had failed because roadblock personnel and rolling guards had used the information collected by CIC interrogators and disseminated it rapidly to aid in the identification of the infiltrating units. The following activities became almost routine: (1) With vehicles, attention was directed in the rear, especially for radios and sabotage equipment. (2) Helmets were checked for the presence of markings which, among the Allied forces, designated officers and non-officer personnel. The Germans had overlooked these design elements. (3) Passwords were demanded and those who did not know the word currently in effect were scrutinized quite carefully to make sure they were genuine American personnel. (4) Since the driver usually was the poorest linguist among the members of the Einheit Stielau teams, drivers of vehicles were questioned thoroughly. No one could answer for him. (5) Vehicle trip tickets were examined in rear areas. (6) Any soldier possessing US or British currency was suspect. (7) Identity documents were checked carefully. CIC had warned that the Germans would use their pay-books to identify themselves; all Germans in the Einheit Stielau carried AGO #65-4 identity cards although few authentic ones were in the theater, and few Germans had Dog Tags (since they were not issued and it required personal initiative to confiscate them from US prisoners of war).
Other Einheit Stielau Men Captured
Throughout records of the Ardennes Campaign, there were scattered references to other captures of teams of the Einheit Stielau. One report, for instance, mentioned the capture of a team when they took a vehicle to an Ordnance Maintenance Unbit for repair. Other reports indicated heroism and alertness on the part of an individual soldier, who finding himself caught by two of the imposters, berated them in German for interfering with his mission and walked away, only to return with reinforcements that captured one German and killed the other. Though some of these reports were widespread, no unit or individual identification, no location, and no reports of interrogations are available which would serve to verify them.
