One man in the patrol chose to stay behind. Within fifty yards of enemy gunners, he lay in the deep snow all night. He made slight movements of his hands and feet to keep from freezing, but knowing the enemy would be alert to a movement for some time after the patrol had been stirring, he waited till daylight before starting to creep. He made his way, almost numb, to the man whom he had stayed behind to save, a man who had been hit seriously by machine-gun fire and had fallen into a ditch.
He tore his snow suit to make bandages and applied them hastily to the man’s back. Snipers noted the movement by then and started to fire occasionally in his direction. He dragged the man over the snow to the Five Corners, where he found a wheelbarrow. He placed the wounded man inside and wheeled it toward his own lines by a covered route. He tried to solicit help from civilians; one gave him cognac, but all feared German reprisals and turned him away. He reached at last an Able Co 120 outpost and procured aid there. The wounded man was saved. The man who brought him to safety was his assistant squad leader, Sgt Herman A. Fischer.
On New Year’s Day, 1945, the Luftwaffe assembled to strike what they hoped to be a decisive blow against American and British airfields. Apparently ‘Fatso Goering’, lover of good drink himself, thought that our flyers would be suffering from New Year’s hangovers. The Luftwaffe, according to reports later received, did execute some damage on Allied aircraft but American and British fighter pilots, alert and ready, shot down many of the German planes. As a result, the Germans suffered far more damage than they inflicted. A squadron or so of German fighters flew low over the Regimental area, apparently lost and looking for landmarks. Our infantrymen manning caliber .50 guns accounted for three. Two were seen falling in flames after having made their way back over the German lines while a third crashed on the edge of the ravine opposite the Regimental Command Post.
Otaimont and Houyire
On January 2, two raiding parties were planned. Item Co 120 was briefed on attacking strategic ground 500 yards southeast of Otaimont from the north through our lines. It was to take prisoners and withdraw on order to our regular positions. Meanwhile, Baker Co 526th Armored Infantry Battalion (Separate) was to drive through Hedomont and Baugnez for Houyire, the high ground 1500 yards southwest of Baugnez. It was to be supported by fire from the 1/120, and also to be prepared to withdraw on order.
So, at 0830, on January 3, both companies moved out on schedule. The day was foggy, snow fell for almost an hour, and observation for supporting fire was almost impossible. Item Co 120 met a force of only about thirty men, who offered little resistance. It appeared that the raid would be a fast, snappy affair; the 3d Platoon, leading on the left, had already pushed beyond the town and along a hedge into a wooded area. Then suddenly events took a change for the worse and appearing apparently from nowhere the enemy inflicted seven casualties upon the 3d Platoon. Actually, the new snow had sided with the Germans and had camouflaged their defensive position. The 3d Platoon had walked on top of them before realizing it. But the tankers were speeding into the town, and after some had reached the woods, they helped hush out the enemy. The tanks had to keep shifting position lest German AT teams slip up on them, as they frequently tried to do using their Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. Gradually the enemy mortar and artillery fire on Otaimont increased in intensity, and throughout the day was so strong that Item Co 120 men suffered seven casualties from mortar fire alone. The 1st Platoon lost its leader, and its sergeant and acting runner assumed the leadership during the fight.
Capt Charles R. Shaw, commanding the company, says of that platoon runner that he ‘ran it like a veteran, placing the squads in position and supervising their digging-in. All day he continually checked with the company CP and his squads’. Item Co 120 soon came to know this remarkable runner. His name was Sgt Ramon R. Zepeda. During the severest time of the fight, S/Sgt Charles L. Tate of Item Co 120 saw a wounded comrade, suffering from the shock from his wounds, dazedly wandering around in an area being sprayed by intense enemy small-arms fire. Disregarding the danger to his life, S/Sgt Tate rushed a distance of 20 yards to the wounded man to assist him in covering. While helping his comrade to safety, S/Sgt Tate was killed. Thus died a brave soldier. There is no greater courage than that of giving one’s life to save another.
Item Co 120 had taken three prisoners when at about 1930, according to plan, it was ordered to withdraw. Resistance proved stiffer against Baker Co 526-AIB, however. They reached Hedomont, but just beyond the town met withering machine gun fire which made it clear that the Germans intended to hold Houyire at any cost. Artillery had been light until about 1630, but when Baker Co 526-AIB withdrew, enemy fires increased considerably.
Foxhole Life – 1945
The next week saw our defenses ever improving. Recon patrols explored the wooded areas of the front and located enemy islands of defense. The men in foxholes were living crudely, and there was no small danger of trench foot and frozen hands and ears, as well as common colds.
Doughboys were therefore rotated to nearby houses where they might warm up, wash, massage their feet, have haircuts, and eat. Squad leaders led men in daily walks within the area to exercise their feet and keep the men active. Feet are the most sensitive parts of the body to cold, and standing stationary guard for a prolonged period was an uncomfortable and dreaded duty for the men of the 120-IR in the cold January snow. Col Purdue designed ‘booties’, simple moccasins made of three thicknesses of blanket cloth.
T/5 Morris Pinter, the Regimental tailor, perfected the design. These booties were worn under overshoes in lieu of shoes and proved of great value in adding to the comfort and preserving the health of the men. Maj John J. Eberhardt and Capt Robert McClain worked incessantly for nearly three weeks procuring a large number of American and captured German blankets required for the project. Furthermore, Capt Robert McClain accomplished a miracle in finding and prevailing upon a salvage repair unit to do the necessary sewing. Care of the feet was vital in this weather, and the ‘booties’ proved of the highest value in adding to the comfort and preserving the health of the men.
The snow had added new problems to the tactical operations. Patrols began to improvise snowsuits from sheets and old goods in abandoned buildings; almost all the soldiers found material to use as a white cover for their helmets. For transportation of ammunition, sleds and toboggans were found or constructed. On January 5, the 1/119, was attached to the 120-IR, and relieved elements of the 99-IB-(S) in their positions in the vicinity of Bévercé. The 99-IB-(S) and the 526-AIB-(S) were 
released from attachment to our Regiment. Reverting to Regimental control, the 2/120 took over the positions around Chodes which had been occupied by the 526-AIB. On January 8, the 2/120 relieved the 3/120 on the line, while the latter took over the positions at Chodes.
D-Day in Belgium
Attack plans meanwhile had been drawn up, and D-Day was to be Saturday, January 13. H-hour was 0800. The strategy of the operation was a double strike, one from each flank of the Regimental zone aimed at the enemy’s probable strong points. From the right flank near Malmedy, the 3d Battalion of the 120-IR was to move forward to take 
Houyire, the high ground southwest of Baugnez (Five Points Crossroads), while the 2d Battalion of the 120-IR from Weismes (Waimes) planned to take the small settlement of Thirimont and the Hauts Sarts, the high ground south of it.
Accordingly, on the night of January 12, the 2/120 moved to Weismes (Waime). The 1/120 was to attack through the other battalions after they had secured their objectives; it was prepared to seize Ligneuville.
Houyire
On schedule, at 0800, both battalions struck. Deep snow slowed the advancing units with tanks and tank destroyers was useless. The 3/120 plan was a \’pincer\’ on a small scale. King Co with tanks attached was to attack between Hedomont and Geromont from the northwest of Houyire, while Love Co was to strike south from the vicinity of the Five Points Crossroads, both to meet upon the high ground. Echeloned to the left rear of King Co, Item Co would move between the lead companies, clearing out Geromont and by-passed pockets en route. The plan looked perfect. But from the minute the attack began, things did not go well.
The two lead companies met withering small-arms fire. Item Co 120 moved out, and desiring to gain contact with King Co 120, swung more and more to the right. After clearing Geromont, Item Co continued 300 to 400 yards, still without contacting King Co. A sudden wall of small-arms resistance met the Item Co riflemen as they trudged through the knee-deep snow toward Houyire.
Members of the lead platoon heard their commander, Lt Andrews, yell ‘Keep moving!’ just before he fell a strong platoon. Still undaunted, they pushed forward to take the remainder of the high ground that they found farther to the south overlooking Ligneuville. Suddenly came much firing to Item Co 120’s right rear and soon the sounds were discovered to emanate from a platoon of King Co, led by Lt Merle J. Sheen, which was struggling with an enemy force. The remainder of King Co was still battling far behind, and Item Co’s platoon joined with that King Co to continue the drive forward. The two platoons made an advance of 1000 yards, overcoming an enemy patrol and reaching within 500 yards of German artillery pieces. Then, at 1500, word reached the group that King Co and Love Co had gained the main heights of Houyire, and that the remainder of Item Co was to return there, leaving King Co’s platoon on the outpost.
# 2-37AE-P17
MALMEDY BELGIUM MISTAKEN BOMBING 23 AND 25 DECEMBER 1944
(Official Record after Investigation)
Conclusion & Information – January 1945
Allied Air Commanders’ Conference
This was held at SHAEF in Versailles (France) on Thursday, January 4, 1945. (Gen Carl Tooey Spaatz, US Strategic Air Forces in
Bibliography
(1) Notes on the Allied Air Commanders’ Conference, January 4, 1945. Files of the Air Historical Archives, Air University, Maxwell Field (Alabama). (2) The Army Air Forces in World War Two, Volume Three, Europe; Argument to V-E Day, Jan 1944 to May 1945. Chap. 18, Autumn Assault on Germany, by John E. Fagg. p. 670. In army Library; General Reference Section, OCMH; Air Force Historical Office.
Documentation
(Translated Version for better understanding) On December 23, 1944, the 322nd Bombardment Group (Medium), part of the 99th Combat Bombardment Wing of the 9th Bombardment Division (Medium), conducted an afternoon bombing mission targeting the communications center at Zülpich (Germany). A total of 28 aircraft (a/c) were dispatched, including two Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft equipped for radar navigation. Of these, five aircraft struck alternate targets, releasing a total of sixty-four 250-pound general-purpose bombs (GP 250). Three aircraft deployed radar-jamming ‘window’ during the mission. Eighteen aircraft failed to bomb the intended target. Six of these were led by flight commanders who were unable to locate Zülpich (Germany) due to adverse weather conditions. Two PFF aircraft returned to base after their navigators determined that the formation would arrive twelve minutes late over the target area as a result of a delayed takeoff.
Six other aircraft mistakenly bombed the town of Malmedy (Belgium), located approximately half a mile west of the bomb line, after misidentifying it as the assigned target. Four additional aircraft did not complete their bombing runs for various reasons: two jettisoned their payloads after sustaining flak damage, one was unable to catch up with the formation, and one refrained from bombing after the lead aircraft dropped its load prematurely.
The bombs from one aircraft, which landed at Couvron (France), were unaccounted for in the final tally. Four aircraft attacked targets of opportunity, though the specific nature and location of these targets remain unknown. One aircraft dropped its bombs on the town of Gladbach (Germany) (map grid F-230410), though there was no photographic coverage or visual confirmation of the strike’s effectiveness. There were no aircraft losses during the mission. However, eighteen aircraft sustained varying degrees of damage from anti-aircraft fire. No crew casualties were reported.
Failures to Bomb
Group N° 322; (1) Personnel Bombardier misidentified target; (2) Other bombs hit the town of Malmedy (Belgium) in friendly territory. (Observations) Weather Zülpich (Germany) 322-BG: Clear, Snow on the ground, Visibility 4-6 miles in base; (S/A Photo Reports) 322-BG cameras photographing 100%; (Flak Analysis)(annex) Zülpich Rail Communications Center (Germany). 322-BG; No aircraft was lost to flak, but 18 were damaged; Flak in the target area started out to be moderate and inaccurate. However, as the aircraft reached the inner defense zone of 18 heavy guns, the fire became intense and accurate. This target represents one of the more heavily defended areas of the enemy’s communication system. Moderate to intense fire could be expected from the 18 heavy guns plotted. (IX-BD Photo Interpretation) S-2 Report (First Phase Interpretation), signed (typed name) by Capt Bernhard O. (Hougen), Photo Interpreter.
Photos of 322-Bomber Group Target hit: Malmedy (Belgium), (A) Target Briefed: Zülpich (Primary); Target Briefed: None (Secondary); (B) M.P.I.: Center of Town; A.P.: Same. (C) N°. & Type of aircrafts dispatched: 26 B-26s. 11 attacking; (D) Bombing b: 3’s 6’s, …: 6’s. (E) N° and size of bombs dropped: 4 x 1000 GP, 150 x 250 GP; (F) Heading aircraft when bombs dropped: Approx. 30′.; (G) Time bombs dropped: 1526; (H) Activity at target: None.; (J) Results of the bombing: Due to operational difficulties, weather, and enemy activity, the aircraft could not fly their designated positions in their respective boxes and flights; it is impossible to determine the bombing by either boxes or flight due to this. 6 aircrafts. P.N.B. Bombs hit through the center of the town of Malmedy (Belgium), on buildings and streets in the town. 1 aircraft P.N.B. Location of strikes undetermined due to poor quality of photos hits in fields, aircraft hit by Flak, one engine out, jettisoned bombs. No photos of other bombings. NB. PNB was probably Primary Not Bombed, according to postwar AF sources.
322-BG OPFLASH Report To be teletyped to the IX-BD within two hours after the last plane landed. (A) Briefed Primary: Zülpich; (B) N° A/A attacking: Primary; 6 Secondary. Believed Lammersdorf (Germany) (F3435) hit the center of town, Excellent; (C) Bombs. 86 Secondary; (D) Results of Bombing: Primary, None; Secondary: Believed Lammersdorf hit the center of town and walked through, Excellent; (E) N° a/c: (as to casualties), 5 damaged; (F) Flak: Target: Moderate and Inaccurate; Elsewhere: IP Intense and Accurate; (G) Altitudes of Attacks: 12.000 Secondary; (H) Time over Targets 1526-1530, Secondary. The more official OPFLASH from the 322-BG was the teletyped OPFLASH N° 228 for 23 Dec. At 231915A Dec., to the IX Bomber Command (to A-2) and CG, 99th Combat Wing. It contained more of the above information of the preliminary report, but, as amended at 2210A, to indicate some of its above data. The most important was Par. B & D to read: 11 a/c Secondary – Lammersdorf (F-3435).
Pilot Interrogation Reports
Maj G.J. Watson; Eft Leader; Box 1, Flt. 1, Pos. 1; took off, 1408, landed, 1655. Altitude, 12.300; hour, 1526. Hit town – not target – might be Lammersdorf. Excellent results in town. Bombs Dropped a load of 13 x 250 GPs. Weather Ground haze. CAVU. Flak is Intense and accurate. Opposition None.
Lt D.R. Gustafson; 451 Sq; Box 2, Flt. 2, Pos. 4; took off, 1340, landed 1700. Altitude, 12.000; hour 1529. Hit the center of town and walked out. Not target. Excellent, Bombs Dropped a load of 16 x 250 GPs. Weather 0/10 in haze. Flak is Intense and accurate. Opposition None.
Lt R. W. Eyeberg; 452 Sq; Box 1, Flt. 1, Pos. l; took off, 1404, landed 1705. Altitude 12.300; hour 1526; Hit the town of Lammersdorf – not the target; Excellent on town; Bombs Dropped load of 16 x 250 GPs. Weather Ground haze. CAVU. Flak is Intense and accurate at IP. Opposition None.
Lt R.W. Pike; 451 Sq; Box 2, Flt. 2, Pos. 1; took off at 1328, landed at 1700. Altitude 12.000; hour 1530, Bombs through the center of town – not target. Excellent results. Bombs Dropped a load of 13 x 250 GPs. Weather haze on the ground. CAVU. Flak is Intense and accurate. Opposition None.
Lt E.S. Isaac; 450 Sq; Box 1, Fit. 2, Pos. 45 took off, 1408, landed 1720. Altitude 12.000; hour 1526, Hit center of town – not target. Excellent results in town. Bombs Dropped 12 of 13 x 250 GPs. Weather CAVC. Flak is Intense and accurate. Opposition None.
X Conley; 451 Sq; Box 2, Flt 2, Pos. 2; took off, 1335, landed 1730. Altitude 12.000; hour 1530, Bombs blanketed the small town, did not bomb primary, 3 or 4 runs on T/0. Bombs Dropped a load of 16 x 250 GPs. Salvoed bombs around. Weather over secondary, grd-haze 2/10 strato. Flak Primary target, intense and accurate. Opposition 2 ME-109s SE Zülpich.
322-BG Log of Million Dec 23 44
Zülpich Defended Area
1145 – Notified of target by operations.
1230-1300 – Prebriefing.
1520 – F/0 #399 and Intelligence annex received.
1640 – Interrogation started.
1730 – Interrogation ended.
1845 – OPFALSH and 2-hour phone report.
Orders
A. IX Bombardment Division; (1) Typed summary of FO #680. The 322-BG of tre 99-BW was to bomb, blind, the Zülpich Railhead (Germany) (F-230327), at 1530. (2) A chart (typed) of the wing’s mission and details. The 99-BW’s target was the Zülpich Railhead (F-230327). The notation ‘Spec. Photos’ was entered in the target column, probably indicating the requirement to take them or the target had been set up as the result of such photos. Specifically, the target was a small railhead 7 miles from the bomb line, and in general, Zülpich was to be bombed as a small village with an important road net. Attack’s objective was to destroy supplies in the railhead and to cut communication in the area.
A Tactical Significance column applied to railheads of Münstereifel (Germany) Zülpich (Germany) and Nideggen (Germany), as follows: The German 7.Army which jumped off in an attack about 6 days ago are depending on these 3 feeder line railheads for all types of supplies and reinforcements, as the Germans expected to capture a lot of supplies and as they did not, they are rather in bad need of supplies. Bombing Visual and Blind. NB. Bombline mentioned was that of the Medium Bomber interdiction line which curved westward from the Rhine River and Bonn (Germany) to pass midway between Zülpich (Germany) and Düren (Germany).
Houyire
The 2/120 found its assignment tougher. Thirimont and the hill behind it were considered by the enemy to be the key to the area, and he clung to them tenaciously. Artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire were deluged upon the attackers. George Co 120 with one platoon of How Co attached, pushed forward and with supreme effort gained the outskirts of Thirimont. Alone the company fought to the main street in the rural settlement. Fox Co had been assigned to clear the route for armor since the path which George Co guided upon was unsuitable for tanks. But Fox Co met the most petrifying fire and was forced to halt when the casualty toll reached a demoralizing total.
All officers in the company except the commander became casualties. Tanks endeavoring to lead the way struck mines. This left George Co in possession of a third of the town without support; it had taken approximately fifty prisoners but its casualties were also numerous. ‘We saw some men in white uniforms, like the ones our men were wearing’, said Lt Robert S. Warnick, one of George Co officers, ‘and they came into town over the way Fox Co was scheduled to use. We shouted to them and figured that at last, we had some reinforcement. But the men in white began shooting at us, and with binoculars, we picked up their Jerry uniforms; we had to tighten our defense and keep fighting’.
It wasn’t till we tried to send our prisoners back that we realized we were surrounded. The Krauts had closed around at our rear, and we realized we were cut off in that Godforsaken Town. At the same time the men were fighting all over the place, in the houses that were spread far apart, and mostly from room to room. All we could do was hope Easy Co would break through the Jerry ring and come to our help. Just before noon, we spotted about a hundred infantrymen counter-attacking us, and we had to call for all the artillery we could. We kept fighting without losing ground until evening came on, and we still hadn’t received any help.
When we spotted more tanks and infantry coming toward us, we drew in our 1st Platoon and tightened up for the defense. About this time we received permission to withdraw; 2 and the company commander, Lt Charles W. Moncrieff, called the officers together to decide how we could best extricate ourselves without taking too many casualties in the process. It was at best a ticklish situation. The officers met at a house near the main road in town, and it wasn’t easy to get there, because the Krauts had the road zeroed in with automatic fire, and everyone that crossed it had to run to dodge the bursts of fire directed down the street at him. We were all together deciding how to get out of town when the enemy tanks broke through the lines and cut our company in half. They came whipping up the street right at the house where we were. We had to call artillery on the street to keep the tanks at bay.
