Additional harassment of the Japanese forces was carried on by the submarine command. Operating outmoded S-class boats out of bases at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor (and later at Adak and Attu), the Navy attacked Japanese shipping throughout the Northern Pacific, including the Sea of Okhotsk and the Japanese home islands. Even with defective torpedos which often went haywire and/or failed to explode on impact, the S-boats accounted for almost 25 percent of the Japanese shipping sunk in the Northern Pacific campaign, with a loss of two subs. While there were numerous reports of sitings of Japanese submarines in Alaskan waters (the RCAF maintained anti-submarine patrols out of Yakutat and Annette Island, and one Japanese sub was sunk in the Panhandle area), the Japanese use of submarines was ineffective, with most being assigned to resupply duty rather than harassing shipping.
Another Navy effort in Alaska, the introduction of motor patrol-torpedo (PT) boats, was doomed to failure. Three squadrons (MTB DIV 1 with four craft and MTB DIV 13 with 12 craft at Adak and MTB DIV 16 with six craft at Attu) were assigned, but proved unsuited to Alaskan usage and lacked tactical targets. The small craft with plywood hulls was no match for turbulent seas, and the lack of insulation led to the formation of ice up to two inches thick on interior hull surfaces. The only tactical use of the PT boats was as decoys in the Kiska invasion: plywood panels were attached to resemble landing craft, and they were paraded offshore in front of the Japanese positions while the main force hit the other side of the island. Otherwise, PT boats served supply, rescue, and patrol duty, when they were able. The role of the Coast Guard was relatively minor. It continued to attempt to provide fisheries patrol and search and rescue functions, although the war effort curtailed much of this. The Coast Guard did operate port and communications facilities in the Southeast and the Gulf of Alaska, where the Navy increasingly turned over responsibilities as its attentions were drawn to the west.
The Army had planned to occupy Tanaga along with Atka after the Adak base was established, but there was no pressing reason to do so. There was, however, concern that the Japanese would move to occupy Amchitka, 60 miles east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz directed Theobald to preempt any such occupation, and Col Talley was sent with a party of Alaska Scouts to reconnoiter the island for an airfield site in December 1942. Gen Marshall approved the advance to Amchitka and agreed to assign troops for an invasion of the Japanese-held islands. While planning for the Amchitka occupation was underway, another change in the command structure occurred. In late December 1942, Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher inspected NORPACFOR and evaluated Adm Theobald. On January 4, 1943, Theobald was transferred out and his command was assumed by RAdm Thomas C. Kinkaid, a former carrier commander in the Southwest Pacific. Theobald’s second-in-command, RAdm W.W. Smith was also replaced by RAdm Charles H. McMorris.
Kincaid, a combat veteran who liked the action and was more to Buckner’s liking, immediately went on the offensive, arranging for a task force to deliver the Army’s Amchitka occupation force of 2000 under Gen Lloyd E. Jones. After weather delays, the force finally landed on January 11, 1943, and begin work on the runway. The Japanese discovered the encroachment on January 24, but the strip was finished by February 16, and eight P-40s flew in to drive away the Japanese, who had maintained intermittent harassing bombing of the garrison. By the end of February, there were 8000 troops on Amchitka and an operational air base that could send planes out to attack Kiska and Attu at will. Six or seven missions could be flown every day, weather permitting. February 13, 1943, however, marked the last bombing mission flown by B-17s; these aircraft were withdrawn in favor of the bigger payload, longer-range B-24s. Perhaps as few as 100 B-17s saw service in the entire Pacific area.
The position of the Japanese on Kiska and Attu was barely tenable. While they could perhaps hold out indefinitely on strictly tactical grounds, having sufficient numbers and being dug in, they were limited by their lack of air power and a very tenuous supply line. The Army and Navy area commanders realized that they could not hold the islands without massive reinforcements and an offensive campaign to drive back the US forces, but their requests for men and materiel were denied, as was their request to withdraw, since it was felt that such would leave Japan open to attack by the US and/or the USSR. The Battle of the Komandorskis was to determine the final outcome by severing that supply line. In February 1943, Kincaid ordered Adm McMorris to set up a blockade of the Japanese-held islands with one heavy and one light cruiser and four destroyers. McMorris shelled Attu, sank one Japanese transport, and scared off two others near Kamchatka in the sea lane to Attu and Kiska. With this presence plus increased bomber activity, some 40 Japanese ships were sunk in the sector by early March and Japanese casualty figures approached 3500. The last supply ship reached Attu on March 10, 1943. Hosogaya assembled a force consisting of nine ships, including one heavy and two light cruisers to escort the supply ships. The US task force was outnumbered, outgunned, and outclassed. The two fleets traded shots in broad daylight for three and a half hours on March 26, 1943. McMorris’ Salt Lake City was dead in the water and his ships were almost out of ammunition when the Japanese broke off the engagement and headed for home in fear that bombers were coming. Actually, the bombers were delayed by a series of circumstances that left the fleet unprotected except by luck. No further attempts to relieve the garrison were made, and Hosogaya was removed from command.
Kincaid and Buckner got along well after the storm of the Buckner-Theobald collaboration. Their first joint decision was to move their headquarters to Adak in March 1943, in preparation for the invasion of Attu and Kiska. About that time Buckner was promoted to Lieutenant General and Kincaid to Vice Admiral, with various additional promotions being received down the line.
The Aleutian invasion was to have a force of about 25.000 troops, division strength. DeWitt asked for the 35th Division which was commanded by Gen Charles C. Corlett and Gen Eugene M. Landrum, both of whom had Alaskan and amphibious operations experience. The War Department offered the 7th Division commanded by Gen Albert E. Brown, a mechanized cavalry unit trained for North Africa, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. These troops began training in California for Operation Landcrab in January 1943, under the supervision of Marine Gen Holland Smith, an expert in amphibious assault. Overall command strategy and operations planning was under the direction of VAdm Francis W. Rockwell. As the time for the invasion neared, it became apparent that neither adequate shipping nor personnel would not be available for a full-fledged assault on Kiska. Kincaid suggested that Kiska be bypassed in favor of smaller and supposedly less well-defended Attu. Kiska could then be interdicted on both sides and starved out. This plan was provisionally approved on March 10, 1943, by the Joint Chiefs, with final approval coming on March 22.
Early intelligence held that the Japanese occupation force on Attu was only 500 men. This was later upgraded to an estimate of 1600-1800, still short of the actual strength. Japanese documents show a strength of 2234, but actual counts put it at about 2400. Since the information on Attu was so sparse (no maps of the island’s interior were available), planning continued in a vacuum throughout March and April, while the invasion buildup occurred. By early May, there were about 27.000 men on Adak (19.000 Army and 8000 Navy) and 11.000 on Amchitka (10.000 Army and 1000 Navy), not counting the actual invasion force, which was en route from San Francisco to a staging area at Cold Bay. The attacking fleet would include three battleships assigned for the occasion, six cruisers, 19 destroyers, an escort carrier, the Nassau with 26 F4F Wildcats, and five troop transport. There were a whole series of contingency plans, and the final one, Plan E, version 2, was not decided upon until the force was on station, so there was some confusion about roles from the start. One group would land at Holtz Bay (Beach Red) on the north side of the island, supported by a small scout force on the western flank (Beach Scarlet), while the main body would land at Massacre Bay on the south (Beaches Yellow and Blue), with a recon force covering their eastern flank at Alexai Point. The plan was to have the two forces drive the defenders between them, link up at Jarmin Pass between Holtz and Massacre Bays, and pin the Japanese down in Chichagof Harbor, where they could be dealt with by Navy guns and air bombardment. The anticipated schedule for this plan was three days. The air force began softening up Attu with shuttle bombing, though bad weather stopped many planned missions and made targeting ineffective.
After the inevitable weather delays, the troops went ashore on May 11, 1943. The fog made a mess of the landing, but no enemy resistance was encountered at the beachheads. However, the initial landing force of 3500 began to take fire from dug-in positions higher up the slopes as they slogged inland towards the ridges at the head of Holtz Bay and up Massacre Valley. At this point, the invasion bogged down, with insignificant advances being made through May 14 (D+3). Gen Brown called for reinforcements, engineers, and heavy construction equipment (the latter at the suggestion of Col Talley, who urged him to think ahead so that construction could get underway as quickly as possible). The constant call for more troops (the 4th Regiment reserves were released to him) and the unclear request for construction equipment and supplies for six months led the operation’s commanders to believe that Brown intended to settle in rather than push the operation to its conclusion. Brown had not been the first choice for the job by the local commanders, to begin with, and when Kincaid, frustrated by the lack of progress and worried that his ships were sitting ducks for enemy submarines, asked that Brown be relieved of command, DeWitt and Buckner concurred. Gen Landrum was appointed to head the ground forces on May 16, just as the troops on the north were finally dislodging their opponents and getting the operation moving. The US breakthrough led to the juncture of the northern and southern forces, bottling up the Japanese in Chichagof Harbor. Though it would take two more weeks to roust the defenders (and sniper attacks would be reported until September), the battle was essentially over.
The Japanese were unable to mount a defense against the invasion, and the only attempt at a counter-attack was submarine action and a raid by bombers based in the Kuriles, which were driven off. One B-24 and two P-38s were lost, as were seven F4Fs, largely due to the inexperience of the Navy pilots. The battle ended on May 29 with a desperate suicide attack by the 700 remaining defenders against the US position at the head of Chichagof Bay (Engineer Hill). The Japanese sought to break out and seize US guns and supplies in hopes that such a severe tactical setback would cause the Americans to withdraw. Wounded Japanese unable to participate in the assault were either killed by their officers or committed suicide prior to the attack. The wave swept past the US front lines, through rear echelon outposts, including aid stations and mess facilities, until it was stopped just short of the artillery positions which were its initial objective by a hastily organized defense led by Maj James Bush of the ACOE. After being repulsed, the remnants of the Japanese withdrew to Chichagof and committed suicide, mostly with grenades. Out of nearly 2400 Japanese defenders, only 29 prisoners were taken. US forces lost 549 killed, 1148 wounded, and about 2100 more due to noncombat injuries and illness, most exposure, out of about 15,000 engaged (the Draft History lists a total of 2900 casualties to all causes, with 1200 due to exposure). In terms of ratios of enemy killed to US personnel killed or wounded, Attu was second only to Iwo Jima as the costliest American victory in the Pacific.
These results also pointed to several problems with planning and execution. The training of troops was barely adequate, and they were unused to conditions in the Aleutians and unskilled in survival techniques for wet and cold. They were also poorly equipped. Special equipment had been requisitioned and delivered but not issued. The troops used Blucher boots, which got wet and trapped the moisture so that feet later froze. Kersey wool pants, which were too heavy and would not dry out, and the Alaskan field jacket, which was too bulky, heavy, and without a hood so that most men discarded it upon landing, were also used. Shoepacs, wool OD clothing -and ski parkas were recommended after the Attu experience, as was the issue)- rain suits. The troops were separated from their rucksacks upon landing o they had no access to changes of clothing, sleeping bags, and food. Supply was inadequate, with poor planning at the beachhead and movement of supplies to the front being exacerbated by the tundra conditions encountered. There was the inadequate issue of rain suits, gloves, insoles, sleeping bags, and shelter halves.
A report of interrogations of POWs captured at Attu and held in a tent camp at the stockade at Adak states that the Japanese accused the US of using poison gas and tanks, though they admitted that the gas was probably just battle smoke or fog and the tanks were tractors. They attributed their defeat to a general lack of firepower. They had 75mm AA/antitank cannon, 75-MM pack howitzers, and light machine guns and argued that they would have done better had they had heavier ordnance, such as 105-MM and 150-MM artillery and heavy machine guns. They pointed out that the US troops were considered psychologically soft, but well equipped in terms of firepower, and so were a force to be reckoned with. Japanese facilities at Attu consisted mainly of dugouts and trenches with machine gun nest strong points. The floors of the dugouts were raised, allowing drainage, a problem that US troops complained of frequently with winterized tents and hut-type structures. The Japanese had attempted to build a runway at Holtz Bay but had made little progress due to a lack of construction equipment. There were two-wheeled carts used manually as wheelbarrows, and a tram with dump cars for a spoil, but only two small Caterpillar-type tractors, which had been used primarily for shifting artillery rather than construction. Facilities and equipment on a personal level were relatively plush (the Japanese were better prepared in terms of equipment for cold weather warfare), liquor rations were provided and recreational facilities (Attu had a ski run for use by the troops) were reasonably well appointed.
