Word of the attack sent aircraft into the area searching for the Japanese fleet, but weather and communication problems were to conspire to keep its position secret. Kakuta withdrew according to plan, shifting course for Adak to bombard the supposed base there. The weather had deteriorated to such a degree that Kakuta broke off the effort and returned to Dutch Harbor for a second attack on June 4, 1942. At about 1600, approximately 15 Zekes and 11 Vals attacked Dutch Harbor, causing considerably more damage but fewer casualties (2 killed, 4 wounded). Four oil storage tanks were destroyed as was a wing of the Navy hospital (which had been evacuated) and an antiaircraft position. The construction barracks ship Northwestern was also damaged, as was an uncompleted hangar at the Naval Air Station. The Japanese planes accidently regrouped over Fort Glenn, which scrambled eight P-40s. Four Japanese planes and two US aircraft were shot down in the engagement. The field at Fort Glenn was named Cape Field after one of the US victims of the dogfight. The Cold Bay-Fort Randall field would be named Thornburgh Field after Capt George W. Thornburgh, who was lost after an abortive attempt to torpedo the Ryujo in one of the few contacts that US airmen were able to make with the Japanese fleet during the next few days.
Kakuta had received a signal from Yamamoto while the second day’s attack was in progress ordering him to head south to join the main fleet in action at Midway. At Midway, Yamamoto was in the process of losing all four of his aircraft carriers with 332 planes and one-third of Japan’s combat pilots, and a total of about 3500 men, while the US would lose a single carrier. Yamamoto’s initial reaction was to join his forces, using the relatively fresh northern force to cover his retreat. Hosogaya argued that the US forces were unlikely to be in a condition to pursue, that the defense of Japan’s northern frontier was still a valid mission, and, finally, that any victory would be better for propaganda purposes than the story of the smashing defeat at Midway. The story of Midway was to be kept from the Japanese public until after the war, but the invasion of the Aleutians would be heavily touted for domestic consumption.
Based on his pre-raid recon which showed how lightly held it was, Kakuta had reportedly requested before the first day’s attack on Dutch Harbor that he be allowed to sieze it with the troops slated for the battle at Adak. The request was denied as it would deviate from the plan and besides the base was too far away from Japan to be supplied and defended. Now, even Adak seemed too close to Dutch Harbor and Fort Glenn for comfort. It was bypassed in favor of concentrating on the western islands, Kiska and Attu. In a dawn assault on June 7, 1942, 1200 troops captured Kiska with its nine-man Navy weather team (a tenth man would stay in hiding for over a month). Another 1200 troops occupied Attu the same day, seizing 43 Aleuts and the community’s teacher; her husband was either killed or committed suicide (there are conflicting stories) and, aside from superficial wounds suffered by two of the Kiska team and one Aleut on Attu, was the only casualty in the two invasions. The victory was indeed small. The US did not even miss the islands until a reconnaissance flight on June 10 noted the Japanese ships in the harbor.
The Battle of Dutch Harbor, the first engagement of the war in Alaska, had ended in a draw. Dutch Harbor was relatively unscathed, the main loss is the fuel that went up when the storage tanks were bombed.
Including aircrews lost to enemy action and misadventures in the course of the operation, 78 US personnel were killed. A total of ten US aircraft were lost, while the Japanese lost an estimated ten planes as well. No shipping was lost on either side, though the US claimed several sinkings. The US also claimed that it had disrupted a Japanese attempt to occupy Dutch Harbor and perhaps the Alaskan mainland as well. In reality, the Japanese had never intended to occupy any territory other than the western Aleutians (and those only temporarily). The Japanese had simply sought to neutralize US forces in the Aleutians in order to secure their perimeter. While it was part of a larger strategic endeavor, the Aleutian portion of the campaign was nothing more than a recon in force. It did, however, leave the Japanese in possession of what could be considered part of the North American Continent and the US with a problem. The problem was more a public relations than a strategic dilemma, although this was not necessarily apparent at the time.
One sidelight to the operation was the recovery of one Mitsubishi A6M Zero after the raid. Flight Officer Tadayoshi Koga’s aircraft was damaged by ground fire in the June 4 attack. Koga diverted to Akutan for an emergency landing and to await pickup by submarine. Instead of ditching, Koga attempted a wheels-down landing on what appeared to be smooth ground. The landing gear caught in the muskeg, the plane flipped over and Koga’s neck was broken. The wreck was spotted July 10, 1942, salvaged and shipped to the San Diego Naval Air Station, arriving August 12, 1942, where it was repaired and tested. These tests helped in the design of Navy planes which bested the Zero in combat later in the war. Both the F4U Corsair and the F6F Hellcat were already in the test stage and ready to go into production when the Akutan Zero became available. Testing may have helped establish operating characteristics for tactical instruction, but could not have aided in design of equipment.
The aircraft in use by the US at the beginning of the war were definitely inferior to the Japanese Zero with its higher rate of climb, general speed, maneuverability, armament, and greater range, although other aspects such as the lack of self-sealing gas tanks, lack of protective armor, and a high requisite level of pilot skill, limited its effective superiority. The P-36, fortunately, was replaced before being required to enter combat in Alaska, although four Hawks got off the ground at Pearl Harbor, with at least one being credited with a kill. While the P-40, P-38, P-39, and F4F were slower and less maneuverable, they did have the advantage of more pilot protection and fuel capacity. The tactics which allowed US pilots to hold their own against the Japanese involved twin team attack plans by P-40s and diving attacks by P-38s. These tactics were developed on an ad hoc basis in combat rather than in exercises and test performances.
Because of the distances involved, Dutch Harbor had been on its own during the raids. Army and Navy headquarters had been informed of the attack but could do nothing about it. This was especially true in the case of the Navy. Once Adm Theobald’s force had set out from Kodiak on June 1, radio silence was maintained so that the commander of the operation was out of contact with his command. On June 5, he returned to Kodiak to assume direct command. One erroneous report had located the Japanese fleet in the Bering Sea, and Theobald, with the backing of Nimitz, ordered all available planes to the area and followed himself in his flagship, the USS Nashville (CL-42) cruiser.
A flight of B-17s newly arrived on the scene located what they thought was the Japanese fleet and proceeded to bomb the Pribilof Islands. After a further comedy of errors, Theobald returned to Kodiak on June 10 to report that the fleet had been located in the harbors at Attu and Kiska where the Japanese had taken up residence. An immediate counter-attack against Attu and Kiska was considered, but it was decided that while available forces might be able to recapture the islands, shipping and air support was inadequate to secure, supply, and relieve the garrison. Buckner and DeWitt pressed for an invasion, calling for the use of Navy forces from Pearl Harbor to force the issue into Alaskan waters, but the Navy’s restraint and the fact that the Army was forced to depend on Navy ships to mount any offensive killed a quick counterstroke. Theobald, acting on orders from Washington (emanating ultimately from President Roosevelt) that the Japanese be dislodged from Attu and Kiska, did order bombardment by all available aircraft. The seaplane tender Gillis was dispatched to Atka to service PBYs, while the Eleventh Air Force bombers were dispatched from Fort Glenn and Cold Bay in what became known as the Kiska Blitz. The distance from Fort Glenn to Kiska was 600 miles, antiaircraft fire over the target was intense, and the weather was abysmal everywhere. During operations in June and July, the Army was only able to locate the target about half the time. Col William 0. Eareckson, commander of the Army bomber forces, tried several tactics. Conventional mid-altitude bombing invited AA fire, while high-level bombing from above 10.000 feet was ineffective.
Eareckson had his men try fighter-style, deck-level bombing to confuse gunners and the success rate went up, but batteries soon learned where the approaches would be made and laid their guns appropriately. The Navy tender meanwhile ran out of supplies and was threatened by attacking Japanese floatplanes. It withdrew, taking with it the residents of the Aleut village on Atka. When Gen Buckner ordered military dependents out of Alaska, concern was expressed about the presence of civilians, especially Native Americans, in potential combat zones. While responsibility for the protection of the civilian populace rested with the Army, responsibility for Native Americans lay with the Department of the Interior, where responsibility was further split among the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Division of Territories and Island Possessions. Coordination was not achieved among the various agencies, leaving the military to act on its own without adequate preparation. During April and May 1942, the debate went on in the Interior bureaus, the Navy, and the governor’s office over the appropriate policy. Interior Secretary Ickes supported the position of the Comissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, and Governor Gruening that natives should be left alone unless they asked to be evacuated. The Navy stated that it lacked the ships to effect an evacuation.
Despite the opposition of Gruening, Buckner and Ickes, it was decided after the Battle of Dutch Harbor that the Aleuts had to be removed from the war zone. The evacuation was accomplished as a side issue of a military operation and did not take into account the wishes or sensibilities of the evacuees.
On June 13, 1942, the Gillis’ officer summarily ordered the Atka Aleuts aboard without time to collect possessions and set fire to their village to deny its use to the supposedly advancing enemy, before retiring to Dutch Harbor. The Navy also removed the Aleuts from the Pribilof Island villages of St Paul and St George by June 22nd. The remaining Aleuts from Akutan, Nikolski, and Unalaska were collected at Dutch Harbor, from where they were transhipped in late June 1942, to camps in the Panhandle. Non-natives at Unalaska were not evacuated. Ironically, planning for the removal and internment of the Japanese and Japanese-Americans in Alaska was more precise and efficiently executed.
The pre-evacuation warnings of permanent damage to Aleut culture and to the physical and mental health of the evacuees proved accurate. The Aleuts were hastily resettled in dilapidated canneries at Ward Lake, Killisnoo, Burnett Inlet, and Funter Bay in Southeastern Alaska. The culture and expectations of the various Aleut groups were very different, and some groups thrown together were traditional enemies. The problems of living in the camps were exacerbated by a lack of facilities, transportation, building materials, household goods, employment opportunities, and enforced idleness. Added to the deprivations caused by abrupt removal, loss of personal possessions, and general disruptions were the problems of adjustment to a new environment. Aleuts reported that temperatures were uncomfortably warm and that the thick southeastern forests made them claustrophobic. Disease, especially upper respiratory maladies, was common, as was malnutrition. Despite good intentions, the Interior officials supervising Aleut camps became virtual jailers. An enumerated 881 Aleuts were removed and relocated by July 1942. Although the danger to civilian populations was over after the recapture of Attu and Kiska a year later, the Aleuts remained in the camps until 1944-1945.
Secretary of the Interior Ickes and Secretary of War Stimson realized that continued refugee status was undesirable, but for lack of transportation and the difficulty of returning them to their proper homes (many of which no longer existed due to looting and appropriation by US and Japanese military personnel), the Aleuts were forced to remain where they were. When the Japanese overran Attu, they captured 43 Aleuts at Chichagof. These individuals were shipped to Japan as prisoners of war (captive guests in Japanese parlance) in September 1942, where they were interned at Otaru until September 1945. They were allowed to perform menial jobs under minimal supervision, but had little in the way of food, supplies, or freedom of movement. Only 25 survived, most dying of tuberculosis. A factor in the decision not to attempt an immediate counterinvasion of Attu and Kiska was the concern that the Japanese had used the Dutch Harbor sortie as softening up and cover for a larger-scale invasion of either Siberia and/or the islands and coast along the US side of the Bering Straits. Army Chief of Staff Marshall purportedly personally ordered that the Nome garrison be reinforced to counter this supposed threat. Operation Bingo, the first massive tactical wartime airlift of personnel and materiel, began on June 21, 1942. Using military transport plus 40 impressed commercial planes (Stinsons, Bellancas and Ford Tr-motors among others), a total of 55 aircraft flew 218 trips over 18 days. In all, 2035 troops and 883.727 pounds of equipment and supplies were airlifted to Nome.
Additional supplies were sent by sea from Seward. A garrison of 1400 was also authorized for Fort Morrow to protect the airfield at Port Heiden. An Army intelligence-gathering force was also established on the St Lawrence Island and a Signal Corps listening post was set up on St Paul in the Pribilofs. In 1977, Helbock reports that National Guard personnel were sent to the Pribilofs with orders to defend the islands in case of a Japanese invasion, destroying the seal rookeries if necessary to keep them out of enemy hands.
