On the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was approximately 20.000 ADC personnel in Alaska. Fort Richardson was essentially complete, as were the staging fields at Annette Island, Yakutat, Elmendorf, and Ladd. Army garrisons existed at Sitka, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, Seward, Nome, and Chilkoot Barracks. Five airfields along the Northwest Staging route in Canada (Grand Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Wataon Lake, and Whitehorse) were provisionally usable, with the refurbished Edmonton Municipal Airport providing a sixth. However, only eighteen obsolete combat aircraft were airworthy on December 7, 1941, the AWS was not operable and there was little in the way of transport, armor, artillery, or ordnance (Kodiak, the main naval base, had 17 minutes worth of ammunition for its batteries) and materiel for active defense of the Territory.
Alaska, including the military, learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by commercial radio. The Japanese task force which hit Pearl Harbor had set out from bases in the Kurile Islands, in the Northern Pacific sector, and passed just south of the Aleutians before heading for Hawaii, slipping between patrol coverage zones. Its whereabouts were unknown, and Alaska might be targeted as well. All leaves were canceled, civilian road and aviation traffic were banned, and civilian radio stations were ordered off the air. Many Canadians, unable to contact Alaska, reported that it had fallen, which was broadcast on Canadian radio, causing increased panic. Radio Tokyo broadcast that Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Fairbanks were bombed and that Anchorage and Sitka had been captured. Anchorage was blacked out, with much of the populace preparing to head for the bush to escape and/or wage guerilla warfare. The panic extended down the Pacific Coast, with incidents in Seattle and San Francisco. After 48 hours, a semblance of calm was restored and the civilian population began to adjust to the new situation. Draft Boards swung into action, including those in remote areas, and Buckner ordered the evacuation of all military and contract construction dependents who were not previous residents. Travel to and from the Territory was strictly controlled and monitored. Military censorship was also imposed, with direct radiotelephone contact being limited to military traffic and mail and news being heavily censored. The initial untrained and overzealous attempts to conceal information of military importance left a virtually complete news vacuum both inside and outside the Territory. This led to rumors which became so prevalent that the commander of Fort Richardson vowed to prosecute anyone spreading rumors.
The Territorial and military governments made plans to evacuate all civilians from military areas; plans were even discussed for the evacuation of the whole civilian population. Fears of sabotage, spies, and Fifth Columnists led to investigations; reports that a small German spy network was uncovered, but that little in the way of subversion, especially by Japanese agents, was discovered well as the role of intelligence gathering by enemy agents or sympathizers. In fact, the Japanese would prove to have very poor intelligence concerning the US war effort and Alaska in particular.
Within Alaska, there were shortages of such basic commodities as food and fuels – coal and gasoline – in the latter case due largely to the lack of adequate storage which prevented stockpiling. Military projects received renewed emphasis, especially forward posts and airfields. Two Army Air Forces squadrons were immediately ordered to Alaska for tactical deployment, but those assigned had to traverse the US and Canada to get to Alaska. By late January 1942, only 13 of the 24 Curtiss P-40E Warhawk P-40Es assigned had been able to reach Alaska; six were delayed and five had crashed en route.
The bomber squadron of Martin B-26 Marauders arrived with only seven of its 13 aircraft. After this initial disastrous experience in ferrying aircraft to Alaska, a plan was devised whereby aircraft would be ferried from their point of origin to Spokane, WA, where they would be turned over to veteran Alaskan pilots for the northern leg up the staging route. The attrition rate of the initial operation was the deciding factor in Roosevelt’s call for the construction of the ALCAN Highway in February 1942. More P-40s and B-26s would be sent to Alaska so that by the end of March, one fighter squadron and one bomber squadron would have a full complement of planes. In the meantime, one Boeing B-17E Flying Fortress and three Consolidated LB-30 (B-24A) Liberators (Lend Lease version of the B-24) were assigned for offshore patrol. Five Douglas C-53 Skytrooper cargo planes arriving in early May 1942, were the first military transports assigned to Alaska. Three Canadian squadrons were also assigned. One bomber squadron with 14 Bristol Bolingbroke Mk. IVT was assigned to Annette Island in May 1942, and two fighter squadrons flying Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawks would eventually arrive at Kodiak. The organization charts coming out from Washington kept ahead of reality. Buckner had earlier been given a promotion to Brigadier General, but not the troops and funds he had wanted. 
In January 1942, the air arms were officially designated the Alaskan Air Force and, less than a month later, in February, became the 11-AAF which, in September, became the Eleventh Air Force). There were two fighter and three bomber squadrons, plus a ground support unit for a total of just over 3000 men. In March, Col William 0. Butler, who as chief of staff of the 4-AAF had worked out the arrangements for ferrying aircraft to Alaska, was appointed to command the 11-AAF. Butler was a cautious administrator rather than an operations pilot. Buckner clashed with him and attempted to circumvent him by dealing with his bolder subordinates whenever possible. The force level present was inadequate to defend Alaska, but when viewed in light of the fact that in April 1942, the Army Air Forces had a total of seven bomber groups and seven and a half fighter groups that were combat-ready, the allocation of a full bomber group and half a fighter group to Alaska represented a major commitment of forces to the Territory.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched an attack on a wide front throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Guam and Wake Island fell shortly after Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong fell on Christmas Day 1941, and Manila fell on January 2, 1942, followed by Singapore Eastern Gibraltar on February 15. Some of the guns the Japanese emplaced on Kiska are thought to have come from British batteries at Singapore though in fact all but three of the Singapore guns were destroyed in the battle with those three being kept in place for defense. The oil fields of the Dutch East Indies fell in March. The Japanese had also sunk or seriously damaged ten battleships, including the USS-West Virginia (BB-48), torpedoed and sunk but later refloated; the USS-Arizona (BB-39), several times torpedoed but didn’t overcome being hit with 
armor piercing air bomb penetrating her deck and detonating inside and ammunition magazine; the USS Oklahoma (BB-37), which also torpedoed capsized and had to be salvaged later; the USS California (BB-44), she was hit several times and moored herself without electrical power to run her water pumps, she quietly sank. The British HMS Repulse and the HMS Prince of Wales (Force Z) were both sunk by Japanese aircraft on December 10, 1941, and additional, eight cruisers, two aircraft carriers, fifteen destroyers, and various other shipping, at little cost to themselves. Allied forces proved to be unable to halt or even slow the Japanese advance. With the stunning successes to the south, it seemed to be only a question of time before the Japanese attacked Alaska.
In January 1942, Gen Buckner and Capt Parker proposed that the US undertake negotiations with the Soviets to develop and use Siberian air bases, offering to help select the sites. They also recommended that the US forces plan for aggressive action against Japan to be launched through the Aleutians. In between these two modest proposals, they urgently requested more men and materiel for rapid completion of the advanced airfields, reinforcement of Alaska with the ground, sea, and particularly air troops, and more land-sea based planes.
The requests for more were standard operating procedure and received the standard reply that there were other critical areas that had a prior claim on the scarce resources. The remaining proposals impinged on high-level strategic issues. Roosevelt had already proposed that the Soviets allow the US to operate from Siberian bases. The Soviets, however, were losing the war in Europe, although, by late 1941, the Eastern Front had stabilized, with the Russians regaining some of their lost ground, had a nonaggression pact with Japan, and could not afford to open a two-front war. As it turned out, the Japanese were the main beneficiaries of Russian neutrality, since they had all along feared the Russians and were now involved in areas far from home. The US was to remain frustrated throughout the war since without mainland bases in Siberia, the logistics of opening a northern front with Japan made it prohibitive. The request for the consideration of a plan for going on the offensive from Alaska was likewise doomed.
First, the strategic policy was one of defense in the Pacific and offense in Europe, and given that policy allocations would continue to be denied to Alaska. Second, as Marshall recognized, Alaska was far too difficult to get around in, much less wage war in, to be acceptable as a major theater of elective operations. Third, as Adm Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander of the US Fleet, pointed out, the facilities in Alaska already outstripped the ability of the military to staff, use and defend them, and that it was tactically unsound to develop facilities which could be used against US forces if seized by the enemy, which Japan would most likely do if provoked by an ill-advised advance. Buckner himself recognized the truth of this viewpoint when he stated of Fort Glenn, the airfield is for use either by ourselves or the enemy, whichever gets there first.
Buckner’s approach in Alaska can be assessed as that of a commanding personality (his father was a Confederate general and US Senator, and he styled himself as the Silver Stallion of Alaska who was out to show that he personally could handle a tough job. He did not suffer fools kindly and was impatient with anything which got in the way of getting the job done as he saw it. He was very narrowly focused on the advocacy role for his own sector to the exclusion of the broader strategic view. While identification with and espousal of one’s area of responsibility is a positive trait insuring maximumr effort on its behalf, many of Buckner’s actions bordered on presenting the War Department with fait accompli which would require that Alaska become a major area of operations whether such was justifiable or not. In this he was abetted by General DeWitt. It may be argued that these commanders were trying to aggrandize the importance of their own spheres of responsibility. Such was not uncommon, as witnessed by the actions of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific.
Now that the Eleventh Air Force finally had some planes, the problem became where to station them. If they were moved west to Aleutian or Alaska Peninsula bases, the core area would be left defenseless, but if they remained around Anchorage and Kodiak, they would be in no position to react to aggression elsewhere. The decision had essentially already been made to leave the Panhandle and Bering Sea on their own until it was demonstrated that they needed further protection. It was finally decided that if bases could be readied, fighters should be based in forward areas, with bombers staying in Kodiak. The completion of Cold Bay and Otter Point received the highest priority. Originally, the runways were to have been paved. By this time, however, paving would delay the operation of Otter Point too long, so the ACOE began installing the first examples of Marsden matting. The first plane to land was a C-53 carrying Col Talley and Gen Butler on an inspection tour. Butler argued against the surface as inadequate for combat aircraft but was overruled by Buckner. The last of the runway was laid on Apr 5, 1942, after round-the-clock shift work beginning in early March. Cold Bay was also barely operational by the end of Apr 1942, with an asphalt runway surface. By the end of May, Fort Glenn had a garrison of about 4000, Cold Bay one of about 2500, and Fort Mears one of over 6000; most were engineering and support troops, but combat troops were present in significant numbers.
The Navy meanwhile had been at work trying to complete its main bases. It also set up two small outposts as weather stations and observation posts on Kanaga and Kiska. The weather in the Aleutians generally moves from west to east, so reports from farther out along the Chain should have allowed more accurate prediction. However, the warm Japanese Current meets the cold Bering Sea, complicated by the turbulence of upwelling from the Aleutian Trench, making Aleutian weather highly variable and localized. The weather prediction was not an art that did very much to help in the battle against the main enemy, the elements. COMALSEC was also building up its fleet, which had consisted of only the Captain’s flagship and the YP, or Yippee, boats: fishing boats painted gray, manned by Navy crews, and lightly armed.
By May 1942, Parker had two old destroyers, [two] … Coast Guard cutters, a few more converted fishing boats [YPs], and ten Catalinas – one each at Dutch Harbor and Kodiak, the others farther south. Flagship Charleston was the only one of these vessels equipped with sonar or with guns larger than 3-inch; both she and the cutters and destroyers were in constant use escorting freighters bringing construction workers and materials to the new bases and airfields … and ships of the Royal Canadian Navy Pacific Command which could be called on if needed.
Meanwhile, administrative activity and rear-echelon construction were progressing as well. Plans were being considered for a Port of Entry (POE) at Excursion Inlet in the southeast. Auxillary airfields at Campbell Creek and Palmer were canceled (though eventually they were completed), and dispersion fields at Willow and Birchwood were ordered instead. Others would be built at Wasilla and Goose Bay. The AWS projects were still in the works and general construction and maintenance work continued. The ACOE opened a Real Estate Office in Anchorage to handle property transactions; before such transactions had to be referred to Seattle.
Another issue that occurred against this backdrop was the internment of Japanese Americans. In the hysteria which followed Pearl Harbor, the traditional prejudice against Asians on the West Coast reached a fever pitch, so in the spring, of 1942, the Secretary of War was given authority by executive order to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from military areas.
Altogether, perhaps 120.000 US citizens and resident aliens were rounded up and relocated to camps in California, Nevada, Utah, Idaho and Arkansas. Their property was left under the stewardship of the Federal Reserve Bank, and they were allowed to take very little with them; many ended up losing most of their property. About 230 Alaskans, including Aleuts with Japanese surnames, were moved to the War Relocation Center at Minidota, ID, where they were kept for the duration of the war.
The Japanese were also faced with a dilemma following their stunning successes since the Pearl Harbor attack. Since the opening of the China offensive in 1937, the Imperial Army and Navy had participated in an uneasy coalition requiring consensus for any decisions, military or political, and the Japanese Army and Navy had, if anything, an even more touchy relationship than their American counterparts. The strategy favored by the Army was one of confining advances essentially to the Asian mainland, consolidating limited gains and negotiating peace with the US and Britain while stopping short of actual engagement if possible. The Navy’s policy, as developed by Adm Isoroku Yamamoto, chief of the Combined Fleet and major strategist, was to strike rapidly, encompassing as much territory as possible, destroy the enemy will and ability to retaliate, and impose a feeling of peace from a position of strength and from a perimeter extended far enough from Japan to prevent a counter-offensive. Yamamoto realized that this was a gamble and that it had to succeed in the short-term before the massive industrial capacity of the US could be brought to bear on resource-poor and overextended Japan. At Yamamoto’s instigation, the Midway-Aleutians operation was reluctantly approved on April 14, 1942.
Though the operational end was complicated, the basic plan was simple: the Imperial fleet would launch a feint at the Aleutians, destroying any bases it could and seizing a temporary foothold in the western Aleutians. The US fleet would split its remaining forces to send reinforcements to the Aleutians. These reinforcements would be ambushed along the way, while the main Japanese force would concentrate on the remaining force at Midway and annihilate it in a classic set-piece engagement. Using the Aleutians as the northern anchor of a patrol line extending through Midway to Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, Japan would establish a perimeter that would hold back US advances as well as cut off Allied contact with Australia and the Soviet Union. The Midway operation could also be seen as the first step in an invasion of Hawaii.
The psychological effect of the raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942, by carrier-based bombers led by Col James Doolittle, a native son of Nome, only served to harden the Japanese resolve to carry out the operation which would theoretically prevent further attacks of this nature. On May 5, 1942, Naval Order No. 18 was issued, formally laying out the Midway-Aleutian campaign plan. Navy Directive No. 94, the Joint Central Agreement on the Aleutians, called for the Army to capture, demolish and withdraw from a supposed US base on Adak, then seize and hold Attu and Kiska until winter. The Navy would attack Dutch Harbor to destroy the facility and prevent reinforcements from reaching the outer islands. With the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May 1942, at which the Japanese lost two carriers and sustained heavy plane and pilot losses on a third, the plan began to fall apart. The advance to New Guinea and Australia and the interdiction of the southern anchor bases were halted, and combat vessels were removed from operations. Nevertheless, the main plan proceeded, with the order for the Aleutian part of the operation being issued on May 12, 1942.
On May 20, 1942, Naval Force Order No. 245 established the staffing and assignments for the Northern Task Forces. Altogether, there would be two small carriers, eight cruisers, 13 destroyers, three gunboats, six submarines, three means of transport, one oiler, and one seaplane tender available to the four northern fleet task force units, as well as about 2400 troops, including 700 engineers.
It was an impressive force compared to that which opposed it, and a force whose presence at the main event at Midway could possibly have swayed the outcome. The Japanese were woefully ill-informed about US dispositions in the Aleutians, despite the intelligence potential of their fishing fleets which had operated there for years (Alaskan King Crab was originally known as Japanese Crab). They expected to be met by cruisers and destroyers, major military installations at Dutch Harbor and Adak, and minor garrisons at Kiska and Attu. In reality, Dutch Harbor was a lightly defended forward base, with the only other naval installations being weather stations on Kanaga and Kiska. There were no fleet forces in Aleutian waters either. There were, however, unexpected airfields at Fort Glenn and Cold Bay.
