By early July, the atmosphere of hysteria had died down and the bombing of the Japanese bases settled into a routine. The Japanese, on the other hand, began to dig in, reinforcing the bases with float aircraft. They also began to construct runways, though these attempts were hampered by the lack of heavy equipment and the constant, if ineffective, US bombardment. Elsewhere, the buildup continued, with resources freed up by the supposed threat posed by the Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska and by the fact that once in the pipeline, projects took on a life of their own, moving inexorably, towards completion despite intervening changes in emphasis. Like the Civil Aeronautics Administration airfield at Port Heiden which was garrisoned during the Nome invasion scare, many other CAA fields, as per the original defense plan, had garrison facilities prepared during 1942. Construction at Bethel was limited by the fact that all material had to be lightered and barged up the Kuskokwim River which was usually frozen and experienced 21-foot tidal bores when it wasn’t. At Gulkana, the Corps of Engineers, plagued with permafrost construction problems, finally settled for installing mudsills at grade for structures to rest on, anchoring them with three-foot posts. Projects also proceeded at Big Delta, Northway, McGrath, Moses Point, Galena, and Tanacross during the summer and into the winter of 1942.
Somewhat behind the march of events, though this could not be known at the time, came the rush to construct shore and harbor defense installations. Facilities included concrete battery emplacements, gun mount plugs, underground, bombproof magazines, fire control stations (battery and group commander’s stations and base end stations, with communications supplied by the Signal Corps), searchlight and power stations, observation and control posts, seacoast radar facilities, and a variety of other emplacements. Kodiak was to be the most elaborate, with Sitka a close second. The former had two 8-inch naval and one 6-inch battery while the latter had three 6-inch naval gun batteries; Dutch Harbor was to have one 6-inch and one 8-inch battery. Six-inch guns were also installed at Annette Island, Yakutat, Cold Bay, Chernofski, Umnak and Nome. In all, 15 projects for 155-MM rifles with Panama mounts were authorized; 72 were to be constructed by the end of 1943. Gun emplacements were constructed by civilian workers at most stations. Siems-Drake-Puget Sound was the contractor at the Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor installations, with other contractors handling the limited work at Annette Island and Yakutat. The Army Corps of Engineers, with the West Construction Company, did the work at Seward, which was the most difficult artillery construction of the war. Seward was still the main Port of Entry for Alaska in Summer of 1942 and needed protection. There was little room in the area for air facilities, and Elmendorf was too far away to provide much support.
The harbor at Seward, however, was extremely rugged and a militarily appropriate siting of ordnance with full coverage and support facilities led to major construction headaches. Construction needed to proceed on virtually all sites simultaneously, but the difficulty of access prevented much sharing of equipment or facilities. Separate facilities were finally constructed with batteries at Caines Head and Rugged Island, searchlights and fire control stations at Rocky Point, Topeka Point, Carol Cove, Chamberlain Point, Barewell Island, and Alma Cove, and seacoast radar emplacements at Patsy Point and South Beach. Housing, communications lines, plus docks and wharves also had to be built. Despite this concern with Seward, Whittier, which was much more important, was never defended, probably due to the fact that by the time it was completed, the danger of enemy attack was considered too remote and the time frame for construction too extended to justify the expenditure. Work had also proceeded on improvements at the Juneau Port of Entry, but the main effort went into the construction, from scratch, of a major POE facility at Excursion Inlet. There were inadequate port and staging facilities in Alaska, and the possibility of mounting a major North Pacific invasion of the Orient required the development of extensive facilities. This was proposed, surveyed, and approved prior to the attack on Dutch Harbor, and active construction began in August 1942, with the Guy F. Atkinson Company as a contractor. Three docks, two sawmills, and a variety of warehouses, ports and other support facilities were ultimately built. The construction force grew to a peak utilization of 3610 in early 1943. The existence of the base was considered a security matter, and construction was kept secret.
Other rear-echelon supply projects were also underway by the summer of 1942. The isolation of Alaska, which was proving to be such a problem under war conditions, had been recognized since the area was prominent during the Gold Rush. A land route through Canada had been proposed since before World War I, with engineering commissions declaring it feasible; however, as late as 1938, from a practical standpoint, the military value of the proposed Alaska Highway is slight. With the establishment of US-Canadian defense accords came the founding of the Northwest Staging Route, with airfields at Fort St John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, and Whitehorse in Canada and Northway, Tanacross, Big Delta and Fairbanks in Alaska. In January 1942, Roosevelt appointed a cabinet committee to assess the advisability of developing a complementary road; the committee, in concert with the War Plans Division, recommended immediate construction to forestall the possibility of naval interdiction of supply routes. The ACOE was to construct the initial pioneer road, with the Public Roads Administration following along to improve and surface it. US approval came in February, with Canadian approval following in March 1942.
Work began in the Spring, of 1942, at three separate points along the route: Dawson Creek, Whitehorse, and Big Delta. Seven engineer battalions, three of which consisted of black construction troops set to work, with materials coming from Edmonton or Skagway, via the Yukon & White Pass Railroad. The engineering and logistics problems were staggering, with cold weather always a complicating factor. Permafrost, muskeg, shifting riverbeds, glacial gravels, and a high water table caused major problems.
Intercepting ditches were required on the uphill side of the roadbed for drainage. It was necessary to strip, thaw, settle and consolidate the roadbed before grading and surfacing. Solifluction (freeze-and-thaw slippage) disrupted roadbeds, and inadequate seasoning of the bed prior to finishing caused much work to have to be redone. Bridges and culverts were constructed from native timber, with stream control revetting (using brush wrapped in chicken wire and weighted with stone) taking up significant time and effort. Still, bridges were washed out with some regularity, and roads sank into the muskeg during the thaws. In all, 133 bridges over 21 feet in length were built and over 800 culverts were installed. These timber features were eventually replaced by steel spans and pipe structures, so that little of the original road remains. Subsidiary roads were built (Chitina Cutoff, Slana-Tok Cutoff, Slana-Nabesna Road, Glenn Highway, Steese Highway, and Elliot Highway) during the course of the war, but the initial blazing of the ALCAN was the most impressive and significant project, though it was of little actual importance for supply. The Signal Corps also installed a telephone line along the length of the ALCAN, requiring repeater stations at 100-mile intervals. The 1400 miles of road employed roughly 11.000 troops and 16.000 civilians. It was substantially complete by the winter of 1943.
The achievement rivaled, and many would say surpassed, that of the construction of the Ledo Road from Assam to China as the major overland building project of the World War II era. The assurance of a secure supply of fuel to ALCAN and Northwest Staging route traffic as well as for military and civilian use in Alaska was a critical concern from early in the war. The vast distances and requirements for transport and heating, plus the uncertainty over the integrity of sea routes, mandated the development of an internal supply and distribution system. The Imperial Oil Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary, had drilled the first well at Norman Wells on the MacKenzie River in the Northwest Territories in 1920. By 1940, three wells were producing 800 barrels a day during the short summer. In early 1942, the ACOE was assigned to develop the reserves at Norman Wells by drilling at least nine new wells to boost production to at least 3000 barrels a day. The ACOE was also to construct a pipeline transport and distribution system, with a service road, across the Continental Divide to a refinery at Whitehorse, which it would also construct, a distance of 500 miles. This was to be accomplished by October 1942. Civilian contractors began construction in May 1942. Imperial Oil would drill the wells, Sverdrup & Parcel and J. Gordon Turnbull provided architectural and engineering services, and W.E. Callahan Company (Dallas, TX), H.C. Price Company (Bartlesville, OK), and W.A. Bechtel Company (San Fransisco, CA) performed actual construction, along with ACOE unit personnel.
After Dutch Harbor, the CANOL project, as it was dubbed, increased in scope and ambition, despite opposition by figures such as Interior Secretary Ickes, who argued that it was impractical and a boondoggle. CANOL 1, the main pipeline from Norman Wells to Whitehorse plus the associated support facilities, oilfield development, and refinery, was to be increased to include CANOL 2, a pipeline from Whitehorse to a Skagway ocean term nal, which itself was extended to CANOL 3 and 4, pipelines running from Whitehorse south to Watson Lake and north to Fairbanks along the ALCAN Highway. In Sept 1942, the Transportation Corps, noting that if Alaska were to be used as a springboard for an invasion of Japan more petroleum supplies would be required, suggested a wildcat drilling program be instituted to expand reserves. The Noble Drilling Company (Tulsa, OK) was contracted to put in 100 wildcat wells. With the war situation grim, it was decided to proceed with the CANOL Project at speed, with all work orders to be completed by Dec 1943. The problem of supply of strategic supplies, such as aviation and regular gasoline, was a continuing problem in Alaska.
As of June 1942, there were fuel oil storage and refueling facilities for shipping at Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Seward, with tankers also stationed at Kodiak for mobile refueling missions, and aviation gasoline storage facilities at Fort Glenn, Dutch Harbor, Cold Bay, Kodiak, Seward, Anchorage and at the airfields along the Northwest Staging route. The capacity of facilities as well as the limited availability both of facilities and supply were major logistics problems. Construction of depots was undertaken at Fort Glenn, Fort Richardson, Ladd Field, Cold Bay, and Nome. Storage tanks were of a standard size and configuration, fabricated in sections elsewhere, and assembled on-site. Welded steel tanks in 25.000 and 50.000-gallon sizes, 50, 5000 and 10.000-gallon bolted steel tanks, woodstove reinforced diesel tanks and POL (petroleum-oil-lubricant) 50 and 55-gallon steel drums were used, with reinforced concrete tanks being constructed at Fort Richardson. Each depot had from one to 125 tanks. Larger projects used 3-12 inch pipelines (standard to light spiral welds, Dresser couplings) with gravity feed distribution. The problem of fuel supply at forward and remote bases was solved by pumping directly from POL drums. These could also be unloaded from shipping directly into the surf at the correct tide to be floated ashore by wind and wave action. POL drums were designed for one-way transport, with no thought given to recovery of the empties.
In December 1941, the US and the Soviet Union signed a protocol agreeing to the provision of Lend Lease aid to the USSR. After a series of contretemps, arrangements were made for the transfer of war materiel. The Soviets’ primary request was for aircraft since most of their air force had been destroyed in the initial German advance. They initially wanted to receive these planes using a South Atlantic ship route, around Africa, to the port of Basra in Iran, from which they could be flown across Central Asia. The alternate was the North Atlantic convoy route to Murmansk and Archangel. The Atlantic routes were unattractive because of German U-boat activity and, in the southern route case, distance. Roosevelt proposed a route through Alaska and across Siberia. This proposal was rejected by the Soviets; the weather was too bad and the facilities too poor, nor did they want Americans spying on their installations or the Japanese upset by dealings on-site with belligerents. However, an agreement was reached in May 1942 on the Alaska-Siberia (ALSIB) route due to the shorter distance, Soviet desperation, and US insistence, and a ferrying group was activated at Great Falls, MT, in June 1942, to set up the route. After being delivered to Great Falls, where they were outfitted and had the Red Star insignia painted on, aircraft were to be flown along the Northwest Staging route through Canada to Ladd Field in Fairbanks, where they would be checked out and turned over to Soviet pilots. The transfer was to be handled at Ladd rather than at Nome, 500 miles closer to Siberia because it was feared that Nome was too vulnerable to Japanese attack.
The first Soviet personnel arrived in August 1942, with the first transfer taking place in September. Only 148 aircraft were handed over in 1942, one-third of the established goal, however, this level would increase to 2662 in 1943, 3164 in 1944, and 2009 in 1945, for an ALSIB route total of 7938 by war’s end. The aircraft transferred were P-39s, P-63s, A-20s, B-25s, P-40s, P-47s, AT-6s and C-46s and 47s. The Soviets reported a loss rate of 0.5% (only about 16 aircraft) on their portion of the route from Ladd Field across Siberia, while the US ferrying group reported a loss rate of 0.5% from Great Falls to Ladd (a total of 40 aircraft). The Soviet facilities at Ladd were separate from the US facilities, and there was little fraternization. In addition to this aloofness, the Soviet mechanics would reject aircraft on the slightest pretext, causing a heavy workload and resentment among the US mechanics who had to bring the planes up to acceptable standards. The Soviets did spend a lot of time shopping for luxury goods, mostly women’s articles and jewelry, in Fairbanks, which they crammed into their aircraft for the trip home. It is also alleged that the Soviets used the ALSIB route to funnel in spies and to take out military intelligence and sensitive items under the cover of diplomatic immunity. A temporary transfer route for the delivery of seaplanes would be set up in 1944. Running through Kodiak to Nunivak Island, it then led to Anadyr and on to Magaden; only some 30 PBYs and PBNs were flown over this short-lived route. Russian shipping also ran along the coast of Alaska from Seattle, passing through Unimak Pass east of Dutch Harbor on its way through the Bering Sea to Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok.
There was poor communication and monitoring of this traffic, and Soviet vessels often put into Dutch Harbor for repairs and refueling. As the war progressed, there were inadequate facilities to handle this traffic, nor space to stock coal (the Soviet freighters were largely coal burners, while the US fleet had converted to oil and had no need for coaling facilities). In October 1942, the Navy set up a coaling and repair station for Soviet marine traffic at the old whaling station and Aleut village at Akutan. Perhaps 150 watercraft of various types were transferred to the Soviets in Alaskan waters as part of the Lend-Lease program, mostly at Cold Bay. Almost all were transports, though, near the end of the war, mine-sweepers, and patrol craft were also transferred. Most voyages to the US were made with empty holds, but Cold Bay was used as a stockpile point for Siberian lumber delivered in token payment for Lend Lease goods. In 1942, while there was still concern about the strategic importance of Nome and the hope that the USSR might enter the war against Japan, a number of surveys were ordered to assess the feasibility of opening routes in western Alaska.
Recons were made for road and/or railroad routes west from Fairbanks during the spring and winter of 1942, down the Tanana and Yukon Rivers to Norton Sound and to Kotzebue Sound via the Tanana, Tozitna, Alatna, and Kobuk Valleys. Preliminary routes were chosen, but no action was taken. The Seward Peninsula was also surveyed for a deep water port, with Moses Point, Golovin Bay, and Port Clarence being the only sites found with any harbor potential. Small facilities would ultimately be set up at Moses Point and Port Clarence. Airfield surveys were also undertaken at Strawberry Point, Kougarok, and Quinhagak, but no action was taken on the development of any of these sites. The action was, however, taken regarding another series of airfield recons in the Aleutians.
In late June 1942, Gen Laurence S. Kuter of Gen Arnold’s staff, made an inspection tour of Alaska, declaring it to be a low priority theater. In early July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to undertake a limited offensive in the south Pacific, meaning that no reinforcements could be expected for Alaska. The subsequent battles in the Solomons, New Guinea, and at Guadalcanal in particular kept the attention of higher commands for the rest of 1942. In late July, Gen Arnold came out against sending more aircraft to Alaska since there were few enemy aircraft to engage, bombing there had proved relatively ineffective and there was such a high attrition rate among aircraft and crews.
