Document Sources: One of my readers uploaded the file for the first part of this archive to the EUCMH web server a couple of days after I had posted the archive about the 32nd Cavalry Recon Squadron, and without more information about the file. While searching the web for additional information, I found out that the file I was working on was in fact, the result of the tremendous work done by a man called Frank Studenski. I’ve tried to get in contact, but the man says he has a family and is very busy. So I decided to continue working on the file. The second part of this archive comes from the Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, and was written by Maj Wendell M. Broadus. Both files allowed me to make a single one for you to read. (link to the original website at the end of this archive)
Prélude
The Evolution of the United States Army Cavalry, from Frontier Horsemen to Mechanized Scouts. The history of the US Cavalry is a story of transformation—one shaped by geography, technology, and the changing face of war. From the dusty trails of the American Frontier to the battlefields of Europe and beyond, the Cavalry evolved from sabre-wielding horsemen into the fast-moving reconnaissance units of the modern era.
The roots of US cavalry stretch back to the 18th century, but its true emergence came in the 1830s with the creation of dedicated mounted units like the 1st and 2nd US Dragoons. These early formations, later redesignated as Cavalry Regiments, were the Army’s answer to the immense and untamed territories acquired during westward expansion. Mounted on hardy horses and armed with carbines, pistols, and sabres, these troopers served as scouts, escorts, and shock troops in a rugged and dangerous landscape. During the mid-19th century, the US Cavalry played a central role in the Indian Wars, battling Native American nations across the Great Plains, the Southwest, and the Pacific Northwest. Operating from outposts like Fort Laramie (Wyoming); Fort Leavenworth (Kansas); and Fort Huachuca (Arizona), cavalrymen engaged in prolonged campaigns against skilled indigenous warriors such as the Lakota, Apache, and Comanche. Legendary cavalry commanders of the era included Col Philip St. George Cooke, Gen George Crook, and Lt Col George Armstrong Custer – whose 7th Cavalry met its end at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876.
The turn of the century saw the cavalry extend its reach overseas. In the Spanish-American War (1898), cavalry units—including the famed Rough Riders led by Theodore Roosevelt—charged up San Juan Hill. In the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), cavalrymen operated in tropical terrain, adapting their tactics to guerrilla warfare. And in 1916, the Punitive Expedition into Mexico, commanded by Gen John J. Pershing, tested the limits of traditional cavalry in the chase for Pancho Villa. World War I marked a turning point. Though some American cavalry units deployed to France, trench warfare and machine guns rendered large-scale horse charges obsolete. The war exposed the vulnerabilities of mounted troops and highlighted the need for mobility without dependence on horses. In the 1920s and 1930s, the US Army began experimenting with mechanization. Light tanks, motorcycles, and armored cars slowly began to supplement—and then replace—horses. This shift was championed by officers like Gen Adna R. Chaffee Jr., who believed the cavalry’s future lay in speed, flexibility, and mechanized scouting. The traditional cavalry saber gave way to the .50 caliber machine gun and radio communications. The old cavalry posts were retooled for training armored and reconnaissance units, such as Fort Knox (Kentucky) and Fort Riley (Kansas).
By World War II, the US Cavalry had completed its transformation. Horse-mounted units were phased out in favor of mechanized cavalry groups equipped with jeeps, armored cars like the M-8 Greyhound, and half-tracks. These modern cavalrymen no longer charged with sabres but gathered intelligence, screened flanks, probed enemy lines, and provided rapid response to changing battlefield conditions. What endured through each era was the spirit of the cavalryman: independent, mobile, and always on the edge of the action. From frontier patrols to European battlefields, the history of the US Cavalry reflects the broader evolution of the American military—and the nation itself.
18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (MECZ). Activated as the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron on July 8, 1943, redesignated as the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on November 10, 1943. Arrived in the UK on September 5, 1944, disembarked over Omaha Beach (France) on September 30. Arrived in Belgium on October 19, assigned Task Force X along the Siegfried Line (Germany). Moved to the Losheim Gap (Belgium) on December 11, hit by the German Ardennes offensive on December 16. Re-equipped and reorganized in January 1945. Deployed along the Roer River in early February. Advanced to the Rhine River in early March, crossed the Rhine at Remagen (Germany) on March 17, attacked southward along the bank. Reconnoitered and screened the 99th Infantry Division advance toward Giessen (Germany). Performed security duties in early April, transferred from First to Third Army on April 18. Reached the Danube River on April 25, mopped up vicinity Kelheim (Germany). Reached Inn River on May 2, 1945 then World War Two ende on May 8, 1945.
On October 19, 1944, 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved from assignment to the 14th Cavalry Group and attached to the 2nd Infantry Division and closed on Manderfeld (Belgium) on October 21. By October 22, the Squadron had taken up positions opposite the German held Siegfried Line 2000 yards to the east, at the approaches to the Losheim Gap. The squadron command post was established at the St Elisabeth Hause. The building was furnished with a Victorian settee and chairs of mahogany upholstered in red plush and furniture that looked curiously out of place in Army confines. There were a great number of religious pictures about and plaster statuary of the Holy Family in various attitudes of devotion.
Their primary mission was to reinforce and improve existing positions previously held by elements of the 2nd Infantry Division located to the south of the cavalry positions. While still attached the 2nd Infantry Division the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron relieved the following units: HQ and HQ Co, 612tn Tank Destroyer Battalion (minus the 1st and 2nd Reconnaissance Platoons); Able Co, 741st Tank Battalion; King Co, 9th Infantry Regiment (2-ID); and an unnumbered 
company of the Belgian Secret Army. Once in position the squadron and its attached units were designated as Task Force X. The Squadron was also utilized to patrol areas between defensive positions and the Siegfried Line, to locate enemy outposts and observation posts, prepared defenses and to reduce the activity of German patrols and to capture prisoners.
Located in the center of Gen Omar Bradley’s sector, the Belgian Ardennes had been quiet since mid-September. Referred to as a ‘ghost front’, one company commander described the sector as a ‘nursery and old folk’s home’. Repeated assurances from the 2nd Infantry Division that this was a quiet sector dominated the atmosphere. Gen Walter M. Robertson, commanding the 2-ID, had reservations that a single cavalry squadron would be able to provide an adequate defense in the Losheim Gap and centered his only divisional reserve, a reinforced infantry battalion in the vicinity of Auw (Germany) to support the 
cavalry. To the north there existed a two mile gap between the south flank of the 99th Infantry Division and the northern extents of Task Force X. This gap was patrolled by elements of the division’s I&R Platoon on the V Corps side and cavalry troops within the VIII Corps boundary. The commanding officer of the 99th Infantry Division, Gen Walter E. Lauer, was aware of his exposed southern flank and stationed his division reserve, the 3rd Battalion of the 394th Infantry Regiment near the Buchholz Railroad Station (Belgium).
The US VIII Corps was still on the aggressive defense from the Losheim Gap through the Schnee Eifel (Germany) and along the line of the Our River to the boundary with Third Army below Remich (Luxembourg) on the Moselle River southeast of Luxembourg. Along the front line First Army had a wide zone of action, the VII Corps had 12.6 miles, the V Corps had 25.3 miles, and the VIII Corps was responsible for 79.9 miles for a total of 113.8 miles. The disproportionate frontages of the corps were due to the more difficult terrain on the right and to the strengthening of the left flank to launch an offensive in that sector. The American armies had typically been offensive in nature and First Army had not been accustomed to establishing a front under defensive conditions. This suspension of offensive operations was to be only for a brief period of time.
(Above – Doc Snafu) The Siegfried Line, known in German as the Westwall, was a massive system of defensive fortifications built by Nazi Germany along its western border, stretching from the Netherlands in the north to Switzerland in the south. Constructed initially in 1936 and significantly expanded between 1938 and 1940, it was intended both as a strategic military barrier and as a political statement of strength, standing opposite France’s Maginot Line. The line spanned over 630 kilometers and consisted of more than 18.000 defensive structures, including concrete pillboxes, fortified bunkers, observation posts, trenches, minefields, barbed wire, and tank obstacles famously known as ‘dragon’s teeth’ rows of pyramid-shaped concrete blocks designed to impede the movement of Allied tanks.
Built under the supervision of the Organisation Todt, much of the construction relied on forced labor and civilian conscription, and while the line was presented as a nearly impenetrable wall of defense, many of its positions were hastily constructed and initially under-equipped. Nonetheless, by the time World War II had entered its final phases, the Siegfried Line had been heavily upgraded, reinforced, and integrated into Germany’s broader defensive strategy. It was during the Allied advance in late 1944, following the success of the Normandy landings and the liberation of France and Belgium, that the Siegfried Line once again became relevant. As Allied forces approached the German border, they encountered fierce resistance in the form of this fortified line.
One of the most notorious and costly engagements near the Siegfried Line was the Battle of Hürtgen Forest, fought from September 1944 to February 1945. This battle, waged in dense, wooded terrain along the German border, was marked by intense infantry fighting, brutal weather, heavily mined ground, and staunch German defenses. The forest’s proximity to the line allowed German troops to utilize the Siegfried bunkers and fortifications for defense, resulting in high Allied casualties and slow progress. Similarly, the Battle of Aachen in October 1944 marked the first capture of a German city by Allied forces and involved grueling urban combat where elements of the Siegfried Line’s fortifications were used by the defenders to prolong resistance. In December 1944, the Germans launched a surprise counteroffensive known as the Battle of the Bulge, which temporarily reversed Allied gains and exploited weaknesses along the line. However, the offensive ultimately failed, and by early 1945, the Allies resumed their push into Germany. The Siegfried Line, though formidable in design, was eventually breached through a combination of direct assault, strategic flanking, and overwhelming Allied numbers and firepower. Following the war, large sections of the line were dismantled, buried, or left to decay, though many parts still remain scattered across Western Germany, hidden among trees, overgrown fields, and rural backroads. Today, the remnants of the Siegfried Line serve as silent witnesses to the immense scale and cost of World War II. In places like the Eifel region, Hürtgenwald, and Saarland, moss-covered bunkers and long rows of dragon’s teeth remain visible, some preserved as memorials or museum sites. They remind us not only of the military engineering involved but also of the brutal human toll exacted during the final battles of the European War.
Along the First Army Front ammunition supplies had been so short that only targets of the greatest and most critical value were fired on. Massed artillery delivered at critical moments, short lived and heavy but almost simultaneous, effective in smashing German counterattacks. Self propelled 155’s were especially good against German Pillboxes and industrial areas. Massed artillery did not play a huge roll during the rapid pursuit across France. The VIII Corps Front was extraordinarily wide. It was faced with a river line for approximately three quarters of a mile of the distance from flank to 
flank and this river line being on the frontier was prepared for defense as a part of the general Siegfried Line. Along VIII Corps Front were the 14th Cavalry Group, the 106th Infantry Division, the 28th Infantry Division, the 9th Armored Division (CCB) and the 4th Infantry Division. It had one infantry division and the equivalent of two armored divisions in reserve. The Ninth Army to the north had its 7th Armored Division and the 30th Infantry Division in reserve and in the south the Third Army had the 
4th Infantry Division, 26th Infantry Division, and the 10th Armored Division. The width of the sector held by the 2nd Infantry Division and eventually the 106th Infantry Division along the attached cavalry group was approximately 18 air miles. The genuine ground distance was actually more than 21 miles. The 14th Cavalry Group had the mission of screening and patrolling the five mile wide gap from a point in the woods northwest of Losheim to that town and then south along the ridgeline across the headwaters of 
the Our River down to the edge of the wooded Schnee Eifel. This corridor is known as the Losheim Gap, heavily wooded and only slightly less rugged than the surrounding Ardennes. The harsh terrain of the Ardennes lends itself well to the defense as to the offense, but it had not been the policy of US forces to prepare for a defensive phase of operations at this point. The road net within the area and to its front was quite limited and in poor condition. This was typical in the Ardennes during the winter 
months. The asphalt roads required constant maintenance and the dirt roads sank away when not reinforced with logs and stone, however travel by heavy vehicles was not impossible. One of the most desirable routes east and west ran right through Manderfeld, the 14th Cavalry Group command post.
When the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was finally in the designed area, the defensive positions were set up in the following manner, from north to south across the gap:
(1) Lanzerath: Elements of Able Company, 612-TDB (Towed), 820-TDB (Towed) after December 11, 1944; (2) Merlscheid: Elements Able Company, 612-TDB (Towed), 820-TDB (Towed) after December 11, 1944; (3) Berterath: Elements of Able Company, 612-TDB (Towed), 820-TDB (Towed) after December 11, 1944; (4) Afst: 1st Platoon C Troop, 18-Cav Recon Sq; (5) Krewinkel: 2nd Platoon C Troop, 18-Cav Recon Dq, elements of Able Company, 820-TDB (Towed) on December 11, 1944; (6) Weckerath: 3rd Platoon and HQs C Troop, 18-Cav Recon Sq, 3rd Platoon was positioned approximately 1000 yards east of Weckerath in a small patch of woods wich was also known as the ‘King’s Woods’ because it was commanded by 1/Lt Ledru L. King; (7) Manderfeld: HQs 14-Cav Group, and 820-TDB, E Troop was stationed to the southwest and Fox Company to the northwest; (8) Roth: 2nd Platoon and HQs A Troop, 18-Cav Recon Sq, elements Able Company 820-TDB (Towed) on December 11, 1944; (9) Kobscheid: 1st and 3rd Platoons A Troop, 18-Car Recon Sq.
The cavalry positions could be described as small islands of resistance. These were located within depressions offering protection against the raw winds which sweep through the Ardennes. Because of the area to be covered a homogenous defensive line was not possible. There also existed substantial gaps on both cavalry flanks. Faced with the mission of defending these garrisons, the cavalrymen made the full use of their various automatic weapons, which in many cases had to be dismounted from the vehicles of the squadron; the initial reaction from the cavalrymen was that these defensive positions limited the fighting capabilities of the unit. An average of fifteen to twenty automatic weapons were positioned in each of the strong points, where thirty to forty troopers had been positioned for defense, however it was felt that some sort of ‘hit and run’ defense plan in which they could capitalize upon the mobility of their organic fighting vehicles, would have been more desirable. Further criticism was voiced of the manner in which they were ordered to replace infantry troops that had preceded them in these positions. It had been specified that the cavalrymen take up the same positions that had been held by the riflemen, and the smaller number of combat personnel available to the cavalry squadron made it necessary to occupy about one half of the established positions, and with fewer men than the rifle company had.
Sketches of the defensive conditions in and around each village reveal a tight circular security. Not much in the way of forward observation posts to warn of an impending approaching enemy. There were not enough troops to provide for a wide coverage of each strongpoint, basically just enough to thwart German patrols and the local harassing attack. There was no contact between outposts except for the occasional shuttle jeep and because of the wide area to be covered only a modest defensive screen could be maintained without the possible support of infantry or armor. Most of the automatic weapons were positioned in pairs and weapon pits had been dug for them. Machine gun and mortar positions were dug in and provided with overhead cover. In several of the garrisoned strong points, tunnels twenty-five to thirty yards in length had been dug from the cellars of the houses in which the troops were billeted to the various gun positions. There were one or two .50 caliber machine guns at each strong point, as well as two or three 60-MM mortars and the addition of one or two M-8 37-MM armored cars with a coaxially mounted .30 caliber machine gun. All positions were wired in and anti-vehicle and anti-personal mines had been planted in the appropriate areas. All weapons positions were rearranged to provide effective fields of fire and protect main lines of resistance.
Gradyn Davies, C Troop 18th Squadron, 2nd Platoon; in Krewinkel, we blew holes in some of the buildings and dug tunnels out for forward positions and for the forward observers. When we took over these positions from the 2nd Infantry Division they had not done much in preparing them for defense‘.
Capt Clinton Meadows commanding officer of E Troop, 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron stated, we had about nine miles to cover with one squadron. We were not trained or equipped to fight as infantry, if we were attacked we probably could not hold them for more than two hundred yards or so. We were trained to obtain intelligence, mostly by gunfire, which is what we were supposed to do. E Troop had 25 to 30 artillery registered concentrations and had computed data for approximately 100 more. Registrations were adjusted on the average of three times per day. A Troop and C Troop knew that there was something going on out in front of our positions, they could hear the vehicles running at night. Lt Col Damon tried for two weeks to try and get headquarters to let us send out more foot patrols and try to capture some prisoners, which was our standard procedure. In the past we had depended on air reconnaissance to determine everything‘.
(Doc Snafu) 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron as of December 1944
The 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), as part of the 14th Cavalry Group, played a significant role during World War II, particularly in the Belgian Ardennes Region in December 1944. Understanding its organization, personnel strength, vehicles, and weaponry provides insight into its operational capabilities during this period.
Organizational Structure, as of December 1944, the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was structured in accordance with the US Army’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) from September 15, 1943. The squadron comprised the following units:
14th Cavalry Group (Mechanized) The 14th Cavalry Group was not a squadron. It was a Group Headquarters, meaning it was the command element responsible for two cavalry reconnaissance squadrons which, in the period of December 1944, were the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 32nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Readers should think of it like a regimental-sized command, even though the US Army had done away with formal cavalry regiments for these mechanized units.
Composition of a Cavalry Group Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT) – This was the command and control element for the group. Plus two mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons (18th CRS and 32nd CRS). The group HQ didn’t have many combat troops of its own because it coordinated the operations of the two squadrons, plus any attached units (e.g., tank destroyers, engineers, field artillery).
14th Cavalry Group (Code name Ceylon) CO Col Mark A. Devine, EXO Lt Col Augustine D. Dugan
Hqs & Hqs Co and Service Troop, S-2 Maj James Worthington, S-3 Maj Lawrence Smith, S-4 Maj L. L. Lee, Adjutant Capt John Aylor, Communication Hqs Adjutant Capt Robert N. Pritchard, Staff Capt William G. North, Staff 1/Lt. Kenneth O. West, Staff Capt Garland Jones, French Liaison Lt George H. Gudfin, (Chaplain) Capt Christian Martin, (Medic) Capt Edward Benson.
18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Code name Deerskin) CO Lt Col Robert F. Damon, EXO Maj James W. Faris, S-2 Capt Robert H. Gies, S-3 Maj Walter J. Dill, (French Liaison) 1/Lt. Edward Schnee, (Communications) Capt Wendell Broadus.
Troop A (Capt Stanley Porche) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop B (Capt R. G. Fossland) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop C (Capt John T. Walker) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop E (Capt Clinton E. Meadows) Assault Gun Troop, direct fire support to recon elements.
Fox Co (Capt William Fitzgerald) Light Tank Co, support recon operations, engage enemy armor.
Medical Detachment (Capt Laurence K. McDaniels) medical support, casualty evacuation.
This organizational structure was standardized for mechanized cavalry squadrons during that period.
32nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Code name Deliver) CO Lt Col Paul A. Ridge, EXO Maj John Kracke, S-2 Capt Gilbert R. Reed, S-3 Maj James L. Mayes, (French Liaison) 1/Lt Leonard Pydesky, HQ Capt Willard S. Wanke, Motor Capt Samuel E. Wood.
Troop A (1/Lt Robert Reppa) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop B (Capt Franklin P. Lindsey) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop C (Capt Charles Martin) Recon Troops, recon missions, intelligence, security operations.
Troop E (1/Lt Earl E. Lawton) Assault Gun Troop, direct fire support to recon elements.
Fox Co (Capt Horace N. Bair) Light Tank Co, support recon operations, engage enemy armor.
Medical Detachment (Capt James E. Kreisle) medical support, casualty evacuation.
This organizational structure was standardized for mechanized cavalry squadrons during that period.
Personnel Strength, while specific personnel numbers for the 18th Cavalry Recon Squadron are not detailed in the available sources, a typical mechanized cavalry recon squadron of that era consisted of approximately 700 to 900 officers and enlisted men. This estimate aligns with the standard TO&E for such units during World War II.
Vehicles and Equipment, the squadron was equipped with a variety of vehicles to fulfill its reconnaissance and combat support roles: M-8 Greyhound Armored Cars: Six-wheeled vehicles armed with a 37-MM gun and a coaxial .30 caliber machine gun later upgraded to .50 caliber machine gun, used primarily by reconnaissance troops for scouting and engaging light enemy forces. Jeeps (Willys MB or Ford GPW): Light utility vehicles employed for personnel transport, command and control, and communication tasks with .30 cal machine gun mounted side wise or .50 cal machine gun mounted on the vehicule on th read area. M-5A1 Stuart Light Tanks: Utilized by Fox Company, these tanks provided support against enemy infantry and light armor. M-8 HMC (Howitzer Motor Carriage): Assault guns mounted on the M-8 chassis, armed with a 75-MM howitzer, used by Troop E for direct fire support. M-3 Half-tracks: Armored personnel carriers used to transport troops and provide mobile support. These vehicles enabled the squadron to perform a wide range of missions, from reconnaissance and security to direct combat support.
Armament, the squadron’s weaponry included both individual and crew-served arms considered here as individual weapons: M-1 & M-1D Garand Rifles: Standard-issue semi-automatic rifles for enlisted personnel. M-1, M-2 Carbines: Lighter, semi-automatic carbines issued to officers, NCOs, and support personnel. M-1911A1 .45 Caliber Pistols: Sidearms for officers and certain enlisted roles. Also considered here as individual weapons were the crew-served and vehicle-mounted weapons: .30 Caliber M-1919A4 Machine Guns: Mounted on vehicles for suppressive fire or dismounted and used ou tripod in infantry positions. .50 Caliber M2 Browning Machine Guns: This beast, heavy machine guns mounted on vehicles for anti-aircraft and anti-vehicle purposes could also be used on tripod in infantry positions. 37-MM M-6 Guns: Main armament on the M-8 Greyhound armored cars using AP, HE, and Shrapnell shots. 75-MM Howitzers: Mounted on M-8 HMCs in Troop E for artillery support using AP, HE, WP and SMOKE shots. 37-MM M-5 Guns: Main armament on YHE M-5A1 Stuart light tanks using AP, HE and Shrapnell shots. This diverse arsenal allowed the squadron to engage a variety of targets effectively, from infantry and fortifications to light armored vehicles.
Operational Context in December 1944, in December 1944, the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was deployed part in the Belgian Ardennes Region as well as in the German Schnee Eifel Area. Their operations were mainly centered on the Bullingen – Losheimergraben highway with concentration in the Losheim Gap area. On December 16, 1944, the squadron faced a significant German offensive. Despite being outnumbered and facing intense enemy pressure, the squadron executed a disciplined withdrawal to the Manderfeld Ridge, demonstrating resilience and tactical proficiency.
