f. Immediately following the glider landings, a resupply mission of five hundred and forty (540) tons, was delivered by B-24 type aircraft of the US 8-AAF employing a total of two hundred and forty (240) aircraft.
g. During the airborne delivery and the resupply delivery, continuous protection was afforded the aircraft of the IX Troop Carrier Command and the US 8-AAF by the US 8-AAF, the US 9-AAF, the Fighter Command, and the 2nd Tactical Air Force. The losses of the IX Troop Carrier Command are reported to have approximated fifty (50) C-47 and C-46 type aircraft. Glider losses from the antiaircraft fire are known to have been very light. B-24 losses were reported to have been approximately twenty (20).
h. Just prior to the last light on D-Day, airfields occupied by night fighter forces of the Luftwaffe were attacked by the 8-AAF and the 9-AAF fighters. Throughout the entire operation of the XVIII Corps (Airborne), there were no reported enemy air attacks on its forces.
i. The 2nd Tactical Air Force supported units of the XVIII Corps (Airborne), throughout the entire operation. The 2nd Tactical Air Force furnished communications parties that were attached to the Corps and each division and which had direct communications with the British 2nd Army G-Air, the FCP, and the supporting aircraft. Requests for air support were submitted directly to Army if the targets were not of a pressing nature, and in case of an emergency direct to the FCP, bypassing the Army. There were very few targets submitted by the two (2) airborne divisions to the air forces, because of the disorganization of the German forces and the scarcity of suitable targets. Targets that were submitted were quickly and effectively attacked.
j. A new type of air support to the Corps was made available in the form of medium bombardment close support. Medium bombardment aircraft were standing by and were prepared to attack a target within 30 to -45 minutes after its submission to the 2nd Tactical Air Force by the Corps. No suitable targets were encountered and hence the effectiveness of this type of support could not be appraised.
(7) ARTILLERY
a. Artillery support for Operation Varsity fell natural into two (2) distinct phases: 1. The artillery bombardment prior to P Hour D-Day, and 2. the close support rendered to the airborne divisions by artillery fire from positions on the west bank of the Rhine River immediately after the airborne troops had arrived on the ground. The British XII Corps planned and executed the preliminary bombardment. Commencing at 1800 Hours on March 23, 1945 (D-1), the bombardment continued unabated until P Hour (1000) on D-Day. Prior to the commencement of the bombardment a silent policy had been in effect. Positions were occupied and ammunition was dumped nearby under cover of darkness. Radio silence was maintained. Gun crews were not permitted in the positions area during daylight. The strictest camouflage discipline was enforced. A special committee was formed to study counter-flak fires, and the last half hour of the preparation was devoted to neutralization known enemy batteries, punishing enemy strong points, disrupting his communications, and denying him any rest. After daylight on D-Day, the artillery concentrated its fire on the area short of the bomb line while the British RAF pummeled the land east of that line. each airborne division submitted its request for areas to be fired upon; these requests were honored in the master fire plan. Careful supervision insured that the Landing Zones would not be pitted by shell holes. Working in the most thorough and painstaking manner the British XII Corps CCRA produced a most excellent fire plan, admirably executed. The exact composition of the artillery massed for the delivery of the preparation may be found in the Artillery Report. It is sufficient to record here that light, medium, and heavy calibers crowded each other to the river bank and every piece had its several hundred rounds of ammunition dumped hard by. The general effectiveness of the bombardment is revealed by the answers of the dazed prisoners of D-Day, who, when questioned as to why they surrendered, so often replied: It was too much; it was more than I could stand. As to the effectivenes of the counter-flak fires there remains the mute testimony of the forty-five (45) planes of the first flights all of which returned in formation to the west bank of the river. Later flights were not so fortunate, for it was planned, and rightly to cease firing when the first planes of the sky train appeared over the gun areas and to fire no more until the air landing was completed. At that time, the US XVIII Corps Artillery (Airborne) took active command of Corps Artillery and the second phase came into being.
b. For the close support of the airborne divisions after they were on the ground a division artillery field regiment (British) in position of the west bank of the river was placed in direct support of each airborne division. The British 6th Airborne Division had three (3) field regiments and two (2) medium regiments; the US 17th Airborne Division had three (3) field regiments and one (1) medium regiment in direct support. The British 6th Airborne Division was allotted the extra medium (4.5″ Gun) regiment to gain more fire at a greater range, for its division zone extended deeper than the area of the US 17th Airborne Division. In general, support was British 8th AGRA and the US 40th Group. On the call were the artilleries of the British XII Corps on the left and the US XVI Corps on the right. The key to the whole problem of giving c1ose support to the divisions was to be found in the communication system. Radio, of course, was the only solution; radio and trained observers for all early fires of necessity had to be observed fires. The British 6th Airborne Division had its own airborne forward observer unit which answered the need admirably. No such organic unit existed for the US 17th Airborne Division. As a consequence, the XVIII Corps (Airborne) trained and equipped such a group for that division calling principally on the division for personnel. Actually, the equipment had been procured and the personnel trained for such an operation prior to the von Rundstedt offensive of December 1944, which precipitated this Corps into a ground role and dissolved the school.
Varsity, however, demanded translator teams with the British artillery formations on the west hank in order that US observers’ sensings could be translated into British fire commands. The US Nith Army supplied the necessary translator teams and equipment. These teams, along with the airborne observer and liaison, teams were given a week’s intensive schooling at Epernay and then went out to join their units. The details of the communication plan can be found in the Artillery Report on the operation. That the communications system worked was gratifying, and that every airborne radio para-dropped and glider-borne, a total of fourteen (14) radios, functioned during the operation was nothing short of miraculous. The effect of having a trained observer with each infantry battalion in direct communication with an artillery regiment already in position is difficult to evaluate. That the observers proved themselves, however, is shown by the fact that one (1) infantry regiment had over one hundred and ten (110) observed fire missions fired for it during the period P to P plus 36 Hours. The observers adjusted fire visually by day and night, and on occasion by sound. They reported ‘Fire Effective’ in every instance. When the divisions moved on eastward the forward observers for the Corps Artillery were no longer needed. But for forty-eight (48) hours they gave to the airborne divisions something unique in airborne annals – observed close-support artillery fire in great mass during the crucial period when the airborne division artilleries were seeking to assemble and organize on the ground.
(8) ENGINEER FUNCTIONS
The engineer plan for the operation covered initially the clearing of routes through Wesel and bridging the Lippe River as well as the Lippe-Seiten Canal on the main road south of Wesel. Based on a route plan prescribed by the British Second Army an overlay showing priority of clearance of routes through Wesel was prepared and given to the 16th Airfield Construction Group. This plan was coordinated with the US Ninth Army engineers working in the same area. Reconnaissance parties crossed on D-Day to check the routes selected, and to make any necessary changes. Late on D+1 troops and equipment of the 16th Airfield Construction Group crossed the river and began the work of clearing the town on D+2. Additional troops of the 16th Airfield Construction Group crossed and helped with work already underway. By this time two (2) routes through Wesel were opened to traffic. On D+3, the balance of the 16th Airfield Construction Group troops and equipment together with additional 8 CRE troops and equipment arrived. Bridging over the Lippe River began with the 8 CRE Troops. On D+4, the balance of 8 CRE troops and additional bridging equipment arrived, and a bridge over the Lippe River was completed. Troops of the 503rd Field Company and one (1) Bailey Platoon came under Corps control and were placed in support of the British 6th Guards Armored Brigade. Troops of the 6th Airfield Construction Group and 8 CRE reverted to the British VIII Corps as of 1800 (D+4). On D+5, troops of the 503rd Field Company with equipment loaned by the British Corps cleared routes of obstacles as far as Dulmen and by 1810 Hours, had cleared two (2) single lane routes through Dulmen.
(9) SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS
a. Wire Communications: Providing the Corps Headquarters with wire communication for Operation Varsity presented the problem of obtaining wire circuits across the Rhine River to the US 17th Airborne Division and the British 6th Airborne Division. To fulfill this mission it was necessary to have a minimum of five (5) spiral-four (4) cables from the Corps Command Post across the Rhine River operating at all times. On D-Day, prior to 1200, six (6) spiral four (4) cables had been installed from the Corps Command Post to a test point on the east bank of the river. In order to assure that a minimum of five (5) cables would be working at all times, sixteen (16) spirals of four (4) cables were laid water across the river, eight (8) being laid at one (1) point and eight (8) at a different point further upstream. These cables were connected to the test point which permitted the selection of any five (5) of the sixteen (16) cables. The first cable to be laid across the river was installed and operating by 0945 on D-Day. The wire teams continued to lay cable until eight (8) cables were installed. The first crossing of eight (8) cables was completed at 1400, D-Day. The construction teams then moved upstream and installed another eight (8) cables. The second set of eight (8) cables was completed by 1300, on D-Day. At 1630, D-Day, wire laying teams had arrived on the east bank of the Rhine River and had begun to extend cables to the US 17th Airborne Division and to the British 6th Airborne Division. These teams had extended spiral-four (4) cables as far as Muhlenfeld by the evening of D-Day. They were unable to extend the lines any further due to enemy action in the area, through which they must proceed, and were forced to wait at Muhlenfeld until the morning of D+1. At this time, they continued toward the divisions’ command posts. At 1430, on D+1, the first cable arrived at the Command Post of the US 17th Airborne Division. At 1600, ob D+1 the first cable arrived at the Command Post of the British 6th Airborne Division. The crews then proceeded to extend backward from the divisions to complete the second cable from each division to the Corps Command Post. After the initial system was installed the crews continued to extend the cable to accommodate
the rapidly moving command posts of the divisions.
b. Radio Communications:
(1) XVIII Corps (Airborne) Command Net C-1: CommUnication established as follows:
– (a) US 17th Airborne Division at 1830, March 24, 1945
– (b) British 6th Airborne Division at 1245, March 25, 1945. (Delay caused by radio set not being available for the net until 1200, March 25.)
(2) XVIII Corps (Airborne) Command Net C-2: Communication established with the British 6th Airborne Division at 1430, March 24, 1945.
(3) XVIII Corps (Airborne) Command Net C-3: Communication established with the US 17th Airborne Division at 1235, March 24, 1945.
(4) Army Net C-4: Communication established with the British Second Army and the US Ninth Army at 2330, March 23, 1945.
(5) British Second Army Command Net A-1: Communication established at 2330, March 23, 1945.
(6) First (Allied) Airborne Army Command Net C-5: Communication established at 1014, March 24, 1945.
(7) US 17th Airborne Division Resupply Net C-6: The monitor station at Corps Headquarters heard the US 17th Airborne Division establish communication with the First (Allied) Airborne Army at 115/, March 24, 1945.
(8) XVIII Corps (Airborne) Administrative Net C-8: Communication was established with Corps Base at 0812, March 24, 1945.
(9) British 6th Airborne Division Resupply Net C-9: The monitor station at Corps headquarters heard communication established at 1235, March 24, 1945.
(10) Enemy units engaged included the 84.Infantry-Division (destroyed), the 466.Division (BG Karst), elements of the 7.Parachute- Division, numerous Antiaircraft, Replacement, Volkssturm, Fortress, Engineer, Assault Gun, Signal, Artillery, Fusilier, and other units.
(11) CONCLUSION (Sketch N°. 7)
Operation Varsity in its conception and planning envisaged the seizure of key terrain to disrupt the hostile defense, and the rapid establishment of a deep, bridgehead by airborne troops with the early link-up by other river crossing forces. Plans for subsequent operations to exploit the surprise and confusion gained were based upon flexible and aggressive command and early reinforcement by supporting armor, antitank weapons, artillery, and, additional supplies and service troops, particularly engineers, over very limited crossing facilities. The successful execution of the airborne and exploitation operations in which the XVIII Corps (Airborne) advanced a total of forty-one (41) miles and captured eight thousand and nine (8009) prisoners in six (6) days was made possible not by the remarkable circumstance of having events develop according to schedule, but rather by the thousands of individuals who through bold and aggressive action, by tireless and intelligent efforts caused those events to occur. It is believed that strategic and tactical, doctrines governing the employment of airborne forces were served in Varsity and that it may well serve as a model for future airborne operations.
Matthew B. Ridgway
Major General, US Army
XVIII Corps Airborne
Commanding
