On August 29 and 30, the team informed the SFHQ that the Germans were preparing the Oise Bridges for demolition and suggested that to prevent their destruction, London should send arms and an SAS group if possible. Team Alfred also reported that the Oise Valley remained heavily congested with German troops and gave the location of forty tanks south of Compiègne. The team still hoped to set up several ambushes, even though it would have to use aged rifles and shotguns. Then at 1100, August 30, it received the following message from the SFHQ: ‘would like you to take all possible steps on receipt this message to preserve following Somme River Bridges from enemy demolition. All bridges Amiens Area. Also at Moreuil, Boves, Fiquigny, Conde, Longprè. Try to keep bridges in the state of preservation for about 4 days. This target of the highest importance. Can drop arms to you from low flying typhoons if you need them’.
Team Alfred had still not received any arms drops, so attempting to stop the German Army from blowing up a number of bridges proved a rather difficult task. On August 31, the team radioed London twice requesting arms drops and that evening set off to conduct two ambushes. Lt Herenguel and Sgt Key remained with the ambush party, while Capt MacDougall took the radio with a horse and cart and attempted to contact the FFI in Amiens. When he arrived in Ferrières at the same time as an American armored column, an American staff officer provided him with a vehicle so he could rapidly reach Amiens. But just as he was preparing to leave Ferrières, word arrived that the British Army had already captured the town. Team Alfred’s ambushes went rather well, at Francières shooting up a German column while receiving few losses.
The second ambush killed a small group of Germans while liberating thirty American prisoners of war. The following day, large US Army forces overran the area. Team Alfred subsequently remained in the area working with the FFI attempting to locate German stragglers. After spending three days in Paris, the team returned to England on September 27. The team concluded its after-action report with the following paragraph: ‘this was the tale of the Team Alfred, not a very glorious one but not through any fault of the team. If we had been dispatched when we were first alerted some two weeks previous to our actual departure (team was alerted and briefed on August 9 but did not leave until August 24) we could have done something useful’. Team Alfred spent four weeks in France, but only eight days before US Army conventional forces overran the area. Perhaps their own postmortem was too critical, for the team did provide valuable information on German troop movements and defenses. Lt Herenguel died on September 8, 1945, in Nape (Laos). Albert Key died shortly after the end of the war. The Jedburgh community subsequently lost contact with Capt MacDougall.
Jedburgh Team Arnold, August 24 1944
The Marne Department of Eastern France proved a difficult area for the French Resistance. The SOE resolved to open an intelligence circuit in this area and picked one of its more experienced operatives to lead it, Maj Nicholas R. Bodington (almost always misspelled Boddington). A former Reuters Paris correspondent, Bodington had already undertaken several journeys to occupied France. The SFHQ sent him to the Marne Region in early July 1944 to reopen the [Pedlar] circuit. Jedburgh Team Arnold would assist Bodington’s circuit in late August. The SFHQ dispatched Team Arnold late in the evening of August 24, 1944, to the Marne Area near Epernay to assist the local FFI. The team consisted of (FR) Capt Michel de Carville (Sussex); (UK) Capt James H. Monahan (Londonderry); (UK) Sgt Alan de Ville (Escudo). The team flew from Tarrant Rushton Airdrome at 2230, August 24, in two Halifax Bombers of the Royal Air Force’s 38th Group, taking with them thirty containers of supplies. They dropped at 0030, August 25, in civilian clothes southwest of Epernay near the small village of Igny-Comblize. The DZ was easily recognized, and the team jumped without difficulty. Maj Bodington (code-named ‘Nick’) led the reception committee, which fetched the containers and retrieved all the equipment except Team Arnold’s leg bags with their personal weapons, maps, uniforms, and crystals for the radio. As a result, the team could not contact the SFHQ. Maj Bodington provided a secluded hunting lodges and several guides to the Jedburghs and suggested that they control the zone from Epernay west to Dormans.
On August 26, Team Arnold sent four agents (selected by Bodington) south to contact the advancing forces of the US 3-A. The team also decided to form a Maquis as soon as possible. The local FFI had already armed some 260 men from parachuted arms and hoped to field 200 more. On August 27, while the team was visiting local FFI leaders, the resistance group in Cerseuil shot and killed a member of the Organization Todt (a labor organization that performed construction for the Wehrmacht). Team Arnold decided to use this incident to raise the Cerseuil FFI to insurrection. On the way to Cerseuil, however, a German patrol spotted the team and drove it into hiding. The team spent that night in the village of Try.
In the morning, they were awakened by the sound of German Army columns crossing the Marne River bridge at Try. Team Arnold sent word for the FFI to assemble at Try. Later in the morning, elements of the US 7-AD’s CCB and the local FFI arrived and attempted to seize the Marne Bridge. As the Allied forces approached, however, the German defenders blew up the bridge and successfully warded off a subsequent American attack. The FFI assisted the troops of the 7-AD by providing a flank screen and taking care of the wounded. The German unit that prepared the defense of this sector of the Marne was Gen Eckart von Tschammer, Osten’s Feldkommandantur 531, which administered the Marne Department, but from some distance away in Châlons-sur-Marne. Its nearest office or outpost was in Epernay.
In Châlons the Germans did not view resistance activity as very threatening and continued to work until American armor arrived on August 28. The Germans concentrated on repairing roads and bridges and preparing demolitions. One major problem was transporting French collaborators and their families east, with some 200 leaving Châlons-sur-Marne only on August 27. Besides assembling livestock north of the Marne, the Feldkommandantur was also responsible for constructing defensive positions behind the river’s north bank. Only 7690 of the requisitioned 12000 French workers appeared on the first day. The Germans soon noticed that the French were sabotaging their vehicles. Gen Franz Beyer’s LXXX Corps headquarters assisted in the construction of this sector of the Kitzinger Line. The German forces that crossed the Marne Bridge at Dormans were the remnants of Gen Kurt von der Chevallerie’s 1.Army retiring from the upper Seine. Included in this force was a battle group of the Panzer-Lehr-Division. From August 29, until September 2, Team Arnold collected weapons from the FFI. They reported no disturbances.
On September 2, along with Maj Bodington and his Maquis, the team moved to Montier-en-Der, where they were to help collect German stragglers. The team discovered few if any Germans at Montier-en-Der, however, and resolved to move on to Saint-Dizier. They found that town occupied by about three companies of resistance troops and contacted Col de Grouchy, the head of the resistance in the Haute-Marne.
Their tranquility was disturbed on September 8, when news came down through FFI channels to prepare rapidly to move south. Team Arnold went to the US 3-A’s headquarters for more precise orders and in the hope of securing more arms. Personnel at Patton’s headquarters instructed them to move on Chaumont with all available forces to prevent German forces from escaping to the north. Maj Bodington dispatched one company from Saint-Dizier toward Chaumont on September 10. The following day, Team Arnold followed with two half companies. They found FFI troops occupying villages on the road between Juzonnocourt and Boulogne, the latter village being ten kilometers north of Chaumont and the closest point to the German positions.
The 2d French Armored Division secured Chaumont on September 13, ending any possible threat to Patton’s southern flank. On September 14, the FFI forces returned home. Team Arnold reported in at Paris on the 19 and later continued on to London. They observed that they had been inserted far too late to organize and coordinate resistance activities, that it had taken too long for them to receive their requested arms drops, and that since they had been parachuted in civilian clothes, they should have been issued false identity papers.
Team Arnold was in France only three days before linking up with the US 3-A. Its remaining twenty-three days were devoted to collecting weapons and finally leading FFI troops to Chaumont.
Jedburgh Team Archibald, August 25 1944
Jedburgh training, as previously mentioned, proved quite rigorous and, at most times, injured Jeds could be found in the local hospital. In May, while the Jedburghs were forming their own teams at Milton Hall, (UK) Maj Arthur du P. Denning (Cumberland); (FR) Capt François Coste (Montgomery); (US) Sgt Roger L. Pierre (Sen), while in the hospital, resolved to form their own team. Denning was a rather imposing figure at six feet three inches in height, with a trim regimental mustache and ever-present pipe. Coste was a career officer in the French Army, a Saint-Cyr graduate, who was usually found smoking a cigarette. Roger Pierre was a nineteen-year-old man from New York. Upon their return to Milton Hall, their self-selection was approved, and they volunteered to jump into France in civilian clothes.
After receiving their briefing in London, however, their mission was canceled. Finally, after waiting fourteen days in London, Denning and Coste received another briefing on August 25. Team Archibald would jump in their uniforms near Nancy, contact the Réseau Planète, and assist the FFI through training, liaison, and delivery of weapons. Their pre-mission briefing, however, was based on information six months old, and hence out of date. They were not informed that other Allied agents were operating in the same area nor that Team Archibald would be delivering a large sum of money to Planète. The team was instructed to avoid pitched battles with Axis forces. That same day, the team drove north for Harrington and took off in a bomber at 2045. The pilot had difficulty identifying the DZ but dropped the team and equipment on the second pass at 0110 of August 26 in the Nancy region near the Forêt de Charmes. Two sixty-man reception committees, each desiring weapons, met the team. Maj Denning gave half the weapons to each group and decided to join the Maquis in the forest, which already possessed some weapons, was led by a Capt Noel and was capable of some military action.
On retrieval of the parachuted equipment, the team discovered that their radio set was destroyed and numerous weapons seriously damaged in the drop. Another agent from the SFHQ, however, (code-named Careful) was in the area and informed London that Archibald had arrived. Team Archibald received another radio with the first parachuted delivery of supplies. Capt Noel led the team to his Maquis camp, where Major Denning and a former Yugoslavian captain attempted to repair the damaged firearms. Team Archibald also began to receive parachute drops – some expected, some a surprise. In the latter category was a ten-man Canadian SAS team with three jeeps led by a major code-named Peter. After much handshaking and backslapping, the SAS team drove off toward Saint-Die and never returned.
Team Archibald later discovered that the entire SAS team was killed in combat. Archibald’s guerrilla band soon rose to a strength of 300 armed and 250 unarmed men. Planète finally arrived to receive his 35 million francs, but he could offer little information on the resistance situation in the area. He promised, however, that one of his deputies would subsequently deliver that information.
That deputy eventually arrived but only after the end of guerrilla operations with the arrival of US Army field units. Upon learning of the approach of a German division, the group left 150 armed men to await further arms drops in the Forêt de Charmes and moved the remainder to Lemenil-Mitry in the Bois de Chivoiteux.
The Germans subsequently swept the Forêt de Charmes, burning the village of Saint-Remy. Maquis Noel lost much of its impetus when Planète called its leader away to Nancy. On September 2, however, Capt Montlac led a resistance group to the German depot at Tantonville, in the afternoon ambushing a German column along the way and subsequently participating in action at Tantonville. News received during the morning indicated that advancing US Army field forces were only some thirty-five kilometers away, so Maj Denning resolved to contact them. He encountered the 42d Cavalry Squadron and gave them his interpretation of the situation, but on the return trip, he ran into a skirmish and received a slight wound in the thigh. Upon returning to the Maquis camp, Denning discovered that Capt Coste and several of the group had been wounded.
Owing to the severity of their wounds, Denning sent the wounded behind German lines to a Catholic hospital in Luneville. If asked, the driver carrying them was to declare that they were innocent victims of FFI terrorists. Denning remained with the Maquis, hoping to assist the US Army in securing bridges over the Moselle River. The only bridges between Nancy and Charmes not defended and rigged for demolition were at the towns of Charmes and Langley. Denning’s group managed to capture the bridge at Charmes, driving off the small garrison in a coup de main in the evening. The US 3-A, however, ran out of gasoline and was unable to push forward to Charmes. The Germans subsequently retook the town and destroyed the bridge during their defense of the Moselle.
With the Americans temporarily out of fuel and German reinforcements now available, the front soon stabilized along the Moselle River. In early September, Patton’s forces secured bridgeheads across the Moselle north of Bayon at Lorey, Saint-Mard, and Velle and asked the FFI for assistance. Major Denning consequently took four companies of Maquis across the river, placing one company in each village and a fourth in Domptail. Capt Noel meanwhile formed an 800-man mobile group that assisted in providing rear-area and flank protection in the no-man’s-land between the US 3-A and 7-A. Following a brief trip to Paris, Major Denning returned to the Nancy area, but the large Jedburgh-FFI operations had come to a close. The French government intended to incorporate the Maquis into a field army, and SHAEF saw no further use for Jedburgh teams. Team Archibald made numerous requests for arms drops after September 3, but the SFHQ or the RAF managed to avert the delivery of arms. Finally, on October 31, the US 3-A directed Team Archibald to return to England. The Team served in the field for more than two months, although only nine days before the arrival of US 3-A units. The Team provided invaluable assistance in organizing a large Maquis that fought as a conventional infantry force with the US 3-A along the Moselle River.
Jedburgh Team Stanley, August 31 1944
Team Stanley was in a hotel in London as late as August 31, wondering if they would in fact ever be sent into action when they received the alert notification. As they drove north for the Tempsford Airfield, Craster and Cantais received their briefing in the back of a truck. Team Stanley took off at 2045 on August 31 in a Stirling Bomber. The SFHQ dispatched Team Stanley as the fifty-third Jedburgh team to France on August 31, 1944, to the Haute-Marne Region. It consisted of (UK) Capt Oswin E. Craster (Yorkshire); (FR) Lt Robert Cantais (Meath); (UK) Sgt Jack E. Grinham (Worcestershire). In addition, two French aspirants, Lt Denis and Lt Ely, jumped with Team Stanley and accompanied them throughout the operation, usually commanding platoon-size FFI groups. Oswin Craster had served since 1939 in the 5th Battalion of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. When it became apparent that his unit would not be sent into combat, he and several of his comrades volunteered for operations behind German Lines.
Cantais was a regular in the French Army, who eventually retired as a colonel. Jack Grinham had previously served in the Royal Armoured Corps. Their mission was to assist the FFI near Chaumont on the Plateau de Langres particularly, in setting up air-supply drops. The SFHQ also directed them to prevent the destruction of several engineering structures in Eastern France. By this late date, the SFHQ knew of the imminent arrival of Allied ground forces, so Stanley received instructions to immediately dispatch agents to serve as guides for the advancing ground forces.
They parachuted shortly before midnight from too high an altitude, so the five parachutists and numerous containers scattered considerably near Rivière-les-Fosses, about twenty-five kilometers south-southwest of Langres. The reception committee assisted in the retrieval of the equipment and provided the team with shelter and transportation. They spent the night in the village and on the evening of September 2, drove about twenty-two kilometers northeast in the rain to join an organized Maquis, which they found in the woods west of Bussières-lès-Belmont. On September 3, the team reported that 300 armed Maquis were in the area along with three companies of the French 1st Regiment, which had defected to the Allies along with sixty French gendarmes. They estimated that another 2000 Maquis could be raised if the SFHQ dropped sufficient arms. The French 1st Regiment possessed only light infantry weapons and enough ammunition to last one day. The Team also discovered that the Germans had already destroyed the facilities the SFHQ had requested saved.
One SAS troop in jeeps arrived one morning and asked to use the Jedburgh’s radio since theirs had been smashed on landing. Sgt Grinham sent their message for them, and the SAS disappeared the following day. Through September 14, Team Stanley provided excellent information on German forces in the area to the SFHQ, including the heavy road traffic toward Langres (held by 8000 Germans, with one general identified) and Chaumont (which the Germans were preparing for defense). The team attempted to avoid pitched battles as a result of insufficient arms and ammunition. Beginning on September 7, however, they began to capture small groups of German troops attempting to escape east from the Bay of Biscay on the road from Champlite to Bonne. On September 8, the team received its first message from the SFHQ, which requested more information on a prospective DZ.
The following night, however, the team received its weapons drop. On September 11, a large body of German troops and their Russian auxiliaries occupied the villages of Grenant, Saulles, and Belmont. A platoon of the French 1st Regiment on its way to guard the Saulles Château ran into these German forces and was repulsed. Team Stanley radioed the SFHQ and requested that Allied aircraft attack the Germans dug in around the Belmont Cemetery. Three hours later, four US P-47s arrived and inflicted considerable damage to the German force, particularly the motorized transports.
Team Stanley reported that they had no idea whether the P-47s’ arrival was a result of their message or simply a coincidence but it certainly improved their relations with the Maquis. On the following day, Team Stanley radioed London that the German forces around Belmont remained stationary and indicated that they would surrender to the US Army, but not to the FFI. On the same day, the FFI captured five Indians in German uniforms (from the Indian Legion). On September 13, the Maquis contacted reconnaissance elements of French troops of the US 7-A advancing from the south. While the French unit attacked the three villages occupied by the Germans (Grenant, Saulles, and Belmont), Team Stanley and the Maquis helped mop up German stragglers in the woods, guarded POWs, and protected the unit’s rear. On September 15, the SFHQ told Team Stanley that their mission was completed and to return to England via Paris.
It remains unclear when Team Stanley dispatched local FFI volunteers to contact advancing Allied ground forces. In all probability, they did so on September 1 or 2, since the volunteers returned to inform Team Stanley that they had successfully made contact. Since Team Stanley jumped into the no-man’s-land between the US 3-A and 7-A, they sent messengers in both directions. Team Stanley served in the field for fifteen days. Later, they reported that they had been dispatched to France at least a month too late. They obviously had little time to prepare the Maquis for combat. In addition, Team Stanley had instructions to prevent the destruction of several engineering structures, but when they landed, the Germans had already destroyed them. The Team also observed that while the former Vichy officers were far too passive, the young volunteers performed quite well. The Team also felt that the SFHQ ignored their messages, particularly their requests for arms drops and an undamaged radio set. The Team suggested that in the future, such Jedburgh teams be capable of direct communication with Allied aircraft so that enemy columns could be attacked immediately.
Jedburgh Team Rupert-Philip, August 21 1944
The SFHQ dispatched Rupert on the night of August 31 as the fifty-first Jedburgh team to France. It was to enter the Meurthe-et-Moselle Region, assist the local FFI, particularly with communications and resupply, and provide information to advancing Allied ground forces. The team consisted of (FR) Cdt Jean Liberos (Kintyre); (US) Lt Robert A. Lucas, (Caithness); (US) T/3 Joseph M. Gergat (USN) (Leinster).
Liberos was a career officer in his early forties, a Saint-Cyr graduate originally from Rouen. Robert Lucas was a twenty-seven-year-old infantry officer from Sheldon (Iowa), who had served in the Iowa National Guard and received his commission in 1942. Joseph Gergat was about twenty-one years old and from Uniontown (Pennsylvania).
A young Frenchman in civilian clothes briefed Team Rupert in a safe house in the suburbs of north London, telling them that their main mission was to prevent German sabotage of French utility structures between Nancy and Verdun. So, the team departed the Harrington Air Base at 2125 of August 31 and flew east without incident. West of Mirecourt, they parachuted at about 0200, landed safely, and were met by a reception committee of about fifty FFI. Ten minutes later, another team of two French officers landed at the DZ from another B-24, so the area proved rather noisy and overcrowded. Team Rupert recovered all its gear except their civilian clothes, two carbines, and two bags including the cipher document. They decided to accompany the Maquis to Offroicourt, which had three trucks and drove them most of the way to the camp.
On Friday September 1, the SFHQ radioed Team Rupert to tell them the team’s name was changed to Philip. The team’s radio, however, had been misplaced by the Maquis during the move, so they were out of contact with London. They spent the day with the group of the Maquis Offroicourt, which consisted of about 100 men organized in 3 platoons. They spent the night in Viviers-les-Offroicourt attempting to contact a representative of Planète. The following day around noon, the team met a light column of the US 3-A at Jevoncourt. Team Rupert – Philip recovered its radio, but their search of the DZ did not produce the lost cipher document. The team spent the night at Forcelles-Saint-Gorgon and on the morning of Sunday, September 3, set off to contact the Maquis at Lemenil-Mitry. That Maquis, which worked with Team Archibald, had withdrawn from the Forêt de Charmes and consisted of about 300 armed and 400 unarmed men. Team Rupert – Philip, at about 0900, found them at a large abandoned building, where they were under periodic fire from a German heavy-weapons platoon. In fighting west of Bayon and south of the Bayon-Vezélise road, the Germans inflicted rather heavy casualties on the Maquis, including three officers. At about noon, Team Rupert – Philip radioed the SFHQ, stating that they were with Team Archibald at Lemenil-Mitry and requesting an arms drop for 500 men at a DZ 3 kilometers west-southwest of Bayon.
With the death of Capt Maurin and the absence of Maj Denning, Capt Liberos of Team (now) Philip attempted to prevent the Germans from destroying the bridges at Bayon and Bainville. Liberos sent two young French women on bicycles to determine if and how the Germans were defending the bridges. He also dispatched three groups of Maquis to the two towns to fire on the Germans if the latter attempted to blow up the bridges. In addition, he sent three volunteers to Bayon to sabotage the electric charges for its three bridges. At 1700, Team Philip radioed the SFHQ, reporting that the bridge at Bayon was mined but not heavily guarded and that Maj Denning and Maj Montlac had been slightly wounded. Maj Denning returned at 2000 and approved Capt Liberos actions.
On Monday, September 4, with the return of Maj Denning, Team Philip prepared to travel to Nancy. The team left Lemenil-Mitry at approximately 1900 in a truck. As they were driving out of Houdreville at about 2015, a column of military vehicles approached from the rear and opened fire. The three Jedburghs and their French driver all jumped out of the truck to seek cover. The approaching column proved to be the Recon Platoon of the 25th Cavalry from the 3-A. Its lieutenant regretted firing on Team Philip, fearing that the gunfire had alerted the German column he was stalking on a parallel road. Capt Liberos, Lt Lucas, and the driver remained uninjured, but they could not locate Specialist Gergat. They consequently spent the night in the Forêt Domaniale de Serres west of Houdreville (2 km north of Vezélise) with an American platoon. The following day, as more US Army field units passed through the area towards the Moselle River, the team searched for Specialist Gergat, but without success. In the evening, they entered their slightly altered truck and drove to Parey-Saint-Césaire, where they spent the night. On Wednesday at noon, they radioed the SFHQ, reporting that they were in the Forêt de Goviller (5 km north-northeast of Goviller), that they had still not contacted Planète, and again requesting resupply of their codes. That evening, as they were starting a trip to Toul, they encountered Col Charles H. Reed, commander of the US 2d Cavalry Group, and followed his advice that it would be best to spend the night in the forest.
