Document Source: Operations of the 423d Infantry Regiment, 106th Infantry Division, in the vicinity of Schoenberg, Belgium, December 16-19 1944. (Ardennes Alsace Campaign) (Battle of the Bulge). Personal Experience of Capt Alan W. Jones, Battalion Operations Officer; including statements by Maj Carl H. Cosby (EXO 1/423); Capt Oliver B. Patton (Fox Co, 2/423).
Introduction
By October 1944, the Allied Forces in Western Europe had swept across France and were generally poised along the western frontier of Germany. The rapidity of the advance across France and the resulting extended front, pressed to the limits of logistical support, had quickly reduced the impetus of advance. As the problem of supply became more acute, large scale advances became impossible and the front temporarily stabilized.
Checked as they were at the fixed defenses along the German frontier, the mounting of a full scale assault became necessary and toward this end momentous efforts were directed. However, Allied commanders, determined to maintain the initiative and to continue the drive into Germany at the earliest opportunity, launched a series of limited attack preliminary to operations which were to mean the final destruction of all German forces west of the Rhine River. While maintaining a relentless pressure of the enemy, supply difficulties had to be solved, regrouping had to be accomplished and units had to be refitted.
In mid October, it was decided by the Supreme Commander that beginning early in November, the US First Army was to advance on Cologne (Koln) from the vicinity of Aachen while the US Third Army struck at the vital Saar Bassin. To continue a sustained offensive, meanwhile holding a front of more than 500 miles, it was necessary to concentrate available forces, reducing to a minimum those forces holding relatively static positions. The largest of these sectors was the portion of the First US Army line stretching through the Ardennes region from Monschau to Trier, a distante of some 73 miles held by the US VIII Corps.
General Situation
On December 6, 1944, the First US Army issued orders for the continuation of its offensive to seize the Roer River dams, the possession of which was essential before the attack could profitably continue toward Koln. The VIII Corps, on the army south flank, was to continue on its previous mission of conducting aggressive defense within the Corps zone and be prepared to advance to Koblenz on army order when the main attack had progressed sufficiently to lessen resistance on its Corps front. The newly arrived 106th Infantry Division (Golden Lion) was to relieve the 2d Infantry Division (Indian Head) on the VIII Corps front thus releasing it to the V Corps, to the north, to assist in the army attack. From north to south, the VIII Corps front on December 12, was held by the 106th Infantry Division (Golden Lion), 28th Infantry Division (Keystone), 9th Armored Division (Phantom) less Combat Command B and Combat Command R, and the 4th Infantry Division (Ivy). The Corps reserve was composed of Combat Command R (9-AD), and four Engineer Combat Battalions.
The Ardennes Region through which the VIII Corps front extended, characterized by rugged, difficult terrain. High plateaus intersected by many deeply cut valleys and covered by numerous heavily wooded areas increased the difficulties of large scale tactical movements while a restricted road net made both supply for defenders and axes of advance for attacked a major problem. Two vital road junctions controlled the road bets necessary for large scale operations in the area: St Vith in the northern portion of the Corps sector, Bastogne to the south. Snow, sleet and rain had added to the problems of maintaining the narrow roads and made cross country movement through the area all but impossible. Supplies of all classes were generally adequate by mid December with several notable exceptions. Winter combat clothing was short or non-existant and badly needed. Ammunition was closely controlled, particularly 81-MM mortar, 105-MM howitzer, 155-MM, and 3″ AT ammunition. These types were restricted in distribution and limited in use.
Facing the VIII Corps were four German Volksgrenadier Divisions: the 18.VGD on the Corps north, then the 26.VGD, the 352.VGD and the 212.VGD on the south. In general, these units had been regrouped or reformed during the month of Octobre and filled up with personnel from the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe units as well as with older men and those with minor physical defects. Holding the Siegfried Line, except for the section which follows the ridge of the Schnee Eifel, these divisions were in strong, well-constructed, permanent defensive positions. Protected from the harsh winter weather by pillboxes, the troops were in good physical condition; and while not of the highest, their moral was good.
Situation of the 106th Infantry Division
In accordance with the plan of US First Amy, the 106th Infantry Division was assigned to the VIII Corps, and by Corps order, the 106-ID, with attachments, was directed to relieve the 2nd Infantry Division in place and to assume responsibility for for the defense of the sector. Attached to the division were the 14th Cavalry Group (Suivez Moi) of two squadrons and one artillery battalion, the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion (3″, towed) and the 634th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion. The attachments were similar to those of the 2nd Infantry Division with the exception of the tank battalion attached to the latter. The 106-ID arrived at St Vith (Belgium) on December 10, 1944, after a two day motor march of 270 miles; relief of the 2-ID began at once, one regimental combat team at a time, and was completed by December 12. The 106-ID assumed responsibility for the sector at 1900, on December 11.
After relieving the 2-ID man for man and gun for gun in compliance with the Corps orders, the division was disposed with the 14th Cavalry Group on the north (left) and three regiments abreast; the 422-IR, the 423-IR and the 424-ir on the south. The 2/423 was in division reserve. The division extended from Losheim (Belgium) across the Losheim Gap (Belgium) to the ridge of the Schnee Eifel (Germany), thence southward astride the Siegfried Line to the southern nose of the ridge. Here the line was echeloned some 2000 yards to the west of the Siegfried Line where it continued south following the high ground just east of the Our River toi the vicinity of Großkampenberg (Germany), a ground distance of some 27 miles. From the east two major routes enter the zone, both converging on St Vith, the division Command Post; one from north of the Schnee Eifel down to the Our River Valley, the other from the south of the Schnee Eifel.
Situation of the 423d Infantry Regiment
By December 11, 1600, the 423-IR less one battalion in division reserve, had completed the relief of the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2-ID and assumed responsibility for the defense of its sector. Troop B, 18th Cavalry Recon Squadron and Baker Co of the 331st Medical Battalion were attached to the regiment. Charlie Co, 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one platoon), Baker Co, 81st Engineer Combat Battalion and the 590th Field Artillery Battalion were in support.
Holding the southern half of the Schnee Eifel within the division lines, the 3d Battalion on the regimental left and the 1st Battalion, bent around the southern nose of the ridge, were in relatively strong positions. Although both sides of the ridge in the 1st Battalion area were under enemy observation, concealment was good, pillboxes were sufficiently numerous to allow their use as command post down to and including platoons, and observation and fields of fire were relatively good. From the 1st Battalion right to the vicinity of Bleialf (Germany) the line was refused some 1500 yards to the rear and west leaving a diagonal gap of about 2000 yards. The defensive positions then continued southward along the high ground just west of the narrow Alf River for another 3500 yards. Antitank Co with one platoon of Canon Co and one rifle platoon from the 3d Battalion held the line from Beialf inclusive to the railway tunnel exclusive, all elements defending as riflemen. Troop B, 18th Cavalry Recon Squadron, extended the front to the regimental right boundary. These troops were organized into a provisional battalion under command of the Antitank Co Commander. Charlie Co, 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in the area of the provisional battalion. Elements of the Service Co and the Regimental Headquarters Co were in regimental reserve. To garrison the six mile front of the regimental sector, depth in defensive positions had been sacrificed.
On the left, contact was maintained with the 422-IR by patrols and on the right with 106th Recon Troop, attached to the 424-IR and occupying Großlangenfeld (Germany), by patrols. Wire lines existed to all units down to companies and lateral lines had been laid between regiments. While two channels existed between the division and regimental command posts, both were in a single cable; nor were alternate wire lines laid between other units. Teletypewriter communication was likewise available to the division. Radio silence was maintained among all units. Radios had been issued to all elements in England but since radio silence had been imposed continuously no opportunity for proper calibration or testing had been available except such as could be done without actual radio operation.
To all history buffs, researchers, and fellow collectors: I’ve been collecting World War II photographs for over five decades now — a journey that has taken me deep into archives, personal donations, estate finds, and just about every dusty attic I could get access to. Over the years, my collection has grown to nearly 20.000 original photos, with a strong focus on US forces during the World War II. However, when it comes to the 106th Infantry Division, I’m facing a significant challenge. As many of you know, this division suffered catastrophic losses during the Battle of the Bulge. Nearly 8000 men were captured, and the division was effectively decimated. Because of this, period photographs of the 106th are extremely scarce — almost nonexistent in many official or personal archives. To visually represent this division’s experience and honor their sacrifice, I’ve had to supplement the archive with photos from adjacent or supporting units that operated near the 106th’s positions. These contextual images help paint a fuller picture of the environment and events, even if they aren’t directly tied to the division itself. If anyone out there has or knows of any original photographs tied to the 106th Infantry Division (December 1944), I’d be more than grateful to hear from you. Every piece helps bring their story back into focus.
Stay sharp,
Doc Snafu
Class I and Class III supplies were normal and adequate while only a major shortage of winter clothing, previously mentioned, was present among Class II and IV items. The available rate of supply of ammunition per weapons per day was : 8 rounds Mortar 81-MM; 5 rounds Howitzer (Canon Co) 105-MM; 42 rounds Artillery Howitzer 105-MM; 15 rounds 3 inch (76.2-MM). With the exception of artillery ammunition, only half of this daily available supply was authorized for use; the other half remained under regimental control loaded on unit vehicles kapt near the regimental ammunition supply point. Other types of ammunition were unrestricted in use. The rapid move of the our regiment across France and into the lines had resulted in units entering combat positions with less than the basic loads of, or no mortar or artillery ammunition. The 2-ID had generously turned part of their surplus stocks over to the 106-ID on position when relieved; and every effort was made at once to fill all the basic loads of ammunition. Surplus stocks were not authorized. A request for antitank mines we made on December 14 brought the curt reply from the army ammunition supply point that 48 hours advance notice was required.
During the period December 11-15 the weather was cold and damp with temperatures generally ranging between 30° and 40° (F) (-1° and 4° C). Snow, alset or rain fell intermittently maintaining from 6 to 12 inches of snow (15 to 30 cm) over the area and making roads to the rear all but impassable. Added to these difficulties were almost daily heavy fogs which remained in the valleys until late in the morning. On the day it had entered the lines, the regiment was at nearly full strength. It’s training over a year and a half period had been rigorous and thorough. However, in the six months prior to debarkation for overseas, the regiment had lost more than fifty percent of its riflemen as overseas replacements; its lost shipment was made after the regiment itself had been alerted for overseas shipment. Their vacancies had been filled with men from miscellaneous units, good soldiers but not trained riflemen. In spite of the extreme discomfort of the cold, damp weather was inadequate winter clothing and the obviously extended and exposed position, morale was high. This was a quite sector where men could learn rapidly but safely.
Operations of the 423d Infantry Regiment, December 11-15
The relief of the 38-IR (2-ID), on December 11, although made during daylight, was covered by a fog and was completed without mishap or confusion. Every advantages was immediately taken of the opportunities presented to gain maximum experience. Patrolling was active, albeit initially overly cautious, with maximum numbers of officers and men participating. Small unit leaders and staffs rapidly nettled into their jobs and routine operations ran smoothly. Detailed counterattack plans were prepared, minor fire fights occurred, and harassing fires were frequently laid down on the enemy lines. In short, the routine activities of a unit in defense in contact with an enemy on the defensive continued.
Commanders at all echelons were dissatisfied with the defensive positions they had been ordered to occupy — a defense based in part on tank support, extra communications equipment, and additional crew-served weapons, none of which the 106th Infantry Division possessed. Every effort was made to obtain authority to make the necessary adjustments, but without success. However, on December 14, division headquarters directed that a list of additional weapons, by type, needed for the current position be submitted. During this period, enemy patrols were active; each night one or more infiltrated through the regimental line. Propaganda leaflets were found tacked to trees in the near area. Prisoners, however, indicated no new enemy units and higher headquarters seemed generally to view activities as those normal in any quiet sector. Wheeled and tracked vehicles movements were reported by patrols on the nights of December 14 and 15; the comment received from Corps concerning these reports was that the sounds heard were undoubtedly from enemy loudspeaker systems.
German Counteroffensive Plan
Even as the Allies were striving to overcome the tremendous logistical problem facing them during October and November, the German Army, taking advantage of the temporary slow-down of the Allied advance, made herculean efforts to build and train new units and to equip and supply them for a gigantic offensive planned to cut off the British forces on the north from their bases and ultimately to destroy them or force a withdrawal from the continent. To accomplish this, the major port of Antwerp (Belgium) was selected as the main objective. The general plan was to brake through weak American forces in the Ardennes (Belgium) with the Six Panzer Army (SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef Sepp Dietrich), Northern Shoulder, making the main effort and striking toward the Meuse River between Liège (Belgium) and Huy (Belgium), then driving on to Antwerp. The Fifth Panzer Army (Gen Hasso Eccard Freiherr von Manteuffel), Southern Shoulder, was to wheel northward to cross the Meuse River in the vicinity of Namur (Belgium) and push on to Brussels (Belgium), protecting the left flank of the main effort. To the right of the Sixth Panzer Army, the Fifteenth Army (Gen Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, was to attack toward Liège protecting and assisting the main effort while of the left (south) of the Fifth Army, the Seventh Army (Gen Erich Brandenberger) was to make a diversionary attack into Luxembourg. For this offensive, 24 divisions with supporting elements, including those in the VIII Corps’ front, were to be used. Training, re-equipments and concentration in an assembly area were accomplished with the utmost secret; favored by overcast and foggy weather which made aerial recon impossible. A complete tactical surprise would be obtained.
