DECEMBER 20
Task Force Jones is Created. The most significant change in the composition and disposition of troops that occurred on Dec 20 was the formation of Task Force Jones, commanded by the commanding officer of the 814-TDB, and its disposition on the southern and southwestern flank of the Division. Centered at Bovigny with outposts at Cherain, Gouvy, Ourthe, and Deifeld, the force consisted of the:
– 17-TB (- Able Co)
– 440-AFAB
– 814-TDB (- Able & Baker Cos)
– 2 Plats of the 38-AIB
– 1 Plat of the 31-TB
– 3 M-4 Tanks of the 40-TB
– Dog Co 40-TB
– George Co 112/28-ID
– Able Co 33-AEB (-1 platoon)
– detachment of the 14-CG with 15 M-8 Armored Cars, 5 assault guns, 13 light tanks
A restriction was placed on the employment of the 17-TB by Task Force Jones. It was not to be employed without authority from the Division CG. This task force absorbed the elements of CCA 7-AD remaining in the south (Dog Co 40-TB and Able Co 33-AECB) and Task Force Hawks of the 14-CG. The strength of the enemy and the seriousness of the situation in the south leading to the formation of Task Force Jones was obtained in part from a Lt Col Stone with whom the Division had been in touch for about two days. This officer was located at Gouvy with an assortment of about 250 stragglers, including Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, and Signal personnel whom he had collected. He had established a defensive position and said: By God… ! the others may run, but I’m staying here and will hold at all costs! Stone’s force was incorporated into Task Force Jones. The force, in position by about 1600, immediately became engaged at Cherain and Gouvy and by 1800 was receiving a strong German attack which it successfully repulsed.
CCB – Has Relatively Quiet Day
In the meantime, CCB 7AD was having a relatively quiet day. During the night, on Dec 19-20, some infiltration was reported by the 17-TB at Recht. At 0800, Dec 20, the 17-TB was instructed to withdraw to Rodt, leaving one company plus a platoon of infantry in position north and east of Rodt to maintain contact with CCA 7-AD on the left. Enemy concentrations of tanks and infantry were collected in Walleröde and Nieder-Emmels. Heavy artillery concentrations quieted the threat.
At 1145 the 17-TB (- Able Co) with Charlie Co 38-AIB attached, was ordered to Bovigny to join Task Force Jones. During the afternoon enemy columns were reported moving from Medell to Born, and at 1630 enemy tanks moved into Ober-Emmels and forced out a light tank platoon on outpost there, but the forces on the ground to the south held firmly. During the night, Dec 20-21, approximately 68 men and two officers from the two surrounded regiments of the US 106-ID (422-IR & 423-IR) infiltrated back through our lines. These men were assembled in the schoolhouse in St Vith and given rations and such other supplies as they needed. They constituted a reserve for CCB 7-AD, to be called upon when needed. During the night, Dec 21-22, these men were put into the line to aid in the final defense of St Vith.
CCA – Consolidates Positions
All through Dec 20 units of CCA 7-AD held and continued to consolidate positions gained despite stiff resistance. The artillery gave support upon request. At 0825 the CG sent CCA a message: Hold your positions at all costs. At 0925, another message: Imperative that you command road leading into Poteau from Recht. In answer to a question put to the commanding officer, CCA 7-AD at 1130: Can you release one medium tank Co? If so alert it at once and await orders for its movement, the reply was received: cannot comply with request for one med tk co and hold present position. At noon, the elements of CCA 7-AD on the south (Dog Co 40-TB and Able Co 33-AECB) were detached and placed under the control of Task Force Jones.
D Troop, 87-CRS
At 0900, Dec 20, D Troop 87-CRS, which was still patrolling the Division’s left rear, was instructed to contact the 82-A/B, reported to be coming from the northwest and notify the CG to send a liaison officer to the 7-AD at once as an urgent situation existed. The enemy route of march was from the southeast in the direction of the 82-A/B. Then, at 1100, D Troop 87-CRS was notified that enemy infiltration was reported moving east towards Samrée and was instructed to contact and intercept the enemy. However, the troop was unable to reach Samrée that afternoon. At 2342, the troops of D 87-CRS, were instructed to contact the US 3-AD north of Samrée and arrange a coordinated attack on the town with the mission of recapturing it and the 50.000 gallons of gasoline that the enemy had taken from the Div QM there. D Troop, 87-CRS, was unable to contact the US 3-AD north of Samrée because the enemy had reached Dochamps.
DECEMBER 21
CCB, Retires from St Vith
At 0400, outposts of CCB 7-AD reported an indication that a German tank and infantry attack was massing in the vicinity of Nieder-Emmels. Continued noise of movement was heard in Nieder-Emmels and Ober-Emmels during the remainder of the early morning. An attack at 1100 was repulsed at 1115. There was continuous artillery fire during the day. An attack at 1610 east of St Vith was repulsed at 1710. Continued pressure was exerted by the enemy on all sections of the line, with the main effort being southeast of St Vith. A coordinated tank-infantry drive finally penetrated in at least three points. The battle continued until approximately 2200 at which time the order was issued to withdraw the center of the line to the high ground west of St Vith.
Those elements which were cut off east of the town were ordered to attack through the town or north of it to join the forces which were establishing a new defense line. It was planned to anchor a defense west of St Vith on the still substantial north flank. The center of the defensive line – from Hünningen to the St Vith – Walleröde road – was to swing back to the west of St Vith and establish a line for the elements south of St Vith to fall back through. This was accomplished. All through the night of Dec 21-22, stragglers were coming back from the troops which had been overrun east of St Vith. Officer control posts were set up on all roads to intercept these men and to send them to the Hinderhausen area. This was done and by early forenoon of Dec 22, about 150 had been gathered up. At dark, Dec 21, an enemy infiltrating force coming from the north had worked into Hinderhausen. A light tank attack drove them out into the woods in the early evening. The Division CO advised the CG CCB 7-AD, that he would be reinforced with the 17-TB in the morning if needed.
CCB 9-AD – Requests Assistance
At 0730, Dec 21, the CG CCB 9-AD, requested that Task Force Lindsey be attached to him to be used in strengthening his right flank. As the Task Force was not employed and had not been in contact with the enemy at all on the previous day the request was granted. The commanding officer of the 14-CG was ordered at 0840 to have Task Force Lindsey proceed at once to Galhausen to assist CCB 9-AD and to go himself to Galhausen to take charge of the force. CCB successfully repulsed an enemy attack west from Neidegen, and assistance by elements of CCB 7-AD which had been arranged by mutual consent of the two commanders was never given. It had also been planned to send the 17-TB from Task Force Jones to CCB 9-AD, but at 0955 Lt Col Jones was notified that it would not be needed. As the situation seemed to be well in hand Task Force Lindsey was returned to its former mission (1000 – Dec 21).
ECB-CCA – Holds Against Heavy Attacks
CCA 7-AD maintained its position in and about Poteau throughout Dec 21. A strong attack from the northwest of Poteau was engaged with tanks and artillery and was successfully under control by 1330. The units of the combat command were shifted a bit during the day for better defense of the sector. Strong combat patrols by the enemy and by the Combat Command were active during the day, probing each other’s positions. The enemy established a very effective ambush on the St Vith – Poteau road in the thick woods southeast of Poteau. Before it was discovered, he had succeeded in capturing the occupants of eight jeeps and one light tank which he knocked out, including such key officers as the:
– Executive Officer (CCA 7-AD)
– Liaison Officer (CCA 7-AD)
– Executive Officer and Adjutant (48-AIB)
– 2nd in command of A Co 33-AECB
– and numerous others
Upon discovery, the enemy abandoned his ambush and the key road was reopened for friendly traffic. At the close of the day, another strong hostile supported by heavy mortar, machine gun, and artillery fire was repulsed at 2000.
CCR – Has Relatively Quiet Day
On Dec 21, CCR 7-AD had a relatively quiet day. During the morning units of CCR cleared the Vielsalm – Poteau road completely of enemy fire, making the road safe for traffic for the first time since the night of Dec 17. Active patrolling continued throughout the day, but the enemy was not contacted except in the CCA 7-AD sector northeast of Poteau. The Commanding Officer, Task Area Jones, was instructed at 0935 to alert the 17-TB for movement to the east to assist CCB 7-AD, but the situation cleared and at 1000 the battalion was released from the alert status. During the morning of Dec 21, patrols of Task Force Jones entered the towns of Vaux Chavanne, Montleban and Baclain and met no enemy resistance. Likewise, the outpost at Deifeld had no contact with the enemy, but the enemy was still strong in Gouvy. During the forenoon, the outpost in Deifeld pushed out recon along the road south of Deifeld to the intersection at 798746 where it ran into an enemy roadblock covered by small arms fire. It then withdrew to the crossroads at 777776 and reconnoitered the road net towards Espeler and Durler, meeting enemy roadblocks towards those towns. Gouvy was cleared of enemy forces by 1630 and Task Force Jones consolidated on high ground south, east, and west of town. The enemy attacked these positions south of Gouvy at 1800 with armored vehicles, but he was driven back by mortar, machine gun, and artillery fire.
D Troop 87th CRS – Defense of Parker’s Crossroads
In accordance with orders received the previous night, D Troop 87-CRS, proceeded on the morning of Dec 21 towards Samrée from the east but was repulsed. It was then sent to join the defense of the critical Parker’s Crossroads between Samrée and Vielsalm. The defense of this crossroads had been established several days earlier by a Maj Parker, Executive Officer of a Corps Field Artillery Battalion who dug in the only 3 105-MM howitzers left from his battalion at the crossroads for direct fire purposes. He had continuously augmented his defenses by collecting stragglers, and at 0300 on Dec 20, the 7-AD sent him two sections of AAA from Dog Co 203-AAA AW Bn (SP), all that it could spare. Later, on Dec 21, the lieutenant who was in charge of the AAA units there contacted the CG 3-AD at a point north of the crossroads and arranged for the immediate dispatch of two companies of medium tanks to add to the defense. The force held but was sorely in need of infantry. It was apparent that the right flank of the US 82-A/B which by this time had formed a line Trois Ponts – Vielsalm – Regné, would be turned if the enemy were not held south of the crossroads. The US 82-A/B, therefore, sent a battalion of infantry upon request of the 7-AD to add to Maj Parker’s force, which during the 21 and 22 of December beat off repeated attacks. The defenders were finally overwhelmed at noon on Dec 23.
Defensive Circle Must Be Tightened
At 2200 when the CG, CCB 7-AD, reported the situation such that it was impossible to restore the line east of St Vith and hence necessary to withdraw, it was obvious that the Division as a whole might at any moment find itself in a very serious position. It was necessary to pull all elements into a tighter circle. Consequently Task Force Jones, already warned that the 17-TB might be pulled away morning of Dec 22, was instructed at 2230: hold on east and pivot around on Deifeld, delay enemy, drop back to Gouvy and hold like grim death towns of Beho, Bovigny. We must have the road. Make liberal use of AT and AP mines and know where they are. The Corps Commander was informed of the urgency of the situation.
