The excellent warning system developed in China was an invaluable aid to this air war in China. Fighter planes were given ample time to become airborne and gain an advantageous position for interception thereby depriving the Japanese of their chief weapon of surprise. As with the AVG that preceded them, the China Air Task Force was forced, into periods of inactivity due to unfavorable weather, combat fatigue, exhausting supplies of bombs and fuel, and the need for aircraft repairs. These periods were used to improve their weapons, develop operating techniques, and plan future operations. On August 9, five B-25s and three P-40s attacked the important Indo-China Port of Haiphong, marking the first time the task force had reached outside of China or Burma to hit the enemy. A 4000-ton freighter was sunk in the harbor, and large fires which burned for three days were started in the dock and warehouse area, while direct bomb hits on Japanese headquarters caused a number of casualties variously estimated at 100 to 400. The task force was successfully employing guerrilla, hit-and-run, tactics against the Jap and keeping him guessing.

British Hawker Hurricane targeting a bridge in Burma

Time after time the enemy would bomb a strip and later discover that the planes had previously moved to another field. In one of these moves, late in August, the bombers were transferred to Yunnanyi in Southeast China to bolster the Burma Campaign. During the last week of the month, the B-25s twice bombed Lashio, an important rail center, and air base. They crossed the border of Indo-China to attack enemy supply dumps at Hoang Su Phi and Phu Lo; and on the last two days of August, they bombed Myitkyina, a northernmost depot of the enemy in Burma.

Myitkyina, aerial resupply of the members of the 5307-Galahad (Marauders)

Following this series of tasks, the bombers returned to Hepyang and Kweilan, leaving the Burmese operations during September and October to the two B-25s and a few fighters which had been stationed at Dinjan. The main part of the task force, in the meantime, carried out raids over occupied China, harassing shipping on the inland waterways, disrupting rail communications and destroying enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air. Early in October, the bombers turned their attention southward in order to aid the Chinese who were opposing renewed enemy attempts to cross the Salween River. Eleven missions were flown against enemy targets in Northeast Burma, including supply depots at Tengchung, Mangshih, Wanling, Chefang, and Lichiapo. With the end of the monsoon, the enemy was expected to increase his air operation to the ferry service, particularly along the western end of the route which terminated at Dinjan. The 10-USAAF, charged with both operation and protection of the ferry service, was barely in a position to carry out either task. Some improvements had been brought about in the cargo service by leasing transport planes from the China National Airways Company. In order to provide a more effective defense of the ferry and to aid Chinese resistance along the Salween River, all the American combat units in India were organized as the India Air Task Force.

Another Bomb Run on Japanese positions in Burma

INDIA AIR TASK FORCE

The India Air Task Force was organized on October 30 under Gen Caleb V. Haynes as commander. With the major units of the 10-USAAF operating in China, or with Gen Brereton in the Middle East, the initial strength of the India Air Task Force was almost negligible. To provide a measure of protection, the 26th Squadron and Hqs 51st Fighter Group were moved to Dinjan. Difficulties were encountered in establishing an early warning system due to a lack of adequate equipment. Late in October, word came that the 10-USAAF would be relieved of the responsibility of operating the Ferry, effective December 1. The First Ferrying Group was to be taken over by the Air Transport Command. Ferry operations were to be taken over by the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command with Col E. H. Alexander as the head. The 10-USAAF was still to have the responsibility of providing protection for the aerial lifeline to China. Before any of the forces could be deployed the enemy attacked Dinjan on October 25. Approximately 100 enemy planes equipped with belly tanks for the long flight from the distant airbase at Lashio, bombed and strafed Dinjan as well as the newer airfields at Chabua, Mohanbari, and Sookerating. The Americans received a little warning and consequently suffered heavy losses. Five transport planes, five P-40s, and two P-43s were destroyed, while four transport and thirteen fighters were badly damaged. On the next day and on October 28, when the enemy came over again the India Air Task Force Squadrons were able to destroy fifteen Japanese raiders with little damage to themselves. These assaults had a telling effect on the dire need for the return of the heavy bombers which had accompanied Gen Brereton to the Middle East and added emphasis to his requests that these bombers be returned to Assam.

Chinese Task Force - Plane Repair Shop

During the month of October, B-25s which had replaced some of the older B-17s conducted bombing operations north of the Yangtze River. The presence of the long-range Liberator in the China-Burma-India Theater gave the 10-USAAF a wider choice of targets and made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to predict where the next blows would fall. For several weeks, while the India Task Force was being built up, Gen Haynes employed his forces defensively with only occasional offensive missions by small flights of heavy bombers. This period marked the beginning of a six-month campaign against the enemy which ended only with the arrival of the monsoon. The opening attack of this campaign occurred on November 20, when eight B-24s carrying 40.000 pounds of bombs attacked the marshaling yards at Mandalay and caused great damage there. From Myitkyina in Northern Burma to Bangkok in Thailand, and Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, the India Task Force strafed at a low level and bombed from high altitudes. In 17 heavy bombing raids between November 20 and December 31, they dropped 414.000 pounds of high explosives on enemy targets. It may be said, that the American war effort in Burma was kept alive by the India Air Task Force. The port of Rangoon and the approaches to it were attacked by our heavy bombers, which also began a patrol of the Gulf of Martaban as far south as Tavoy Island and as far west as the Andaman Islands.

Merrill’s Marauders (CO Frank Merrill) or Unit Galahad, officially named the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional), was a US long range penetration (LRPG) special operations unit in the South-East Asian Theater which fought in the Burma Campaign. The unit became famous for its deep-penetration missions behind Japanese lines, often engaging Japanese forces superior in number

AIR OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND BURMA – 1943

In 1943, the India Task Force concentrated on the active defense of the Ferry Route between India and China and the airfields and equipment in the Assam Area. This included the maintenance and operation of an adequate air warning system, continuous fighter protection for the area, offensive patrols in northern Burma with a concentrated effort to neutralize enemy airdromes, a patrol of the Air Transport Command route through Burma, and escort of the Air Transport Command planes when necessary. American planes operating during the wet monsoon months in 1943 proved that operations could go on regardless of the weather. As a result, up to October, almost 65% of the rail facilities of Burma were destroyed, a great amount of shipping was sunk, and whole areas of Japanese installations were devastated. By November 1943, the 10-USAAF was making headway in gaining limited air superiority over Burma. That November, the 10-USAAF joined Gen Stratemeyer’s Eastern Air Command, which in turn was a part of the Southeast Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. Its bomber forces were integrated with the RAF bombers to form the Strategic Air Force, while its fighters united with the British fighters to form the 3rd Tactical Air Force. In June 1944, the 10-USAAF re-assumed direct operational control of all its units.

During the interim period, the Japanese really began to feel the weight of the American bombs. The strategic targets selected for the 10-USAAF, whose headquarters had moved to Calcutta, were merchant shipping, docks, storage and repair facilities, including terminals, rail centers, important bridges, river shipping, rolling stock with particular emphasis on locomotives, and barracks. In seeing, approximately 15 miles (20 KM) north of Rangoon, one of the biggest railroad yards and the only one of its size left to the Japs, was destroyed on November 27, 1943. Heavy bomber sorties for the year 1943 mounted to 2751 with 4651 tons of bombs dropped. Light bombers flew 4003 sorties and dropped 4243 tons of bombs. Commencing in the fall of 1943, the 10-USAAF offered aerial protection to Allied ground forces in north Burma. These forces, originally Gen Joseph Stilwell’s American-trained Chinese forces, were later joined by the famous American Jungle Fighters known as Merrill’s Marauders, the 5307th Composite Unit, Galahad.

Merrill’s Marauders (CO Frank Merrill) or Unit Galahad, officially named the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional), was a US long-range penetration (LRPG) special operations unit in the South-East Asian Theater which fought in the Burma Campaign. The unit became famous for its deep-penetration missions behind Japanese lines, often engaging Japanese forces superior in number

The high degree of mobility and secrecy which resulted from air supply as one of the chief reasons for the success of the Marauders. Casualties were evacuated by L-4s and L-5s based at Ledo. Landing and drop areas, rice paddies, or gravel bars along the river, these light planes flew the wounded to rear echelon airstrips or to collection and clearing companies along the Ledo River. In February 1944, in attempting to attain local air superiority in support over the battle area of his Arakan Offensive, the enemy expended a major effort against the Allied Air Forces. However, the newly acquired Spitfires of one group took such a heavy toll that he was forced to abandon the effort. In pressing counter-air action, Allied fighter cover soon dominated the Arakan battlefield, permitting hundreds of transports to fly in supplies to the besieged Seventh Division. A potential defeat was rapidly changing into a decisive victory. On March 27, 1944, the Japanese Air Force made its last major effort against North Burma, the Assam air bases, and the Hump route to China. Eighteen enemy bombers and twenty fighters, in attempting to raid the Assam Area were intercepted by P-40s and P-51s of the AAF 5320th Air Defense Wing. In the resulting air battle, eleven enemy bombers and thirteen enemy fighters were confirmed destroyed, at a loss of two American fighters.

The last serious effort of the enemy to challenge Allied air power in central Burma came in May 1944, when he sent fighter sweeps of as many as 20 to 30 Oscars, into the Imphal area to assist the Japanese forces in the drive to Kohima and to destroy Allied transport aircraft supplying the besieged Imphal garrison. He was consistently intercepted and came off as the loser in the ensuing battles. The combined AAF-RAF score during March, April, and May was 309 enemy aircraft destroyed, 56 probably destroyed, and 193 damaged. In June 1944, a marked change in operational policies by the Japanese was evidenced. The losses he suffered in the preceding months, coupled with the air superiority now enjoyed by the Allied forces caused the enemy to employ conservative tactics. Japanese air activity almost ceased during the monsoon season. Fewer and fewer aircraft were active offensively, until finally, during the closing days of the Burma Campaign, few enemy fighters rose to defend even the most important installations.

P-40, 25th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group

In the face of Allied air pressure and ground advances, the Japanese air activity shifted south to Pyinmana in February 1945. By advancing their airbases the Allies were in better positions to strike at bases deeper into the Japanese rear areas. During March, Toangoo and the surrounding airfields became the most important Japanese bases north of Rangoon. On March 8, AAF P-51s again attacked the main airdrome at Rangoon, Mingladon but were unable to find and destroy more than three enemy aircraft. On March 9, 1945, 70 B-24s and a P-47 escort bombed Rangoon against a very weak aerial defense. The next day, 24 B-24s again bombed Rangoon targets, this time without any fighter interception whatsoever. In preparation for the move on Rangoon by the Allied Forces, strikes were made against Moulmein and airfields in Siam. So effective was the reduction of the Japanese force in this area that not a single enemy aircraft attempted to interfere with the Allied occupation of Rangoon. At the time Rangoon fell, the Japanese Air Force strength in Burma was zero and an estimated maximum of 50 aircraft was based in Siam. The role of the 10-USAAF in China may be divided into three headings: (1) Direct assistance to the China Theater while based in Burma; (2) Air movement of the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Divisions from Burma to China, December 5, 1944, to January 6, 1945; (3) Air operations on the Salween River in support of China Expeditionary Force, August 1944 to January 1945.

CHINA OFFENSIE
POSTWAR OCCUPATION EVACUATION AND SUPPLY
AIR OPERATIONS – SALWEEN RIVER

To augment the support of the Chinese Expeditionary Force by the 14-USAAF, the 10-USAAF established 8 radio links between their Headquarters in Burma and the Sixth-ninth Composite Wing of the 14-USAAF. This enabled the 14-USAAF to call for airstrikes by the 10-USAAF on targets holding up the advance of the Chinese Expeditionary Force. The additional airpower proved necessary since the 14-AAF was insufficient supplies to provide all of the air effort required. The operations of the 14-USAAF can conceivably, be considered as starting with the action of the American Volunteer Group, which went into action in December 1941. For six months thereafter, the Flying Tigers were almost, the sole hope of the Chinese forces, which for more than four years had been fighting desperate battles with little help from the Allies. In fact, the American Volunteer Group provided the first organized air resistance the Japanese faced since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The second prologue to the story of the 14-USAAF is provided by the operations of the China Air Task Force which was activated in battle on July 4, 1942. Chennault, who headed the American Volunteer Group, was recalled to active duty as a brigadier general and named Commander of the China Air Task Force. The mission given to the China Air Task Force was to (a) defend the southern and eastern approaches to the Hump air route and its China terminals; (b) attack and destroy hostile aircraft, shipping, personnel supplies, and installations in other areas when munitions are available and when such operations do not jeopardize the primary objective; (c) give air support to the Chinese ground forces.

American Volunteer Group, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Hells Angels



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