AIR Operations – China Burma India (Maj Edward M. Hudak)

AIR ORGANISATION – INDIA-BURMA

During the period December 7, 1941, to October 30, 1942, the 10-USAAF was as follows:

India Air Task Force
China Air Task Force
Karachi American Base Command
10-USAAF Air Service Command
India-China Ferry Command

During the period October 3, 1942, to December 15, 1943, the British RAF and the USAAF air units operated under separate command. Coordination was by mutual agreement. December 1, 1942, The India-China Wing of Air Transport Command was activated at Chabua, Assam, and took over the Hump operations. March 10, 1942, The 14-USAAF was activated by the China Air Task Force and became an independent air command. July 29, 1943, Hqs USAAF, India-Burma Sector was activated. December 15, 1943, the Southeast Asia Command was created for the joint British and American prosecution of the war in Asia. Following major commands resulted: Eastern Air Command; 222nd (Coastal) Group, RAF; 225th (Coastal) Group, RAF; Air Transport Command; 20th Bomber Command; 14-AAF and Hqs Army Air Force India-Burma Sector, CBI Theater.

THE INDIA-CHINA FERRY


As part of its mission, the 10-USAAF contributed heavily to the early Allied effort in the China-Burma-India Theater by its ferrying operations. Though confronted with shortages of personnel and equipment, lack of suitable fields and adequate protective facilities, the 1st Ferrying Group, continued operations, transporting supplies into Burma and China. While the Japanese were closing in on important bases along the route, they evacuated wounded soldiers and civilian refugees to the limit of their capacity. Due to operational difficulties, the original plan of establishing two commands, the Trans-India, to operate from Karachi to Dinjan in Assam, and the Assam Burma China, to operate from Dinjan to Kunming, China, was discarded in favor of one command, the India-China Ferry. The Assam Burma China Ferry, under the command of Col Caleb V. Haynes, retained its identity, however, for several months. Immediate attention was given to this route due to the necessity of transporting supplies to China, whose morale had suffered a serious setback with the fall of Rangoon. The carrying capacity of the Ferry Command was increased by the addition of ten Pan-American DC-3s from Africa.

Early in April, these planes were utilized in transporting 30.000 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of oil to airfields in China. This fuel will be used by sixteen B-25s that were moving across the Pacific aboard an aircraft carrier, preparatory to executing a daring attack on the Japanese homeland, (Doolittle Tokyo Raid). Later these transports were employed in accomplishing greater tasks. When the Japanese major advance through Burma threatened to overrun the British and Chinese defenders, the DC-3s carried ammunition and supplies into the battlefield area and evacuated the refugees and wounded personnel. After the fall of Mandalay on May 1, the planes were loaded to capacity evacuating as many passengers as possible before the Japanese could close on points along the ferry route to China. Though the planes were unarmed and subject to enemy attack, not one transport was lost in these operations.

The susceptibility of Dinjan to the Japanese attack forced the pilots and crews to get the planes off the field at dawn. Planes and pilots were working to a maximum, even after the fall of Myitkyina, on May 8, in dropping food and supplies to the retreating defenders of Burma. The fall of Burma dictated a change in the air and ground plans of operations. Heretofore, the Ferry service was considered merely a supplement to the regular supply lines. It was now necessary to build an air cargo service with capacity enough to replace the Burma Road. From this standpoint, the ferry operations during April, May, and June provided an experience that later assisted in developing aerial cargo service over the Hump on a much larger scale. The loss of bases in Burma and the heavy rains of the monsoon season reduced the number of supplies carried over the Himalayas to about 800 tons a month. The Japanese would be ready for the big push into India when the heavy rains ceased to fall.

The initial work on the establishment of ground services essential to air combat was accomplished during the Burma Operations, utilizing the few reinforcements arriving at Karachi for the 10-USAAF. On May 1 the 10-USAAF Air Service Command was activated under Gen Elmer E. Adler. Necessary cadres were taken from other units of the 10-USAAF. The main depot was located at Agra, approximately 700 miles east of Karachi. Later in the month, the 3rd Air Depot Group arrived in Karachi, the 3rd Air Depot being established at Agra on May 28. The immediate task was the construction of barracks and an airdrome in which native workers assisted. To provide front-line service to the combat units, the 59th Materiel Squadron was divided into small base units located at Allahabad, Xunming, Agra, Dinjan-Chabua, Chakulia, and Bangalore, where an aircraft manufacturing plant was being converted into a repair and overhaul depot.

EARLY OPERATIONS OF THE 10-USAAF

While elements of the 10-USAAF were involved in the preparation of supply depot facilities and transporting supplies and evacuating refugees, the bombardment groups were preparing for air strikes against the enemy. The night of April 2/3, 1942, marked the beginning of bombing missions. A flight of two B-17s and one LB-30, led by Gen Lewis Brereton, attacked shipping at Port Blair, Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Another attack was scheduled for targets in the Rangoon Area but wasn’t completed due to difficulties occurring during the take-off. These operations entailed the use of an advanced base near Calcutta, a distance of 1200 air miles (1900 KM) from Karachi. Subsequent operations were characterized by the same difficulties of distance and shortage of aircraft, as well as by unfavorable weather conditions. Consequently, these missions were little more than harassing missions. Bombers operating from the advanced bases at Asanol and Dum Dum, Burma bombed Rangoon shipping and air facilities. Due to a lack of spare parts and major repairs required the bombing missions were restricted to the limited operational aircraft available. During this period operations were suspended for a two-week period while necessary repairs were being made. Operations were further hampered during the summer of 1942 due to the adverse weather at times grounding all bombers for weeks.

Taking advantage of this respite the 10-USAAF improved early warning and AAA facilities in the Assam and Calcutta areas. Improvement of the Allied situation in the Indian Ocean permitted the movement of airbases eastward. The 436th Bombardment Squadron moved on June 1, to Allahabad, joining the 9th Bombardment Squadron, Hqs of the 7th Bombardment Group moved to Barrackpore, near Calcutta. The 51st Fighter Group was moving units into Kunming and Dinjan, while the 23rd Fighter Group and the 11th Bombardment Squadron were assembling in China. This latter move was partially in anticipation of replacing the AVG in China whose contracts would expire on July 4, 1942, but mainly to provide increased air support for the British and Chinese forces operating in China. The situation for the 10-USAAF was taking on a brighter hue by June. Definite policies had been established in defining the mission of the air force. Relations between the theater commander and the air force and the disposition of forces in China had been decided upon. As stated before, ferry and service organizations were operating and the badly needed combat units with personnel and equipment were due in.

Operations in the main were still of a defensive nature due to the inadequacy of equipment, personnel, and supplies, coupled with Japanese capabilities which indicated still further advances in the China-Burma-India Theater. Late, in June 1942, the British suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Knights-Bridge, in Cyrenaica. Gen Brereton, with all available bombers, was ordered to the Middle East. He left India on Jun 26 with key officers to establish operations in the Middle East. This left a seriously crippled 10-USAAF in India under the command of Gen Earl L. Garden.

CHINA AIR TASK FORCE

Initially, the China Air Task Force was composed of the 23rd Fighter Group, the 16th Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group, one flight of the 9th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, and several flights of the 11th Squadron (M) of the 7th Bombardment Group. Operational aircraft numbered approximately seven B-25s and thirty P-40s. This force faced the problem of conducting a 5000-mile (8000 kms) front extending from Chungking and Chengtu to the Indo-China Red River in the south, the Tibetan Plateau and the Salween River in the west, and the China Sea in the east. In order to bring the important enemy targets in southern China within range of the B-25s and the P-40s, operations were conducted from a string of bases running in a northeast southeast line starting at Hengyang, followed by Lingling, Kweilin, Leuchow, and Nanning. In order to guard the ferry operating over the Hump, aircraft operated from Yunnanyi, in western China and Dinjan in Assam. Although operating against numerically superior forces, the American Flyers continued to inflict losses to the enemy with minimum loss to themselves. Bomber strikes included attacks on important Japanese airfields at Nanchang, southwest of Hankow, and Tien Ho Airdrome at Canton, in an effort to reduce the Japanese numerical superiority. Fighter aircraft challenged every Japanese bomber raid over Free China, accounting for a number of enemy aircraft during every engagement.

The excellent warning system developed in China was an invaluable aid to this air war in China. Fighter planes were given ample time to become airborne and gain an advantageous position for interception thereby depriving the Japanese of their chief weapon of surprise. As with the AVG that preceded them, the China Air Task Force was forced, into periods of inactivity due to unfavorable weather, combat fatigue, exhausting supplies of bombs and fuel, and the need for aircraft repairs. These periods were used to improve their weapons, develop operating techniques, and plan future operations. On August 9, five B-25s and three P-40s attacked the important Indo-China Port of Haiphong, marking the first time the task force had reached outside of China or Burma to hit the enemy. A 4000-ton freighter was sunk in the harbor, and large fires which burned for three days were started in the dock and warehouse area, while direct bomb hits on Japanese headquarters caused a number of casualties variously estimated at 100 to 400. The task force was successfully employing guerrilla, hit-and-run, tactics against the Jap and keeping him guessing.

Time after time the enemy would bomb a strip and later discover that the planes had previously moved to another field. In one of these moves, late in August, the bombers were transferred to Yunnanyi in Southeast China to bolster the Burma Campaign. During the last week of the month, the B-25s twice bombed Lashio, an important rail center, and air base. They crossed the border of Indo-China to attack enemy supply dumps at Hoang Su Phi and Phu Lo; and on the last two days of August, they bombed Myitkyina, a northernmost depot of the enemy in Burma.

Following this series of tasks, the bombers returned to Hepyang and Kweilan, leaving the Burmese operations during September and October to the two B-25s and a few fighters which had been stationed at Dinjan. The main part of the task force, in the meantime, carried out raids over occupied China, harassing shipping on the inland waterways, disrupting rail communications and destroying enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air. Early in October, the bombers turned their attention southward in order to aid the Chinese who were opposing renewed enemy attempts to cross the Salween River. Eleven missions were flown against enemy targets in Northeast Burma, including supply depots at Tengchung, Mangshih, Wanling, Chefang, and Lichiapo. With the end of the monsoon, the enemy was expected to increase his air operation to the ferry service, particularly along the western end of the route which terminated at Dinjan. The 10-USAAF, charged with both operation and protection of the ferry service, was barely in a position to carry out either task. Some improvements had been brought about in the cargo service by leasing transport planes from the China National Airways Company. In order to provide a more effective defense of the ferry and to aid Chinese resistance along the Salween River, all the American combat units in India were organized as the India Air Task Force.

INDIA AIR TASK FORCE

The India Air Task Force was organized on October 30 under Gen Caleb V. Haynes as commander. With the major units of the 10-USAAF operating in China, or with Gen Brereton in the Middle East, the initial strength of the India Air Task Force was almost negligible. To provide a measure of protection, the 26th Squadron and Hqs 51st Fighter Group were moved to Dinjan. Difficulties were encountered in establishing an early warning system due to a lack of adequate equipment. Late in October, word came that the 10-USAAF would be relieved of the responsibility of operating the Ferry, effective December 1. The First Ferrying Group was to be taken over by the Air Transport Command. Ferry operations were to be taken over by the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command with Col E. H. Alexander as the head. The 10-USAAF was still to have the responsibility of providing protection for the aerial lifeline to China. Before any of the forces could be deployed the enemy attacked Dinjan on October 25. Approximately 100 enemy planes equipped with belly tanks for the long flight from the distant airbase at Lashio, bombed and strafed Dinjan as well as the newer airfields at Chabua, Mohanbari, and Sookerating. The Americans received a little warning and consequently suffered heavy losses. Five transport planes, five P-40s, and two P-43s were destroyed, while four transport and thirteen fighters were badly damaged. On the next day and on October 28, when the enemy came over again the India Air Task Force Squadrons were able to destroy fifteen Japanese raiders with little damage to themselves. These assaults had a telling effect on the dire need for the return of the heavy bombers which had accompanied Gen Brereton to the Middle East and added emphasis to his requests that these bombers be returned to Assam.

During the month of October, B-25s which had replaced some of the older B-17s conducted bombing operations north of the Yangtze River. The presence of the long-range Liberator in the China-Burma-India Theater gave the 10-USAAF a wider choice of targets and made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to predict where the next blows would fall. For several weeks, while the India Task Force was being built up, Gen Haynes employed his forces defensively with only occasional offensive missions by small flights of heavy bombers. This period marked the beginning of a six-month campaign against the enemy which ended only with the arrival of the monsoon. The opening attack of this campaign occurred on November 20, when eight B-24s carrying 40.000 pounds of bombs attacked the marshaling yards at Mandalay and caused great damage there. From Myitkyina in Northern Burma to Bangkok in Thailand, and Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, the India Task Force strafed at a low level and bombed from high altitudes. In 17 heavy bombing raids between November 20 and December 31, they dropped 414.000 pounds of high explosives on enemy targets. It may be said, that the American war effort in Burma was kept alive by the India Air Task Force. The port of Rangoon and the approaches to it were attacked by our heavy bombers, which also began a patrol of the Gulf of Martaban as far south as Tavoy Island and as far west as the Andaman Islands.

AIR OPERATIONS IN INDIA AND BURMA – 1943

In 1943, the India Task Force concentrated on the active defense of the Ferry Route between India and China and the airfields and equipment in the Assam Area. This included the maintenance and operation of an adequate air warning system, continuous fighter protection for the area, offensive patrols in northern Burma with a concentrated effort to neutralize enemy airdromes, a patrol of the Air Transport Command route through Burma, and escort of the Air Transport Command planes when necessary. American planes operating during the wet monsoon months in 1943 proved that operations could go on regardless of the weather. As a result, up to October, almost 65% of the rail facilities of Burma were destroyed, a great amount of shipping was sunk, and whole areas of Japanese installations were devastated. By November 1943, the 10-USAAF was making headway in gaining limited air superiority over Burma. That November, the 10-USAAF joined Gen Stratemeyer’s Eastern Air Command, which in turn was a part of the Southeast Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. Its bomber forces were integrated with the RAF bombers to form the Strategic Air Force, while its fighters united with the British fighters to form the 3rd Tactical Air Force. In June 1944, the 10-USAAF re-assumed direct operational control of all its units.

During the interim period, the Japanese really began to feel the weight of the American bombs. The strategic targets selected for the 10-USAAF, whose headquarters had moved to Calcutta, were merchant shipping, docks, storage and repair facilities, including terminals, rail centers, important bridges, river shipping, rolling stock with particular emphasis on locomotives, and barracks. In seeing, approximately 15 miles (20 KM) north of Rangoon, one of the biggest railroad yards and the only one of its size left to the Japs, was destroyed on November 27, 1943. Heavy bomber sorties for the year 1943 mounted to 2751 with 4651 tons of bombs dropped. Light bombers flew 4003 sorties and dropped 4243 tons of bombs. Commencing in the fall of 1943, the 10-USAAF offered aerial protection to Allied ground forces in north Burma. These forces, originally Gen Joseph Stilwell’s American-trained Chinese forces, were later joined by the famous American Jungle Fighters known as Merrill’s Marauders, the 5307th Composite Unit, Galahad.

The high degree of mobility and secrecy which resulted from air supply as one of the chief reasons for the success of the Marauders. Casualties were evacuated by L-4s and L-5s based at Ledo. Landing and drop areas, rice paddies, or gravel bars along the river, these light planes flew the wounded to rear echelon airstrips or to collection and clearing companies along the Ledo River. In February 1944, in attempting to attain local air superiority in support over the battle area of his Arakan Offensive, the enemy expended a major effort against the Allied Air Forces. However, the newly acquired Spitfires of one group took such a heavy toll that he was forced to abandon the effort. In pressing counter-air action, Allied fighter cover soon dominated the Arakan battlefield, permitting hundreds of transports to fly in supplies to the besieged Seventh Division. A potential defeat was rapidly changing into a decisive victory. On March 27, 1944, the Japanese Air Force made its last major effort against North Burma, the Assam air bases, and the Hump route to China. Eighteen enemy bombers and twenty fighters, in attempting to raid the Assam Area were intercepted by P-40s and P-51s of the AAF 5320th Air Defense Wing. In the resulting air battle, eleven enemy bombers and thirteen enemy fighters were confirmed destroyed, at a loss of two American fighters.

The last serious effort of the enemy to challenge Allied air power in central Burma came in May 1944, when he sent fighter sweeps of as many as 20 to 30 Oscars, into the Imphal area to assist the Japanese forces in the drive to Kohima and to destroy Allied transport aircraft supplying the besieged Imphal garrison. He was consistently intercepted and came off as the loser in the ensuing battles. The combined AAF-RAF score during March, April, and May was 309 enemy aircraft destroyed, 56 probably destroyed, and 193 damaged. In June 1944, a marked change in operational policies by the Japanese was evidenced. The losses he suffered in the preceding months, coupled with the air superiority now enjoyed by the Allied forces caused the enemy to employ conservative tactics. Japanese air activity almost ceased during the monsoon season. Fewer and fewer aircraft were active offensively, until finally, during the closing days of the Burma Campaign, few enemy fighters rose to defend even the most important installations.

In the face of Allied air pressure and ground advances, the Japanese air activity shifted south to Pyinmana in February 1945. By advancing their airbases the Allies were in better positions to strike at bases deeper into the Japanese rear areas. During March, Toangoo and the surrounding airfields became the most important Japanese bases north of Rangoon. On March 8, AAF P-51s again attacked the main airdrome at Rangoon, Mingladon but were unable to find and destroy more than three enemy aircraft. On March 9, 1945, 70 B-24s and a P-47 escort bombed Rangoon against a very weak aerial defense. The next day, 24 B-24s again bombed Rangoon targets, this time without any fighter interception whatsoever. In preparation for the move on Rangoon by the Allied Forces, strikes were made against Moulmein and airfields in Siam. So effective was the reduction of the Japanese force in this area that not a single enemy aircraft attempted to interfere with the Allied occupation of Rangoon. At the time Rangoon fell, the Japanese Air Force strength in Burma was zero and an estimated maximum of 50 aircraft was based in Siam. The role of the 10-USAAF in China may be divided into three headings: (1) Direct assistance to the China Theater while based in Burma; (2) Air movement of the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Divisions from Burma to China, December 5, 1944, to January 6, 1945; (3) Air operations on the Salween River in support of China Expeditionary Force, August 1944 to January 1945.