AIR Operations – China Burma India (Maj Edward M. Hudak)

AIR ORGANISATION – INDIA-BURMA

During the period December 7, 1941, to October 30, 1942, the 10-USAAF was as follows:

India Air Task Force
China Air Task Force
Karachi American Base Command
10-USAAF Air Service Command
India-China Ferry Command

During the period October 3, 1942, to December 15, 1943, the British RAF and the USAAF air units operated under separate command. Coordination was by mutual agreement. December 1, 1942, The India-China Wing of Air Transport Command was activated at Chabua, Assam, and took over the Hump operations. March 10, 1942, The 14-USAAF was activated by the China Air Task Force and became an independent air command. July 29, 1943, Hqs USAAF, India-Burma Sector was activated. December 15, 1943, the Southeast Asia Command was created for the joint British and American prosecution of the war in Asia. Following major commands resulted: Eastern Air Command; 222nd (Coastal) Group, RAF; 225th (Coastal) Group, RAF; Air Transport Command; 20th Bomber Command; 14-AAF and Hqs Army Air Force India-Burma Sector, CBI Theater.

THE INDIA-CHINA FERRY


As part of its mission, the 10-USAAF contributed heavily to the early Allied effort in the China-Burma-India Theater by its ferrying operations. Though confronted with shortages of personnel and equipment, lack of suitable fields and adequate protective facilities, the 1st Ferrying Group, continued operations, transporting supplies into Burma and China. While the Japanese were closing in on important bases along the route, they evacuated wounded soldiers and civilian refugees to the limit of their capacity. Due to operational difficulties, the original plan of establishing two commands, the Trans-India, to operate from Karachi to Dinjan in Assam, and the Assam Burma China, to operate from Dinjan to Kunming, China, was discarded in favor of one command, the India-China Ferry. The Assam Burma China Ferry, under the command of Col Caleb V. Haynes, retained its identity, however, for several months. Immediate attention was given to this route due to the necessity of transporting supplies to China, whose morale had suffered a serious setback with the fall of Rangoon. The carrying capacity of the Ferry Command was increased by the addition of ten Pan-American DC-3s from Africa.

Early in April, these planes were utilized in transporting 30.000 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of oil to airfields in China. This fuel will be used by sixteen B-25s that were moving across the Pacific aboard an aircraft carrier, preparatory to executing a daring attack on the Japanese homeland, (Doolittle Tokyo Raid). Later these transports were employed in accomplishing greater tasks. When the Japanese major advance through Burma threatened to overrun the British and Chinese defenders, the DC-3s carried ammunition and supplies into the battlefield area and evacuated the refugees and wounded personnel. After the fall of Mandalay on May 1, the planes were loaded to capacity evacuating as many passengers as possible before the Japanese could close on points along the ferry route to China. Though the planes were unarmed and subject to enemy attack, not one transport was lost in these operations.

The susceptibility of Dinjan to the Japanese attack forced the pilots and crews to get the planes off the field at dawn. Planes and pilots were working to a maximum, even after the fall of Myitkyina, on May 8, in dropping food and supplies to the retreating defenders of Burma. The fall of Burma dictated a change in the air and ground plans of operations. Heretofore, the Ferry service was considered merely a supplement to the regular supply lines. It was now necessary to build an air cargo service with capacity enough to replace the Burma Road. From this standpoint, the ferry operations during April, May, and June provided an experience that later assisted in developing aerial cargo service over the Hump on a much larger scale. The loss of bases in Burma and the heavy rains of the monsoon season reduced the number of supplies carried over the Himalayas to about 800 tons a month. The Japanese would be ready for the big push into India when the heavy rains ceased to fall.

The initial work on the establishment of ground services essential to air combat was accomplished during the Burma Operations, utilizing the few reinforcements arriving at Karachi for the 10-USAAF. On May 1 the 10-USAAF Air Service Command was activated under Gen Elmer E. Adler. Necessary cadres were taken from other units of the 10-USAAF. The main depot was located at Agra, approximately 700 miles east of Karachi. Later in the month, the 3rd Air Depot Group arrived in Karachi, the 3rd Air Depot being established at Agra on May 28. The immediate task was the construction of barracks and an airdrome in which native workers assisted. To provide front-line service to the combat units, the 59th Materiel Squadron was divided into small base units located at Allahabad, Xunming, Agra, Dinjan-Chabua, Chakulia, and Bangalore, where an aircraft manufacturing plant was being converted into a repair and overhaul depot.

EARLY OPERATIONS OF THE 10-USAAF

While elements of the 10-USAAF were involved in the preparation of supply depot facilities and transporting supplies and evacuating refugees, the bombardment groups were preparing for air strikes against the enemy. The night of April 2/3, 1942, marked the beginning of bombing missions. A flight of two B-17s and one LB-30, led by Gen Lewis Brereton, attacked shipping at Port Blair, Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Another attack was scheduled for targets in the Rangoon Area but wasn’t completed due to difficulties occurring during the take-off. These operations entailed the use of an advanced base near Calcutta, a distance of 1200 air miles (1900 KM) from Karachi. Subsequent operations were characterized by the same difficulties of distance and shortage of aircraft, as well as by unfavorable weather conditions. Consequently, these missions were little more than harassing missions. Bombers operating from the advanced bases at Asanol and Dum Dum, Burma bombed Rangoon shipping and air facilities. Due to a lack of spare parts and major repairs required the bombing missions were restricted to the limited operational aircraft available. During this period operations were suspended for a two-week period while necessary repairs were being made. Operations were further hampered during the summer of 1942 due to the adverse weather at times grounding all bombers for weeks.

Taking advantage of this respite the 10-USAAF improved early warning and AAA facilities in the Assam and Calcutta areas. Improvement of the Allied situation in the Indian Ocean permitted the movement of airbases eastward. The 436th Bombardment Squadron moved on June 1, to Allahabad, joining the 9th Bombardment Squadron, Hqs of the 7th Bombardment Group moved to Barrackpore, near Calcutta. The 51st Fighter Group was moving units into Kunming and Dinjan, while the 23rd Fighter Group and the 11th Bombardment Squadron were assembling in China. This latter move was partially in anticipation of replacing the AVG in China whose contracts would expire on July 4, 1942, but mainly to provide increased air support for the British and Chinese forces operating in China. The situation for the 10-USAAF was taking on a brighter hue by June. Definite policies had been established in defining the mission of the air force. Relations between the theater commander and the air force and the disposition of forces in China had been decided upon. As stated before, ferry and service organizations were operating and the badly needed combat units with personnel and equipment were due in.

Operations in the main were still of a defensive nature due to the inadequacy of equipment, personnel, and supplies, coupled with Japanese capabilities which indicated still further advances in the China-Burma-India Theater. Late, in June 1942, the British suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Knights-Bridge, in Cyrenaica. Gen Brereton, with all available bombers, was ordered to the Middle East. He left India on Jun 26 with key officers to establish operations in the Middle East. This left a seriously crippled 10-USAAF in India under the command of Gen Earl L. Garden.

CHINA AIR TASK FORCE

Initially, the China Air Task Force was composed of the 23rd Fighter Group, the 16th Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group, one flight of the 9th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, and several flights of the 11th Squadron (M) of the 7th Bombardment Group. Operational aircraft numbered approximately seven B-25s and thirty P-40s. This force faced the problem of conducting a 5000-mile (8000 kms) front extending from Chungking and Chengtu to the Indo-China Red River in the south, the Tibetan Plateau and the Salween River in the west, and the China Sea in the east. In order to bring the important enemy targets in southern China within range of the B-25s and the P-40s, operations were conducted from a string of bases running in a northeast southeast line starting at Hengyang, followed by Lingling, Kweilin, Leuchow, and Nanning. In order to guard the ferry operating over the Hump, aircraft operated from Yunnanyi, in western China and Dinjan in Assam. Although operating against numerically superior forces, the American Flyers continued to inflict losses to the enemy with minimum loss to themselves. Bomber strikes included attacks on important Japanese airfields at Nanchang, southwest of Hankow, and Tien Ho Airdrome at Canton, in an effort to reduce the Japanese numerical superiority. Fighter aircraft challenged every Japanese bomber raid over Free China, accounting for a number of enemy aircraft during every engagement.