Type 92 Japanese Machine Gun

After cleaning our weapons, we remained in the perimeter until about noon when we attacked again. Progress was again slow. We had not gone far when fired on by two machine guns. One heavy machine gun was firing from a position off to our right front near the paddy’s edge. Sgt Jasinsky yelled to me that the other gun, a light Nambu, was firing from a Basha just beyond the hedgerow. Lt Delores, leader of the Machine Gun Platoon, went in and captured the heavy machine gun, killing three Jap soldiers. I was attempting to find a passage through the thick wall of hedge separating us from the open field containing the Basha. In the meantime, the heavy machine gunners had worked their way forward and were firing into the hut. Then Sgt Jasinsky yelled, ‘Hold your fire’, I’m going in and get that ‘son of a bitch’. He jumped up and rushed in. An instant later, Lt Algieri and Cpl Touhet rushed forward. Algieri was on the left of the Basha and Touhet on the right. The front and two sides were closed right to the ground with only an opening in the front for the enemy to fire through, but the back was open, Jasinsky went right in through the rear and killed the crew of three. We were running short of mortar ammunition and as we had only a few hours of daylight left, we decided to dig in for the night. The night again was active with the usual attempts at in filtration. Our grenades exploding and the usual Jap harassing mortar fire.

Japanese Type 92 Machine Gun Crew WW2

RIPAfter the death of Lt Rowe, I put Lt Van Matre in command of the 3d Platoon. He was assigned to my company the day before we crossed the paddy. As I already had five officers, I did not have an appropriate assignment for him until now. On the afternoon of the July 31, we were ordered to attack again. We jumped off and the going was very slow again because of the nature of the enemy and terrain. We were in hedgerow country now and visibility was a little better. After gaining about 200 yards, we decided to dig in as we had less than an hour of daylight left. The men were digging in and after checking the perimeter and being satisfied with the tie-in with Item Co, I walked back to my CP. Lt Van Matre came up and was slated over the way his men had fought. He said that when notified that we were to attack again, they grumbled and were becoming reluctant to continue these constant attacks, but that he had talked to them and when we jumped off they went forward in great shape. He left me and went back towards his platoon. Two minutes later, a soldier came running up to me and said, ‘They got Van!’ I asked him if he was dead and he said, ‘Yes’. I walked over to the 3d Platoon area. Van Matre was shot through the head. He was not yet dead, but did die after being evacuated.

In this day’s fighting, Lt Delores was wounded for the second time and was evacuated. Lt Pearson took command of the machine guns. I was checking the perimeter and stopped for a few moments to talk to Sgt Jasinsky who was checking his squad. I had left him only a few momenta when Jap mortar fire came in and Whistling Willies opened up. He was hit. I ran over to him. There was a large gash in his arm. I was opening a first aid packet when the aid man, Sheppard, ran up. He put a bandage on his arm and he was evacuated. Later in the day Sheppard was hit and evacuated. The I & R Platoon had been relieved from outpost duty on the river and had taken position on the left of Item Co. It was given an attack sector and participated in the day’s fighting. Its leader, Lt Adkins, besides fighting with his platoon during the day, led several night patrols behind the Jap lines. He was extremely brave. He was later killed in the Central Burma Campaign.

On August 1, Love Co moved up on the right of King. We attacked on this day with three companies abreast, plus the I & R Platoon and made the usual gain of a few hundred yards after heavy fighting. In this day’s fighting, I lost two more lieutenants: Lt Lane, my Executive Officer and Lt Campbell, 2d Platoon. Toward evening of this day, Lt Algieri was wounded and evacuated. I now had one lieutenant left: my Weapons Platoon Leader, Lt Meade. On August 2, Love Co attacked to the southeast to secure a wooded area. They accomplished their mission but this left a large gap between Love and King Companies. The remainder of the battalion was ordered to attack straight to the south to close the gap and protect the flank of Love. The men were out of their foxholes and we were forming for the attack when the Japs opened with everything they had, including Whistling Willies. I lost 17 men in about five minutes. This completely disrupted the attack and it was called off. The Battalion Commander called me and I explained the situation to him. Then he gave me this GEM of advice: ‘when caught in an artillery or mortar barrage, the best way to go is forward’. After the casualties were evacuated came the order to attack again. My 1st Platoon was now commanded by a Pvt. He commanded two other privates. There were six men in the 2d Platoon, commanded by a Cpl. Lt Duncan, who had been on duty with Regimental Headquarters, was sent up and I gave him the 1st Platoon of 12 men. My Weapons Platoon consisted of Lt Meade and 4 men.

For this attack, I consolidated the 2d and 3d Platoons (9 men) and commanded them myself. The field to our front was bordered by hedgerows, I ordered Lt Duncan to advance along the left hedgerow, keeping contact with Item Co on his left. I would go up the right row and at the same time protect the right flank. The attack was supported by my one remaining 60-MM mortar and two mortars from Item Company. We moved out almost immediately and came under mortar fire. We continued on for about 75 yards when Whistling Willies joined in and wounded two of my men, leaving me with seven. This fire stopped my group. I then attempted to make contact with Lt Duncan who was supposed to be moving up on my left. I then discovered I was doing a solo. When the mortar fire came down, Duncan moved out but Item Co did not. Duncan advanced a few yards, but because the unit on his left had not moved out, he withdrew to the perimeter.
Now realizing the attack was completely disorganized, I withdrew to the perimeter.

A short time later, Maj Harrold (Battalion ExO) came up with the Battalion Headquarters Company Commander, Capt Prevo, to see what the trouble was. He asked me to show him Love Co’s position. We were walking down a trail towards Love when the Japs laid down another mortar concentration. In attempting to escape the fire, the three of us took cover in a hole not large enough for one man. Maj Harrold then agreed that we should not attack without more supporting fires and went back to the Battalion CP. Because of its exposed position, Love Co withdrew to its original position and tied in with King Company.

The next day, August 3, after stocking up some mortar ammunition, the battalion attacked, driving straight for the river. We came out of a hedgerow into a clearing when Whistling Willies opened up not 50 yards to our front. It was behind a clump of bamboo at the end of a hedgerow. I moved up the left followed by Pvt Sardella and Pvt Tickey. Lt Pearson, the Heavy Machine Gun Platoon Leader, came running across from the right, straight for the gun. He threw a grenade right into the olump of bamboo and when it exploded we moved in right under the muzzle of the gun and killed the crew. We continued on and soon reached the river. Eight Japs committed suicide on the river bank. The only fire now was coming from a temple in Love Co’s sector. As our men were closing in, the seven remaining enemy committed suicide. While Item Company guarded the rear (north) of the battalion, King and Love formed a line to the south facing Myitkyina. The artillery liaison officer said he still had about 50 rounds left. I told him to fire them. He did and we jumped off and overran a Jap position designated as a ‘strong point’ on our aerial photos. It proved very weak, containing only a few Japs. We soon made contact with the Chinese force that was driving north and the 78-day battle of Myitkyina was over.

John J. Dunn, Major, 5307 Composite Unit (Provisional)
Advanced Infantry Officers Course 1947-1948
Academic Department – The Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia

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VIAU.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater – Historical Division
SOURCEPersonal Experience of a Company Commander, Maj John J. Dunn 5307-(C)(P) Buirma
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