On board, organizations were split and scrambled. Some of the men were in compartments commanded by Air Corps officers of a different unit shipping on the same boat. There was neither space nor opportunity for any kind of organizational activity. The whole lot was commanded by Transportation Corps escort officers who had one missions to deliver this crowd in Bombay and get a receipt. These TC officers and the so-called ‘convoy officer’ complemented each other in forming the perfect useless team. On May 18, the ship’s newspaper carried a story of the fall of Myitkyina and many aboard wondered if they would ever see that part of the world. A little over two weeks later, many of these men were dead at Namkwi.
The ship arrived off Bombay on May 26. Before docking, a lieutenant colonel from Gen Frank Merrill’s staff came aboard. All officers were assembled in the ship’s wardroom and this officer informed them that they were to join the Marauders in forming a light division. He stated that they would train in India as a regiment, and then join in the Burma Fight. He did say that the present situation was in a state of flux and plans were subject to change.
The troops debarked in battalion order, wearing woolen OD uniforms, Field Jackets, full packs, and carrying even overcoats, this being in India in May, absolutely an essential item. The 1st Battalion disembarked first (upon reaching Myitkyina, this unit was redesignated the 3d Battalion; henceforth, I will refer to it as the 3rd Battalion) and immediately boarded a ‘troop train’ for the trip across India. There apparently was no planning connected with the transportation across India by anyone in authority. Troops suffered for lack of water, and upon arriving at Ramgarh on May 30, after four hot dusty days, no one was prepared to receive the battalion. Apparently they had not been advised of its coming. The battalion was finally billeted in some tents and an improvised mess was set up to serve K-rations, tea, and lemonade.
After some hurried staff conferences, things began to happen. Planes were flown from Calcutta for weapons. Lt Haraldson, designated Battalion S-4, began to issue hodge-podge assortment of weapons at 2000 that night: M-1 Carbines (cal 30 short), M-1 Rifles (cal 30.06), M-1911-A-1 45-ACP, Thompson 45-ACP Sub Machine Guns and even British Lee Enfield Rifles (cal 303 British). That same night, the battalion was alerted for an air lift to Burma. The Battalion Commander took off in the first plane with most of his staff, leaving no one in definite charge of the battalion. The Battalion Hqs Co Commander took off in plane N°2 and landed at Chabua (India), and found great difficulty in obtaining transportation to get to Burma. No one seemed to be advised of their coming or knew what to do with them. Maj Holland talked to the base commander in Chabua into furnishing another plan to complete the trip. The first plane carrying the Battalion Commander had already left for Burma. The groups that were following the Battalion CO’s plane had no idea where they were going. They were not briefed – had no maps or orders. What little information they did get was from the pilots of the planes. In spite of lack of planing, the battalion managed to reach Myitkyina after two days of confusion and tie-ups.
The following day was spent in attempting to organize this group into a tactical battalion. This was easier said than done. With absolute no knowledge of their men, all officers could do was line them up and ask for all those who had ever fired a machine gun, a mortar, etc., or who had any special training. Capt Holland (not yet Major), the CO of Hqs Co assisted Lt McFadden the Battalion S-1 and with the aid of the shipping list, attempted as best he could to assign the men according to MOS numbers whenever possible, although the percentage of infantry man was small. Men who had apparently never done anything became riflemen and medics. The Heavy Weapons Company was equipped with three castoff 81-MM mortars (plus an extra mortar base plate) and four heavy machine guns, all of which had been through the Marauders’ campaign and were in foul condition. The few 60-MM mortars issued to the Rifle Companies were from the same source. Communications equipment consisted of a few SCR-536 radios and a few field telephones with some salvage wire.
Statement Maj James D. Holland, then Bn Hq Co CO; This battalion boarded a troop train at Bombay four hours behind the 3rd Battalion, but due to British hospitality and the remarkable inefficiency of the Indian Railway System, this grew into a 36-hour interval. The train was watered at Bombay and by the end of the second day had not been resupplied. The Battalion Commander put two officers in the cab with pistols and refused to allow the train to move until a supply of water was put aboard. It was not until then that they got the first inkling of what was in store for them. A British official appeared greatly agitated, informed them that they were a high priority shipment, greatly needed in Burma, and could not stop for such trivial things as water. He threatened with court-martials and firing squads, but the train did not move until water was put aboard.
The battalion was then given the mission of setting up a perimeter defense of the airstrip and immediately did so. The 2nd Battalion, after similar experiences and difficulties, arrived at Myitkyina during June 1, 2, and 3, went into bivouac northeast of the airstrip, and on June 5, took over the perimeter defense of the airstrip from the 3rd Battalion.
The Most Tragic and Controversial Marauders Operation
According to many of the company grade officers, they were told that they were going out on a Field Problem when the battalion moved out from the Airstrip on June 5. The battalion, less King Co which had been assigned a separate mission, bivouacked about two mile southeast of Namkwi. That night, a lieutenant colonel joined the battalion whose place in the picture has never been made clear. He acted as a sort of advisor and gave the battalion its mission, which was to take Namkwi, then turn right and drive on the Irrawaddy River. They were told that there was about one platoon of Japanese in the area and that they were in bad shape. This was the first of a long series of misinformation that plagued this battalion. The officers and NCOs spent most of the night instructing the men in the use of their weapons. Many of them had never seen an M-1 Rifle of a Thompson Sub and the great majority had a little or no range firing.
Capt Brubeck, who up until this time was not sure of his place in the battalion because of the indecision of the Battalion Commander was finally told that he was in command of the Heavy Weapons Company. He spent the remainder of the day and night canvassing the battalion for men with experience to fill out his MG and Mortar Crews. The battalion was to attack with two companies abreast, Item on the left with its flank on the Namkwi River and Love Co on the right with its flank on the Railroad. On the right of the railroad was a unit of the 236th Engineer Combat Battalion (US). Capt Brubeck was to provide support with his 81-MM mortars from the high ground on the south side of the Paddy Field. The heavy machines guns were attached to Love Co and there were no reserves.
Three phase lines were established and these were drawn on all of the serial photos that were available and issued to the officers. The companies were to move forward until phase line one was reached, halt there and send out patrols to reconnoiter to the front, then move forward to the second and third line in a similar manner. Many of the officers in the attacking companies and apparently all of the men were under the impression that they were going on a Field Problem. The companies moved out and the first phase line was reached without incident. Soon after leaving the first phase line, the unit lost contact with each other and shortly after crossing the Paddy Field the companies were out of radio contact with battalion due to the short range of the SCR-536 Radios.
They continued on. The men taking no interest in the problem appeared bored with the whole thing. Halfway to phase line 2, the leader of the 1st Platoon of Love Co noticed some officer equipment on the trail with blood on it, but attached no importance to it as he had been told that there had been a few Japs in the area but they had been cleaned out. However, he was suspicious enough to warn Sgt McDowell, his platoon sergeant, to be alerted as they crossed the flooded paddy field. The men were being hurdled forward, bored with the whole affair when suddenly the Japanese opened up with mortar, rifle and machine guns. Men went down; near panic ensued. The officers making gallant attempt to establish order and to press the attack were going down like ten pins. Almost complete disorganization was prevented from becoming a route only through the heroic actions of Lts Schwarta, Ken Campbell, Jim Applegate, Jim Blocker, Billy Payne, Patsy Algieri, Item Co’s 1/Sgt whose name I do not recall and Lt Mitchell who was wounded. Capt Corey, CO of Love Co and his radio operator were killed in the first few minutes and the radio destroyed.
The leader of the 1st Platoon of Love Co who was next to the railroad, determined that the fire on his platoon was coming from the vicinity of a railroad bridge to his right. His platoon sergeant reported that many men were hit. The Platoon leader, Lt Algieri, sent out two runners, one to the left in a effort to contact the 2nd Platoon on his left and the other to the rear to obtain support from the machine gun and mortar sections that were supposed to be following the 1st and 2nd Platoons. Soon, these runners reported that they could not contact either one. He then ordered Sgt McDowell, his platoon sergeant, to employ all the automatic weapons against the bridge while he attempted to pull back the platoon with the wounded.
During the withdrawal, the men of the light machine gun and mortar section were discovered sitting under a group of trees and smoking cigarets. The fuming Platoon Leader, demanding to know the reason for this, was told that they had heard the firing but thought it was part of the problem and so did not bother to investigate. The platoon had 8 wounded, one of whom was to die reaching the aid station.
Suddenly, a noise was heard from the other side of the railroad. Upon investigating, Lt Algieri discovered the combat engineers digging in there. They joined forces and dug in. The engineers had a radio and Lt Algieri contacted battalion and was informed that the battalion had withdrawn to its original position on the south side of the paddy field and for him to stay where he was for the night and rejoin the battalion next day. Upon rejoining the battalion the following day, he was informed that he was in command of the company as the Company Commander, Capt Corey, had been killed. Casualties in the battalion were very heavy, including 12 officers. Two days later, on June 8, the battalion was moved to the vicinity of the road fork at Radhapur where it remained for one day. The following day, it moved on to Mankrin on the river without opposition, thus cutting the enemy route from Myitkyina to the north. It then turned south with its left flank on the river, and had the opportunity been properly exploited could probably have advanced almost to Myitkyina. However, the enemy was given adequate warning and the opportunity was lost. King Co was sent out to reconnoiter the area. All was quiet and everything appeared clear when suddenly the enemy attacked. The company broke and fell back in confusion leaving their wounded and dead. The twice wounded Company Commander, Capt McMasters, was killed while trying to rally his men.
The next day, the battalion attacked and moved forward about 150 yards, then stalled and the men dug in. They had advanced far enough to recover some of their dead. In some cases these were found to have been mutilated. This fact posed a new morale problem for the officers. The men developed a morbid fear of having their bodies fall into the hands of the enemy. Half-hearted attacks were continued for the next two days without gaining a yard. The battalion remained here until June 24, when they were relieved by the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion then moved back to the airstrip and took over the defensive perimeter that was vacated by the 2nd Battalion. The author took command of King Co on July 15, 1944. At that time, the company was occupying a section of the perimeter around the Airstrip. It was during the monsoon season and the rain and sun alternated during the day with the rain dominating the night. The men were in pitiable condition. Many did not have either blankets or shelter halfs and were simply living on the ground without the slightest cover, exposed to the elements. Sleeping in rain and mud. Many were even without toilet articles. Their weapons for the most part were in a rundown condition due to a lack of cleaning materials and a general feeling of despair and bitterness that permeated the whole battalion.
Every effort on my part to obtain supplies was unsuccessful. The Battalion Commander would refer me to the S-4 and the S-4 insisted that he tried many times and could not get any supplies. He stated that he several times requested the Battalion Commander to do something about it but with no results. A startling contrast was immediately apparent between the miserable conditions existing in the companies and the relatively regal splendor of the Battalion CP. This consisted of a British wall tent for the exclusive use of the Battalion Commander and three American pyramidal tents for the staff and the remainder of the CP personnel. In the CO’s tent was a sand bagged foxhole at least eight feet deep. Next to it was another excavation six feet deep, six feet long and three feet wide, lined with sandbags and with an additional four feet of sandbags protruding above the ground. At the bottom of this excavation was a cot with numerous blankets and four chairs with two folded blankets on each chair as cushions. (Many men in ny company were without blankets) Numerous souvenirs and two orderlies completed the picture.
The following days were a struggle against the weather, official apathy and negligence, and a general feeling of suspicion, bitterness and despair, to try to whip the company into condition for what I was certain was in the offing – a death struggle against the enemy in Myitkyina. My chief concern was in correcting the mental attitude of the men. There existed an under current of distrust. Every new project or field exercise was greeted with suspicion.
Second in importance was instruction in the care and use of their weapons, and third, organization. Although these men had been associated as a company for six weeks, they were so spread out, occupying such a large section of the perimeter and almost never assembled, that outside of their own squads and, in many cases within squads, they still did not know or have any confidence or trust in each other.
To correct this, I assembled as many as possible and as often as possible for informational talks and instruction. I required daily inspections of weapons and succeeded in impressing on the men the vital necessity of keeping their weapons in such condition that they could be depended on in any emergency. I preached the great importance of teamwork and the right of every soldier to feel that he could absolutely depend on the man on his right and on his left to do his part as they moved forward in the attack. At the same time discipline was not overlooked. I refused to allow them to feel sorry for themselves. They were required to shave daily. It was necessary for many men to share their razors with others.
On July 25, I was instructed to send a representative to go with the Battalion Executive Officer, Maj Harrold, to reconnoiter a new area that the battalion was to occupy. It was understood that the 3d Battalion would occupy a position extending from the rifle range to the 236th Engineer Combat Battalion area, thus relieving two Chinese battalions and the 236-ECB. This would have given us a front of about 2000 yards.
The next morning, July 26, the battalion, under the Executive Officer, moved out and after proceeding for about two hours, we were about to move into the new positions when some runners met the column with instructions for the battalion to move into the area behind the engineers. We did as directed and bivouacked along the road to Radhapur. The engineers moved out and the Battalion CP was established in the one vacated by the engineers. Late that afternoon I was instructed to report to the Battalion CP. There I found the other Company Commanders, the Executive Officer, and staff, but the Battalion Commander was not present. Everyone was simply sitting around and waiting – waiting for what, no one knew or showed much interest in – all appeared bored. I asked, ‘What’s up’? Someone mumbled, ‘Who knows’?
Along toward dusk, the Battalion Commander came in. No one paid any attention to him nor he to anyone else. He was in no hurry and gave not the slightest indication that anything unusual was afoot. He spoke a few words to different people around the CP and had some coffee. Time was the least of his worries. I was getting impatient as were the others. About thirty minutes a fter he arrived, he called the Company Commanders together and informed us that we would attack the next morning at 0500. The formation would be a column of companies with the companies in a column of platoons. My company was to lead the attack, followed by Item, Love, and Mike. One platoon of Love Co under Lt Lee Nelson was across the Irrawaddy River under direct control of Task Force Headquarters.
The I & R Platoon, under Lt Jordan Adkins was on the river at Pamati, also under Task Force Headquarters. The plan was to attack directly across a flooded Paddy Field nearly 400 yards wide, and establish a perimeter on the other side. No further mission was given, but everyone assumed that after building up supplies we would continue the attack into Myitkyina.
Love Co’s mission was to turn north and defend against Japanese force supposed to be between us and the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was then occupying a position south of Mankrin and they too were to attack on July 27. The attack was to be supported by a 30-minute artillery preparation that was to start at 0430.
The plan was to have my company move out at 0415 to a point about 150 yards from the enemy side and then wait for the artillery to open. When the artillery lifted at 0500 we were to move in. This plan I considered as unnecessarily risky. The field was covered with water – in some places knee deep – and a body of troops moving across in the stillness of early morning would probably alert the enemy into firing his FPL. Inasmuch as there was no cover available, this could result in excessive casualties and would probably cause the attack to fail.
My suggestion was to wait until the artillery opened and then to move out under cover of the noise. We had nothing to gain by moving out early and everything to lose. This suggestion was ignored. I was to have the head of my company on the road opposite the Battalion CP at 0330. There I would pick up one platoon of heavy machine guns that was to be in direct support of my company. I was to pick up one reel of wire and then proceed on down to the Jump-off point.
I was not satisfied with either the plan or the formation. The critical period in the attack would be the few seconds from the time the artillery lifted until we could reach the enemy position. Common sense dictated the necessity of getting as many men as possible in on top of the enemy in the shortest possible time. This could only be accomplished by having two companies attack abreast and then charging the enemy the moment the artillery lifted. Going across in a column of platoons meant that only a few men would reach the enemy in the first critical moments, leaving the remainder of the battalion spread out in a long column, completely exposed to any flanking or mortar fire that the enemy could bring to bear. Another great disadvantage was in the necessity for reshuffling troops on the enemy side in the face of an almost certain counterattack.
My greatest concern was the reaction of the men if another blunder occured. I was skeptical of the ability of these men to absorb heavy losses and still continue on. I felt that I had succeeded in convincing them that from now on things would be different, that all of the blundering was in the past, I was sure that another affair in which they were unnecessarily cut up would so disillusion them in their leaders that they would never become an effective force.
Following the issuance of the order, the Battalion Commander said he would show me the jump-off point. We left the CP and proceeded to a spot near the west side of the Paddy Field. In the gathering dusk, he pointed to the other side and said to go across there. Attacking across ‘there’ appeared to me to be a formidable undertaking. The place chosen was the widest part of the paddy. I said ‘OK’ and we turned back towards the CP. As we walked back in the gathering darkness, he amazed me by saying, ‘I want you to bring your lieutenants up here and show them the ground and bring your NCO’s up too. Make sure everyone is thoroughly oriented’. He completely ignored the fact that it was now almost dark and my company was over a half-mile distant. I left him at the Battalion CP and proceeded on down the road towards my company. I assembled the platoon leaders and NCO’s and told them the plan. I had an aerial photo of the area over which we were going to attack and by the use of a flash light oriented them as best I could. I ordered the company alerted at 0200. They were to be on the road at 0230.
