We will now turn our attention to the 96th Infantry Division, which as a part of the XXIV Corps and Tenth Army was assigned to: (a) land at 0830 April 1, 1945, on Beach White and Beach Brown and defeat and destroy all enemy forces encountered in its zone of action; (b) capture the commanding hills along the line Sunabe Sukugawa Hill (102) and hill mass south of the line Sunabe Fuenzan Kue in its zone of action; (c) protect the corps right (south) flank and secure the objective line marked L plus 10 and be prepared to continue the attack to the south on corps order.
Gen James L. Bradley, Commanding General 96th Infantry Division, ordered the 381st Infantry Regiment and 383rd Infantry Regiment to land abreast, the 381-IR on the left (north) and 383-IR in reserve. During the 115 days of combat on Leyte, the division had received valuable training and morale and fighting spirit were excellent. Orders were received and planning began for the Ryukyus Campaign while the troops were still engaged in clearing out isolated pockets of enemy resistance on Leyte and Samar. The 96-ID was designated an amphibious division in the spring of 1944. The division was trained by the Marines at Camp San Louis Obispo (California) and completed the training at Camp Callan (California) and made landings on the coast of California prior to embarking for the Oahu Island. During the four weeks of intensive training, the division made battalion landings on Oahu and a Division landing on the Maui Island. The amphibious training was climaxed by the assault on Leyte (Philippine Islands), October 20, 1944. The division was well trained and morale was high for the assault of Okinawa. Last minute training period was short as the division stressed individual and small-unit training. The three regiments held extensive training for their infantry assault teams in the use of flame throwers and demolitions. Snooper-scopes and Sniper-scopes were received two weeks before the operation and last minute instructions were given in their use.
M-1 Flamethrower
The M-1 flamethrower was the first standardized flamethrower adopted by the US military in 1940. It was based on earlier experimental designs and was quickly manufactured for use in the war. This weapon which had a weight of approximately 70 lbs when fully loaded used two cylindrical fuel tanks connected to a smaller pressurized gas cylinder for propellant. The gas (usually nitrogen) forced the fuel out of the tanks and into the nozzle for ignition with a range of 20 to 25 yards (18 to 23 meters), depending on weather conditions and fuel viscosity. Ignition of this weapon used an hydrogen gas torch ignition system, which was relatively reliable but susceptible to wind or rain. The weaknesses of the M-1 was the weight and cumbersome, making it difficult to carry over long distances or through rugged terrain as well as a limited range and fuel capacity (around 10–12 seconds of continuous use). Having an hydrogen ignition system which was not always dependable under field conditions, the M-1 saw limited deployment in the early stages of World War II, being often criticized for being less effective compared to other flamethrower designs of the time.
M-2 Flamethrower
The M-2 flamethrower was developed to address the shortcomings of the M-1 and became the standard-issue flamethrower for US forces by 1943. It was widely used throughout the remainder of World War II and even later during the Korean War. Weighing a little less than the M-1, about 70 pounds fully loaded the weapon also used a similar dual fuel tanks (carrying about 4 gallons of gasoline and napalm mix) and a single pressurized gas cylinder (typically nitrogen or compressed air). The range of the M-2 was improved to about 20–40 yards (18–37 meters), depending on conditions while the ignition system utilized a safer and more reliable electric ignition system with a battery-powered spark igniter, which replaced the hydrogen torch of the M-1.
Enhancements over the M-1 were (1) increased range and more precise targeting; (2) improved ignition reliability and safety and (3) a modular design which allowed for easier repairs and replacements.
Extensively used in the Pacific theater for clearing bunkers, pillboxes, caves, and jungle undergrowth and particularly in battles such as Iwo Jima, Saipan, and Okinawa to flush out entrenched Japanese defenders. Typically operated by a two-man team, one to carry and fire the flamethrower and another to provide cover or assist with fuel resupply, the flamethrowers were particularly effective in jungle and fortified environments where traditional weapons (e.g., grenades or rifles) were less useful. The intense flames could incapacitate or kill enemies hiding in bunkers or caves, often consuming oxygen and suffocating occupants. The flamethrowers struck fear into enemy forces, who often associated them with inescapable and gruesome death due to the fuel utilized, a mix of gasoline and napalm which burned longer and adhered to surfaces more effectively than gasoline alone.
Flamethrowers like the M-1 and M-2 were essential tools for US forces in World War II, particularly in the Pacific Theater. They helped overcome difficult defensive positions, contributing significantly to the success of numerous operations. However, the moral and ethical concerns about their devastating effects led to their decline in use during the late 20th century.
Two exercises were held in preparation for Operation Iceberg. A rehearsal which included the ‘ship-to-shore’ movement phase of the operation was conducted on March 17. This included the landing of the four assault battalions and the embarkation and movement to the line of departure of the remaining five battalions. The deficiencies discovered were corrected. A second rehearsal held on March 19, included the landing of all three infantry regiments. The two rehearsals were of utmost importance to the naval personnel but the battalion landing teams were not able to advance sufficiently inland thereby decreasing the value to the infantry! All landings were made on Leyte.
We will not discuss the terrain overlooking Brown Beach and White Beach on Okinawa. The beaches were composed of coral sand and guarded by a reef located from 350 to 425 yards off shore. At low tide parts of the reef were above water. Numerous hills or pinnacles extending from the beaches to a depth of 3500 yards and ranging in height from sixty to three hundred feet afforded the enemy excellent positions from which to observe and fire on the beaches and on which to organize strong points to resist our advance, A narrow gauge railroad roughly parallels the coast line. Most of the houses had a wall of stone or adobe around them which afforded the enemy excellent cover and concealment. Stone burial vaults also provided excellent cover for riflemen and gun positions. The disposition of the Japanese 32nd Army on Okinawa was unknown but the 96-ID G-2 did not expect the enemy to defend the beaches in greater strength than one infantry battalion in the zone of the 96-ID.
With all necessary preliminary planning, loading and embarkation, training and rehearsals completed the assault elements commenced loading on March 23, and the remainder of the division embarked March 24, for the Okinawa operation. The convoy of LSTs sailed from the Leyte Gulf on March 25, and the troops waited anxiously for their arrival at the target. The 1st phase of Operation Iceberg began while the combat divisions were enroute to Okinawa. On L minus 6 day (March 26, 1945) the 77-ID began the assault on the Kerama Retto. The troops established beachheads and by March 29, organized resistance had collapsed. The following day the islands were declared secure. During this operation, the 77-ID destroyed over 350 Japanese suicide boats loaded with high explosives and designed for ramming our naval shipping under cover of darkness.
On March 31, 1945, the 77-ID seized the small island of Keise Shima about 20.000 yards from the Hagushi Beaches and 11.000 yards from Naha city. The 420th Corps Field Artillery Group (155-MM guns) were landed and in position ready to support the landings early April 1, 1945. Since L minus 7, March 25, Okinawa had been under intermittent bombing and gunfire which would continue until the landings were made.
The Battalion Situation
The 3rd Battalion, 381st Infantry Regiment, was in the town of Catbalogan – Samar (Philippine Islands) when the division received orders for Operation Iceberg. The battalion returned immediately to Leyte and rejoined the remainder of the regiment. Planning orders were received on February 8, and only six weeks remained to receive replacements, equip the men, train, rehearse, load and complete the final details for the invasion. Fortunately, the casualties in the battalion were light on Leyte and the majority of the key non-commissioned officers remained with the companies. The battalion
had received ample amphibious training and little time would be required. The battalion S-3 instructed the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon to construct a vertical wall and the boat teams were given intensive training in scaling walls. In case the troops encountered a high seawall on Okinawa, no delay would occur in climbing the wall. The engineers built ladders which became organic equipment for each landing vehicle track. No firing ranges were available nor did time considerations permit construction so, all beer cans and bottles were conserved and used for targets as a field expedient. The resulting firing range corresponded to a shooting gallery comparable to one found at a fair or carnival in the states. Physical and mental conditioning was stressed. Detailed training was given in map reading, scouting and patrolling, individual training, demolitions, and leadership during the extensive mopping up on the islands of Leyte and Samar.
Operation Order 1-45 gave the following missions to the 381-IR. (1) Regimental Combat Team 381 lands on White Beaches, 1/381 on the right, 3/381 on left, 3/381 in reserve, advances inland defeating and destroying all enemy forces in its zone of action. (2) Maintain contact with 3/33-IR (7-ID) on the left. Plans for the 3/381 were as follows: Battalion Landing Team 3/381, Item Co on the right, Love Co on the left, King Co in reserve lands on April 1 at 0830 on Beach White 1 and moves rapidly inland destroying all enemy in its zone of action; remove all enemy mortar and small arms fire from White Beach 1, captures commanding hills along line Sunabe-Sukugawa-Hill 102. In reference to Class I supplies; each man was to carry (1) D Ration, (1) K Ration, and (1) Assault Ration and (2) full canteens. These were to be issued prior to debarkation. Full Field rolls would be left aboard ship and only toilet articles, extra pair of socks and other minor articles of clothing were taken. The jungle poncho was issued to all soldiers for protection against the rain and elements.
The critical terrain features in the zone of the 3/381 were the railroad running parallel to the beach approximately 650 yards inland, Highway #1 and Hill 103. The battalion zone was divided between Companies to avoid confusion and to prevent the by passing of enemy groups. Numerous rifle pits and possible machine gun emplacements dotted the area behind the wall and along the beach. Cross country mobility was excellent. Observation and fields of fire favored the enemy. The two rehearsals familiarized all boat teams with their leaders. Charlie Co of the 170th Engineers W&B attached to the battalion with the mission of relieving the infantry of all beach responsibilities. The company was designated the Shore Party Company and landed detachments early to mark the flanks of White Beach and to blast two holes in the seawall. Col Daniel A. Nolan, 3d Battalion Commander, had at his disposal liaison officers with sufficient communication from the navy, naval air, artillery and 4,2 mortars. Complete plans were coordinated to ensure utilization of all available fires. Troops were payed ten dollars in Japanese yen to be used as legal tender with the natives. The yen was also interchangeable one for one with the regular Japanese yen. To bring the battalion officer strength up to authorized T/O four outstanding non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves on Leyte were given battlefield promotions to the grade of 2d Lieutenant.
When the division sailed from Leyte to Okinawa the information program was instituted with a transcribed fighting address by Gen Simon B. Buckner, and on the eve of the landing a message from the division commander, Gen James L. Bradley, was read to the troops. As the ships arrived in the China Sea and commenced launching landing craft, the battalion operation officer was confident the men were ready for whatever resistance would be met on the beaches. On April 1, 1945, an armada of 1321 ships will assemble in the far Western Pacific off Okinawa. Most had come from Leyte and Ulithi, others from Pearl Harbor, the Solomons, Sydney, and even the US West Coast. They were there to land the US Tenth Army – a joint Marine Corps Army force – on this large island, part of the Ryukyus chain between Formosa and Japan. The 19 fast carriers of Task Force 58 and the British Pacific Fleet, escorted by 10 battleships, 17 cruisers, and 60 destroyers, supported the amphibious armada of escort carriers and older battleships, attack transports, and landing ships. Hundreds of mine craft, store ships, and repair vessels were present, as were netlayers, tugs, and salvage vessels.
