German Defeat 1945 – Air-Sea-Ground – USSAF 1945

Kapitän zur See von Kutzleben

Allied air power was at least 60 percent responsible for our defeat. (1) It cut our fuel production, and thus crippled our military machine. (2) It disrupted our transportation network so badly that reserves and necessary supplies could not be transported regularly to the fronts or rushed to critical sectors at important moments. (3) It destroyed our U-boats and won the logistical Battle of the Atlantic. The loss of the Battle of the Atlantic opened the European Theater and Mediterranean Theater to the vast flow of United States war material. Airborne radar more than anything else defeated our submarine campaign. They rendered it impossible for our U-boats to operate without becoming a target for your aircraft. Strategic bombing of sub-pens and sub-building yards was not nearly as significant as bombing attacks on our U-boats on the high seas. Very few submarines were lost in the harbors, as many as 18 were hit in one night in raids against Hamburg and Bremen (6 sunk and 12 damaged), but because of their compartmental construction repair was relatively easy.

An Intelligent World War One Pilot Looks at World War Two
June 19, 1945

The following statements were made by a 45-year-old Luftwaffe major, who served as a pilot in the last war and in various administrative capacities in World War II. They are repeated here because they are believed to be typical of a large group of officers of similar age and experience.

1. Allied air power won the war beyond all shadow of a doubt. By the middle of this war, Germany had made the European Continent in general and the German Reich in particular, a powerful and effective fortress. While the Allied armies besieged it beyond the barriers of water and terrain, the business of warfare proceeded within its walls with amazing clocklike precision. The world’s most skilled brains were at work on plans for new and terrible weapons.

2. The most highly developed industries in Europe were engaged in turning out a flood of war material to repel the enemy assault troops. Plans were made for greater production of Me 109 and Fw 190. The great Ploesti oil fields and synthetic oil plants all over Germany produced the vital fuels necessary to keep the machine in motion. The most concentrated transportation network carried the war effort of the entire German Nation.

3. The German fortress finally fell. But it would not have fallen to the actual storming from without if its war potential had not first been shattered from within. With uncanny certainty, the Allied air arm sought out the centers of German industry and proceeded one by one to destroy them. As new nuclei were established, Allied intelligence discovered and annihilated them. The Allied air raids forced the General Staff to revise its plans drastically sometime around the time of the Battle of Stalingrad. At this point, the increasing frequency and strength of Allied bombings forced us to concentrate almost entirely on the production of fighters alone – a revolutionary change from an offensive to a defensive strategy. Our industrial program was changed to include the introduction of newer and more modern models of fighter aircraft; an increased emphasis was placed on research on jet and rocket aircraft and the development of a production schedule for these planes. As we cut down the production of bombers for the increased production of fighters, we were forced to find a substitute for the bomber. Thus the V-weapons were decided upon. The prevailing German opinion is that the V-weapons were intended from the start to be used against England to prevent the establishment of bases from which an invasion could be launched against the Continent. Some informed sources, however, believe that the original intention was to use them against Allied forces already landed in France and that the plan was later changed. The actual use of V-1, however, was postponed as much as 6 to 9 months by Allied air attacks on important factories manufacturing V-1 components (such as an optical factory near Travermuende engaged in important parts of the V-1). Without (a) Allied strategic bombing of industry, and (b) Allied air raids on the German transportation network, the Allied assault against the German Festung Europa‘ could not have succeeded. The Allied air forces decided the war, absolutely.

4. At no time were German industry and transportation actually paralyzed. The industry was too decentralized to be completely knocked out. Transportation, of course, was seriously handicapped – chiefly between Germany and Italy – but not paralyzed.

5. In the future, as in this war, no war can be won on land without an overwhelming superiority in the air. The Allies had this air superiority in all respects. The German Luftwaffe had air superiority only at the beginning of the war.

6. If I were to ask myself the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s decline, four questions would have to be answered: a. Why didn’t we build heavier bombers? b. Why didn’t we increase our fighter production program sooner? c. Were our fighters too old? d. Why did we introduce our new weapons too late? Unquestionably Allied material superiority broke the Luftwaffe and unquestionably the superiority of certain types of aircraft (ex. the B-17 with its heavy armament – a danger to attacking fighters) was an important factor. But on whose shoulders the blame for strategic errors on the part of the Luftwaffe rests, I cannot definitely say. To a certain extent, General Milch may have been responsible. He headed an ‘engineer staff’ whose chief concern was with the development of new inventions at the expense, perhaps, of the air force.

A German War Correspondent Speaks

Additional opinions were expressed by a first lieutenant who had formerly been attached to Kesselring’s Headquarters in Italy as a correspondent. At the time of his capture, he was serving as an officer of the 3rd Company of the 682 Engineer Battalion. He stated that his views were shared by the men of his company, and a spot check with men selected from all ranks proved this statement to be true.

1. You ask me if the German armies could have been victorious in this war assuming that there had been no Luftwaffe and no Allied air force. There is only one answer to this question. I am now speaking for every German soldier! Without the Allied air might, Germany could never have lost the war but, to the contrary, we would have fought on and successfully and victoriously concluded this war.

2. The general opinion existing today in all of the ranks of the German Army is still that Germany would have never lost the war if the Allies would not have their tremendous air superiority. The German front lines could not hold out because the Allies bombed sector after sector, laid their carpet of bombs, and decimated one unit after the other before the real attack began. As a result of your bombings, the Germans lacked not only equipment but in the last phases of the war, we lacked munitions, fuel, and food.

3. There could have been no successful invasion of the European Continent without your air forces. The intensive bombing of supply and communication lines by the Allies prevented rapid and effective German counter-defensive measures. The constant air superiority of your fighter bombers made every German troop movement during the day impossible.

4. The German attempt to disperse the key factories of the German armament industry in subterranean locations, especially to the Protectorate Bohemia, did not alter the situation so that in the last year of this war the shortage of fuel made itself felt to such a degree that every common soldier was aware of the shortage. The trucks had to be converted to charcoal burners. The motorized AA units were drawn by oxen. Finally, flying units could no longer fly on account of the lack of fuel. In our withdrawal from the Balkans, for instance, a great number of aircraft had to be destroyed due to the lack of fuel as oil and gas were not available for these aircraft to take off. Weeks before the German surprise dive-bomber attack on the Allied airfields in Holland on January 1, 1945, oil and gas had to be carefully saved to accomplish an effective attack. The whole German Army believed and set their hopes in the new German fighter aircraft which were to insure victory which kept our morale high and which we were told were being produced in mass in underground hangars and caves. These aircraft would be flown with a revolutionary new kind of fuel which was available in huge quantities, and easy to produce. As far as I know, very few of these aircraft were ever used. Your aircraft and your precision daylight bombings softened the Reich from within, and without the Allied strategic plan of operations you would never have won the war.

MISCELLANY
July 23, 1945

The following statements were made by German officers previously associated with a great variety of units in Italy. While none of the remarks is of great importance in itself, it is felt that in the aggregate they constitute an interesting body of opinion about the war, and why it was lost.

If We Had Had Your Air Force… {Two German Ground Force Majors)

Without air supremacy, the invasion on the channel coast would not have been possible. Elsewhere, perhaps it might have succeeded. On very favorable terrain, and with overwhelming sea and land forces, a landing might be possible without air power, but only with very great losses. The bombing of the transportation facilities behind the front was of extreme importance in practically all of your land, sea, and air operations. In Italy, or in Africa, because of the great extent of coastline, you could land anywhere without air superiority, but you could not hold it if the defender possessed sufficient strength and reinforcements and an intact transportation system to rush this strength to the crucial points. At Nettuno, the Allied bridgehead could under normal circumstances have been repelled by artillery fire, but not with our transportation shattered by air and not with our inability to cope with your sea and air artillery. Our movement difficulties were tremendous. At the time of the Cassino front and the Anzio Beachhead, we had one army on the front and another in North Italy. We had to rush the 2. Army down from the Via Emilia in time to prevent further expansion of the bridgehead—a tremendous task. We never visualized a landing at Nettuno, because to us it was swamp territory, and because it was further south than we expected you to land. If we had had your air force after the fall of North Africa and Sicily, we would have risked a simultaneous landing operation at Genoa and Venice, and thus finished the Italian Campaign in one daring, though dangerous operation.

A General Staff Officer

It was often stated by various General Staff officers that if we had the Allied Air Force which was in Italy, for one week, we would be back in Sicily at the end of that week. Had the Allies started their push last fall (1944), supported by the Allied aerial might which was employed in this theater, you would have been across the Po River, and we would have been unable to stop you.

They Were Always Repaired… (A Luftwaffe Captain)

In my opinion, you cannot destroy railroad lines by blows with four-engined heavy bombers. The Berlin railyards were attacked and reattacked, but they were always repaired. In our own bombing attacks against railroad lines in Russia, we could knock out transport for only a very limited period. Usually, the Russians had their lines operational within three hours. In my opinion, a paralysis of the enemy’s transportation is much more difficult to attain than the destruction of his industry.

Transportation Became Impossible… (Two German Majors)

Your most effective attack was on transportation and gasoline since both these factors were mutually dependent. Toward the end of the war, the transportation system was practically dead. In Italy, without exception, transportation became impossible because there were no alternative routes as in Germany. The air attacks against ball-bearing and tire factories in Stuttgart, Hannover, and Schweinfurt, were highly effective.

We Would Have Won the War… (Three Ground Force Officers)

The decision to fight Russia was such a grave mistake that even without Allied air blows against our war potential at home, and in the field, we might have lost the war anyway. Your great tank offensives were possible only with air superiority. Without your air force, or without the Russian advances on the East Front, we would have won the war. The necessity of fighting on so many fronts compelled the German air force to disperse its planes all over the European Fortress, thus exerting a tremendous strain on the Luftwaffe. Yes, if we had had sensible political leaders, we would not have provoked war with Russia, England, and America. Without the air force, we could have achieved victories on the continent alone, but we could not have overcome the material might of the coalition arrayed against us. In Russia, in 1942, I captured my first Willys Jeep. The Russian soldiers were carrying US C rations. We felt then, that it was the beginning of the end. After the fall of Stalingrad, the continuation of the war was a crime against the German people and against humanity. These party members senselessly prolonged the war and caused the loss of thousands of men. The superiority of the German soldier over the soldiers of other armies would have won. Our industry would not have been smashed. Our transportation network would have been left intact. We could have defended the Homeland. The morale of the troops at the front would not have been shaken by the bombings in Germany.

Part Played by the Russian Air Force… (A General Staff Officer)

There is no comparison between the Russian Air Force and Anglo-American tactics. The British and American Air Force operated a gigantic armada of all types of aircraft and followed plans which were both strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. The Russian Air Force did not have enough aircraft to bomb our cities, our industries, and our railroad lines of communication. The excellent aircraft given to the Russians by the United States and Great Britain proved to be not so dangerous in Russian hands. The Luftwaffe could fly against the Russians with training aircraft and little Fieseler Storch, but not against you. The Luftwaffe was always very effective when operating against the Russians, but you made mincemeat of this same air force when it was put against yours. The Russian Air Force did not possess the aircraft, the well-trained pilots, or the technical knowledge that the United States and British Air Forces commanded. The Allied Air Forces greatly assisted the Russians by bombing Luftwaffe airfields, strategically located targets, and lines of communication. The most effective part played by the Russian Air Force was their nuisance raids at night over the front. Your Air Force operated more or less independently, whereas the Russian Air Force was thought of as part of the Russian Army.

Without Its Support, We Never Won a Battle… {Same General Staff Officer)

In the first year of the war, the German Army never advanced, or attacked, without a. Recce aircraft; b. A direct fighter cover; c. A strong bomber formation flew ahead with its loads of bombs, removing any obstacles. A Luftwaffe Liaison Officer directed the aircraft from a tank fitted with R/T.(ground to air). The German Army’s General Staff planned that the Luftwaffe was a part of the army, and was trained accordingly. We depended on the Luftwaffe and without its support, we never won a battle. When we made counterattacks against the enemy without direct air support, we were forced to withdraw. Without the Luftwaffe support, no major thrusts could be carried out. In November 1944, we planned the ‘winter gewitter’ (winter thunder), to take place in March 1945, a drive that would push the Allies back past Florence. Florence was our goal. For this undertaking, we ordered 3500 cwt of fuel, 5000 tons of ammunition, and 300 fighter aircraft. The promised aircraft failed to arrive and the drive was halted north of Pistoia in March 1945, before it ever really got started.

Accomplished More in Three Weeks… (A General Staff Officer)

In Italy, the Luftwaffe had only three aircraft of note available. These three Arados accomplished more in three weeks than all the rest of the Luftwaffe aircraft in Italy. This aircraft, employed as a recce plane, performed wonders. These aircraft covered the ports of Leghorn and Ancona; thus we knew that no preparations were being made to undertake landings in the Gulf of Genoa and in the Gulf of Venice.

The Most Effective Results… (A General Staff Officer)

The most effective results against infantry troops and troop concentrations are obtained by dropping fragmentation bombs and not by laying a bomb carpet. Frags cause much more havoc. They strike and hit bunkers easily, and are apt to drop into foxholes. Used against artillery positions pattern bombing is most effective. Butterfly bombs are most effective on airfields, runways and landing strips, railroads, dams, and bridges. Because of the delayed action, minor repairs take days to finish, especially here in Italy. Fuel tank incendiaries have a great morale effect.

Part of Our Strategy… (A General Staff Officer)

For the past two months we had given up the idea of ever using the Brenner railroad route. We tried nevertheless and even managed to slip a few trains through once in a while. It became part of our strategy to keep your air forces busy bombing this stretch so that your bombs would not be dropped on other targets in Italy, or be used to bomb the Homeland.

This War Was Decided in the Air… (General Staff Administrative Officer for Italy)

Without a doubt this war was decided in the air, through the following factors: a. The purely material effects of air attacks on the industries, particularly the ball-bearing, fuel, and heavy war equipment industries. b. The complete crippling of the transportation system both at home and on the fronts. c. The moral effect on the population is because of the staggering personnel losses sustained during the bombing. d. The acute food shortage in Germany is due to the disruption of the transportation system. The stepped-up air offensive against Germany, in conjunction with the increasing signs of military weakness, had an overwhelming effect on morale which might sooner or later have resulted in a complete national collapse. I have five small children, and I shall never forget the perfect terror that seized them every time a bomber formation flew overhead. No human nervous system could continue to endure what the German people endured during the last months of the war. For a while, the people still had hopes of winning in the end. Day in and day out in radio and newspapers, they were promised new, incredible weapons to operate against the Allied bombers. But as months passed and the new weapons failed to appear, or else, when introduced, proved ridiculous failures, the population became apathetic. German morale fell into a state of absolute lethargy. As a result of air attacks, the transportation supplies to the front experienced the same difficulties. In Italy of course the greatest concern was the vulnerability of the Brenner line, which was seldom open to traffic for more than a few days at a time.

As if Carrying Out a Maneuver… (Chief Signal Officer, Luftwaffe in Italy)