Incomplete U-boats abandoned at the Blohm & Voss shipyard following the German surrender, May 4, 1945

Other Industries
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) Were grave difficulties to the German war effort caused by damage to another particular industry? (b) Can you suggest any other class of target in the German war industry the attack of which would have been more effective in reducing Germany’s war potential than the attacks which were actually carried out?

(a) Considered as already answered in the replies to previous questions.

(b) Yes, by means of a more logical form of attack on industrial targets. No dispersal of effort on final manufacturing processes or upon transport for both of these requires too great a number of attacks, and after a certain time, it is possible to provide alternative facilities. It is only by producing a bombing plan aimed at certain vital targets resulting in the elimination of a horizontal section (Querschnittfaktor) of an industry that more rapid success may be obtained. In this connection, the sequence of attacks must be speeded up in order to render reconstruction impossible. The destruction of the ball-bearings industry, at the cost of a small expenditure of effort, would have caused a complete standstill of armaments and war production within a period of four months, and in certain important spheres even within from 14 days to eight weeks. Attacks on the electric power stations would have had to include a comparatively large number of plants as our grid system, like that of England, is unique in the world and we possess many small and medium power stations. Despite this, however, according to the estimate of the Reich electricity controller (Reichsverteiler), the failure of 60 percent of the total electric power production would have sufficed to cause the complete collapse of the entire electrical network. In countries where the number of power stations is smaller and in the absence of an extensive grid system the average capacity of each station is somewhat greater, the destruction of power stations is the most effective means of bringing the whole industry and public life immediately to a standstill. This and the gas industry are the only spheres where it is impossible to create reserves and build up stocks between the producer and the consumer which can postpone the effects of bombing for several months.

Another industry that falls within the scope of the question is the chemical industry including synthetic oil plants. In this connection, however, the nitrogen plants must also be attacked in order to bring about a standstill in powder and explosives manufacture. In this connection, it has emerged that the processing of crude oil by means of the comparatively primitive process used by the refineries can be continued despite the attack.

Thyssen Krupp Plant 1945

Area Attack
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) To what extent did the attacks on cities cause direct damage to the plant and equipment of vital war factories? (b) How far was the production of vital war factories affected by damage to essential services (power, gas, water, transport, etc.)? (c) How far was war production in bombed cities affected by the effects of area attacks on the productivity of labor? To what extent did conditions change in this respect as the war proceeded? (d) To what extent did the loss of records affect the efficiency of production and public administration? (e) To what extent and when did the attack on cities cause the dispersal of industry, and what was the net effect of this dispersal on the overall level of production? (f) How far did general administration and accommodation difficulties caused by the attack on cities affect the German war effort as a whole? What would have been the position if both bomber forces had thrown their effort continuously into the attack on cities? (g) What was the effect of Mosquito raids on Berlin and other cities? How could these have been made more effective? (h) What diversion of manpower and resources was necessary to meet the threat and results of an area attack, including ARP and essential repair work, and how far did this affect the resources available for war products and the armed forces?

(a) It often occurred naturally that attacks on cities caused damage to plants and equipment of vital war industries, but this was mostly of a temporary nature, as it was due to the failure of electricity and gas supplies. The best gauge of the effects of night attacks upon production was provided by the demands on power supplies following the attacks; these frequently dropped to between 30 and 40 percent although after a week they usually rose again rapidly to their original level. Such graphs showing the demand for current were prepared in respect of all major night attacks and are to be found in the records of the Reichslastverteiler. They give the best overall impression of the effects of the various night attacks upon production.

(b) A particularly difficult situation was caused by the failure of transport facilities in all areas where employees had to cover large distances on the way to work. Thus in the case of the attacks on Berlin, on every occasion, individual groups of factories remained idle for several days, although their buildings were intact. Heavy damage was caused by the destruction of the gas grid in the Ruhr, which resulted in a serious and continuous reduction in the processing of products. In this connection, the graphs kept by the ‘Ruhrgas’ organization (Director Wunsch), showing the rise and fall in gas supplies, present an exact picture of the situation. As a result of the breaching of the Moehne Dam, the Ruhr Valley was flooded, and the freshwater pumping station in the Ruhr was put out of action by mud and silt; despite this, however, adequate supplies of water were restored after a lapse of a week. The simultaneous destruction of the other Ruhr Valley dams would have resulted in a considerable drop in output in the Ruhr. Works lying idle owing to shortages of electric power could always be restored to activity within a comparatively short space of time.

 Correll B-17 Flack (every black smoke cloud is an 88-MM shell exploding)

(c) Up to the end of the war the productivity of labor remained as high as ever.

(d) On the contrary, the loss of records led to a temporary loosening of the ties of bureaucracy. We very often receive the message ‘Administrative building burnt out, production continues at full pressure’. I do not know how far the loss of records affected the difficulties of local administrative authorities.

(e) The dispersal of important industries from the west and northwest Germany to central and eastern Germany was carried out in 1942 and 1943. From 1944 onwards, vital key industries were transferred to caves and other underground installations. These dispersals did not at first affect production as it was possible to execute them within a short space of time. Production was hindered by dispersal and decentralization only after transport and communications facilities had been shattered.

(f) The accommodation available for the workers was of course entirely insufficient but this state of affairs was unwillingly borne right up to the end of the war. Even if all the raids had been concentrated upon the towns and cities this would still not have had any decisive effect if the old system of attacks with long intervals between each, had been continued. The effects would, however, have been more important if the raids had been based on a different system. After the first raid, it was generally the case that the water mains were heavily damaged and that consequently the water pressure in the town was considerably reduced. A renewal of these attacks on the next two or three nights would have had a considerably greater effect since damage caused by the night raids was in the main due to fire. A prerequisite for attaining such results is that the town attacked should be reduced from an undamaged condition to a state of complete destruction by a succession of raids separated only by short intervals. If intervals of considerable length elapsed between the attacks which raised the first fires, the danger of new conflagrations were considerably reduced by the restoration of the water mains and the creation of natural firebreaks. Day attacks made in addition to night raids would only have had some effect if in the main they, like the night raids, had taken the form of incendiary attacks. Such a system of attack was employed on Dresden and, despite all previous raids throughout the Reich during the three preceding years, it caused a considerable shock effect. Nevertheless, the industrial life of Dresden recovered with comparative rapidity. Consequently, it can be said in conclusion that a bomb load is more effective if it is dropped upon economic targets than if it is expended upon towns and cities.

B-24s of Maj Gen Nathan F. Twining US 15-AAF thunders over the railway yards of Salzburg, Austria Dec 27, 1944

(g) The Mosquito attacks on Berlin and other towns with the exception of the ‘Oboe’ attacks had no considerable effect. They were felt as purely nuisance raids and it would have been more effective if they had been continued over a longer period of time because their most disturbing aspect was the loss of sleep that they caused. Moreover, the regular timetable of the attacks enabled people to make their own arrangements to correspond. Irregular attacks, spread as widely as possible would have been more effective.

(h) I do not know the detailed figures of personnel engaged in ARP and in bomb damage repair organizations, but for the years 1943-1944, the figure may be reckoned at some 1 to 1,5 million. Needless to say, this was one reason why the industry was unable to make good on its shortages of manpower. It is not, however, to be assumed that a materially greater output of armaments would have been attained even had the necessary manpower been available since the bottlenecks in materials (raw steel, etc.) would still have persisted. There is no doubt that in the absence of air raids it would have been possible to withdraw several hundred thousand more soldiers from the armaments industry at the end of 1943. A large proportion of German skilled labor was required at the factories for bomb damage clearance, where their specialized knowledge and keenness to restore the plants made their presence indispensable after air attacks. If no air raids had taken place, we should have been able to increase the proportion of foreign and unskilled labor. Furthermore, during 1944 Army training units were increasingly employed on bomb damage clearance work, leading to a reduction in the standard of training and to a lengthening of training schedules.

Question: In attacks on German cities what was the relative effect of High Explosive and Incendiary Bombs respectively on 1. The production of industries associated with the city? 2. Absenteeism among workers in those industries? 3. The morale of the population?

(1) In so far as concentrated area attacks are concerned, the effect of incendiary bombs was greater than that of high explosive bombs owing to the wide area affected. The effect of high-explosive bombs was merely to render the incendiaries more effective. On the other hand, the effects caused by the heaviest type of mines were fearful. The difference between the effects of high explosive and incendiary bomb attacks was to be seen in Berlin. Here the American Air Force carried out several attacks on the center of the city, exclusively with heavy explosives, but considering the number of aircraft engaged, these did not have the effect of a comparable night attack. The damage caused to industrial plants by concentrated high explosive attacks was of varying character. The best and most effective attacks were the last raids by the RAF on Poelitz and Brux, which, thanks to the mixed bomb loads had excellent results.

(2) Fire was also much more effective in destroying workers’ dwellings than high explosives, which often left a part of a house still habitable. Consequently, the worker was kept from his place of employment for a longer period by conflagrations than by high explosive attacks. (3) Fires made the greatest impression on the general morale of the population which after events in Hamburg and elsewhere was extremely afraid of the
outbreak of large area conflagrations
.

576-BS during the March 22, 1945, mission to the jet airfield east of Schwabisch Hall

Pr. Wilhelm Emil Messerschmitt (Frankfurt am Main, 26 June 1898 – München, 15 September 1978)Defeat Through Air Power
by Professor Wilhelm Emil Messerschmitt
Why Germans Failed, June 25, 1945

The Messerschmitt Company suffered from a lack of raw materials or components until at least the second half of 1944. After the heavy attacks on the Ruhr, and particularly after the heavy attacks on transportation in the second half of 1944, shortages of sheet metal and of components arose. A shortage of nuts and bolts occurred early in 1945, and during that year there was also trouble with electrical instruments. At no time, however, did Messerschmitt suffer from a lack of ball bearings or other components. Propellers were never a problem. Undercarriages were obtained in satisfactory quantities despite our attacks on the Opel Plant at Russelheim, which was the largest source of supply.

The Luftwaffe suffered from deficient leadership, in Messerschmitt’s opinion. One of its principal defects was caused by the fact that young pilots who had distinguished themselves in combat had been placed in positions of great responsibility. At least so far as production problems were concerned, these men were largely incompetent. In Germany, a front-line fighter had been made the hero and the production men had been considered only as mechanics. German Production Errors. One of the early strategic mistakes was the failure to construct a fleet of long-range bombers to supplement submarine warfare in the Atlantic and thereby to deny the United States the ability to set up an operating air force within the range of German industrial centers.

Generaloberst Ernst UdetOne of the reasons for the failure to proceed with the ME-264 (a long-range four-engined heavy bomber Messerschmitt proposed to build) may have been the decision taken by the Air Ministry to concentrate on the production of the HE-177. This aircraft was never a success. The engines were continually catching fire and this resulted in explosions that destroyed the entire aircraft. Another serious error was the failure to build an adequate fighter force for the defense of Germany.

Professor Messerschmitt believed, from the day that Germany invaded Poland, that the United States would enter the war, and was much disturbed by the published figures for our aircraft production, which he took seriously despite the fact that most people in Germany did not. In 1942, he stated to the Air Ministry, to Milch, and to Goering, both orally and in writing, that Allied air attack would become very serious and that Germany should concentrate on the production of large quantities of fighters. He argued for the production of the ME-262 fighter, which he felt was better than anything we had and which was suited to combat our daylight precision raids. These raids were the most damaging to German industrial production. The unanimous reaction, except for General Udet, was that Messerschmitt was merely trying to exploit the virtues of his own aircraft. Udet had serious difficulties with Milch and Goering and found himself blamed for many things for which he was not responsible; he finally committed suicide in November 1941.

The Allied Bomber Offensive. Professor Messerschmitt had long feared an attack on German industry and thought, from the outset, that the combined bomber offensive attacks were a very serious matter for Germany. The first attack on his company was on the plant at Wiener Neustadt and was made with very few aircraft; the results obtained were an ominous indication of future potentialities. Professor Messerschmitt had always taken US production figures seriously, although many others in Germany had refused to do so. He was aware, therefore, of the increasing weight which could be thrown into the attack on German industrial targets and cities.

The first raids upon the Messerschmitt Plants were not so accurate as later ones, he said. The company did not suffer more than a 30 or 40 percent loss of production for a period of one month after the 1943 attacks on Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt. High explosive bombs were used and the machine tools at these plants were not seriously damaged either by high explosives or by fire. It was discovered that even though the buildings collapsed on machine tools, relatively little damage was done. Efficient fire fighting in one later instance permitted the plant to cope with 1000 incendiary bombs without great damage from fire. This was in part because there was little or no wood construction or other inflammable material in the plants. The workers were given additional rations, tobaccos, liquors, and food as a reward for clearing up debris and restoring production and the Army furnished troops in addition. No large numbers of troops were required. As soon as the machines had been cleared up, a tarpaulin was stretched over the rafters, and production was reestablished.

Remains of the Luftwaffe 1945

The February 1944 attacks caused a deduction of 50 percent in the company’s production for a period of one month, and production had been restored to normal at the end of that time. A persistent and heavy attack on the Messerschmitt aircraft plants in the summer of 1943 would have had a far greater effect than the series of raids that were in fact made against the company’s plants in 1943 and 1944. In the summer of 1943, the Messerschmitt Company had not dispersed and had the company’s machine tools at Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt been severely damaged, it would have taken a considerable time to get back into production. In Professor Messerschmitt’s opinion, this would have required one year at the minimum.

Dispersal of aircraft production is most inefficient and Professor Messerschmitt estimates that Germany’s potential production in this field had been cut by as much as 50 percent. Underground plants are the best form of safeguard against air attack. Messerschmitt sought to place his plants underground in 1935 but got no support from the government because of the expense involved and because of overconfidence as in the Luftwaffe. Underground dispersal, generally, however, would have progressed throughout Germany to a point where, within the next six months, Germany might have warded off the worst effects of air attack. Our combined bomber offensive attacks on oil were extremely successful and were the principal cause of Germany’s collapse, he feels. A lack of gasoline was first noticed after Stalingrad. During this phase of the Russian Campaign, the demand for oil for transport purposes was enormous and great stores were lost. After D-Day, stocks were lost in France as well as in Russia, and in the Balkans. By Fall of 1944, the situation was extremely serious.

(I didn't find a photo of Fritz Böhme - Sorry)Factors in Germany’s Defeat
by Kapitän zur See Fritz Böhme
July 11, 1945

The following information was secured from an anti-Nazi German naval officer. He has been a professional mariner in the service of the German Navy since 1916, and commander of torpedo boat squadrons in France and Italy during World War II.

Oil Shortage

The air attacks against the German gasoline and oil industries prevented the Luftwaffe from taking the role they should have played in this war and made our naval and land forces relatively helpless targets for your air attacks. Our fighter program, which should have bolstered our defenses, was smashed by strategic bombing attacks. As soon as the great gasoline plants like that at Poelitz were set in operation again, another raid knocked them out. Toward the end of the war, the Kriegsmarine felt an acute oil shortage. For the destroyers, the shortage began to be felt as early as 1942 and 1943, and it increased steadily in intensity. Destroyers were forbidden to move from port except for certain specified operations of extreme importance and in emergencies, or else they were allotted only 200 to 300 tons of fuel per month. In the period between January and April 1945, I had 100 Sturmboote (assault boats) ready at Seste Calende on Lake Maggiore, but I could not bring them down to the sea because of the gasoline shortage. In 1944, when I was engaged in Naval AA training, only 100 tons of oil were allotted monthly for an AA training ship (5000 to 6000 tons), and I received this amount only because the training was intended for U-boat flak.

Allied Airborne Radar

In the battle of the Atlantic, Allied airborne radar devices alone killed the U-boat offensive. Over and over again our submarine commanders returned to base to say that further operations were impossible. Allied planes were able to detect and bomb submarines as soon as they began operations. If it had not been for the Allied Air Force, we could have won the tattle of the Atlantic, as we estimated we could sink one to two million tons of shipping per month. Aircraft equipped with radar was much more effective against U-boats than were Allied destroyers.

U Boats about to be sunk



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