Heavy Strategic Bombing Against Germany

Question: What was the relative importance of: (a) Attack, on cities? (b) Attack on specific types of production? (c) Attack on communications? (d) Use of heavy bombers for the bombardment of front-line positions? (e) Attack of naval installations and shipping including the effects of mining? (f) Attack of airfields and airparks?

From the point-of-view of armaments the relative importance of the various forms of attack was as follows: (1) Attacks on key points in the basic industries or supplies. (2) Attacks on transport and communications, but the effect of these was long delayed on account of the density of the transport network. (3) Attacks on front-line positions, also because of the psychological effect upon the troops. (4) Attacks on final stages of manufacture in the industry. (5) Attacks on towns. (6) Attacks on naval installations, shipping activity, and airfields.

Question: Which of the above forms of attack were most difficult to counteract and for what reason?

The attacks on the chemical industry were the most difficult to deal with since chemical works form an extraordinarily complex organism. Before activity can be recommenced at a chemical factory, the entire plant must be restored in at least one phase of manufacture in order that the chemical process, which forms a self-contained unit, can pass through all its stages. On the other hand in the final stages of all other industrial manufacturing processes work can be recommenced shortly after an attack with the remaining undamaged machine tools and in this way, the factory concerned can take up production again in successive stages. The highly rationalized automobile industry was also extraordinarily difficult to restore owing to the multistory buildings in use in the trade, the destruction of which brought to a standstill whole sections of the continuous belt production system. These breakdowns could not be offset by emergency improvisations as in the case of other industries. In any event, these attacks had exceptionally serious effects.

Question: Which, at various periods of the war, caused the most concern: British or American heavy bomber attacks, day or night attacks’, why?

The American attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks that caused the breakdown of the German armaments industry. The night attacks did not succeed in breaking the will to work of the civilian population. Two mistakes were made in this connection; (1) The weight of the attack was gradually stepped up and consequently, it was possible to improve defensive measures and the civilian population was able to accustom itself to the raids. In every case in which the RAF suddenly increased the weight of its attacks, for example, the first attack on Cologne and Hamburg and the attacks on Dresden, the effect not only upon the population of the town attacked but upon the whole of the rest of the Reich was terrifying, even if only temporarily so. (2) The powers of resistance of the German people were underestimated and no account was taken of the fatalistic frame of mind that a civil population finally acquires after numerous air raids. Other peoples, as perhaps the Italians, would have certainly collapsed under a similar series of night attacks and would have been unable to undertake further war production.

RAF Bomber Command unit on a bombing run

Question: To what extent did the diversion of forces and equipment to counter the strategic bomber offensive detract from the fighting power of the Wehrmacht?

The continuous bomber offensive kept a considerable amount of the German armament’ production inside Germany, thus withholding it from the front. Some 30 percent of the total output of guns in 1944 consisted of Flak guns, while some 20 percent of that year’s output of the heavier calibers of ammunition (from 70-MM upwards) consisted of AA shells. Between 50 and 55 percent of the armaments production capacity of the electro-technical industry was engaged in the manufacture of radar and signals equipment for defense against bomber attacks. Thirty-three percent of the optical industry was engaged in the production of aiming devices for AA guns and other antiaircraft equipment.

The fighting power of the Wehrmacht was considerably weakened by reason of the above since the production of valuable Flak guns would have supplied us with excellent antitank weapons and the use of Flak ammunition at the front, in addition to other types, would have provided a very substantial increase in stocks. Both were used only to a small extent in the final battles. I cannot say to what extent the fighting capacity of the Luftwaffe was weakened by the use of fighters and night fighters in Germany itself. One may assume, however, that the small number of fighters retained for Reich’s defense would have done little to improve the position if they had been used at the front itself.

The shortage of signals equipment, such as W/T pack-sets, artillery ranging equipment (sound-ranging devices), and, in fact, the whole supply situation of every type of signals equipment in the Army was particularly serious. This shortage, which made the task of command extraordinarily difficult, was caused by the employment of the electrical industry on priority defense measures against the bombing offensive. In addition, for the same reason, the radar equipment industry was unable to keep up with the requirements of the Army and Navy, either from the point of view of development or production. The position was made even more grave by the fact that 50 percent of the valves produced for Luftwaffe purposes were diverted for home defense.

Military Service, World War II; artillery; Krupp K5 railway gun, 283-MM

Question: Do you believe strategic bombing alone could have brought about the surrender of Germany? What scale and form of attack would have been required to achieve this?

The answer to the first part is yes. The attacks on the chemical industry would have sufficed, without the impact of purely military events, to render Germany defenseless. Further targets of the same kind were to be found in the ball-bearings industry and in power stations.

Question: What effect did the bombing of the Homeland has upon the morale of the three fighting forces?

The morale of the fighting troops at the front was considerably influenced by the bombing of the Homeland. In this connection, the attacks on the towns undoubtedly had some effect. The stories recounted by soldiers returning from leave in a town that had been destroyed made a big impression on the front-line troops. Such stories became very numerous after soldiers were granted the right to home leave following the total destruction of their dwelling. Owing to the poor channels of communication, the troops were very disturbed regarding the fate of their relatives whenever they learned from the Wehrmacht communique that their Hometown had been bombed.

Question: What effect did strategic bombing have upon the willingness and ability of the civilian population to sustain the war effort? Was German morale more affected by the destruction of cities or by knowledge of the damage caused to essential industries?

We drew a distinction between morale and conduct. The morale following attacks upon towns was bad, the conduct of the civil population on the other hand was admirable. In the armament and war production industries, the conduct of the workers could be measured in terms of output which right up to the end of the war did not diminish despite all the raids, as production figures prove. Moreover, the will to rebuild the factories remained unimpaired right up to the end. Neither of these results could be achieved by means of compulsion but only by virtue of the voluntary response of the German workers.

Ploesti was far more important for Italy. It was its only source of oil, along with the small Albanian production (200–250,000 tons per year), and some German deliveries

Oil Production
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 145

Question: (a) At what stage did the attack on the oil industry affects fuel supplies to the three branches of the armed forces? (b) On what consumers, including industry and transportation, did the cuts first fall, and with what effect on subsequent fighting efficiency? (c) To what extent was the maintenance of the attack on oil production right up to the end of the war justified? How far did it succeed in nullifying plans to retrieve the position? (d) For how long was it possible to maintain minimum essential production? What was the policy observed in the use of reserves? (e) How far did the attack of oil storage installations increase the difficulties of the fuel situation?

(a) The shortage of liquid fuel first made itself felt in the aviation categories. The stocks of Rumanian natural oil in Germany enabled the manufacture of both motor spirit and diesel fuels to be continued for several months further. In considering this question, account must be taken of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) reserves and at the same time of the reduction in the quantities in circulation. In the Luftwaffe the shortage of liquid fuel became insupportable from September 1944 onwards, since as of that date the allocation was cut down to 30.000 tons a month, whereas the monthly requirements amounted to between 160,000 and 180,000 tons. So far as the Army was concerned, the shortage of liquid fuel, which in this case was also due to supply difficulties, first became catastrophic at the time of the winter offensive of December 16, 1944, and this was substantially responsible for the rapid collapse of the German defensive front against the Russian breakout from the Baranova Bridgehead. There were approximately 1500 tanks ready for action but these had only one or two fuel supply units (Versorgungssaetze) and were consequently immobilized.

(b) An unwelcome factor was the falling off in the output of producer gas (Treibgas) as a byproduct of hydrogenation. This production sank to about 10 percent of the previous level (?) (more exact information will be found in one of the memoranda on the synthetic oil plants). On the other hand, the reduction in the production of motor spirit and diesel fuel for industrial purposes remained within tolerable limits, since up to the end of the war the total requirements could be covered, on an allocation of 60.000 tons per month of each type. The rationing of fuel did not produce serious losses of output in the industry; from October 1944 onwards, production sank, in any case, owing to difficulties in rail transport, and consequently the demands on motor transport doubtless diminished also.

(c) It was essential to continue the attacks on synthetic oil plants up to the end of the war. At first, it was possible to start a plant up again within six or eight weeks after an attack, thanks to our repair measures. Several attacks on the same plant considerably weakened its structure (gas and water mains) and consequently, towards the end of the war, an equal weight of attack lengthened the period which was required to restore production. Owing to their greater effectiveness, night attacks caused considerably more damage than day raids. Nevertheless, repair measures were executed at most of the synthetic plants until the end of the war, although towards the end the bombers succeeded in timing their attacks either shortly before or shortly after the resumption of production so that it was no longer possible to attain any output worthy of the name. Moreover, as a consequence of the latest attacks, it was impossible to restore the production of aviation spirit, as the chemical plant required for the conversion of normal fuel to aircraft fuel (DHD plant) could not be repaired in time for the resumption of manufacture. In consequence, even at the time when the synthetic plants were in production, only motor spirit was manufactured.

(d) It proved possible to maintain a minimum production of motor spirit and diesel oil right up to the end of the war because the supply of crude, including that from the Hungarian Oil Fields, was sufficient to produce 60.000 tons of each type of fuel per month. On the other hand, from June onwards, aviation spirit was produced in such small quantities that it was not possible to meet the demands of the Luftwaffe. The existence of considerable stocks, together with a diminution of the quantities of fuel in circulation, which was partly due to the shrinking of the area to be supplied, enabled the minimum emergency requirements of the Luftwaffe to be met up until September or October 1944.

(e) Storage capacity at the synthetic oil plants and refineries became inadequate, owing to the loss of tankage facilities so that when transport was disorganized production had to be reduced owing to the impossibility of disposing of the normal output. For this reason, the production of natural crude at Zistersdorf stepped down in February/March 1945, and similar steps were taken at the same time regarding Hungarian crude. Reduction of production was also doubtless attributable to the shortage of tank wagons arising from the extended turn-round times on the railways, though this was naturally due to transport conditions rather than an attack on storage installations.

A gasoline refinery and storage facility used by Nazi armed forces in flames after a bombing raid by the U.S. 9th Army Air Force

Communications
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) When did the German High Command first feel concern at the effects of air attack on communications? (b) When and where did these attacks begin seriously to affect: 1. Central and regional administration? 2. War industry? 3. Military supply traffic? (c) Which form of damage to the communication system gave most trouble and was most difficult to overcome? (d) To what extent did the attacks on oil aggravate the effects of the attacks communications? (e) What was the economic and military effect of the repeated breaching of the Dortmund Ems and Mittelland canal system? (f) How far, and for what reasons, did the attack of rail communications in France and Belgium contribute to the success of the Allies in the Battle of France? (g) How far, and in what way, did the attack of communications contribute to the defeat of the Ardennes Offensive? (h) At what point, and for what reasons, did the attack on communications begin seriously to affect industrial production in the Ruhr? When, and to what extent did this react upon industrial production in the rest of Germany?

(a) As regards industrial production, concern was first felt following attacks on communications in the Ruhr in May 1944; this threat grew from month to month and gave rise to a most serious crisis from the autumn of 1944 onwards to the final catastrophe in January 1945 onwards.

(b) (1) From the autumn of 1944 onwards, it was impossible to maintain communications between central and regional authorities, owing to the breakdown of the postal services. An attempt was made to overcome the situation by means of a motorized carrier service but this enjoyed only limited success. As a result, the centralization of the control of armaments production threatened to entail serious consequences, but these were kept within comparatively moderate limits, thanks to the initiative of the intermediate administrative bodies and frequent journeys by responsible persons from the central authority.(2) War industry was affected by the insufficiency of winter stocks of coal for power plants and gas works from November 1944 onwards and by the lack power plants and gas transport space for the July deliveries (ex. in the case of munitions from October 1944 onwards). Despite the greatly reduced raw steel production, the stocks actually held by the steel plants increased from month to month from the summer of 1944 onwards. This is the best demonstration of the extent to which deliveries to industrial producers were limited by transport difficulties. (3) So far as I am aware, the attacks began to exercise far-reaching effects on military supply traffic at the time of the invasion of France by the Allies. The preparation for the Ardennes Offensive was brought to a standstill on this account; the transport hold-up in the area on the right bank of the Rhine River caused a shortage of supplies in the forward areas. The period elapsing between the dispatch of finished weapons from the factories and their reception by units was substantially raised by the increased times taken by transport from the factory to the ordnance depot and thence successively to the firing range, the modifications depot, and the front, and in consequence, the supply of weapons to the fighting units was diminished.

(c) First in order of importance was the loss of railroad marshaling facilities, which delayed the passage of single wagons to the factory rail sidings. The second most troublesome factor was the collapse of the railway signals (ex. telegraph, and telephone) a system that, in addition to causing a general deterioration of traffic conditions, made it impossible to trace important consignments.

(d) In the Reich itself the possibility of using trucks to help out with the general shortage of transport was limited. Only in the case of minor bottlenecks could sufficient motor transport to cover requirements be made available to make good the loss of railway wagon space. For this reason, the shortage of liquid fuel could not be said to have aggravated the situation to any substantial extent. At the front, the effects of the shortage of fuel must have been very far-reaching, as the distances which supplies had to cover were insupportably great. Supplies for Bastogne had to travel a distance of 200 KM by truck and as neither trucks nor gasoline was available the supplies themselves proved insufficient.

(e) After the transport of coal by rail had fallen off, owing to traffic difficulties, its transportation by canal became decisive in the maintenance of industry in central Germany. The output from Salzgitter and Peine could have come to a complete standstill had the canals been put out of action, and at the same time, the gas supply of Berlin would have been considerably reduced. It was possible to maintain industrial production in central Germany on an emergency basis, thanks to the fact that we always succeeded in pushing through emergency traffic for one or two days before the next attack. All the same, the attacks on the canal from the late autumn of 1944 onwards were of extraordinary importance.

(f) As far as I know, they were decisive. Tanks, for example, had to be unloaded at Rheims and from there moved by road to Normandy. This resulted in a considerable loss of motor transport and substantial wastage before ever the tanks went into action, quite apart from the great expenditure of fuel.

(g) Transport difficulties were decisive in causing the swift breakdown of the Ardennes Offensive. Even before the offensive began, the supply organization was blocked and disorganized by the bad traffic conditions off the right bank of the Rhine, so that it proved impossible, for example, to trace the most vital fuel trains quickly and get them up to the troops. While the offensive was in progress it was not possible for the railway to keep pace with the advance. On the contrary, the most advanced railheads of the Reichsbahn were withdrawn further and further back during the offensive owing to the continuous air attacks. Although, for example, at the beginning of the offensive, rail traffic could still reach towns like Stadtkyll, Bitburg and other locations in the Eifel, by the end of December the whole of the supplies had to be fetched from the right bank of the Rhine. A properly organized railway supply system, however, was a cardinal condition for the success of the offensive because the motor transport capacity available was limited and made up of worn-out types. In addition, due to the activity of the day and night fighters, the transport was reduced to traveling by night and without lights. In consequence, the truck space available could be utilized only to the extent of some 30 percent of capacity.

(h) In May-June 1944 steel production fell (see the memorandum presented to the Fuehrer in June 1944), but this, as far as the Ruhr area was concerned, was rather to be ascribed to the direct effects of air attacks. Coal from the Ruhr was moved at a rate of only 12.000 trucks daily instead of at the normal rate of 22.000 trucks. Later in February or March 1945, only some 3000-4000 trucks were dispatched every day. Until the late autumn of 1944, the effect of this drop in coal production could be cushioned as it was balanced by reduced deliveries for winter stocking to power stations and gas works and to industry. With the sharp deterioration of the transport position and the advent of winter, the coal situation became so catastrophic that already from November 1944 onwards it became impossible to avoid the most serious dislocations in the whole of the armaments industry. The final collapse of armaments and war production became inevitable following the loss of the major part of the Upper Silesian coal resources towards the end of January 1945.

A convoy of motorized German equipment more than two miles long was destroyed by US air action at  St Martin de Cenilly, Normandie, France. 1944

Ball-Bearings Industry
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) How far did the attack of ball bearings affect the production of essential military equipment for the three services? (b) How far were the effects of these attacks overcome, and by what means? (c) Could decisive effects have been achieved from the attack of this industry, and if so, how?

(a) The attacks on the ball bearings did not materially affect the production of essential military equipment, as the output necessary for armaments production was maintained despite the attacks.

(b) Four means were employed: 1. A reduction of the transit time between factory and consumer from six-eight months to 14 days and in extreme cases from three months to a matter of a few days. 2. The utilization of machine tools already ordered for projected new ball bearings plants. 3. A 50 to 60 percent economy in the use of ball bearings in different kinds of equipment and the use of substitute types of bearings. 4. Speedy dispersal and the restoration of the industry by a special plenipotentiary (Kessler).

(c) Armaments production would have been materially weakened over a period of two months and would have been brought to a complete standstill at the end of about four months if: 1. All ball-bearing plants had been attacked at one and the same time. 2. The attacks had been repeated three or four times at intervals of 14 days each, without regard to the bomb plots. 3. Each attempt at reconstruction had been attacked every eight weeks by two consecutive heavy raids, and if the execution of this total bombing policy had been continued for six months. Even bomb plots are deceptive, and consequently, too great an interval is left between the attacks. It is therefore better to time attacks on the basis of experience.

Military Equipment
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) How far did the attack of tank assembly plants affect the fighting strength of German armored units? (b) How far did the attack of ordnance depots deprive armies in the field of essential military equipment?

(a) The attacks were particularly effective upon Mark VI-2 Tiger tank production at the Henschel factory. As, however, hulls, suspensions, torsion bars, and drives were in short supply at the time as a result of raids on other factories, the output of the assembly plants was not directly affected by the attacks. Even had these attacks not taken place, no greater output could have been achieved. During 1944, the output was on average some 30 percent below schedule, the decisive factor is the shortage of supplies of materials and components.

(b) So far as I am aware supplies of weapons and equipment were not substantially affected, thanks to the decentralized organization of the subsidiary ordnance depots. I cannot speak for the effect on food and clothing stores.

U-Boat (Submarine) Offensive
Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer
July 11, 1945

Question: (a) How far did the bombing of shipyards affect the U-boat construction program? (b) In what other ways was the U-boat construction program affected by bombing?

(a) Output at the shipyards was conditioned by the delivery of electric motors and batteries so that the attacks on the shipyards themselves did nothing to reduce the output of U-boats. Moreover, U-boats that had been sunk could be raised and repaired within a short time. The reduction in output, due to damage inflicted on the yards, would be about 10 percent.

(b) By bombing of the electrical industry, which was responsible for manufacturing the electric motors, and of the factories manufacturing batteries. Both types of products constituted particular bottlenecks because the new U-boats required triple the quantity of equipment per boat. The factories in Hagen and Vienna manufacturing accumulator batteries were destroyed, and Posen was lost to us, but the largest accumulator factory (Aafa), at Hannover remained intact. If the last-named factory had been destroyed, the construction of U-boats would have had to be abandoned four
weeks later
.

Submarine Construction Plant



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