Nevertheless Gen Milch, Gen Koller, and Gen Galland believed that until late in 1944 supplies of new aircraft were always more than sufficient for the number of aircrews available, but this state of affairs is probably to be attributed rather to the relatively inadequate influx of crews resulting from an unsatisfactory training program than to a superfluity of aircraft. In the last months of 1944, the increased output of the industry was making itself felt and drastic measures were taken to increase the supply of crews, but by this time the lack of fuel resulting from attacks on the oil industry had begun to render these matters of purely academic interest.
The manufacture of the ME-262 components was said to have suffered relatively little from bombing attacks, thanks to the efficient dispersal policy adopted in the case of this type. Raids on the final assembly plants proved very effective and Gen Galland quoted in this connection the destruction of some 30 machines during a low-level attack on Memmingen. On the other hand, although the immediate results of such raids were spectacular, the loss of output was rapidly made good. All the present Prisoners of War (Generalleutnant Galland and General der Flieger Koller supplement the remarks of Generalfeldmarschall Milch) expressed the opinion that the attacks on the airframe factories were not of decisive importance, but that considerably more damage would have been caused if the aero-engine plants had been bombed earlier and more constantly. In support of this view, it was pointed out that the aero-engine industry was considered to be more vulnerable than airframe manufacture on account of the extent and nature of the equipment required. Gen Milch also claimed that when effective raids on the aero-engine plants were eventually made, the industry was in the process of changing over to the production of new types, the manufacture of which had already been transferred to dispersal sites. In this way, before decisive damage, was done to the Junker’s manufacturing complex, the production of the Jumo 213 had already been evacuated from the main factories and it was only Jumo 211 production, which in any case was on the decline, which was affected.
The loss of the Jumo 211 output was in itself of little importance, since at this time ample reserves of this type of engine were available, the total stocks of all types amounting to between 2000 and 6000, and the results of the attacks were therefore not felt in operations. In conclusion, all Prisoners of War have agreed the aircraft industry as a whole was finally and decisively crippled by the collapse of transport facilities as a result of attacks on communications and fuel targets, a development which reduced the dispersal factories to impotence. A member of the General Quartiermeister’s staff has stated in this connection by the end of 1944 transit times on the railways might be anything between six and eight weeks, and from January 1944 onwards it was impossible to dispatch single trucks, as only complete trains could be worked through. In March, on the eve of the final collapse, the transport was brought to a complete standstill by the Allied attacks, and 2000 trains loaded with Luftwaffe material were ‘frozen’ in various parts of the Reich. Road transport, which had formerly been relied upon in cases of emergency, was naturally out of the question at this time in view of the desperate fuel shortage.
Effects of Attacks on the Ball-Bearing Industry
Quoting from memory, Gen Milch estimated that the bombing of the ball-bearing industry reduced the total production of all types of ball bearings from 11 to 12 million per month to about half of this quantity, but that output was rapidly restored to an average of about 9 million. The effects on the aircraft industry were not particularly serious, since it was possible to find substitutes for about 60 percent of the ball bearings which it had hitherto used. The greatest economy was naturally affected in the case of airframes, where Gen Milch opined that the extensive employment of ball bearings was attributable less to necessity than to skillful propaganda on the part of the manufacturers. Large-scale substitution in the aero-engine industry was impossible, but the position was eased by the possession of very large stocks, notably in one store in the Magdeburg Area which itself contained sufficient supplies of all types to last for several months. Thanks to the existence of these stocks and to the rapid recovery of the ball-bearings industry itself, the aircraft manufacturers were never seriously threatened by a cessation of supplies, although temporary difficulties may have occurred.
June 28, 1945.
Additional opinions on Allied Air Power have been expressed by the following German Officers captured in Italy: General der Panzertruppen Fridolin von Senger, Commanding General XIV Panzer Corps; Major Frank Neubert, operations officer of the Luftwaffe General Staff in Italy; Major Bertelsmann, Army Staff Officer on the Staff of the Supreme German Commander Southwest; General Heinrich von Vietinghoff; Colonel Heggeweiner, liaison officer on the staff of Marshal Graziani; Engineer Anderle, an engineer with Rhein Metal Borsig, Berlin/Tegel from 1940-1945. Worked on armament for fighters and bombers. Kapitan zur See Karl von Kutzleben, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief West. Colonel Kurt Gottschling, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe in Italy.
Major Frank Neubert
(a) The greatest single cause of the German collapse was the Allied strategic bombing of the fuel industry. Before the loss of the Rumanian oil fields, we already knew that the offensive possibilities of the German Army and Luftwaffe were over. Preparations were made to produce enough synthetic fuel to put on a very effective defensive strategy. Synthetic fuel plants were moved underground (a very difficult process). In March 1944, we were producing 185.000 tons of synthetic fuel, the high point of German synthetic oil production. The General Staff estimated that this tonnage was sufficient to wage a very successful defensive aerial war; allotting sufficient fuel for the needs of the Army and allowing a generous tonnage to carry out the Luftwaffe’s training program. The synthetic fuel plants, Leuna, Moosbierbaum, and Politz were of the utmost importance to us. To defend these vital areas from aerial attacks these key points of Germany’s mainstay were well defended by heavy and light AA installations, by effective smoke screening, balloon barrages, and camouflage.
The main installation of these plants received a heavy protective coat of armor (reinforced concrete). However, your successful bombing strategy and your methods of attack reduced our fuel output, so that in October and November 1944, we were producing only 3000 tons. Fighting against overwhelming odds, we were able to climb back to 17.000 to 18.000 and 20.000 tons in January and February 1945. In March 1945 we were barely producing 1000 tons. The attempt to insure a constant source of synthetic fuel was a battle against daily increasing odds. The greatest skill, ingenuity, and persistence were called into play. Where you required one man to bring the fuel to your army we needed six. The conversion of breweries, small shops, and the tremendous obstacles of underground locations whipped our industrialists and workers into a frenzy of energy. Only the strength of desperation enabled us to bring the coal to the plants and as time went on and the crescendo of destruction increased with each new raid, all our efforts were blown to bits.
(b) Attacks on the aircraft industry: Compared to the successful Allied bombing of the fuel industry, the bombing of our aircraft plants cannot be considered as having been as effective. We estimated that 18 percent of our aircraft industry failed. We were confronted with insurmountable difficulties moving the industry underground, using every available workshop, no matter how small, and every garage to produce parts. Replacement of workers, moving and housing the workers, difficulties with our foreign laborers, transportation difficulties, and securing the alloys and other materials which go into an aircraft were but a few of our Gargantuan tasks. In this respect your strategic bombing program was of course successful; you forced us to the limits of our endurance, ability, and energies, and had it not been that we were fighting a desperate, fanatically defensive war, our aircraft industry could never have overcome your bombings.
Major Bertelsmann
(a) The concentrated Allied bombing of our fuel industry was very effective and probably lost the war for us. Without fuel, the Luftwaffe was grounded most of the time, the training program was drastically curtailed, your superior Allied Air Forces had supremacy of the skies, and you controlled the sea and land. The Luftwaffe, unable to move against you, cringed in hiding. The development of your radar-equipped aircraft greatly restricted the operations of our U-boats. Our tanks were helpless without air cover, and our troops, on foot, could only move under the cover of darkness for we lacked the necessary fuel to transport them. (b) The aircraft industry of course was badly damaged, but somehow we managed. It was a tremendous task to assemble the parts from the widely dispersed locations where they were being made due to transportation difficulties and loss of time.
Oberst Heggenweiner
Without strategic bombing of our gasoline and A/C industries it is doubtful whether you could have won the war; certainly, you could have won only after a very long struggle and tremendous personnel and material loss. If our gasoline and A/C industries had gone underground sooner, the entire course of the war might have been different. On the whole, your raids against the gasoline industry were more disastrous for Germany than those against A/C factories. Toward the end of the war, there were many aircraft grounded because of the shortage of fuel.
Engineer Anderle
In my opinion your raids against the aircraft industry were too scattered; they should have been more heavily concentrated than they were. Striking at the source of power would have been the best way to knock out the aircraft industry; you should have aimed at more electric power plants and transformers.
Kapitän zur See von Kutzleben
In the fall of 1944, the oil shortage first became really acute. All during the war, the navy had tried to keep its gasoline consumption to a minimum, but at this point, the shortage was felt by all branches of the Wehrmacht. Though the loss of the Rumanian oil fields undoubtedly played a part, the primary reason for the shortage was the Allied strategic bombing of oil refineries and synthetic oil plants, as the value of the Ploesti oil fields had been diminished through air attacks against the wells and transportation.
Colonel Gottschling
The Luftwaffe program was very much handicapped by the scarcity of fuel. Our aircraft were often grounded because there was not enough fuel available to continue the training of pilots. As the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I could not even make a trip by car. My Staff consisted of 120 officers. Forty of these officers, whose duties consisted of visiting various units, were obliged to thumb their way. Almost daily, we phoned Berlin and requested the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) to send fuel. We always received the same reply: ‘The bottles are empty. In my opinion, there is no doubt that the paralysis of the German fuel industry was complete. This paralysis of the fuel industry not only affected the Luftwaffe but the supply of vital materials. The entire transportation system was, of course, affected. Transportation suffered not only on account of fuel shortage, but your bombing of railroads and bridges made it even worse. There was, for instance, a pronounced lack of munitions. Formerly each AA battery was allotted 3000 rounds per day; towards the end, only 1500 rounds or less were allotted to each battery, so I must add that you not only paralyzed the fuel industry but also some of our other industries and railroads.
Invasion of the European Continent
General von Senger
Provided the land and naval forces of the invading power are overwhelming in numbers and firepower any invasion is possible. At Anzio, air power was less effective than the naval artillery fire, which could be concealed by smoke screens and meanwhile lay a concentrated and overwhelming barrage on our positions. Furthermore, an invasion can be successful without air attacks against the forces of the defending power. Against an army as poor as the Italian, you might conceivably have won with purely naval superiority.
Major Neubert
The invasion of Normandy, France was always possible but not for long. We would have thrown you back into the sea, and there would not have been a Dunkirk this time if we had had an air force. Your strategic bombing of our lines of communications and transportation resulted in our being unable to move our reserves in time and prevented our troops from ever coming into effective tactical deployment against your forces. Your Air Force attacks stopped our flow of supplies, and troop movements during the day were made impossible. Without this strategic bombing of our lines of communications and transportation, without your gigantic aerial coverage of the landings of your troops, your invasion ships and barges would have been sunk or driven out to sea, and the invasion would have been a dismal failure.
Mahor Bertelsmann
Without the Allied aerial activity directed against our lines of communications and transportation before and during the invasion of France, the invasion might not have been successful. The Allied air armada covering your troops and protecting your ships, boats, and barges during the first stages of the invasion was highly successful. We had 40 (not all motorized) reserve divisions in strategic positions, in readiness in France. Your effective bombing of the road nets, transportation, and lines of supply made it impossible for us to move our troops rapidly, if at all. Besides that, we were expecting another landing of your invasion forces. The Atlantic Wall was a myth; it ought to have been erected 10 miles farther inland. Through your recce aircraft, you knew all of the details of this much-propagandized barrier. Your aircraft smashed all troops which we tried to bring up. Without your strategic and tactical use of your air forces, the invasion would never have succeeded.
Kapitän zur See von Kutzleben
You could undoubtedly have landed on the continent, but it is highly doubtful that you could have remained there if our transportation system had not been shattered. Any landing is possible; the problem is moving reserves and material at the right moment to the right place. Both in Italy and in France, the roads and railroads were so constantly under air attack that we could not rush our reserves to the front.
Oberst Gottschling
The landing of troops could not have taken place without your air cover, without your strategic bombings of our transportation and lines of communication. You knocked out the bridges and we were unable to move troops to vital areas during the day. Our Atlantic Wall was situated too near the coast. We should have built three or four more defense lines. No troop commanders realized the value of air-supported ground troops as the German COs did. Our troops were spoiled by previous air-supported undertakings. The absence of our Luftwaffe, plus the overwhelming aerial might that the Allies had at their command before and during the invasion period, won the war for you. Seventy-five percent of the success of the invasion is due to the Allied Air Forces preparing the groundwork for the invasion.
The Role of Air Power
General von Senger
Allied aerial might was the deciding weapon in this war. At the end of the war, the Allied Air Forces were able to operate almost at will. On the other hand, it was a mistake to imagine that the war was won entirely by air power. To overestimate the importance of air power might be as disastrous for the Allies in some future war as our over-estimation of the tank to us in this war. You will recall what von Clausewitz writes concerning cavalry. You cannot imagine a war being fought without infantry and artillery, but you can imagine a war waged without cavalry. Cavalry is a shock weapon and in a war between an army with cavalry and an army without cavalry, the war might easily be determined by cavalry. If one side develops a new type of shock weapon, then the same shock weapon must be developed by the opposing power. Superiority in these shock weapons may be a decisive factor in wars or battles until the development of another shock weapon of greater effectiveness. Only once in history was cavalry actually the decisive factor. Frederick the Great introduced the galloping attack, a new type of shock action that defeated his enemies who had not yet developed a similar tactical concept. History repeated itself, with the use of our tanks in Poland and France. Likewise, in Ethiopia, with the opposition to a mechanized power with primitive military tactics.
In this war, Allied air power was the shock weapon that determined the outcome of action on the ground, but the concept of victory through air power alone, certainly on the tactical plane, is erroneous. Air power increased the power of your ground and naval forces five or six times. Had we had fighters to attack your Jabos (Fighter Bombers) at the center of gravity, in land combat, had we possessed planes to attack your naval artillery and aircraft carriers, your victory would have been won at a much greater cost. We lacked this great third branch of warfare, the Air arm. We were like the Ethiopians trying to fight the mechanized Italian Army.
The best way to defeat a nation wholly and completely is by the combined action of the three branches—air, ground, and naval. In the last stages of the war, Allied air power was overwhelming against all phases of the German military and industrial machine, but this overwhelming air superiority was due to the effective cooperation of all branches of the Allied forces. Our theory of over-running a nation with one strong arm, a tank force that succeeded in the earlier stages of the war, failed in the presence of Allied air superiority so air power will fail in the future if it is considered the sole weapon for victory. Hitler’s idea not to abandon ground easily was in a sense much more modern than that of his generals; he hoped by preventing the advancement of Allied air bases toward the German boundaries stave off the complete subjection of the German Homeland to Allied air might. That he failed is not the sole achievement of the air forces, but of the combined action of services that secured these air bases.
