III. What Is Air Power
An Air Power must engender an Air Force whose extent and technical development enable it in wartime to assume the burden of the conduct of the war. The task of completing or securing the successes achieved by an Air Force then falls upon the land and naval forces. The strength that makes up Air Power lies not so much in the quantity of aircraft which exist at any given time, but rather in the aircraft construction potential, industrial capacity, raw materials, and strategic reserves. It is furthermore not as decisive to an Air Force as to land forces, how many soldiers are available for military service, but more important that there is a smooth coordination of all the numerous air-force producing components such as economic energy, industrial capacity, raw materials for fuel and construction, scientific knowledge, technical experimenting, weapons, training (all of which are indispensable for the creation of a modern Air Force).
The creation of an Air Force by an Air Power depends upon a steady and continuous production program as laid down by technical and military planning. Without these conditions it is impossible to create an Air Force in a short space of time and when the ideal condition exists it furthermore becomes impossible for a coalition of smaller powers to overcome the initial advantages of such a program. Air Power is not only dependent on the willingness of the people to make personal sacrifices but also on the possession of great material surpluses.
IV. The Independence of the Air Force
The Air Forces in this war proved their effectiveness and independence of the land and sea forces. The full development of its numerous possibilities was demonstrated by its planned cooperation with the other branches. In the future an Air Force will operate not only as the most important factor in a large operation, but also as an independent and dominating element. This development excludes the possibility of an Air Force being used in mere supporting roles to the other branches, and in this age, control of the air being the decisive factor in a war, makes an Air Force the most important component of any nation’s striking power. This development is particularly obvious for war at sea, which is mainly fought in the air. That has been demonstrated in the war against Japan where the Navy was used principally as a transport service for Air Power where it was needed.
The Air Force, as the heart of a great power, must be independent in command and development and the Navy and Army are destined to play secondary roles in the conduct of wars. The High Command must retain control over all operations of ground, naval, and air forces and since the burden of decisive action falls on the conduct of air warfare its control must lie with the best brains, willing to accept the greatest responsibilities.
August 8, 1945. The following information was obtained from Major Karl-Heinrich ‘Heinz’ Hoefer, a German Luftwaffe pilot of considerable distinction. It represents some of his impressions of the effect of the Allied air effort on the Luftwaffe production and operations programs. Hoefer had been assigned an important role in working out the Luftwaffe ‘jet program’ and was therefore in a position to know the difficulties encountered by the Luftwaffe program makers due to Allied air bombing.
One of the causes of our complete defeat was our failure to produce a defensive Luftwaffe in time. Instead of building fighter aircraft, we kept on producing bombers, which as it turned out was senseless because eventually, the destruction of our fuel industries prevented the bombers from flying. Then, we had no fighter force capable of effectively intercepting the heavy bomber formations which the Allies sent over day and night.
Effects of Allied Bombing
on the German Aircraft Industries
on the German Transportation Systems
and ineffective Countermeasures with Jet Aircraft.
The dispersal of fighter aircraft factories was seriously undertaken early in 1943. This program was carried out efficiently and effectively and production was kept at fairly high levels, but continual attacks on our transportation systems eventually made it exceedingly difficult to transport materials to the assembly and finishing plants. Obtaining the needed components at the right time was often impossible.
One disastrous effect on the German war effort resulting from this disruption of the transportation system was the hindrance to ME-262, Arado-234 and the Volksjaeger (ME 162) production. An ambitious production program had been worked out to reach the following figures by August 1945: 3000 ME-162 per month; 1200 ME-262 per month; 400 2 and 4-engine Arado-234s per month. Since components could not reach the assembly lines, the accelerating program for the previous months never even reached the halfway mark. There would furthermore have been no fuel problem for these types as they operate on a simple synthetic type of fuel which is easy to manufacture. Instead, we had a Luftwaffe which was dependent upon fuel supplies that were being wiped out by Allied bombing and we were thus caught in a vicious circle of destruction from which there was no escape except through cessation of Allied bombing.
Our activity with the ME-262 aircraft which we managed to build was considerably restricted by air attacks over the bases where these units were based. A good take-off is essential for the ME-262 and this was often prevented by Allied fighter activity over or in the vicinity of fields where they were based. Considerable ME-262 losses were also incurred on the ground by Allied bomb carpet procedures, especially in the areas around Osnabrück and Neuburg.
Effect of Fuel Shortage
An example of the confusion caused by the destruction of our fuel supplies is provided by the experience of Fliegerkorps IV. This Fliegerkorps normally consisted of bomber, fighter and miscellaneous units and in 1944 was changed to a complete Fighter Corps. The Commander was the well known Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz. For this program he received five complete bombers Geschwadern (Wings), to be retrained and re-schooled to conventional fighters with approximately 1000 crews. The conversion to jet units was to be piecemeal, one Geschwader following another starting in the Spring of 1945 and the entire Fighter force entering combat in July 1945. From the beginning, the training program suffered because of fuel shortages and in August 1944, the IV Fliegerkorps and its units were broken up completely because there was no more fuel available for them.
Cumulative Effects of Allied Air Blows
They destroyed the German armament industries. They caused such a great loss of working hours that the industries could not meet their production quotas. They caused a great loss of important skilled labor which, because of the destruction wrought by the bombs, had to be drawn from their regular tasks to rebuild the bombed-out industries. In the same way, many who could and should have been soldiers fighting at the front were lost to the German Army. The stoppage of traffic and destruction of the transportation system was so complete that after April 1944, even small trips in many areas could not be made without interruptions.
The fighter bomber attacks were especially effective against transportation lines. There arose a paralytic delay to troop movements in the French Theater, both before and particularly after the invasion. The Allied Air Forces played a great part in the breakthrough of the German lines by Allied ground troops. Even the bravest soldiers cannot hold out indefinitely under the constant bombardment such as was laid down by the Allied Air Forces. German soldiers have often told me of the shattering effects of continuous exposure to air bombardment.
The demoralizing effect of Allied air attacks upon the people of Germany increased with ever greater rapidity after July 1944. The speech in which President Roosevelt said: ‘America will build so many aircraft that the skies over Germany will be black’ made a great impression on the German soldier and provided a special topic of conversation in the German Luftwaffe circles. To our dismay, the threat materialized.
Luftwaffe Oil Supplies
August 13, 1945
The information on the Luftwaffe oil supplies during the war contained in this report has been obtained from the interrogation of the following Prisoners of War: Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, General Inspekteur of the Luftwaffe until February 1945, and Generalluftzeumeister until the summer of 1944; General der Flieger Karl Koller, head of the operations staff of the OKL (Ober Kommando der Luftwaffe) until November 1944 and thereafter chief of the German Air Staff. Generalleutnant Adolf Galland, inspector of fighters until the autumn of 1944; Generalleutnant Heinrich Kreipe, AOC flying training during the twelve months ending July 1944 and thereafter head of the Luftkriegsakademie; Oberst Wolfgang Ruhsert, head of the operations section of the Reichsverteidigung until April 1944 and later head of Abteilung 2 of the Generalquartiermeister’s department. Professor Heinrich Steinmann, professor of Energiewissenschaft at the Berliner Hochschule, consulting engineer to the Luftwaffe, and from July 1944 onwards head of the Luftwaffe Technische Verwaltung. Between them, prisoners of war were able to provide a general account of the development of the oil supply situation in the Luftwaffe in so far as they had been able to observe it in their particular spheres of activity and to give their own views regarding the influence of oil on German general strategy.
Period May 1944 – May 1945
The first really serious crisis in German oil supplies was said to have commenced in May 1944 with the beginning of the Allied air attacks on the synthetic oil plants. Up to this date, difficulties had been experienced, but none had proved insuperable although the more far-sighted leaders, to whom Generalfeldmarschall Milch naturally claims to have belonged, had for long been dreading an assault on the synthetic industry. Some of the effects of the attacks on the German oil industry between May and November 1944 may be seen in the OKW production statistics. It will be noted that the receipts of aviation spirit, some 90 percent of which was said to come from the synthetic plants, fell from 150.000 tons in May to 52.000 tons in June, and 7.000 tons in September. In October and November a slight recovery was made to 18.700 and 39.200 tons respectively.
With such a disastrous slump in production, the stocks on hand naturally dwindled rapidly, and between May and November, the OKW reserve of aircraft fuel was reduced from 107.000 tons to 30.000 tons, while the Fuehrer’s reserve, which had stood at 207.000 tons at the end of May, appears to have been exhausted by November. It was stated that when the attacks on the oil industry commenced, the stocks held by the Luftwaffe were sufficient to cover approximately three months of maximum effort. As a consequence, the full severity of the crisis was felt from about August onwards, when drastic measures had to be taken in order to affect the necessary economies.
Training was once more severely curtailed, and it was stated that the shortage of petrol was also one of the causes leading to the disbanding of the bomber units which were broken up about this time. Operations were also adversely influenced, in that night fighter sorties had to be cut down in order to permit of as many daylight operations as possible with the fuel available. Even so, by February 1945 day-fighter sorties also had to be restricted to days when it appeared that conditions were most favorable for interceptions. As a result of the fuel shortage in the autumn of 1944, the Luftwaffe was therefore unable to derive any advantage from the fact that its first-line strength had reached a pack that had never before been attained during the course of the war. In November 1944 the supply position became even tighter for a time owing to the assembly of stocks for operations associated with the Ardennes Offensive, but thereafter the position eased somewhat owing to the reduction in operations consequent on bad weather conditions. By February 1945, the Luftwaffe fuel situation was desperate, although in the following month a certain alleviation was made possible by the blending of 23.000 tons of iso-octane stocks with motor transport fuel. This was a measure that it would have been impossible to repeat on any considerable scale, as the iso-octane thus used represented the bulk of the remaining stocks of this type.
North African Campaign
It was generally agreed that the ultimate failure of the Axis North African Campaign was due to the impossibility of maintaining supplies and replacements of all types for the troops in this theater, and Milch was emphatic that it was the breakdown of oil supplies which played the predominant part in the debacle. The most important cause of this breakdown was said to have been the sinking of tankers by air attack, and Milch was of the opinion that tanker losses resulting from attacks by surface vessels and submarines were less serious. In this connection due tribute was paid to the role played by Malta which the Luftwaffe had been unable to neutralize even at the cost of large numbers of aircrew personnel or irreplaceable skill and experience.
France
After the Normandy landings had been made, it proved impossible to bring in any considerable supplies of aviation spirit from Germany owing to the damage caused to communications by Allied air attacks. It transpired, however, that no serious shortages developed during the first two or three months, partly owing to the heavy losses in aircraft and partly to the fact that as the Germans retreated it proved possible to evacuate a respectable proportion of the fuel supplies of forward airfields to bases further in the rear.
Effects of Oil Shortage on Flying Training
Allocations
When the Luftwaffe supplies of aviation spirit were reduced, the first effects were always felt by the German flying training schools, and the cuts made in this way were rarely fully restored when the oil situation became easier. The natural result of this policy was that in the end, the supply of adequately trained aircrew personnel would have proved insufficient to maintain a normal level of effort if the supplies of aircraft and fuel had remained normal. In June 1943, when Generalleutnant Heinrich Kreipe was put in charge of training, he stipulated before taking over the post that he must be assured of a monthly allocation of 50.000 tons of aviation spirit in order to carry out his duties adequately. He was actually granted an average of 30.000 to 35.000 tons per month until the autumn and in fact, he was able to carry out the prescribed program with this amount.
In August 1944, when the full effects of the losses of sources of supply began to be felt, the fuel quota available for flying training was reduced once more, and in the following month, it amounted to only 20.000 tons. From the end of September onwards, the supplies underwent a catastrophic decline, and by the end of the year, they had fallen to negligible quantities so training came almost to a standstill.
Synthetic Oil Plants
General Milch stated that the construction of the large synthetic oil plants commenced in 1936 as part of the 4-year plan. The professed aim was to enable Germany to become self-sufficient as regards liquid fuel supplies, but he was of the opinion that in peacetime it was not in fact intended to use these plants as the main source of supply but to maintain them as a reserve source of production to meet wartime needs. The total planned synthetic output when all the projected plants were in operation was said to have been 700.000 tons per month, of which in time of war 250.000 tons were to consist of aviation spirit for the Luftwaffe, 150.000 tons were to be allotted to the Kriegsmarine and 300.000 tons were to consist of motor transport fuel for the Army and civilian use.
It was intended that this product should be attained by the end of 1943 and, according to Milch, together with the other sources open to Germany at this time, it would have been sufficient to permit her to maintain her war effort although not to build up any considerable reserves. Prisoners of war claimed that immediately prior to the beginning of the heavy Allied attacks on the synthetic industry in the spring of 1944, an actual output of 540.000 tons a month had been achieved, including approximately 180.000 tons of aviation spirit, 100.000 tons of oil for the Kriegsmarine, and 260.000 tons of motor transport fuel. At this time the synthetic output was still rising and had not yet reached its peak as the plants at Oswiecim (Auschwitz) and Blechhammer, which were the last of the projected chain of factories, had still to come into serious production.
Although his views may be prompted only by wisdom after the event, Professor Steinmann claims that he strongly opposed the original project of building large synthetic oil plants and, according to his story, even so early as 1936 he pointed out their vulnerability to air attack and pressed for the construction of small dispersed units each producing about 150 tons daily. This proposition was said to have been rejected on account of the cost of manufacture, which was reckoned at about 27 Pf (German Pfennig) per liter, as compared with an estimated cost of 18-23 Pf in the larger type of manufacturing unit. General Koller also reported that early in 1944 the Luftwaffe, being acutely conscious of its dependence on the synthetic output and the difficulty it would experience in defending the plants against the growing weight of air attack, made urgent requests for the dispersal of the factories.
In spite of the recognition of the potential menace represented by Allied attacks, the actual work of dispersal only began after May 1944. None of the present Prisoners of War had any reliable knowledge of the measures taken except that they involved the dispersal of the industry into small units, the speediest possible repair measures in the case of damaged plants, and the speeding up of construction work at the unfinished factories. General Milch stated that he and Albert Speer consulted all competent authorities on the possibility of locating synthetic plants in underground sites, but that the difficulties involved were declared to be insuperable. Professor Steinmann, however, reported that from October 1944 onward the SS were engaged in projects for underground plants in the Nordhausen and the Porta Westfalica areas, and that it was believed that the ventilation problem had been overcome and that some system for reducing the working pressure had been evolved.
Effects of Air Attacks on the Aircraft Industry
and ball-Bearings Industry, Sep 1939 – April 1945
June 21, 1945
The majority of the following information was obtained from Generalfeldmarschall Milch, Staatssekretaer der Luftfahrt, Generalinspekteur of the Luftwaffe until February 1945, and Generalluftzeugmeister from December 1941 until June 1944. Some further information of a more general nature was also supplied by Generalleutnant Galland, General der Jagdflieger, and General der Flieger Koller, Chief of the German Luftwaffe Staff.
Effects of Air Attacks on the Aircraft Industry
The attacks on the German aircraft industry developed at a period when the dispersal program (well underway by the summer of 1943) was in course of execution but was not yet completed, and it was agreed that considerable damage was inflicted. The most obvious effect of the raids was to be seen in the losses suffered among aircraft in the final stages of construction, and among finished machines on the airfields adjoining final assembly plants, where a bottleneck often developed as a result of the interruption of test-flying by bad weather conditions. It was considered, however, that although the output may have suffered immediately after a raid on a given factory or factories, production was very rapidly restored if the raid was not repeated within a short time, and therefore on average the monthly output of fighter aircraft of all types, which was running at between 1000 and 1100 machines per month in July 1943, was not actually reduced between that date and the following March.
On the other hand, as a result of the Allied attacks it was impossible to bring about the planned expansion in production, which included an increase of 100 to 150 fighter machines per month, thus holding down production to the pre-July 1943 level the Allies were credited by Milch with having deprived the Reich of some 4000 fighter types which would otherwise have been manufactured. Generalleutnant Dietrich von Criegern, Chief of the Luftwaffe Supply until June 1941 and thereafter Luftwaffe Quartermaster-General, has stated that the loss of finished machines frequently caused serious concern to his department, which was responsible for the allocation within the Luftwaffe of aircraft received from industry. This Prisoner of War was also of the opinion that there was at one time during the period of the Allied attacks a definite shortage of fighter types for distribution.
