Sub Hunters Over the Bay of Biscay

Bombing and Defense of Submarine Pens

On the other hand, Allied strategic bombing of submarine construction yards was not very effective. A few submarines were, of course, destroyed or badly damaged, but no appreciable effect on the total submarine war was felt. Many of these raids were night bombings which missed some of the vital spots, and the resumption of submarine construction could be undertaken relatively quickly. I was in Le Havre early in June 1944 and witnessed one of the first Allied raids with the new 6-ton bomb. These bombs crashed through a 3.5 meter reinforced concrete roof in the submarine pens. At that time, however, no U-boats were in the pens. I had intended to keep my small one-man submarines in these pens when they arrived, but because of the damage, this was impossible. At St Nazaire and Lorient, the 6-ton bombs did not pierce the roofs of the submarine pens, but we were forced to add three meters of concrete to the original thickness of 7 meters.

We were very much afraid of ricochet bombing attacks launched by low flying aircraft against the submarine pens and the outer locks on the French Canal and the Dutch Canal. We constantly expected such attacks which would have proved highly disastrous, and we were surprised that the Allies did not launch them. However, our antiaircraft defense of such installations was most elaborate. At a distance of 100 meters in front of the submarine pens or locks we set up lines of steel cable, to block low-flying aircraft. In the channel leading up to the pens or locks, we planted water mines at distances of approximately 100 meters. These mines could be detonated by remote control on the approach of aircraft. The columns of water would theoretically shoot up to a height of 200 to 300 meters. The diameter of these gigantic columns at their greatest density would be 50 to 80 meters, and, of course, the total thickness of the column of water was even greater. A flight of 3 low-flying aircraft flying simultaneously against us could have been destroyed by one of these columns.

Fifth Army, Italy. Captured German 'one man submarine' converted from an ordinary torpedo from which the war head has been removed and a control cockpit substituted. Beneath this is fastened a regulation torpedo which can be released at a target and the 'one man submarine' returns. This one landed on Anzio beachhead where the 17 year old Nazi pilot was captured. In middle of removal operations the torpedo air chamber opens and the propeller starts spraying water all over the duck

One-Man Submarines

At the mouth of the Orne River in France, I used my small one-man submarines, as a surprise weapon against Allied steamships. These submarines carried one torpedo, which they released at 300 to 400 meters from the target. In all, 120.000 to 150.000 tons of Allied shipping were sunk in these operations. The largest number of these submarines I ever employed in one operation was 60. These submarines used a plexi-glass hood instead of a periscope, and accordingly could be used only under cover of darkness, from around 11 or 12 o’clock at night until dawn. Otherwise at least twice as many Allied ships would have been sunk. Frequently day broke before my one-man submarines had returned and Allied fighters strafed them on the way back to the mouth of the Orne River.

Of the submarines I sent out, I recovered only 10 or 15 percent. Approximately 200 small submarines were lost through Allied strafing attacks. I have seen at one time as many as 50 to 100 fighters circling the bay like hawks hunting for these submarines. They were very persistent. Once they mistook a wreck caught in a strong current for a submarine wake, and attacked and reattacked it for a half hour.

E Boats

In Italy, the fuel shortage was so acute that we were forced to plan our Sprengboot (small attack boat) attacks long before they occurred, in order that we could have the necessary fuel on hand. To present their detection by air recce, we avoided basing them in the coastal cities such as Venice, and stationed them, as a rule, in the interior, in the Padua Region. The simple preliminary operations of moving them down to the sea for attacks were frequently impossible because they required more fuel than we could obtain. In the last days of the war, we were supposed to remove the 60 or 80 remaining Sprengboote to Monfalcone. Lacking sufficient fuel for the movement, however, we were compelled to destroy them near Bellune.

German One Man Midget Sub

Training

From about the middle of 1943 to the middle of 1944, I was director of naval AA training. During that time we were constantly handicapped by the lack of sufficiently high-speed aircraft. All along, I had wanted planes capable of flying 300 to 400 KMH. Instead, I received a W-33, with a top speed of 150 KMH. Against the wind, which was often the case, it couldn’t go faster than 80 KMH. Sometimes I managed to get an old worn-out ME 109. The effect of using these old types of targets, so different from what our students could expect to encounter in actual operations, could be clearly seen in our operational results. Increasing Allied air superiority intensified the necessity for naval flak in the following order: a. U-boat flak; b. Ship flak—which was less urgent; c. Coastal flak. U-boat flak was the most badly needed of all. For a long time, we had suggested to Doenitz that he should equip his U-boats with flak, but he refused flatly. He felt that the best defense against air attack was to submerge. It was not until 1943 that he gave in. We felt that after systematic training, the use of U-boat flak was successful. Every 3 days, 10 U-boats came in for training courses ranging from 3 days to 4 weeks. Generally, a U-boat commander returned from operations to claim at least one or two aircraft downed on his trip. Independent of the number of Allied losses in aircraft, the very threat of U-boat flak was effective, as its chief purpose was to prevent surprise attacks by air when caught on the surface, and to force the attacking aircraft to circle widely before launching the attack, thus giving the U-boat time to submerge.

Effects of Strategic Bombing

My personal opinion is that German industry and transportation were badly crippled by Allied air power. Frequently, boats and equipment I had ordered could not be delivered because a few small, but essential parts were lacking. We felt acutely the shortage of parts for our Funk Mess Gerate (Radar Equipment). The most critical shortage was radio tubes, which we had hitherto obtained largely from firms in the Berlin area. You can’t imagine what day-in and day-out night-and-day bombing attacks can do to a people materially and spiritually. Air superiority is everything. We began the war with air superiority and were successful because of it. In the end, the whole situation was reversed. The same thing is true of Japan. Japan should have been able to profit by our example to have seen how air power strikes at the very nerve centers of the people and national life. Japan has had what we did not have—time to develop a counter weapon. In this respect, Japan, like Germany, has failed.

German Submarine resting at the bottom of the sea - probably with the crew inside

Effects of the United States Strategic and Tactical Air Power
June 12, 1945

The information was obtained from the following German officers on the staff of General Feldmarschal Gerd von Rundstedt; Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann, G3 of C-in-C West; General der Kavalerie Siegfried Westfal, CoS West; Oberst John, G4 of C-in-C West.

The routine demands for fuel before the Normandy invasion were 800 to 1000 cubic meters and were expected to rise after the landing to about 3000 cubic meters. The strategic reserves were concentrated in three large surface dumps at Paris-Argenteuil, Bordeaux, and Lyon. When Oberst John assumed his duties as G-4, C-in-C West, at the end of July, he discovered to his dismay that nothing had been done about changing the location of the dumps. He at once ordered the Argenteuil Dump to be moved into the Metro Tunnels of Paris. But when the Allied Air Force struck on 2 August, the dumps at Bordeaux and Lyon were completely destroyed at a total loss of 7000 cubic meters or two-thirds of the strategic reserves. But the fuel dumps in and near the invasion area were decentralized to lessen the damage caused by air attacks.

Heavy attacks on railroad and road transport were also anticipated. Movements would be delayed, and in order to reduce them to a minimum it was proposed that a large number of railroad repair gangs should be formed from Organization Todt workers. They were to be stationed along the main railroad lines ready for instantaneous commitment. A memorandum elaborating these ideas was submitted by Generalmajor Erich Hampe General and John, but it was disregarded. In spite of the devastating blows struck by the Allied Air Force against railroad and road transport, it was possible to send fuel trains from the Paris area to Normandy.

Due to desperate efforts which had to be repeated constantly, it was possible to reopen from time to time the following lines: Paris-Lisieux, Paris-Rennes, and Paris-Caen. The trains, carrying about 450 cubic meters of fuel, left the Paris area at nightfall and arrived at their destination before daybreak. They were unloaded immediately and returned the following night if the lines were still open. This was a deviation from the policy established before the invasion. When it became apparent that Allied fighter bombers concentrated their attacks on trains, ordinarily hauling 600 to 700 cubic meters of fuel, it was decided that only freight trains carrying a variety of supplies would be run. Thus no train carried more than 200-300 cubic meters of fuel. This was done much against the wishes of the Feld Transport Abt, which wished to shirk the additional work caused by the handling of mixed freight trains. Another means of protecting fuel transport by rail was to camouflage tank cars as box cars. This, however, was never done to an appreciable extent. In spite of all successful improvisations, supplying the front with fuel remained a grave problem.

Railroad Destroyed in Cologne

Westphal, Zimmermann, and John agreed that the problem was caused not so much by shortages as by the growing deterioration of the transportation system. Not only the operations in Normandy but also succeeding phases of the campaign were hampered not so much by a lack of fuel as by the destruction of railroad and road communications.

Rail Transport

G-3 is of the opinion that the attacks on the French railroad system prior to and during the invasion were of decisive importance for the success of the Allied campaign. Other factors, such as fighter-bomber attacks on road transport, logistical skill, superior artillery, and reduced German air power, were less significant. The strategic attack on the railroad system East, Southeast and Southwest (outside of a line along the Seine to Paris, Paris to Orléans, and Orléans to Nantes began on March 1 and, after a lull to the end of April, were resumed on May 10. The attacks on the Seine River bridges started in May and those on the Loire River bridges on June 9. The accumulative effect of those attacks revealed itself by the end of June when the traffic congestion extended almost to the Rhine River.

Two thousand trains moved slowly, tortuously, or not at all. The destruction of the Seine River bridges rendered troop movements from the Pas de Calais to the invasion front particularly difficult. This emergency had been expected, and ferry service had been established by which a total of six or seven divisions were enabled to reach Normandy: one ferrying point could cope with one regiment per night, and it often took a week for a division to cross the river. Damage to the rail system, added to the fear of Allied landings in the Pas de Calais, resulted in too few shipments too late. G-3 places the blame on Rommel for opposing those movements too long.

Train Wrecked France 1944

Close Support Operations

The attacks of medium and heavy bombers on the Atlantic Wall had no critical effect. They had been expected. Orders had been issued to the unit commanders to hold to the last. The informants are of the opinion that most of them gave an excellent account of themselves. The effectiveness of laying bomb carpets is beyond doubt. They did not result in the loss of personnel so much as in a terrifying immobility on the battlefield. The troops could not move and were immobilized; the communication system broke down; artillery and antitank pieces were knocked out; and tanks were immobilized in craters or beneath heaps of dirt and debris. Carpet-bombing on the MLR (Main Line of Resistance) at the beach was not too effective because it was nof deep enough. At Caen the German troops withstood the effect because they were still fresh and their morale was still good. Besides, the Allied troops did not show sufficient initiative in following up the bombing. St Lo was the textbook solution, although the officers pointed out that the German forces at St Lo were battle-weary.

Conclusions

C-of-S, C-in-C West, is of the opinion that the two decisive factors, both of equal importance, which brought about Germany’s defeat, were Allied air power and Allied superiority in men and materiel. A third important factor was the faultless strategy of the Allied High Command: doing the right thing at the fight time, ie. to strike only when sufficient strength was gathered to guarantee that the objective was attained. German strategy failed because Germany tried too much with too little. Maintaining strategically unimportant fronts (Italy, the Balkans, and Norway) and failure to give up positions that had become untenable (Stalingrad, Heeresgruppe Nord, later renamed Kurland) and cited as cases in point.

G-3, C-in-C West, names the following three factors in the order of their importance: a. Allied air superiority, b. Allied strategy, and c. Allied war potential. His reasoning follows Westphal’s lines. G-4 states that Allied air superiority was by far the most important factor responsible for Germany’s defeat. The strategic and tactical bombing of railroads, and tactical attacks on road transport ‘dealt the decisive blows’ (Das Verkehrsproblem war das Entscheidende). The three officers agreed that the heavy attacks on German cities were the least harmful element, although C-of-S was sure that the demoralizing effect on the troops at the front was severe. They believe that if this effort had been diverted to the railroad and road transport systems and to war production centers, greater results would have been achieved. In conclusion, it may be stated that those air attacks aimed at interfering with the movements of troops and supplies contributed most to the Allied successes in Normandy and the Ardennes. Both offensively and defensively the Allies were most successful when their air forces laid waste to the German arteries of supply, and by creating a traffic desert, preventing the flow of replacements and materiel from giving new life to Rundstedt’s hard-pressed divisions.

Operations Goodwood and Cobra, originally planned to start consecutively on 18 and 19 July 1944

Air Power as a New Element in Warfare
by Oberst Paul Göttschling and Major Frank Neubert
September 10, 1945

The following statements on air power were made by two German General Staff Officers, Colonel Paul Gottschling and Major Frank Neubert, both of whom were combat flyers in all the theaters of the European war. Colonel Paul Gottschling was Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe in Italy during the final stages of the campaign and Major Frank Neubert was the operations officer.

I. The Air War in World War II

Air power proved itself to be the deciding factor in this war, and its influence became clearer and clearer toward the last phases of the war. The revolutionary development toward ‘air’ is indicated merely by the popular acceptance of the term ‘Air Power. Formerly, one spoke of ‘Sea Power’ (England) or ‘Land Power’ (Russia), and today, one speaks of ‘Air Power. Many possibilities arise from this new development, such as whether an Air Force should be the only or principal weapon of great power and if so how it should be used. It has been clearly shown that to insure the success of a large operation it is absolutely necessary to have continuing air superiority or at least control of the air over one’s battle area and the communication routes which supply it. Only after this air superiority has been achieved is it possible to bring the other forces (ground and sea) into a planned action. Even with clear local air superiority, the ground and naval forces must still reckon with the possibility of attack from the air as long as the enemy Air Force has not been rendered absolutely impotent by losses through air battle, by attacks on airfields, and through the destruction of his aircraft industry and his fuel plants.

Then, and only then can the victorious Air Force take full advantage of the situation. Until now, air attacks alone have not forced a complete decision without following exploitation by Land and Sea Power. The air war has increasingly taken on the role of an indispensable gigantic artillery preparation that could be spread over a very large area or heavily compressed into a small one after which the successes of land and sea forces can be achieved with a considerably smaller loss of life. Without such air preparation, an opponent equipped with modern weapons of defense can not be beaten on the ground without terrific sacrifices on the part of the attacking forces. Clearing the air of enemy activity prior to a large operation is therefore considered an essential prerequisite for a conclusive victory.

The following are a few pertinent examples illustrating the effects of air superiority or the failure to have it: a. The battle for North Africa and the control of the Mediterranean. The battle for Italy with landing operations in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and the destruction of the German supply lines from the Brenner Pass and further north. b. The preparation and execution of the invasion of France and the continuing use of air strength in the war of movement in France and Germany. c. The operational development of the war against Japan with the elimination of the Japanese fleet through the use of Air Power.

German Bf 109 fighters in flight, circa late 1944 (BA)

II. future Developments

A great power must in the future possess a strong and highly technically developed Air Force. The prospects of the terrible influence of the newest weapons such as the Nuclear Bomb and the enormous expense connected with research, manpower and material, will play the deciding role in the new air potential of the various powers. Because of this, the influence of smaller states as military powers is definitely at an end. The industrial, economic, and technical advantages, necessary to produce Air Power in short order, are available only to the large powers. The smaller states can only follow a convenient pattern set by their larger neighbors, and warlike aspirations of the former can be immediately suppressed by the latter.

Air Power has therefore become a new element in warfare, in that, through mere possession of the Nuclear Bomb it can subjugate the course and politics, of all smaller states. Also a coalition of the small powers must succumb to the influence of Air Power, because the mere size of land and sea forces has no weight against the influence of a modern Air Force. Only if a large opposing industrial and material power supports one or more of the smaller powers in the creation of an Air Force, can such a coalition have any influence at all. A small nation today only serves as a buffer or parasite of the larger nation and is useful as a jumping-off place or forward defense area, but contributes little toward effectively strengthening the neighboring military power.

Hans Dobrich & his Me 109 F4



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