Flexibility and adaptability also characterized the 101st operations in and around Bastogne. The most serious problem occurred on the night of Dec 19, when the Division Clearing Station, operated by the 326th Medical Company, was overrun by six German vehicles (half-tracks and tanks) supported by 100 infantrymen. In that action, the Germans captured 18 American officers and 124 enlisted men, as well as most of the unit’s medical equipment and supplies. Until a surgical team arrived by glider on Dec 26, only two medical and two dental officers, four medical administration officers, and 113 enlisted men remained to handle all of the division’s medical needs. A makeshift casualty collection station had to suffice because there were no means to evacuate the wounded after Dec 20. The station quickly became overcrowded. Medical supply shortages soon plagued the operation, and the overworked staff’s primary focus became the survival of the wounded by any means available. Over 1000 American and German wounded eventually were treated at the collection center.
Another major problem for the division was the constant shortage of supply and maintenance troops, The 801st Ordnance Company started for Bastogne on Dec 19. Five miles from the town, the Germans ambushed them. The Allied command then diverted the unit and placed it under the VIII Corps’ control until Dec 29. Therefore, the division had no direct support maintenance or evacuation capability until after the Allies broke the German encirclement.
More serious was the supply situation. Conveying supplies to Bastogne on Dec 19, the 426th Quartermaster Company was ambushed and subsequently diverted to the VIII Corps’ control until Dec 27. The division was, in effect, without normal supply operations during the entire period. Further complicating matters was the loss of the division’s reconnaissance platoon on Dec 22. The platoon had been used to establish an antitank warning net and had called for and directed field artillery fire to destroy German tanks. But on leading a cut-off artillery battalion to safety at Neufchâteau, the platoon was isolated and would not return until Dec 23.
According to its commander, the 326th Engineer Battalion might as well have been among the missing. Its deployment around Bastogne was a classic case of misuse through ignorance, Although the men set up a few roadblocks and prepared several bridges for demolition, they were committed piecemeal as infantry early in the battle rather than in their engineer support role with the different regiments. When promised infantry protection to accomplish engineer tasks, the engineers frequently found themselves alone, unprotected and exposed. Fighting as infantry, they had no responsive, designated artillery support. Strangely, no one used them in any way to prepare antitank obstacles.
Resupply was the most serious problem, which was exacerbated further by the absence of the 426th Quartermaster Company. Soldiers could fight only as long as supplies of food, ammunition, fuel, and equipment were available. Some food and medical supplies were found in abandoned dumps in Bastogne, but most of the critical items had to be brought in from the outside. After the German encirclement on the twenty-first, aerial resupply was the only way to accomplish this. The first request for aerial resupply was sent by the division on Dec 20. The G4 maintained strict supply control and accountability and required and received daily status reports from all units. Redistribution was accomplished as needed. Despite all possible supply economies, the division could not hold out without resupply. On Dec 23, the weather finally cleared, and 241 cargo planes dropped supply bundles that gave the division new life. They contained ammunition, rations, medical supplies, signal items, and gasoline.
Bolstered by this resupply and the knowledge that an American relief column was fighting its way through to Bastogne, the soldiers of the 101st had reason to feel optimistic. Succeeding resupply drops on Dec 24, 26, and 27 eased the supply difficulties considerably. With the linkup of attacking American troops and a more stable supply situation, the 101st could predict success. But the battle was not over. Weeks of hard fighting lay ahead. Nevertheless, a light infantry division, complemented by key attachments, especially artillery and antitank support, had stopped an armor-heavy German corps. At the outset, no one would have dared expect such successes – no one, that is, but the men and their leaders who were given the mission.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Assessing their actions at Bastogne, German generals concluded that they had failed for a number of reasons. Poor terrain and a restrictive road net had caused them to have disastrous traffic jams that disrupted their timetable from the start. Moreover, they had no forces available for traffic regulation. Poor weather favored a German advance until Dec 23 but created a thaw that kept German tanks bound to the roads. After Dec 23, Allied air superiority made any German advance difficult and interdicted lines of communication, causing all logistical activities to be slow and cumbersome. Supply depots could not be moved forward with the advance, nor could fuel depots remain operational for long. Fighting under such circumstances was an army whose leaders and soldiers were weary from six years of war. Commanders doubted the feasibility of their mission, and after a small surge of morale as the offensive kicked off, the already tired soldiers soon lost the will to fight. Units were understrength in personnel and equipment, and there were significant shortages in the officer and NC0 ranks. Replacements for the ground forces were not well trained, many having come from the naval and air forces. Combined arms tactics were either nonexistent or uncoordinated.
The piecemeal German attacks at Bastogne illustrated the deficiencies. American forces were allowed time to react at each decisive sector where the Germans attacked, thus preventing any serious breakthroughs. Continued refusal by the Heeresgruppe and the 5.Panzer-Army Headquarters to permit the XLVII Corps to concentrate all of its forces against Bastogne (obviously influenced by Hitler’s insistence that the offensive continue) clearly saved its gallant defenders from a horrible defeat. The sheer weight of forces would have given the Germans control of Bastogne if they were willing to pay the price in casualties. But the German’s overall timetable was considered more important. German generals also expressed grudging admiration for the Americans who rapidly met the German offensive with strategic forces. The American tactic of delaying through the use of successive positions was highlighted as was the continuous artillery support made available to the infantry. The continuing ability of American artillery units to fight was also cited. Proper credit was given to American leadership, which played a very essential role by making the proper tactical resolution with great flexibility and equal rapidity adopting all countermeasures, and performing them with great energy and skill. Repeatedly cited was the brave determination of the men of the 101st Airborne Division.
An in-depth analysis of the Battle of Bastogne, focusing on the ability of a light division to defeat heavier ones, leads to predictable conclusions. At Bastogne, well-coordinated combined arms teams defeated uncoordinated armored and infantry forces committed to an unrealistic plan. Results of isolated cases in which American infantry fought German armored forces point out how important the attached package of tanks and tank destroyers was to the 101st. Without them, even the bravest of infantry actions would have been no match for the tanks. The infantry, fighting alone, would have lost Bastogne early in the battle. Coordinated German attacks in mass, rather than the small-unit attacks they employed, might also have resulted in a decisive German victory over the 101st and its attachments. In the final equation, moral strength, luck, and the fog of war must also be considered. The Americans had advantages in all three of these categories. The right combination of events and situations-conditions unfavorable to the Germans and favorable to the Americans produced the American victory at Bastogne. At Bastogne, a light infantry division, properly augmented by good artillery and armor support, was able to defeat a numerically superior and heavier opponent. But the conditions of that victory were particular, not universal in application.
