III. SAVING BASTOGNE – A CHRONOLOGHY
The first steps to save Bastogne were taken on Dec 18, when Middleton dispatched the recently arrived CCB-10-AD to the northeast, east, and southeast of the town with orders to hold their positions at all cost. Such action indicated to the Germans that Bastogne would not be surrendered. In the week that followed, the Germans squeezed the perimeter around Bastogne tighter and tighter, but it did not break.
Throughout the defensive sector, McAuliffe organized the 101st and its attachments into regimental task forces. Each had its proportional share of artillery, tanks, antitank, and antiaircraft forces. Thus, light infantry received supplemental firepower in their defense. With the exception of artillery, the Germans were similarly organized. Their artillery was kept primarily in general support.
On Dec 19, small German infantry-armor forces, both with and without artillery support, infiltrated under cover of bad weather. German action also included night fighting with tanks. The Americans resisted strongly in all sectors, defending outlying villages and road intersections. By nightfall, the XLVII Corps had been contained along the line Noville, Bizory, Neffe. The inadequate road network; old, broken-down, and overloaded German vehicles; and the American artillery around Bastogne were slowing the German advance.
With pressure from Heeresgruppe to push beyond Bastogne, the 5.Panzer-Army and the XLVII Corps decided that the Panzer-Lehr-Division should take Bastogne on the twentieth while the other forces continued their westward advance. On Dec 20 and 21, the same pattern of small-unit infiltration continued, with some gains accruing to the Germans. The villages of Noville and Bizory were finally taken, but an attack against Marvie was repulsed. Bastogne continued to be a matter of concern to the XLVII Corps. But it was believed on the twentieth that, with advances continuing north and south of the town, Bastogne would soon be encircled and that the 26.VGD following the panzer divisions could capture it. Indeed, the town was surrounded on the twenty-first, but the 26.VGD was not strong enough to take it. Though surrounded, the l01st was not cut off. The division still maintained communication with the VIII Corps and knew an American relief column was pushing toward them as German advances along the entire Western Front were diminishing. The 5.Panzer-Army refused to authorize sufficient additional forces to take Bastogne and to keep the faltering offensive alive. But the 26.VGD still had the mission, with some help from the Panzer-Lehr-Division. On the evening of Dec 21, Manteuffel and Luettwitz composed the now famous surrender note that, after being delivered to the 101st on Dec 22, received McAuliffe’s more famous reply: Nuts.
In addition to the note on Dec 22, there were continuous probes along the entire perimeter. Only two German attacks of any significance occurred, however, and both were no larger than company size. On Dec 23, probes continued to the west and southeast, but the weather had cleared and American airpower was beginning to take its toll on German forces and equipment. Aerial resupply also began that day, bringing the 1Olst badly needed supplies and sending American morale soaring.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF FORCES
Though fighting in the villages around Bastogne pitted a multi-division force against a reinforced light division, combat for the most part was characterized by small-unit actions. Fate, as it always does, played a significant role in the outcome, but a more detailed look at how the 101st was organized and equipped to fight also provides insight into its success. Firepower for the light division was far greater than would have ordinarily been the case. In addition to its own artillery of four battalions, the division had at its disposal a field artillery group consisting of two 155-MM gun battalions and a 4.5-inch howitzer battalion. It also had one 155-MM gun and two 105-MM howitzer battalions (which had fallen back after initial German assaults on Dec 16). In all, that meant that as many as ten field artillery battalions could have supported the division at any one time. Two battalions of the attached group were overrun and lost on Dec 20 after the group commander moved them without permission. For his actions, he was summarily relieved that day by Gen McAuliffe. But even with that loss, the American artillery in Bastogne was still a potent force, especially when compared to the weaker German artillery.
When alerted for movement to the Bastogne area, the 101st Division’s artillery was still reconstituting from operations in Holland. Many of the howitzers were in poor condition but were repaired or replaced before the road march. Anticipating a departure from their traditional airborne role, the artillerymen reconfigured for land movement and consequently carried with them far more ammunition than they would, or could, otherwise have taken via aircraft. Without the additional loads, they would have run out of ammunition before aerial resupply was possible.
Upon arrival at Bastogne, all battalion’s task organized for a static defense. Personnel shortages, especially in the forward observer and liaison teams to supported infantry, quickly became acute. Headquarters and firing units were stripped to fill the void. Command, control, and communications problems, as well as general supply shortages, occasionally detracted from the effectiveness of the defense but were never insurmountable. The biggest problem remained a shortage of ammunition. As the intensity of the fighting increased and overland supply lines were cut, ammunition conservation became critical.
The majority of all rounds fired were directed against enemy armor. Firing in the direct and indirect mode, artillery was effective against German tanks, while unsupported infantry rarely stopped the German armor. But had it not been for the timely aerial resupply of Dec 23 and subsequent drops on succeeding days, the guns would have fallen silent and been easy prey for attacking German forces. By that day, some units were down to less than three high-explosive rounds per howitzer and had no remaining rations.
As it was, the Germans had much to be concerned with when in the vicinity of American artillery. The cold, hungry, and exhausted artillerymen manning the guns repeatedly stated their willingness to endure any deprivation if only they could get some more ammunition, American morale was excellent, and no German tank within range of American artillery was safe. The encirclement and the widely disseminated Dec 22 surrender note were considered amusing incidents rather than awe-inspiring threats. On Christmas Eve, an entry in one battalion journal read, Christmas Eve and all personnel here wish for plenty of ammunition and one good supply route. On Christmas day, the entry read, Three cooks in C Battery took a little time from their regular chores to kill two Germans in a tank with a grenade and captured six others. That same day, another artillery battalion, under attack by seven tanks and accompanying infantry, employed its howitzers as antitank guns and destroyed two tanks, captured one intact, killed a number of infantrymen, and captured twenty-four others. Similar actions occurred throughout the operation. On Dec 20 alone, no less than seven battalions fired 26OO rounds solely at enemy armor. The incomprehensible German failure to attempt to destroy or neutralize American artillery only served to bolster the cannoneers’ confidence and determination. In his after-action report, one direct-support battalion commander wrote, After arriving at Bastogne and going into position, we found ourselves in exactly the situation we had been trained to handle. Perhaps that was ultimately why they acquitted themselves so well.
A prime example of task organizing can be seen in the case of the division’s 81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion. Entering combat with three antiaircraft and three 57-MM antitank batteries, that unit found its role quickly changed to meet the German armor threat. Initially, the antiaircraft batteries supported the division’s artillery, but they were shifted to the main line of resistance (MLR) to strengthen the defensive perimeter. While that action caused division headquarters and the division artillery to be more vulnerable to German air strikes, it provided firepower where it was most needed-in ground support in the second line of defense.
The antitank batteries were also positioned on the MLR, where, in conjunction with the larger vehicles of the tank destroyer battalion, they formed a defense in depth that the Germans could not penetrate without unacceptable losses. The 81-AFAB’s weapons would engage German tanks at maximum range, slow the German tanks, and thus give the more mobile tank and tank destroyer units time to move to the point of the German attack and defeat the enemy’s armor. Time and again, this technique was used to counter uncoordinated enemy thrusts that came from all directions.
Other effective antitank measures included active infantry patrolling to give early warning of German assembly or attack, preparation of tank barriers and obstacles, and aggressive hand-to-hand fighting to separate German infantry and tanks after penetrations had occurred. Most tanks were destroyed after they had penetrated the defenses and had been separated from their infantry. That task was most frequently accomplished by direct-fire artillery, antitank weapons, and bazooka fire at close range.
Typical of the close-in violence of the battles was an incident on Dec 23 in the town of Marvie. There, Pfc Norman Osterberg, a member of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, exposed himself to intense enemy fire and, using his bazooka, repeatedly drove attacking tanks away even though they came within ten yards of his position. Wounded in the process, he continued his stand for three hours, thus stopping the attack in his sector. Such bravery and esprit were common throughout the elite division. Fighting against tanks, soldiers quickly discovered that digging in around a town was far preferable and more effective than occupying its buildings and being crushed in the rubble. Teamwork, cooperation, effective combined arms attacks on targets, and stubborn and brave resistance gave the paratroopers a fighting edge they never relinquished.
V. COMBAT SUPPORT
The successful defensive activities at Bastogne were made possible in the good measure through the efforts of the 101st Signal Company, which provided outstanding communications support and ensured excellent command and control. From the beginning, the signal company was hard-pressed to keep communications operational in an encircled town subject to intense enemy fire. Their task began when the division was first alerted. Signal loads had to be configured for ground, rather than airborne operations. Their deployment was excellent, and by 0600, Dec 19, all elements were in radio and wire contact with division headquarters. Secure and nonsecure communications with the VIII Corps were also established and never lost throughout the operation, Indeed, these were the only links with the outside after Bastogne was surrounded.
Batteries for radios posed a problem. With only a three-day supply, the division had to rely on a strict supply economy and conservation. Even with such conservation measures, many divisional units ran out of essential batteries on Dec 23; but that was the day they were resupplied by air. The wire was also constantly being broken by shelling, bombing, and heavy equipment passing over it. Teams serviced the lines constantly, often under fire. From the first day, signal personnel continuously expanded the net, establishing alternate routes, laterals, and additional circuits.
Communication among units was rarely lost. Radios were in poor condition from the Holland operation, but they were sufficient to meet all divisional requirements. The nets established allowed for real-time dissemination of intelligence information from all sources, even down to local patrols. Frequent German jamming was overcome, as was the problem of friendly elements nearby operating on division frequencies. Contact was established with the 4th Armored Division two days before that element broke through to the 101st, and it was maintained continuously from that point until no longer needed. Wire communication was established as soon as the linkup occurred. With such signal efficiency, it is no wonder that the Americans enjoyed communications superiority.
