It was also learned that plans at the battalion rear were not progressing as previously arranged. Lt John M. Donahue, the ammunition and pioneer platoon leader, with 2 squads had located several box mines along the trail over which the tanks and battalion vehicles were to be moved. Also, the retreating Germans had felled timber to hinder the advance of allied troops. What normally would have been an easy task was turned into an almost impossible one because of the deep snow. One of the 5 tanks, while trying to proceed up the trail, had thrown a track when attempting to cross what appeared to be a small depression but was a 500 or 1000-pound bomb crater concealed in the deep snow. However, the other 4 tanks were on their way and if at all possible would be with the forward platoons by the time they reached their objectives. The route was still too rough to permit passage of the battalion vehicles. It was found that even after a tank had moved along a fire break, it was impossible in many places to move a jeep and much pioneer work was necessary.
Wire communication was still out to the battalion rear, but the PC group continued to string wire and move forward. As soon as they again caught up with the rear elements of King Co, they found the company halted at the edge of a large clearing which seemed to be the dominating terrain just before the railroad that the battalion was to occupy. Capt Alexander J. Mikules (King Co) wasn’t sure of his location and did not know whether or not his company had been able to keep on the azimuth. Fox Co which should have been a short distance to the east could not be contacted. The battalion S2 who was directing the CP group had taken an azimuth reading when the group moved out in the morning but had not thought it necessary to repeat this procedure during the day.
Since the area to the front was not as shown on the map, the battalion commander directed the battalion S2 to proceed to the top of the large cleared hill to their front to see if he could orient himself. At this point, every man in the battalion was so tired that the thought of further movement was particularly discouraging. Although the cleared hill to which the S2 had been ordered was only a few hundred yards away he doubted his ability to reach the top. However, some 20 minutes later he found himself at the top of the hill only to discover that the view to the southeast was further restricted by a ridge a quarter of a mile away. Unable to determine his exact location, he returned to the area of the woods to report to the battalion CO.
Meanwhile, the battalion Artillery Liaison Officer had set up his radio to request one smoke round fired on concentration 42 which, in the opinion of the battalion commander was located about 300 yards to our front. Soon the round was reported on its way and the battalion expectantly awaited it. When no sign of the round was observed, the battalion commander felt sure that the battalion was off its course. At this time the Liaison Officer’s radio failed to function so about 30 minutes were lost before contact was again made. An additional round was requested and considerable relief was felt when it landed far to the left, but visible. The battalion CO decided to move east where the woods continued to the south and from there obtain information on the area to the front. Shortly after this Lt James Caskey (Item Co), who was maintaining contact with the 84-ID, arrived in the area very tired and disgruntled to check on the location of the battalion. When the S2 was unable to furnish the exact location, Lt Caskey stormed off with three members of his platoon in the direction of a small trail that led around the hill to our front and further southeast. He had reported to the battalion S3 that the 84-ID was moving as scheduled on our right and that he would try to contact the division again before dark.
The time was about 1700 and Fox Co was again in contact but had never been able to locate the 1/291-IR on its left. No check could be made with the regiment regarding the progress of the 84-ID since wire communication was out and the SCR 300 radio was not adequate in the hilly timbered terrain, however, there were no indications of contact with the enemy. As the battalion moved east it discovered the hull of a German tank that the Air Corps had bombed and destroyed the previous day. Also, the bombs had removed part of the snow and disclosed large roots of trees and sawed-off trunks. The cleared and open area that the battalion encountered had previously been wooded as shown on the map. The battalion then was on its course; however, since the battalion CO was still not certain of the exact location of the railroad which was his objective, he ordered the battalion S2 to proceed down the trail to the front to make one recon. Item, King, and Fox Cos were halted to await further orders.
At about 200 yards down the trail, the S2 with 2 men from his section searched the area with the S2 observation scope. The trail could be seen moving south past a farmhouse and on under what appeared to be a railroad overpass. As the S2 looked through the scope he saw someone walk along the overpass and though he wasn’t sure, he thought the man could have been in German uniform. At this time one of the men accompanying the S2 accidentally discharged a machine pistol while removing it from his shoulder. The bullet entered his left hand, went up to his arm, and came out at the elbow. The man screamed in agony and fell to his knees. As the battalion S2 turned to the aid of the injured man, the person he had seen on the overpass was forgotten. It took approximately 20 minutes to get the wounded soldier back up the trail to a medic and on his way to the rear. The S2 reported the incident of the wounded soldier to the battalion CO and was informed that the companies had been ordered to move forward and that the S2 was to proceed directly to the farmhouse which was directly down the trail in the direction of the battalion objective, and to clear the place for the battalion command post. Fox Co was to proceed straight south from its present location across the field to seize the road overpass and the railroad embankment. King Co was to proceed down the trail and occupy the railroad overpass and the embankment. Item Co was to stay in the woods on the rear.
As he started down the trail again, this time on his way to the farmhouse, the S2 heard tank movement to his rear and was told that the tanks attached to the battalion had made it through. Capt Drake (Fox Co), again noticing the extreme fatigue of his men and the half-mile of open ground with snow almost waist-deep between him and his section of the railroad, decided to move his company west along the edge of the woods to the trail King Co was to move down, then down this and left again to his objective. Though this was a longer route, walking would be easier. This decision was not cleared through the battalion. As Fox Co, moving in single file, approached the trail, it ran into King Co moving out in the same formation and the 2 companies moved down the trail side by side as darkness settled. As the battalion S2 moved through the 2 companies he was reminded of the lone person he had seen near the overpass of the railroad. Lt Caskey and the three men who had stopped for a short time as they passed through King Co now seemed to be leading the battalion. Lt Caskey was about 100 yards out in front of the battalion, one man to each side of him and the third man bringing up the rear. They were on their way to contact the US 84-ID.
It was dark now and the men were walking very closely together. They looked more like vintage 1776 than a part of a victorious army of the Twentieth Century. The trail made a slight turn to the west as it passed the huge farmhouse which was to be the battalion CP and just across the trail from the farmhouse was a typical Belgian barn made of sandstone. Just past this light turn in the trail was a small culvert over a creek and then the trail went straight into Beho. The railroad overpass which was included in the battalion objective was about 250 yards farther up the trail. As Lt Caskey neared the railroad overpass and the forward elements of the two companies had cleared the culvert by almost one platoon and all felt that the objective had been reached, hell seemed to break loose. For a few minutes, the night air was filled with crisscrossing tracer fire. At first, it seemed to the battalion S2 who had just reached the road between the farmhouse and the barn that German machine guns were everywhere. As he hit the ground, he heard someone immediately forward and yell, I’m hit. Then he heard another voice, Hit the creek!
At the battalion front, two German machine guns seemed to be firing continuously from the vicinity of the railroad overpass, and to the battalion, right were small flashes of light spaced several yards apart all along the ridge. The battalion S2 thought of the tanks and started to run up the trail to the north. Then he noticed what was causing the vast column of tracer fire. The fire of the two machine guns in the vicinity of the overpass was coming straight down the trail, hitting the stone barn, and ricocheting on up the trail in all directions. As he ran up the edge of the trail he noticed that the men had hit the ground when the firing started; however, because they were so tired and worn out practically none had moved. It was necessary to use force in moving them off the trail into the ditches for protection against the ricochet and crossfire.
Capt Mikules (King Co), who when the firing started had yelled, Hit the creek! and over one complete platoon had taken cover in the creek. As they jumped, slid, or fell into the creek the ice broke and most of the men found themselves in water to the waist. The remaining platoons were scattered back up the road, some in or near the farmhouse and others in or near the barn. Confusion reigned in King Co at this time. Since the sun had set, the temperature was down to about 10 degrees (C) below zero, and all fights had gone from the men. King Co seemed to shiver and shake and wait for someone to start moving. The time was now about 1810 and the extreme darkness did not help matters.
Finally, as officers and NCOs regained control, and the company began to react return fire was directed at the enemy. When the firing started Capt Drake’s company seemed to crumble with the shock and most of the men were mixed in with King Co and strung all along the trail. Capt Drake took a few men and established the left flank along the creek. He ordered the rest of his men to move back up the trail into the woods. Then he reported to Capt Mikules who was in the farmhouse and told him what he had done. Capt Mikules had ordered the men who were with him in the creek to get into the farmhouse during the intermittent bursts of machine-gun fire, as the men wet to their waists could do nothing but shiver. Upon entering the farmhouse they found it occupied by 60 to 70 civilians who had fled from the town of Beho.
The above took place in a matter of minutes and was noted by the battalion S2 as he ran back up the trail to get the tanks. The battalion CO and the S3 had heard the firing and were on their way to the front when the S2 arrived. After the explanation of the situation, the battalion CO directed one tank (since it was felt that perhaps even one tank could not move over the terrain at night) to go with the S2 and engage the German weapons. As the tank left the woods and started down the trail the firing could still be heard and the small flashes of light could be seen in the field to the right of the farmhouse. However, as soon as the tank cleared the woods and started down the small grade to the creek all firing seemed to stop. The tank commander proceeded to the culvert just past the farmhouse and started to pump HE rounds in the direction of the railroad overpass. The firing was to have been directed by someone firing the .50 caliber AA gun on top of the tank, but the gun was so packed with snow and ice that it wouldn’t function automatically and had to be loaded each time by pulling the handle back. However, tracer rounds were pulled out of the belt and loaded singly and the firing was conducted. HE rounds were fired throughout the field and machine-gun fire from the tank swept the railroad embankment. No return fire was received.
The S2 asked Capt Mikules for someone to go with him up the road to find out about Lt Gaskey and his men but was refused because it was not necessary and the men were wet and cold. Capt Drake couldn’t be found so the S2 took two of his men and one medic and spread out in front of the tank and started up the trail past the culvert. The tank commander when asked if he would go, said, Hell, yes! Just get me a little flank protection against the brush and I will take this tank anyplace. Lt Caskey and his 3 men were found about 50 yards from the overpass. Their bodies had been riddled by machine gun fire. They had received the brunt of the enemy machine gun fire and as Lt Caskey was picked up and placed on the rear of the tank, it was noticed that his web equipment was almost completely shot from his body. The group returned to the farmhouse and reported to the battalion commander that the Germans appeared to have withdrawn and that Lt Caskey had drawn their fire before they were aware of the remainder of the battalion. A complete check showed one officer and three enlisted men dead. Five other enlisted men were also wounded. King Co was in bad condition because of the wet men so Item Co was passed through and took up the position previously designated for that company. Fox Co was ordered to reassemble and proceed to its assigned objective.
By the morning of January 23, 1945, the battalion was again organized, and the men were on their objectives; however, it had taken most of the night to complete the task. The 84-ID had taken Beho, and the 1/291-IR on the left was on its assigned section of the railroad.
