Although the first FSS had begun its target work for the S Force in South Florence on Aug 4, when the Tactical Headquarters, and advance guard of combat troops and certain special intelligence bodies(39) went forward, operations in other parts of the city could only commence as they were cleared in a long, drawn-out battle. The formation suffered thirty-four casualties from German gun and mortar fire during the three-week occupation of the city. By the time, the S Force operation was closed on Aug 23, the unit had processed 152 building targets out of 181 listed or identified as ‘spot targets’; and detained 92 persons, of whom 34 had later been released. Thanks to No 1 ICU coordinating with PWB, No 1 Special Force, and the partisans, an agent was located who provided plans of the ‘Gothic Line’, the German Army’s major defensive line along the summits of the Apennines (Allied forces started a three-month campaign that successfully penetrated of the ‘Gothic Line’, but they were unable to break out of the mountains). Further coordinating action with SCI, the 30 Commando, RE, and 71 Garrison resulted in a number of sabotage camps being uncovered. All operational agencies and combat commanders participating with No 1 ICU in this operation endorsed its existence and requested its continuance.(40)
The 407 FSS was part of the S Force operation which occupied Forli with the 46th Infantry Brigade on Nov 10, 1944, and survived an artillery barrage which hit the section HQ the same night. This did not prevent the section from capturing 2 enemy agents in Forli on Nov 11, though one later hanged himself while in custody.(41)
Around Sept 1944, the No 1 ICU prepared the S Force operations to enter Turin and Milan with partisan forces via France. An OSS team that took part in this operation was captured by the Germans, showing that the units involved in these operations often had more to contend with than shelling and booby traps.(42) Elsewhere in Italy and later in Austria the title of the S Force continued to be used for some intelligence-gathering task forces. The No 1 ICU was directed to assist in the West of Italy, while Armies elsewhere were made responsible for exploiting intelligence and CI on their main own axes of advance. Starting with La Spezia, the No 1 ICU was to coordinate efforts in Northwest Italy, including Genoa, Turin, Milan, Brescia, and the Lake Garda region. The No 1 ICU was disbanded on Jan 20, 1945. (43) An order was given by HQ AAI for a second unit, the No 2 ICU, to be organized and equipped to exploit special intelligence targets in the zone of operations for the US 7-A.(44) The unit accompanied the 7-A in the invasion of the French Riviera (Operation Dragoon), and was later incorporated into the 6-AG T Force.
On Apr 21, 1945, the S Force under the US 5-A entered Bologna. The 5-A CIC operated in the city for the first five days, apprehending numerous persons of interest, including GIS officials, and capturing valuable intelligence documents. The CIC then moved to Verona, the headquarters of the German intelligence Service in Italy, as the Germans began their rapid retreat out of Italy. (45) On Apr 25, 1945, three members of an OSS Special Counter Intelligence Unit (SCI/Z) were detailed to join members of the CIC of the US 92nd Infantry Division and the 85 Port Security FSS at Carrara, to form the S Force for La Spezia. While in La Spezia they captured eight GIS agents. The OSS element moved on to Genova, where they began operations on Apr 31 and made four arrests. They also picked up an OSS agent who helped identify and arrest a further 16 GIS agents based on his local knowledge.
The S Forces continued to be used even when the allies occupied Austria. It was decided to employ an S Force, defined in the military orders as an ad hoc body of troops, assisted by Intelligence personnel whose task is to seize intelligence targets during the first stages of an occupation. For Austria it seems that CI, as in earlier S Force operations, remained more important than the emerging interest in technology and industrial secrets. In fact, in the précis document seen by the author, no mention at all was made of scientific targets.(46)
CONCLUSIONS and LESSONS LEARNED
A report was sent in Dec 1944 by Lt Col Thomas G. Young, Commanding Officer of the No 1 ICU, to the 15-AG for further transmission to Washington. In the introduction he defined his organization as follows:
– An Intelligence Exploitation Force or ‘S’ Force is defined as a force embodying representatives of recognized Intelligence Agencies, staff to control, coordinate and administer them, communication, transportation, and housekeeping elements to meet their needs, and protective troops to guard them and their objectives when seized.
The S Force operations, as developed in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, are designed to deal with the confusing period, both military and political, which normally follows the capture or liberation of a large center of the population by the combat troops, and precedes the establishment of a normal secure military government, with its civil auxiliaries and controls.
During the confused period, the S Force and its embodied Intelligence Agencies carry out all exploitation of intelligence objectives in the newly captured center, comprehending the seizure and safeguarding of documents, archives, technical data, equipment and records, and the arrest and disposition of enemy agents and major sympathizsers.(47)
The report acknowledged the evolution of the S Force-type of operation from its beginnings in Tunis and went on to explain in detail how the experiences in Italy had produced firm guidelines on how to prepare for such an operation, and how to organize the duties of all participants once an operation commenced. It can therefore be seen that the Allies were satisfied with the results thus far obtained. As they looked to operations in Northwest Europe, and particularly in Germany, however, they needed to change the emphasis on the types of intelligence being targeted. The activities of the 30 Commando and the Alsos Mission were pointing towards the growth in interest by the Allies in investigating and exploiting German advances in technology.
In the next part of the story, the evolution of S Force into T Force is explained and the activities of the units using this title are explored.
NOTES
39. WO 204/907, HQ No 1 ICU report dated 28 Dec 44, Mediterranean “S” Operation (UK National Archives)
40. WO 204/907, HQ No 1 ICU report dated 31 Aug 44, Final Report on “S” Operation in Florence (UK National Archives)
41. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession # 955 (10)
42. RG226 Entry 136 Box 15 Folder 124, NARA
43. WO 204/796 (Exploitation Of Intelligence In N Italy), A 15AG Directive dated 17/2/45 on S Force Ops, mentions that a document dated 20/1/45 authorised the disbandment of No 1 ICU, (UK National Archives)
44. WO 204/943, HQ AAI Order dtd 3 Aug 44, for Formation of No 2 ICU Assault Intelligence Force, (UK National Archives)
45. Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II, produced by the Counter Intelligence Corps School, Fort Holabird, Baltimore, 33-34
46. Allied Force HQ document from the Office of Asst COS G-2, ref GSI/CI/SF/4001/D dated 5/3/1945, entitled “Lecture: The Task of ‘S’ Forces in Austria (Precis)”. Int Corps Museum Accession #497
47. WO 204/907, HQ No 1 ICU report dated 28 Dec 44, Mediterranean “S” Operation (UK National Archives)
