The objectives of the formation were given in the outline plan of the operation as:

– 1. S Force will secure all Intelligence material of interest to the Royal Navy, the Army, the Royal Air Force, and the French and American Authorities with all the maximum speed possible in the event of the occupation of Tunis and Bizerte.
– 2. S Force will be considered as an Allied Force with the second objective of concentrating all efforts of interested parties until such time as it can be seen that its function no longer usefully exists.(6)

In the Directive issued on Apr 23, 1943, the reason for the name S Force was not given, but the formation was described as a Security Intelligence Force. The first paragraph of this directive states: Tunis and Bizerte, being the last Towns to fall, are likely to contain a large amount of Intelligence Material. This material is of use not only to the Military Formations responsible for its capture but to a varied and wide network of organizations whose sphere of responsibility covers countries outside this Theater of Operations. It, therefore, follows that any Intelligence plan for exploiting the capture of Tunis must be framed in such a way that these organizations, whose work is normally of a long-term nature, are fully represented.(7)

By the night of May 7, the British First Army had driven a wedge through to Tunis, and the Axis armies were split. At the same time, US units had entered Bizerte, and organized resistance by the Germans became impossible. The remaining active Axis forces SE of Tunis surrendered on May 13. As S Force received its operational orders too late on May 7, (since the town fell that afternoon), the unit moved into Tunis at 0615 on May 8. All targets were dealt with by 0730 that day, with four of the targets arrested. The FSS continued their searches for others on their wanted lists, for POWs, and for documents. Between May 8 and May 11, seven targets were arrested, ten POWs taken, and 88 buildings searched from a total of 99 targets inside and 23 outside of Tunis.

In an After Action Report, the 68 FSS were critical of the command and control aspects of the operation.(8) One reason for this may have been the uncoordinated activity of some of the participants. According to the obituary of Lt Col Strangeways, he drove a scout car into Tunis with one other officer and an escort at the first hint of a German collapse in Tunis, and took over the German HQ by bluff and daring. He then blew the safe and seized the secret documents inside before contacting the local French Colonial Police and taking virtual control of the capital ready for the entry of the Allied troops the next day. For this, and other actions, he was awarded the DSO.(9) A jeep from the 30 Commando, not waiting for the rest of the S Force, also entered Tunis on May 7 behind the 11th Hussars and Derbyshire Yeomanry.(10) The S Force formation consisted of units from 228 Army Field Company RE (mainly for handling booby traps), 18 Army Group Royal Signals, Royal Army Medical Corps, 200 Provost Company of the Corps of Military Police, the Royal Naval Party (under Lt Comdr Curtis and presumably including 33 Troop of 30 Commando), RAF Intelligence group and 2788 Sqn RAF Regt (to secure the four landing grounds out of town), the FSS units mentioned previously, Bureau de Sécurité Militaire (French Counter-espionage), two sections of the Garde Mobile, a Psychological Warfare Section, the Tunisian Detachment of Civil Affairs with the US Vice Consulate, a Major from HQ of UDF (South African Forces), an officer from the Controle Technique at AFHQ, and an infantry battalion assigned on the arrival of S Force in Tunis. Strangeways suggested that the infantry should come from US 34th Infantry Division, as the division has already had experience in the Algiers landing.(11) The initial directive had also indicated that TAC ‘A’ Force and MI6 would be represented, and it appears A Force supplied officers besides Strangeways to help oversee the operation.

The 37 FSS were briefed on April 30 and took part in S Force operations on May 7-10, 1943, after which it returned to the UK 1-AD command. Detachments of the 37 FSS were given a list of 10 targets and map references, which consisted of HQs and addresses of specific officers and civilians, plus the location of a wireless transmitter hidden in a local synagogue. The unit was ordered to determine whether the addresses were occupied and if so, to arrest any occupant whose name appeared on the Black List and search the building in their presence for any documents. The prisoners and any documents were then to be taken to S Force HQ. If the target building was empty, it was to be searched, and if nothing and no one of immediate importance were found, the detachment was to proceed to secondary targets.(12)

The 33 Troop of the 30 Commando was given permission to operate independently of S Force, but like the other sub-units, it was unable to enter Tunis until after the capture of the town. The unit helped US troops to search Bizerte (taken by the US 9-ID and the UK 1-AD on May 7), but little of interest was found by them. Agent James Gardner of CIC (US Army Counter Intelligence Corps, equivalent to the British FSS) accompanied a party entering Bizerte ahead of US 9-ID and managed to secure valuable records on pro-Axis organizations and established contacts with local French authorities while under enemy fire. For this action, he received the Bronze Star and a Purple Heart.(13)

S FORCE IN ITALY

Initial planning for S Force operations in Italy was done by the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ); coordination and control were exercised by G2, US 15-AG; and the active exploitation in the field was the responsibility of G2, UK 5-A or GSI (General Staff Intelligence, the British G2 equivalent) of the UK-8-A, depending on the territory of operation. An Intelligence Objectives Sub Section (IOSS) of AFHQ compiled target lists, and S Force US 15-AG maintained a connecting link between this section and the 2 armies. The role of this S Force included assisting and coordinating the activities of exploiting agencies operating in the US 15-AG area other than those under Army control and arranging for the seizure of targets by partisans prior to the arrival of Allied forces. The Armies had the responsibility of providing the military support to guard target sites and handling targets discovered on spot information. The various intelligence agencies involved had to identify their known objectives to IOSS, providing all available information on the targets; notify IOSS of any other special targets which came to notice, whether they were of interest to themselves or other agencies; and to provide such special reports as were needed.(14)

The British FSS was involved in ad hoc S Force-type operations after the landings at Salerno and Taranto in 1943, where the targets were primarily of interest for battlefield intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes. A British fleet occupied the harbor of Taranto in the arch of the Italian boot, putting a British division ashore on the docks, while the US 5-A under Gen Mark W. Clark staged an assault landing on beaches near Salerno, twenty-five miles southeast of Naples. The 35 FSS landed on Sept 9, 1943, at Salerno (they claimed they were the only allied unit to spend the night of Sept 10 in the town) and operated until Sept 27. The unit immediately began interrogation of POW and civilians, seized the town’s telex and postal facilities, and sealed the banks to prevent looting. They set up a billet at the via Independenzia 27 on Sept 11, and on that day also searched the Questura and the Municipio. On Sept 12, they searched a Fascist HQ, finding documents of interest; and on Sept 13 an Italian military HQ was inspected while previously captured material was studied. The unit moved on Sept 24 to search Cava and the HQ of the 7th Italian Army where they obtained documents relating to the OVRA (Italian Security Organization – Opera di Vigilanza e di Repressione dell Antifascismo) in Maiori.

The 35 FSS was joined on Sept 11 by elements of 31 and 276 FSS, and on Sept 13 by elements of 312 FSS and five CIC (US Army Counter Intelligence Corps) agents from the US 5-A under command of a the FSHQ (Field Security HQ), which directed their operations.(15) The 89 FSS was among the first units to go ashore and enter Taranto. Their task was to search two enemy headquarters at the Miranda and Europa hotels for documents and booby-traps. The Section later went on to capture the German consul at Bari.(16) Meanwhile, the Allied troops from Taranto in the East and the landing at Salerno linked up on Sept 2. When Naples fell on Oct 1, 1943, the 305th CIC Detachment (US 5-A) was placed in charge of the counter-intelligence there for the next three weeks and captured several Italian generals in hiding as well as important documents and material … obtained from German espionage agents and their headquarters.(17)

The FSS and their CIC equivalents were normally kept busy with their CI duties in between serving with S Force. Some of the other units engaged in S Force operations had a remit to work alone when not designated to assist in the takeover of specific city targets. The 30 Commando, for example, was used for obtaining information on, and examples of, advanced German and Italian weapons and technical knowledge in the areas of submarines, torpedoes, and electronics. One target of this unit in Italy was the Silurificio Italiano, the Italian torpedo factory located at Baia, north of Naples. Captain Fredman Ashe Lincoln QC was temporarily attached to the 30 Commando in Feb 1943 from the Naval Directorate of Torpedoes and Mining (Investigations) to check out the factory. A search of the location revealed practice warheads which confirmed reports of the existence of an acoustically guided torpedo code-named GNAT by the British. The first indication of its existence had come from a POW in North Africa in 1941. He had witnessed night testing of the weapon, fitted with a practice head bearing a light to make it visible. From his description, British experts had concluded the weapon was an acoustically operated torpedo. In January 1943 the weapon had been used to sink six tankers and an escort ship in one attack in the South Atlantic.(18)

As mentioned above, an S Force was organized for the occupation of Rome. The S Force commander later described the development of this operation, stating that British Intelligence had realized the potential problem of handling and absorbing the vast and varied sources of intelligence in a great international city such as Rome. There were twenty or more agencies interested in intelligence targets in Rome, some for tactical information, but most for strategic and political intelligence. The S Force assumed responsibility for researching the intelligence assault, and months were spent in planning and preparation. Italian sources, particularly their military intelligence service SIM (Servizio Informazion Militare), were very helpful in the research and planning phases and their information proved particularly reliable.(19)

Two main defects had been demonstrated during previous S Force operations in Tunis and Naples: inadequate detailed planning and preparation of intelligence target information, and lack of any continuity of command and staff.(20) Accordingly, more detailed arrange­ments were put in hand in preparation for the capture of Rome, and a con­siderable body of specialists – mainly intelligence and counter-intelligence officers and NCOs – was assembled some months in advance.(21) Maj RGS Cave, the G2 (Advanced) for AFHQ, had proposed a routine procedure for the Intelligence exploitation of large cities in early 1944,(22) and most of his suggestions appear to have been implemented in the occupation of Rome. Targets were not, of course, purely GIS unit premises and agents; the Italian Armed Services ministries, major banks, and other governmental establishments all had to be seized at the earliest possible moment to prevent possible destruction or pillaging and to enable important intelligence documents to be safeguarded. The S Force for Rome included con­siderable numbers of RAF, RN, and Army intelligence officers on temporary loan, as well as US military intelligence personnel. The OC of the force was an American, Col George Smith, GS (Int) of the 15-AG.

NOTES

6. WO 204/6992, from TAC HQ A Force, Occupation of Tunis and Bizerte Memorandum No 1, dated 24 Apr 43 (UK National Archives)
7. WO 204/6992, 18 AG Directive of 23 Apr 43 to 1st Army, Directive for Intelligence Plan – Tunis and Bizerte (UK National Archives)
8. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession # 955
9. Electronic Telegraph Issue 1170, obituary dated 8 August 1998
10. Fleming’s Commandos, by Nicholas Rankin, Faber and Faber 2011, 169
11. WO 204/6992, from TAC HQ A Force, Occupation of Tunis and Bizerte Memorandum No 1, dated 24 Apr 43 (UK National Archives)
12. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession # 955(1)
13. America’s Secret Army, by Ian Sayer and D Botting, Grafton Books London 1989, 119
14. Military Encyclopedia based on Operations in Italian Campaigns 1943-45, by G3 Section HQ 15AG Italy, provided by the US Military History Institute
15. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession # 955(4)
16. FSS – Field Security Section, (reminiscences of Colin Ormiston), by Bob Steers, Robin Steers of Heathfield 1996, 82
17. Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II, produced by the Counter Intelligence Corps School, Fort Holabird, Baltimore, 29
18. Secret Naval Investigator, by Comdr Fredman Ashe Lincoln QC, Kimber; 1961
19. Report, G2 Section, HQ 6AG, dated 10 July 1945; Final Re provided by the US Army Military History Institute
20. WO 204/907, HQ No 1 ICU report dated 28 Dec 44, Mediterranean “S” Operation (UK National Archives)
21. WO 204/907, HQ No 1 ICU report dated 28 Dec 44, Mediterranean “S” Operation (UK National Archives)
22. WO 204/795, G2(Adv) AFHQ Memorandum on “A Suggested Routine Procedure for the Intelligence Exploitation of Large Cities”, undated but subsequent to 24 Apr 44, (UK National Archives)



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