An Office of Strategic (OSS) memo dated Apr 4, 1944, commented on the assignment of Special Counter Intelligence units (SCIUs) to various task forces emanating out of AFHQ. In Naples it stated that the establishment and twenty-four-hour alert status of the S Force are being maintained. Their intelligence mission is to be in the immediate vanguard when Rome falls. (They have been very helpful on the Anzio beachhead).(23) The SCI Units were concerned with the capture, interrogation, and turning of enemy agents. The initial formation which gathered to the north of Naples was a combined British, US, and Italian intelligence group under the command of Col George Smith and Lt Col Dorian Young Jr of the US Army. However, the formation was disbanded when the US 5-A’s advance was stopped. The 276 FSS had been designated as part of the task force but returned to Salerno until the Rome S Force was reformed near Lake Avernus outside Naples. The 276 FSS was then included in a company-sized group under the command of Col James W. Pumpelly (sometimes spelled as Pompelly). According to the CIC History, the security personnel consisted of about 50 CIC personnel and 50 FSS, all under US 5-A CIC direction, but other sources suggest about 40 FSS and 30 CIC were involved in the immediate occupation of the city.(24)
The S Force traveled by sea from Nisida to Cisterna and overnighted in the Alban Hills before entering Rome on Jun 4, 1944, (according to diary notes on its wartime activities).(25) According to the authors of America’s Secret Army, the 88th CIC Detachment was the first CIC unit into Rome on Jun 4, entering ahead of the 1000-strong S Force. The 88th CIC Detachment had covered a coastal area of 15 miles in the Mondragone sector (North of Naples) for an eight week period, during which the unit captured 11 GIS agents from Rome and Florence. Col James Pumpelly had a close shave in Rome when he was almost killed by a booby-trapped fountain pen connected to a box of dynamite. He was saved by a former Italian Army explosives expert, whom he then retained as an orderly for the rest of the war. Pumpelly later commanded the US 6-AG’s T Force (a similar type of formation to the S Force, discussed in later articles).
This Rome S Force also included elements from the OSS, who came under the command of Maj Andrew H. Berding, the chief of X-2 (the OSS Counter-espionage branch) in Naples. On May 23, Lt Paul J Paterni of X-2 was recalled from the S Force holding area at Sessa to his office in Naples until the US 5-A move into Rome. Two other OSS members, Carlo R Gilardi and Clorinda V. Russo, were to remain in Naples until X-2 was partially established in Rome when they would join this unit there.(26)
Valuable information on the location, organization, and personnel of German intelligence training schools in both Rome and Florence was obtained from captured enemy agents before the S Force moved into Rome. This information helped in the capture of 47 principle stay-behind agents and 17 wireless sets in the first three weeks.(27) Lt Paterni had been involved in the interrogation of 3 stay-behind agents caught in the US 5-A area, who had reported on the presence of a further 23 stay-behind agents. Based on that information, Maj Andrew H. Berding and Sgt Victor Abbott of the OSS personnel attached to S Force raided a GIS recruiting HQ and found highly important documents and lists of agents. Two of the senior officers involved in agent recruitment were arrested and the names of others were added to arrest lists. Lt Paterni was put in charge of the investigation on his arrival in Rome but was working outside S Force channels. Another OSS officer, Capt Robinson O. Bellin, arrested two Abwehr agent recruiters and obtained descriptions and cover names of two other GIS agents.
Prior to the fall of Rome, Abwehr Kommando 150 organized a stay-behind network of 15 agents and three W/T sets, controlled by two head agents, a Col Alessi and a professional spy called Capellaro. Unfortunately for them, these head agents were in fact Allied agents planted on the Abwehr by the Italian SIM/CS and British MI6,(28) so the network was rounded up immediately after the city was occupied. The German Sicherheitsdeinst (SD) had also prepared a network called the Falco Organization, consisting of four groups of a total of 40 agents. They were controlled by the German Embassy to the Holy See. Again, this organization was penetrated by a British agent working in Rome prior to the liberation, with such effect that 24 of the agents were picked within three days of the occupation. A similar SD sabotage group of 20 agents was given up by its leader, who surrendered himself to the Allies.(29)
The S Force was then divided into smaller teams covering different sectors of the city. A report on the operation from the counter-intelligence perspective noted that the objectives were divided into personnel and building targets, grouped together according to the proximity of the location, with usually two to five targets allocated to a target team. A target team would consist of a specialist nucleus of security personnel assisted by combat troops as required. The S Force had three FS Sections, about 30 CIC personnel, 6 OSS officers, 6 British SCI officers, and 35 SIM/CS personnel. Of the 130 personnel targets, 40 were found and detained, and another 85 spot targets were subsequently picked up based on new information. Personnel targets were the first objectives, while the 30 building targets were secured by the combat troops, who prevented entry or exit until the security personnel arrived.(30)
There was an intelligence coup shortly after the fall of Rome in June 1944, when the Allies captured the greater part of the intelligence files of the German 14.Army Headquarters in one fell swoop. An analysis of the material, written at the time, shows what information the GIS was obtaining from radio intercepts, from agent reports, and from prisoners. The files also showed the success of the Allies both in security and in the use of deception material for the major attack through the Cassino line, which resulted in the capture of Rome. The S Force units for Rome reached the city in two waves, and the ensuing operation lasted about 10 days. The 276 FSS was in the first wave and succeeded in picking up several men on the target lists, including the Italian general in charge of OVRA (the Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism), which was the Italian equivalent of the German Gestapo. The section established an office at via Sicilia, along with several other British and American intelligence units. Elements of the 276 FSS worked for several weeks with SCIU personnel rounding up Italian fascists trained as stay-behind sabotage agents.(31) The 97 and the 314 FSS were part of the second wave into Rome. The 314 FSS located themselves at the Hotel Flora, which was formerly occupied by the Gestapo. The section was used in operations to capture Sicherheitsdienst (SD), SS and Gestapo officials, agents, and collaborators.(32) The 97 FSS had been allocated its S Force role while serving in Caserta in January 1944. The unit arrived in Rome via Naples on Jun 9/10, and worked directly under Lt Col Dorian Young at AFHQ in vetting suspects and arresting agents. The unit finally left Rome in March 1945.(33)
Most of 30 Commando had been transferred back to the UK prior to the invasion of France, but the remnants of 34 Troop joined the S Force for Rome using the cover of Special Engineering Unit. The troop, which was the British Army element of 30 Commando, had suffered heavy losses during the fighting on the island of Leros in October 1943. The results of the S Force Rome were so encouraging that it was decided to operate similar assault forces in other large cities as they were occupied by the Allies, in Italy, Austria and Northwest Europe. The Rome S Force also established a system of controls to prevent the misuse of captured documents which was considered by the COSSAC planners in London to be so effective that it was used as an example for the T Forces under the SHAEF command to emulate later.(34)
As an indication that the role of the S Force was changing, a letter dated Jun 12, 1944, from the US Army’s MIS outlined the MIS Intelligence requirements for future S Force operations, starting with scientific targets: locations of German experiments in progress on Biological Warfare; rockets, explosives, electronic devices, all new technology – and the names of scientists involved. Next in importance came strategic, economic, and political information.(35) The Rome S Force had also been used by the American Alsos Mission to gain access to personnel and targets which were of interest in connection with the Axis atomic research and by 30 Commando seeking technical information for the British Naval Intelligence Department.
No 1 INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION UNIT (ICU)
The Rome ‘drill’ was so successful that it was decided to retain the essential elements of S Force as a permanent body, to be renamed as No 1 Intelligence Collection Unit (No.1 ICU), and used subsequently in Florence and in all the main cities of the Po Valley. There were numerous other S Force operations as each major town and city was taken by the Allies. Bracia, Rimini, Florence, Ferrara, Padua, Tarvisio, Forli, and Venice were all targets occupied by S Forces, with various FSS sections being employed in the operations. On Jul 19, a CIC detachment entered Leghorn (Livorno) as part of an S Force operation, but little was found as the town had been largely abandoned.
In Aug and Sept 1944, preparations were made in London and Rome for a Florence S Force. The OSS X-2 (Counter-Intelligence) field group was attached to the Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) with the designation SCI/Z and placed under the military control of the Assistant CoS, G2 (CI) of the AAI. His specialized work (running Controlled Enemy Agents or CEAs) was to be coordinated by 1 SCIU, a similar, more experienced British unit composed of MI5 and MI6 officers.(36) For Florence the SCI/Z station was divided into two teams, one to work with the British team and the CIC in the Piazzi Signoria, servicing the Counter Intelligence Branch (CIB) of 15 AG in the handling of special CI interrogations. The other was located in the OSS HQ.(37)
The 263 and the 412 FSS were both parts of the S Force operation in Florence in Aug 1944, as was 34 Troop of 30 Commando. The name of S Force itself was changed to No 1 Intelligence Collection Unit (No 1 ICU) immediately after the Rome operation. The 34 Troop was given several targets, including an Abwehr training school, but were not allowed to occupy these targets ahead of the advance of the main forces. The result was that most targets were evacuated well ahead of the Allied advance. After the capture of Florence, the 34 Troop (aka the Special Engineering Unit) underwent training prior to operating with SOE and Italian partisans to assist the advance on and capture of Genoa on Apr 27, 1945. The subsequent mopping up operations in Florence were more successful. In Oct 1944, for example, all 15 members of one Abwehr espionage course were captured and gathered for a group photograph in the prison at Florence(38).
NOTES
23. RG226 Entry 110, Box 46, Folder 470, NARA, Operational Report for X2-NATO Jan 1-Apr 1, 1944, dated 5 Apr 1944
24. Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II, produced by the Counter Intelligence Corps School, Fort Holabird, Baltimore, 30
25. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession # 955(4)
26. RG226 Entry 126 Box 2 Folder 22, NARA: Letter From OSS X-2 AAI to CO OSS AAI dated 23/5/44
27. Secret War Report of the OSS, by Anthony Cave Brown, Berkley Pub. Corp. 1976, 218
28. WO 204/12397, HQ AAI Report dated 19 June 44, SCI Activities in Rome, (UK National Archives)
29. WO 204/12916, Counter-Espionage activities in the Western Mediterranean theatre of operations, dated 29th June 1944, (UK National Archives)
30. WO 204/12916, HQ Allied Armies in Italy Memorandum on Seizure of Rome from I(b) Point of View, dated 3 July 44, (UK National Archives)
31. FSS – Field Security Section, (reminiscences of Gerald Cockell), by Bob Steers, Robin Steers of Heathfield 1996, 148
32. Article in Intelligence Corps magazine, by J D Martin, Rose and Laurel 1987
33. Intelligence Corps Museum Accession #955(2)
34. RG331 Box 142, NARA, Use of Archives by MI
35. WO 204/943, MIS letter dated 12 June 44 to JICANA, IBS Branch (UK National Archives)
36. X-2 War Diary Vol 7 Basic Documents, “Redesignation of OSS X-2 Detachment” dated 18 July 1944, (NARA)
37. RG226 Entry 176 Box 2/2, NARA, X-2 History Project, “X-2 Italy”
38. FSS – Field Security Section, (reminiscences of Hugh Dovey), by Bob Steers, Robin Steers of Heathfield 1996, 134
