The attack, however, continued. The enemy facing the 23-IR had retired south of the Amblève River to take up strong defensive positions on the south bank. As the deployed troops of the 23-IR pushed on down to the river bank they were subjected to intense small arms and mortar fire, but in spite of heavy casualties, the 2/23-IR managed to reach the near bank. But the position was untenable; exposed to direct fire from the other side, the troops were being decimated. After dark on Jan 16, the battalion pulled back to the high ground southwest of Ondeval. In the center sector of the 16-IR, it was found that the enemy occupying the southern half of Faymonville, in spite of a show of force earlier in the night, had withdrawn to the south.
By 0915, the town was open and the high ground was taken to the south. Enemy resistance stiffened almost immediately, however. As the 2/16-IR pushed on down the road to Schoppen, with Fox Co in the lead, intense small arms fire supported by self-propelled guns was laid on the advancing troops from the town. The condition of the road prevented friendly tanks from being brought up, and it is doubtful that they would have had much effect anyway; the enemy was firing from hull-down positions and had the road covered and zeroed in from several directions.
Meanwhile, the 1/5.FR facing the 18-IR on the right continued to resist any attempts to push further south, a resistance that was considerably aided by artillery support that resembled that of Heistern and Verlautenheid ridge during the Battle of Aachen. An attempt to take over the enemy ground was turned back although other elements of the 18-IR managed to push through the snow east of the Klingesberg draw. To the east, the 1055.Regiment (89.VGD) was identified holding the northern edge of the woods from 903017 to 921017. In spite of the artillery concentrations laid on the 18-IR, enemy artillery over the whole front showed a substantial decrease from the day before, when more than 1700 rounds were reported. The reduction was believed to be the result of the 3.FD artillery moving to more secure areas.
The next day, Jan 17, the first offensive enemy reaction to the attack of the 18-IR hit King Co at 888018. About 40 men from the 1/5.FR supported by two tanks attacked and were repulsed. Later elements of the 18-IR managed to push to the southern edge of Hill 566 and to the high ground north of Schoppen (Schleid). Enemy artillery was intense. On the other end of the front, the enemy mounted a major counter-attack to break up the drive of the 23-IR (with 1/18-IR attached) through the Rohr Busch.
About 200 men from the 8.FR (160 of whom were replacements fresh from Holland), plus 60 men from the 13.Company, 9.FR, and 30 men from the 3.FD-Recon unit, launched their attack supported by five to seven self-propelled guns. The attack came in at 0730, just before the 23-IR was to launch its own attack to clear the woods, and raged back and forth through the woods until noon. Extremely heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy; at least two-thirds of the attacking force was killed, captured, or wounded, and by 1400 the remnants of the enemy began pulling out to the south.
While this fight was going on, the 1/18-IR, attacked the elements of the 1/9.FR plus the 15/8.FR, and the reserve companies of both regiments which were holding the pocket south of the Amblève River cleaned the force out of the woods. The complete surprise of the attack from the south resulted in the capture of three 88-MM guns, four 105-MM howitzers, a half-track, and an ammunition dump. These two actions on the western flank of the Division sector netted a total of 236 prisoners for the day. To the east, the 16 and 18-IR continued to work their way south under heavy artillery fire. On Jan 19, four more enemy-held towns were taken in the worst weather of the battle. Eibertingen, the first, was defended by a force of about 130 replacements and stragglers from the Rohr Busch.
The entrance to the town was blocked by a large number of wooden box mines (Shoemines). Self-propelled guns and one tank were in the town, which faced the attacking 23-IR, and it was only after heavy artillery concentrations forced the enemy to fall back into the town that infantrymen were able to move forward and seize several houses on the northern edge. The enemy counter-attacked immediately, and bitter hand-to-hand fighting resulted, but by 1400, the enemy troops began to pull out toward Deidenberg. One hundred prisoners were taken and more than 35 enemies dead were counted in the streets.
Captured – Order of Col Liebach, Resuming Command 8.Fall.Regiment
8.Fall-Regt, Jan 7. (Commanding Officer, Special Order).
As of today, I am again in command of the 8.Fall.Regiment. I greet you in old comradeship and mindful of the old spirit and soldierly bearing which you displayed in so many actions as paratroopers. With proud memory, I think of the many officers, NCOs, and enlisted men who died for the freedom and future of Germany. Also, I think of the many who were taken prisoner through no fault of their own and who now must endure the rest of the war defenseless. I particularly expect the old men of the Eighth to carry on the traditions of the regiment and also that the new men will fit themselves into the unit. They owe that spirit to the many who have died for the banner in the course of their duty. With the old paratrooper’s spirit, we will fight on, master the difficult, and achieve the impossible. I expect strict discipline in all men of my command; expect everyone to bear responsibility for his command down to the letter. We know that we, paratroopers, always draw the toughest assignments. In the proud tradition of our branch, we think back to the men of Crete, the many battles in the east, west, and south which have added here and there more and more glory to our banner! We are a community of battle-hardened men; we look with confidence to the new year!
Our watchword is: Strong and True For the Fuehrer and Reich!!!
sf Liebach, Col and CO, First Staff Officer
sf Gaul, Major
Montenau and Iveldingen, also taken by the 23-IR, put up less resistance, and only 22 prisoners were taken from the two towns. The most effective resistance was put up by a nine-man strong point from the 5.Co, 352.Regiment in Iveldingen; the same group was later encountered in Montenau after they had been forced back. With the line on Jan 20 running roughly on the axis Deidenberg Eibertingen Schoppen, the division attack held up, except for readjustment of the lines and mopping up of stubborn areas. Most stubborn of these was the Bütgenbacher Hutte, where elements of the Fusilier Battalion, 89.VGD, and the 1/1055.Regiment were deeply and skillfully dug in. Division troops succeeded in clearing about 800 yards of the northern edge of the woods in the face of extremely heavy small arms and artillery fire and the relentless weather and terrain. On other sectors of the front, the enemy took advantage of the breather to reorganize his shattered forces and feverishly erect defenses. He was anxious to learn our intentions.
Captured Interrogation Report.
This document was captured by the 1-ID. It is a model of its kind in several ways. First, it indicates how much the enemy wants to know about our order of battle, our replacement system, and our organization. Second, it points up again the enemy’s preoccupation with the propaganda value of interrogation, i. e., V-1 damage in London, the effect of leaflets and the stock question, and the progress of Communism in America. Third, and most important, it shows that the soldier in question refused to say a word of value to the enemy. His identification was made by shoulder patches and documents.
89.Inf-Div, Div CP, Jan 24, G-2 Sec, Interrogation Report.
Through interrogation of a POW taken shortly after midnight 2000 meters north of Büllingen, the following information was obtained. (Unit) 9-IR (2-ID). Through document interpretation, it is believed that the POW probably belongs to the 1/9-IR. The shoulder patch of the 2-ID, US Army, was worn on the sleeve. (Name) Sgt Edward G. Morlock, 35129778, 25 years old single, from Ohio. In the army since Sept 1941. Morlock for over one year, volunteer; civilian occupation, clerk. (History) According to documents, the POW was still in Camp Blanding, Florida in Jun 1944. Five months ago he came to England and has been in this sector for a few months. At one time he came through the outskirts of London, where he observed heavy damage and saw intense labor being done.
(Circumstances of Capture) During the night of Jan 22—23, he was at an outpost with a few other 2000 meters north of Büllingen. The POW was somewhat in advance of the others. Here he was surprised by a German patrol of about 5—6 men which he did not notice due to their white camouflaged clothing. He was taken POW without a fight while the others escaped. (Attitude of the POW) The POW shows good soldierly bearing and refuses to give any information, although he has been influenced by propaganda about the supposed maltreatment of American POWs. He refused to give information about his unit, a number of replacements and losses, the location of the 23 and 38-IRs, neighboring divisions, or weapons of his unit with the reasoning that he would hurt his friends that way. The POW says that he is ready to take the consequences of his decision.
(Weapons, Equipment, Rations) As far as weapons are concerned he admitted that he himself had only an M-1 at the time of capture but added that his battalion has heavy mortars, with which they will bombard Büllingen. He would not say how many mortars there are in a company or platoon. From captured documents, it can be assumed that the 2nd Platoon of Able Co was supported by 60-MM mortars. With reference to gas masks, the POW said that each man has a gas mask that is always kept within reach. In case of loss, the mask is replaced without penalty. Concerning his basic training, the POW would say nothing. Food was termed excellent by POW; he got warm food twice daily. (Own propaganda and Enemy Propaganda) Our own propaganda leaflets and loudspeakers were not observed by the POW. However, he was very much influenced by the US’s point of view. During our breakthrough at one time, we were alleged to have murdered 105 drivers after taking them, prisoner. In another instance, German tanks were alleged to have shot several drivers after they had surrendered. To our doubts, he answered that the report can be read in the ‘Stars and Stripes (the US Army newspaper).
(Miscellaneous) With reference to his serial number, the POW said that all volunteers do not have an [1] as a first number. Those who enlisted before a certain date kept their old serial number. Concerning the end of the war, the prisoner said because of the rapid advance of the Russians the war would be over by April at the latest. Our resistance on the western front is still formidable, but what he saw of our transport on his way to the rear he termed ‘catastrophic’. He expressed surprise that soldiers march everywhere and that so many dilapidated vehicles are on the roads. When we explained, he replied that in spite of the weather conditions all the vehicles needed repair and maintenance badly. America and England know how to prevent Communism from spreading in Europe and the more territory England and America occupy the better Germany will be. (Interpreter, Schonfeld, Corporal)
Division patrols heard digging and construction work all along the front as the enemy tried to bring a coordinated resistance line out of the chaos. This activity, with concomitant stubborn defensive action on the part of the enemy troops in the Butgenbacher Hutte, continued to Jan 24. It was clear from patrol reports that the enemy intended to make an MLR on the east bank of the Moderscheid River, with an outpost line on the western bank.
On Jan 24, the enemy’s Morscheck position, which he had captured in the early stages of his December offensive, was retaken. The Morscheck crossroads, possibly the best organized of the enemy’s defensive positions, and probably where he least expected an attack, was held by the 1/1055.Regiment. The force was divided by the attack of the 18 and 26-IRs, and our troops, achieving this breakthrough by surprise, continued to push on south and southwest against stubborn but disorganized resistance. Coincidentally, the enemy positions in the Butgenbacher Hutte were heavily attacked and the enemy was forced to withdraw from the northern part of the woods. A high number of prisoners were taken from the 1/1055.Regiment, which held the eastern part of the woods as well as the crossroads, and the 2/1055.Regiment which was deployed to the west.
Our troops pushing south from the crossroads position reached Moderscheid shortly before dark. Our positions in the vicinity of the crossroads were counter-attacked by the 2/1056.Regiment which had assembled in Hepscheid, but effective artillery fire beat the attack off. A second attack by 50 enemies was similarly handled. Moderscheid itself fell after a brief struggle when the 3/5.FR pulled out toward Hepscheid at dusk. A total of more than 280 prisoners were taken during the day.
On the next day, Jan 25, the enemy was cleared from the ridge southwest of Moderscheid, and the towns of Amblève and Mirfeld were taken. The 2/1055.Regiment encircled in the Butgenbacher Hutte area managed to extricate only a limited number of its personnel to Hepscheid to organize another line of defense.
