Defense of the Moletta River Line
At 2100, just four hours prior to H-hour for the contemplated raid, the 3/157’s positions were subjected to an intense and jolting artillery and mortar barrage. As soon as the barrage subsided somewhat, German infantry with strong tank support suddenly assaulted Love Co and the adjacent British on the right. While the main enemy pressure was hurled between Love Co and the left flank unit of the British 2nd North Staffordshire Regiment, Item Co fought off a limited diversionary attack. There were several farm buildings 350 yards to the front of Love Co, which the enemy employed as an assembly area to discharge waves of infantry into the 3/157’s right flank. Increased activity around the farm buildings disclosed that the Germans had organized for more than just a small-scale attack. Several hundred yards to the right of these buildings, sixteen Mark VI-1 tanks (Tiger) were slowly but without stopping rumbling towards the British positions. Three hundred yards to the left of the farmhouses an abandoned American tank (M-3) was fully utilized as a pillbox. Even though the tank was immobilized, the Germans had organized a strong point of three heavy machine guns, with excellent fields of fire, around and under the stricken vehicle.
Soon it was discovered that five German Tigers were roaming about to the direct front of the gap between Item and Love Cos. Apparently these armored monsters were leisurely and playfully endeavoring to locate a weak point along the forward line. Item Co was alert to this mechanized threat and marshaled the only active AT measures available for defense. Bazooka men were in the most advantageous firing positions and the artillery forward observer was firing all available guns at his command. The passive AT measures of minefields would be partially effective in retarding the few tanks which might breakthrough.
When the attack had started, all men were alerted to battle because of the tremendous volume of deadly artillery, tank, mortar, automatic weapons, and small arms fire that covered the entire battalion sector. Just as this untimely attack began, the battalion switchboard operator opened all circuits starting a party line, which connected the battalion commander, the company commanders, and the mortar and artillery observers. A lateral line had been laid to the British, establishing communication with them.
The Germans’ initial preparatory and subsequent covering fires actually destroyed the four heavy machine guns in the sector of Love Co and the two heavy machine guns in Item Co’s right flank within the first thirty minutes of the attack. It was unknown how the enemy neutralized these automatic weapons as quickly as they did. In addition to the light machine guns of the rifle companies, there were two extra light machine guns from Mike Co in action. These two soldiers, one a sergeant and the other a German-speaking private, had cautiously crawled to a vantage point in one of the dry wadis. When the right flank of the enemy was suddenly turned for heavy machine-gun fire, the German officers and non-commissioned officers could be heard bellowing commands to maintain the unity of the organization and to keep contact with adjacent units. It was at this opportune moment that the two American soldiers decided to play havoc with their German counterparts.
The German-speaking American subjected the enemy to a mixture of official-sounding commands and sworn epithets while the American sergeant demonstrated his prowess as a hand grenade thrower. This little sidelight provided a touch of comedy to what was meant to be entirely a tragedy. Any enemy soldiers that had strayed or had become lost from his unit was ordered by the American to move in the latter’s direction. The GI even lashed out with fluent obscene German retorts to entice the enemy within grenade range of the two men from Love Co. Additional grenades were supplied the sergeant and his comrade realized quite a profitable hour of labor before withdrawing into their company’s main position. (Statement of Capt Clifford R. Austin, February 10, 1944).
During the initial phase of the attack, the commander of Love Co, Capt Clifford R. Austin, had requested an immediate 81-MM mortar fire in the vicinity of the farm buildings. Enemy reserves were being assembled here in order to exploit any serious penetration or major break in the forward lines. The 81-MM mortar section, emplaced in the quarry, was assigned the fire mission of dispersing the enemy forming in the rear of the farm buildings. This target had been previously designated as a primary target and registration fires had been completed by this mortar section. Forty to fifty rounds of HE Light ammunition were fired at a rapid rate and thereafter sustained fire was maintained for several hours. This one section of 81-MM mortars expended 3600 rounds of ammunition. Several hundred rounds were fired blindly without the employment of a forward observer.
(Doc Snafu) US Army ammunition at hand for 60-MM and 81-MM mortars. (1) 60-MM, a. Shell HE M-49-A2 HE; b. Shell ILL M-83-A1, Illuminating with Parachute; c. WP M-302 White Phosphorus. (2) 81-MM, a. Shell HE M-43-A1 Explosive (light); b. Shell HE M-45-B1 (light) Explosive; c. Shell HE M-56 (heavy) Explosive; d. Shell WP SMOKE M-57 White Phosphorus; e. Shell FS SMOKE M-57 (Red Smoke).
When Love Co requested fire on the enemy assembly area, it was discovered that the platoon leader and two mortar section leaders of the 81-MM mortar platoon were isolated and cut off from friendly troops, along with an artillery forward observers’ party of four men. The heavy weapons company commander conversed with his mortar platoon leader by telephone and learned that the trapped observers could not escape from their observation post, a two-story stucco house located in the gap between Item and Love Cos. The observers reported that bursts of machine-gun fire prevented them from using the windows to observe and adjust artillery and mortar fire on available enemy targets. Consequently, these observers were of no assistance in firing on the reserves forming near the farm buildings. Initially, the mortars were actually obtaining excellent results without the use of observers, Capt Austin reported that the fire was perfect and exactly where he wanted it, and to maintain heavy fire on that target.
The heavy weapons company commander contacted the battalion commander at his forward CP and requested permission to take a squad of riflemen from King Co and extricate the forward observers from their positions. Inasmuch as wire communications were out and could not be maintained, and the radio communication proved inadequate, the request was granted. Subsequently, the Forward Observer parties returned to safety after spending a harassing hour. They soon occupied, other OPs and contributed to the defensive battle action. The heavy weapons company commander suggested that the battalion commander move his CP to another site that offered better observation and much more protection. The suggestion was ignored and the battalion commander remained in a position where the enemy was continually shelling in order to maintain better control of the situation. A short time later the battalion commander was killed by tank fire and the battalion executive officer assumed command. The new battalion commander had maintained close contact with the progress of the battle and was a well-qualified professional to continue the defense of the position.
It was ascertained that the British Staffordshires were fighting a losing battle against overwhelming numbers, both in men and tanks. The British company on the immediate right flank had fought courageously against the several waves of tanks attacking them, but the unit had been reduced to one-third of its original strength. The Brits had exhausted their supply of ammunition, and their supply road had been cut temporarily by a group of infiltrating enemies. The Tommies requested the use of the 3/157 supply road and shortly afterward this road was subjected to intense shelling by the Germans. However, the British were supplied with ammunition from the distribution point in Love Co’s sector. The British had been partially equipped with some American weapons and this fact plus Love Co having a reserve supply of ammunition on the position was conducive to prolonging the battle insofar as the Tommies were concerned. This proved to be only a temporary measure, for the British company commander requested permission to withdraw his unit and join Love Co, after having made their third bayonet attack due to a lack of ammunition. The British officer and sixty men, all that remained of that unit, were granted their request but were either captured or killed before joining Love Co.
As soon as it was evident that the British position was untenable, plans were made to reinforce the right flank of Love Co with part of the 3/157’s small reserve. The British regiment had fought gallantly but could not be expected to resist indefinitely against superior odds on flat terrain. Small gaps appeared in their lines and in several hours the British were forced to withdraw about 400 yards and reorganize along the wadis. This withdrawal exposed the right shoulder of the battalion’s position. The companies of the 3/157 began shifting to establish defenses against renewed attacks that were sure to come. Two squads from King Co moved to the extreme right flank of Love Co, and after several skirmishes, the enemy infiltration stopped.
A raiding party from King Co flanked and captured a German machine-gun crew that had penetrated the lines and was pouring fire into Love Co’s position. The 3-RB (Rangers), a platoon of volunteers organized for raids and combat patrols, hurried from a reserve position to the extreme right flank of the battalion to reinforce the two squads of King Co. The collapse of the adjacent British troops on the right forced Love Co to organize a perimeter defense. The right platoon of Love Co and the recently added reinforcements were pulled back in order to protect the right rear of the battalion. The new position of Love Co now assumed the outline of a semicircle or crescent moon. Later as enemy tanks and approximately fifty paratroopers attacked the rear areas of the British sector, the 3/157 right flank was exposed to this new threat.
To counter the situation, the battalion commander extended his line to the southeast, withdrawing Love Co to keep it from being trapped. All available men in the vicinity of the battalion Command post were employed to outpost the rear of the sector and to prevent further infiltration and penetration nearer the command post. Meanwhile, Item Co had withstood the minor thrusts made at its position and had reinforced the fires of King Co in denying the enemy any penetration in the gap between the front-line companies. However, a German tank had broken through into the left rear of Item Co and was shelling the 81-MM mortars in position behind King Co. Each time the mortars fired, the tank retaliated and finally succeeded in driving the mortars into the rock quarry, where they aided in turning back the tank to its own lines. When Love Co had withdrawn to the southeast, its left platoon (on the west of the company position) had a terrific skirmish of thirty minutes in a successful attempt to disengage itself and cover the withdrawal of the main force of Love Co. The fighting engaged in by this platoon seemed to be a hopeless measure because it had turned into a hectic and confusing hand-to-hand affair. However, the platoon composed mainly of seasoned troops, fought hard, determinedly, and became disengaged through the efforts of one squad. This squad screened the disengagement of the platoon and then resorted to individual tactics and infiltration to rejoin their unit. Only two men of this squad failed to return, so the action was considered to be successful.
All of the casualties, both the dead and the wounded, were left behind so as not to jeopardize the withdrawal to the new position of those men still able to fight. After Love Co had organized in its new position, combat patrols were dispatched frequently to determine the strength and probable intentions of the increasing enemy forces to the east and southeast (right rear). Other patrols were organized to the outpost and screen the rear against further infiltration, especially by small groups of Fallschirmjaeger force which had been detected on the right rear. These German paratroopers were contacted and soon liquidated. (Lt Charles P. Barker, Feb 10, 1944). The position of the 3/157 remained intact but offered a precarious situation that grew more alarming as each minute passed. The only supply road leading into the position was under constant fire and several jeeps ran the gauntlet to bring in ammunition and to evacuate the wounded to the battalion aid station. Due to the bulge in the British sector, the 3/157 was on the west shoulder of this indenture, protruding like a large wart and ready to be cut off.
The Division and the Corps HQs were alert to the 3/157’s predicament and were endeavoring either to reinforce the battalion position or to have a sufficiently strong force counter-attack and partially restore the over-run British position. The latter solution was more desirable inasmuch as it would secure the right flank and rear of the 3/157, as well as reestablish the initial line of the previous day. Moreover, the greatest problem was in locating a unit that could be withdrawn from the line in another sector without endangering the strength of that portion of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) and employing it as a counter-attacking force in the hard-pressed sector. Reserves in each sector were greatly inadequate and it would involve many risks to shift units of a battalion or a regimental strength from one sector to another. Directly to the rear of the 3/157, there were only several British artillery batteries (twenty-five pounders) between the defending battalion and the service troops of the VI Corps in Anzio. The only available infantry reserve in the sector of the 157-IR was the 1/157, 2500 yards to the left rear, which occupied breakthrough positions and constituted the only combat troops between the MLR and Anzio.
Immediate measures were required to maintain a more tenable position and to continue the defense of this sector. At 0500, February 3, the heavily shelled 3/157 command post and the two 81-MM mortar sections nearby were withdrawn, suffering casualties as men came under small arms and machine-gun fire in attempting to cross open ground in the early dawn. Item Co made a slight withdrawal to relieve increasing pressure by the enemy to exploit his gains on the battalion’s right flank. As soon as the new Battalion CP was established and the 81-MM mortars had been emplaced in new positions, Item Co launched a counter-attack at 0630 and regained its former position. The enemy had occupied the ground formerly held by Love Co. When Love Co had withdrawn to the southeast, it was necessary for King Co to retire a few hundred yards in order to further support both front-line companies and to repel the enemy if he should attack through the gap between Item and Love Cos.
The new Main Line of Resistance extended now from Item Co’s position on the Buonriposo Ridge to the east across intervening wadis and then turned southeast for several hundred yards. These wadis were natural obstacles with a depth of thirty to fifty feet and just as wide across the top of the gulch. These new positions were organized around the wadis, utilizing these freaks of nature to the maximum advantage. Being perpendicular to the enemy’s advance, the wadis offered excellent defensive positions from which the enemy could be stopped from making further gains. As the enemy’s attack slowed, new lines of communication were established and by 0800, the battalion position was consolidated and improvements continued. A new supply line was established which required carrying parties to transport the supplies through the wadis that lead directly from the south into the vicinity of the new battalion CP. Ammunition, water, and rations were replenished, and the new battalion aid station was established, near the Battalion CP, 800 yards west of its former location.
At 0830, the attack ceased and the Germans began consolidating their costly gains. Concentrated artillery and mortar fire was maintained on the former positions of the 3/157 in an effort to prevent the enemy from entrenching and establishing himself too permanently. It was believed that the 3/157 could attack and restore its initial positions. However, all available forces in the battalion were committed and were actively engaged, and soon it was learned that the battalion could not be assigned a reserve sufficient to launch a successful counter-attack to regain the old positions. One rifle company from another regiment was sent to support the battalion. It was now planned to reinforce the present position, dig in, and prepare for another phase of defensive combat.
The Relief of the 3rd Battalion
At 1400, February 8, a recon party from the 1/157 arrived to recon the 3/157’s positions in order to relieve the latter battalion commencing at dark that night. Installations of the Battalion CP and the 81-MM mortars were relieved from dark, due to the fact that these positions were well-defiladed and hidden from enemy observation. The relief was completed by 0100 and the weary men of the 3/157 marched to the breakthrough positions formerly held by the 1/157. Even though they were tired, dirty, hungry, and some wounded, the men of the 3/157 remained in good spirits, with the feeling that once again they had withstood an enemy onslaught of superior odds.
