Concentration for Husky
Concentration, April 22 to July 22, 1943. Pursuant to orders CG, IAC, the 2-AD moved from Rabat, French Morocco to the vicinity of FAITC (Fifth Army Invasion Training Center) located in Oran, Algeria (Port aux Poules), by rail and motor beginning April 22 and closing May 22. An average train density of 2 500-ton trains daily was allotted to the division for the move. Track vehicles, except lightly loaded H/T, moved by rail from Port Lyautey, and all other vehicles moved overland. Car crews and necessary command groups moved with their respective commands by rail or road. This movement was made without incident except for that shortage of rail equipment, the interruption of rail service for two days by flash flood near Meknes, Morocco, and heavy traffic both rail and road delayed the concentration.
Training for Husky
A. During the period of May 16 to June 19, intensive physical hardening training was conducted which included violent exercises, calisthenics obstacle courses, rope climbing, forced road marches, etc. All guns were test-fired, and tactical exercises using ball ammunition were conducted. Amphibious training utilizing the facilities the FAITC included instruction and practical work in waterproofing vehicles, loading various types of craft and ships, and landing exercises.
B. Difficulties were experienced with the unloading of the LST’s and LCTts since the draft of these vessels was not suited to the gradient of the beaches in the vicinity of Arzew. Considerable lost of time resulted while various types of equipment for unloading LST’s were tried out under the direction of the Navy and FAITC. The final solution of unloading LST’s was to use LCT’s with sides out and transhipping the vehicles, an unsatisfactory solution at the best, slow and laborious in a calm sea and a most difficult task in the dark or with a sea running. Little attention was paid to this practice loading by Naval officers except by very junior officers, and no comments were made concerning the weight limitation of the LSTs.
C. A practice landing was conducted on June 17 to June 19 which was intended to be a full-scale rehearsal. Elaborate preparations were made along the selected beach, such as wire, obstacles, enemy in position with flares, ammunition, etc. Secrecy as to hour and place of landing was maintained until the convoy put out to sea. Due to the lack of shipping, only approximately 80% of the assault units and about 75% of the armored vehicles could participate. This excluded troops of vehicles on the two troop ships, the seven Liberty type store ships, twelve LCIs and fire LCTs. This exercise had considerable benefit to those who participated but due to the relatively small scale of the operation it was of limited value to the division as a whole.
Loading for Husky
A. June 13 to July 5. Concurrently with the above. training equipment was prepared for shipment, vehicles were waterproofed, ships and craft loaded in accordance with the mounting schedule prescribed by the 7-A.
B. Inspection of ships and craft indicated generally insufficient AAA protection. To overcome this, organic weapons of the division were loaded on decks with favorable locations to completely cover respective ships. These guns were included in the AAA Artillery protection of the ship and were fired under the supervision of and at the direction of Naval gunnery officers on board.
Secrecy for Husky
A. All loading of personnel, except for small details, was accomplished at night. Necessary mass personnel, ships guard, billeting parties, advance CPs, etc, were brought to the ships’ side in small groups so as not to attract attention to loading being conducted.
B. The vacated bivouac sites were taken over by personnel remaining behind and in construction of dummy tents and other installations, so as to present a picture of an unchanged bivouac. This rearrangement of the camp was accomplished under cover of darkness and concurrently with the departure of troops being loaded.
C. A signal detachment with a comparable number of radios to those of the 2nd Armored Division was installed prior to the loading dates and took over all radio traffic of the division so as to present unchanged radio activity.
D. All plans and orders in connection with this operation and loading were kept in a locked room under guard to which only officers classified for the purpose had access. Orders necessary to accomplish the loading and essential advance planning were issued to subordinates without explanation or discussion of the operation.
Husky – Sea Trip
A. Due to convoy requirements the landing craft type vessels, 23 LCIs transporting the 18-RCT, 5 LSTs transporting the armored elements of Combat Command D and advance elements of the 540th Engineer Combat Battalion, 7 LCTs transporting the 540th Engineer Combat Battalion and the armored vehicles of Combat Command B, left Azrew on June 24 to rendezvous off the Tunis and Bizerte areas. They departed from Bizerte on July 8.
LSTs assigned to armored units had been loaded exactly as they were loaded in the various exercises of June 27, varying in the payload from about 600 tons to about 850 tons. On July 3, nine days after the departure of these craft from Arzew and five days before their sailing date, orders were received from the Navy to reduce the weights to 500 tons each. This would have reduced the tank strength of the Kool Force to about one company of medium tanks.
This separation from the rest of the division necessitated the transmission of any last-minute instructions to them by courier. Three such trips were required due to changes in the situation. No contact other than this courier service was established with these craft until the arrival of the convoy off Gela in Sicily on DDay when radio contact was established.
B. Seven Liberty ships carried a considerable portion of the combat and administrative vehicles of the Kool Force in addition to essential ammunition, gasoline, and rations for the operation. These ships departed from Oran on July 5 with the troops’ ships but due to convoy requirements left that convoy. They rejoined the Kool Force off Gela on D+1.
C. Two troops ships transporting the Kool Force HQs, Combat Command B, HQ, and crew for combat vehicles (being carried in Liberty ships and landing craft) departed Oran on July 5 and arrived off Gela with the assault force on D-Day.
Husky – Debarkation
Constant and close liaison was maintained with the Navy during the preparation of plans and orders. Orders, as issued, were in every respect in accord with the Naval operational orders. On arrival off Sicily, however, several instances occurred which materially delayed the landing.
A. Small crafts were not manned by sufficiently trained or responsible personnel. Numerous examples were noted where boats failed to come alongside in response to orders, land as directed, or return to the proper ship for reloading.
In many instances, Army Commanders ashore searched up and down the beach for these crafts and redirected them on their mission. It appeared that the small crafts were used entirely at the will of the operators and so, there was no control over these vessels. It is believed essential that these crafts be operated in small groups each under the control of a responsible Naval officer.
Adequate communication between boat group commanders and individual LCMs, LCVPs, and LCTs, must be provided.
This control must tie the beach master to the boat group commander as well as the controlling Naval authority afloat. Orders given in many cases by the beach master were not obeyed by small boats.
B. On receipt of orders to land, information was received from the Naval command that LCIs were at that time in cruising formation and not the planned landing formation. It being impracticable to weigh anchor, maneuver out to sea, and assume the proper formation, it as decided to debark the 18-RCT from the cruising formation of the ships and reorganize troops into attack formation on the shore.
C. The plan for the debarkation of the troops and vehicles contemplated the transfer of car crews from troops ships to the store ships at sea, so as to permit the landing of the vehicles with their operating crews. The store ships arriving in the transport area the day after the troops’ ships carrying car crews made this plan impractical and the troops were landed separately. This complicated the assembly of the command ashore.
D. Landing operations were difficult due to the high surf that was running and the almost continuous enemy action by long-range artillery fire, aerial bombardment, and strafing.
The Kool Force under the command of Gen Hugh J. Gaffey constituted the Seventh Army Floating Reserve. This force was grouped into the following major units to facilitate the landing either opposed or behind a secured beachhead.
(Assault) 18-IR; 32-FAR; Able 1-ECB; Baker 1-ECB; Det. 540-ECB; 2 Plats, Item 67-AR; Item 67-AR, CCB; 3/67-AR (-); Able 41-AIR; 78-FAB; Charlie 82-Recon Bn; Baker 17-ECB.
(Reserve) 82-Recon Bn (- 3 Recon Co’s); 1/41-AIR (- Able Co – dismtd).
(Beach Group) 540-ECB (- one Bn)(reinf); 107-AAA Bn (-); 433-AAA Bn (-).
(Service) Det. 48-Med Bn; Det. 2-AD Maint. Bn; Det. 2-AD Supply Bn; 396-QM Port Bn.
Husky – Mission
The general mission assigned to the Kool Force was sailing with the assault convoy, prepared to land in support of any of the Assault Forces. In order to accomplish this, two general plans were prepared which were to be placed in operation on orders CG Kool Force. (Plan A) – Land on one or two beaches at which beachheads had already been established, and assemble the command prepared to operate in support of the other assault forces as ordered by CG 7-A. (Plan B) – Force a landing on one or more designated beaches and operate in support of the other assault forces as ordered.
The troops ships and landing craft of the Kool Force arrived off Gela, Sicily, in the rendezvous area at about 0200 July 10. About 1330, the CG of the Kool Force went aboard the flagship CG 7-A to determine the situation ashore and the expected hour for landing. At 1340 orders were received to the Kool Force. This order included a directive that the Naval Cmdr would designate suitable beaches in the Gela area. Certain 1-ID beaches were indicated as satisfactory. Upon receipt of this information, command recon parties were immediately sent ashore to make arrangments for assembly areas, routes from the beach, and the necessary guides. Later information was received from the Navy that the beaches given as satisfactory were suitable only for a certain type of craft and that the bulk of the force would land at different beaches. This change was transmitted by radio to the Chief of Staff Kool Force, ashore, who made the necessary readjustments. Debarkation was delayed some two hours by this enforced change.
In the meantime, landing craft from LSTs (no landing craft could be carried on the vessels of the Kool Force except LSTs, due to their design and weight limitations) were assembled and dispatched to pick up battalion commanders from their respective ship and bring them to the Kool Force flagship for issuance of debarkation orders. Debarkation of the 18-RCT and the 1/41-AIR was initiated at 1800 and completed prior to daylight. Both units except for a few scattered detachments which had been landed at the wrong beaches were closed in assembly areas north of Highway 115 and east of Gela by daylight.
Debarkation of CCB personnel was completed before dark. Two platoons of Item 67-AR were debarked about 0200, July 11. Because of the high surf and congestion on the beach, it was decided not to unload additional armored vehicles during the hours of darkness. The balance of the CCB vehicles was started ashore about 1100. By dark, all the tanks of the 3/67-AR, 8 tanks of 82-Recon, and the bulk of the 78-FAB vehicles were ashore. About 1000 the 1-ID was counter-attacked by elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Regiment consisting of 30 to 40 tanks (Mark IV, Mark IV Specials and Mark VI-1). These tanks broke through the 1-ID position and debouched on the plains northeast of Gela.
One platoon of Item 67-AR, some field artillery and infantry cannon of the 1-ID engaged them and successfully repulsed the attack destroying 14 enemy tanks. The action lasted until about noon. During the course of the engagement, several tanks were unloaded and moved rapidly to the dunes north of the beach to engage the enemy in case of further penetration. Also, the dismounted elements of Dog 82-Recon were placed in position on the ridge north of the beach to prevent infiltration. These elements did not participate in this engagement but were in a position to meet the enemy had he continued his advance. At 1100, the 1/41-AIR (less Able Co), vas attached to the 1-ID, and marched to join the Rangers at Gela. About noon, George 67-AR was attached to the 1-ID to support the 16-RCT. About the same time, How 67-AR was also attached to the 1-ID and the company (less one platoon), moved west of Gela in support of the 16-RCT.
One platoon of How 67-AR was held in the vicinity of Gela in support of the Rangers. Two platoons of Easy 67-AR, and attached to the 1-ID in Africa, were disposed of as follows, the 1st platoon joined How 67-AR, and was attached in support of the 16-RTC. The 2nd platoon reverted to the 2-AD and was assigned to CCB. During the afternoon, almost continuous bombing and strafing attacks were directed at shipping lying off Gela. Several ships and craft were damaged by near misses. One Liberty Ship, the Robert Rowan, assigned to this division received a direct hit, exploded, and burned. The cargo and vehicle load were a complete loss except for a few DUKWS that had been unloaded prior to the attack.
In the late afternoon, orders were received to protect the right flank of the 1-ID and rear, and that the 2/18-RCT reverted to the 1-ID. The Kool Force was disposed during the night of July 11-12 in compliance with this order, and as shown on the sketch.
At 0900, 3 enemy tanks of the Co 4, 1st Bn, Hermann Goering Division attacked the southeast flank of the 1-ID. Two of the three tanks wore destroyed by guns of the 32-FAB and a Plat 67-AR. The third withdrew. During the day several tank attacks were repulsed in this sector. In the sector of the 16-RCT, George 67-AR took part in several tanks vs tanks actions destroying six enemy tanks and three other vehicles with probable hits on five others. In the sector of the 26-RCT, How 67-AR supported the advance of the RCT. Effective use was made of the tanks as artillery support and in bringing up tank attacks. Six enemy tanks (including 2 Mark VI-1) were knocked out by this company in addition to the effective fire support against enemy strong points. CCB displaced forward after dark to the vicinity of Highway 115 and the Niscemi Road. The remaining tanks of Dog 82-Recon were unloaded making a total tank strength at this time of 22 medium tanks and 21 light tanks directly under the CG of the Kool Force, and 42 medium tanks attached to the 1-ID. facilities of the beach group of the Kool Force were pooled with those of the 1-ID while beaches and supply dumps were operated jointly.
Pursuant to orders of the CG of the 7-A, the use of the code name Kool Force for the 2-AD was discontinued. During the morning, the 18-RCT was released from the 2-AD and reverted to the 1-ID. The 1-RB, the 4-RB (Ranger), and the 83rd Mortar Chemical Bn were released from attachment to the 1-ID and attached to the 2-AD. The 1/41-AIR was released from attachment to the 1-ID and reverted to the 2-AD. At this time, the Rangers and the 1/41-AIR were occupying and protecting Gela and occupying positions covering the plains north and west of Gela on the heights in the vicinity of Monte San Nicola and Mount Lungo.
About noon, the CG of the 2-AD ordered the Rangers, the 83-MCB, the 41-AIR, the 82-Recon (less Det.), and the 78-FAB to advance north under the cover of darkness and at 2230 to attack and secure Butera and the heights dominating the town. Information was received shortly afternoon that a force of hostile troops had entered Butera. Immediately, the town was taken under fire by Naval gunfire. Later during the afternoon, white flags were observed displayed from some of the buildings in the town.
The advance moved out as scheduled and on the outskirts of Butera, considerable resistance was met. CCB in the meantime continued on its mission od protection of the right flank of the 1-ID. Tank units attached to the 1-ID continued in support of assigned combat teams.
The resistance in front of Butera was overcome by a skillful maneuver by one company of Rangers and at 0300 on the morning of July 14, the leading elements entered the town of Butera. A number of Italian prisoners were taken. These men were from the 28-FAB, 1/33-Inf, and the 1/54-Inf, all of the 4-ID (Livorno). Combat Command B continued to protect the east flank of the 1-ID. Recon patrols were maintained east beyond the Acate River and northeast for a distance of several miles along the two roads running parallel to and west of the river.
During the morning of July 14, the CG 2-AD received orders from the CG 7-A that all tanks attached to the 1-ID reverted to the 2-AD. CCB started assembling tanks in an assembly area between Blue Beach and Highway 115 east of Gela. During the afternoon, pursuant orders of the CG 7-A, Item 67-AR with one platoon of Able 41-AIR attached, moved to block Highway northeast of Gela between the 45-IF and the 1-ID. In the meantime, the remainder of the division continued the occupation of Butera and the organization of the hills which dominated the town.
On July 15, the disposition of the 2-AD remained unchanged. The 83-CMB was detached from the 2-AD. The 82-recon conducted patrolling of the area north of Butera and between the 3-ID and the 26-RCT (1-ID). Contact was gained and maintained with both of these units.
On July 16, pursuant to the orders of the CG 7-A, elements of the 2-AD were relieved from patrols and outposts and assembled for maintenance and rehabilitation in preparation of assembly of the entire division in the Campobello area. The beach group, the 10-AAA, and the 123-AAA were relieved from attachment to the division. During the morning of the day, the 1-ID reported that the 26-RCT was being attacked by German medium tanks and that they required help.
The CG of the 2-AD alerted the tanks of the 82-Recon and the 78-FAB and led them to Barrafranca to repel the attack. Upon reaching Mazzarino, it was learned that the tank attack had been repelled with the means at hand. The 2-AD units then returned to the former areas in the vicinity of Butera.
The division assembled in the Campobello area closing at 1330 July 18. All detachments then present in Sicily reverted. The 2-AD was now organized as follows, HQs 2-AD; 82-Recon Bn (less one recon Co); 41-AIR; 66-AR; 3/67-AR (plus 3rd Plat Dog attached); 1-RB; 4-RB; 17-ECB (less 2 Cos and HQ Det); 17-FAB; 78-FAB; Baker and Charlie 48-Medic Bn; 106-AAA (SP); Det. 2-AD Maintenance Bn and Supply Bn; Det. 51-Medic Bn and 36-Amb Bn.
The objective of the 7-A was announced as Palermo was captured, the 2-AD being sent to army reserve. The 2-AD was given the mission of being prepared to exploit the successes of the assault units or to extend the envelopment through Castelvetrano. The 82-Recon Bn was detached from the division and given the mission to cover the front of the Provisional Corps. The displacement of the division westward was initiated during the night 18-19 July.
The movement to the west continued by bounds. The division completed displacement from Campobello to Agrigento where it was held pending orders of the CG 7-A. Orders were received about noon assigning the 2-AD to the Provisional Corps. During the afternoon of July 20 and the night 20-21, the division moved from Agrigento to the march assembly areas in the vicinity of Ribera. The 1-RB and the 4-RB were relieved from attachment to the division and orders received to transport this force to the Line of Departure for their attack against Catelvetrano. The 62-FAB and the 20-ECB were attached on that day to the 2-AD.
During the morning of July 21, the leading elements of the division had reached the Belice River where they were held pending the capture of Castelvetrano. The mission of taking this city was assigned to Task Force X under the CG Provisional Corps. Task Force X consisted of the 39-RCT, the 77-FAB, the 1-RB, and the 4-RB.
The city was captured during the afternoon and the force continued the attack in the direction of Marsala. This action secured our left flank and rear and covered our turn to the north against Palermo. During the evening, orders were received to assemble northeast of Castelvetrano and attack at 2200. The CG 2-AD ordered to advance, CCA in the lead, CCB following by bounds to phase lines prepared to extend envelopment.
The entire movement from Agrigento to the assembly areas west of Belice River was made along one roed in the face of most difficult conditions. All the important bridges had been blown out necessitating by-passes through precipitous gorges or in some cases through railway tunnels. Engineers worked unceasingly on these by-passes improving them, widening the trails, clearing mines, both on the roads and on adjoining shoulders and fields. In addition, the movement was made across the rear of the 3-ID through the rear elements of the 82-A/B and in the later stage on the same road with the two Ranger Battalions and 39-RCT shuttling forward into an assembly position for the attack on Castelvetrano. The division, short as it was on transportation, furnished MT for the move of the two Ranger Battalions.
At 0600, the leading elements of the division moved out to the attack. Each defile was strongly defended by AT weapons and machine guns cleverly emplaced and protected by infantry. Each of these elements had to be reduced one by one. Not until surrounded by infantry and shelled by artillery and/or tanks was there any sign of surrender. For the most part, the AT guns were manned by Germans, and the infantry protection furnished by Italians.
These actions were principally advance guard handled by the leading elements of the division and the recon companies of the 82-Recon. Leading elements of the division on arrival at the pass 4 miles northeast of San Guisseppe were held up by a determined defense in depth by AT guns including German 88-MMs.
Those guns were well emplaced in the sides of the canyons, cleverly concealed and in an extremely strong natural position. This resistance was overcome by flanking action of dismounted patrols covered by artillery, tank, and supporting cannon gun-fire. In the meantime, recon was being pushed around the flanks, to determine routes to by-pass the defile.
The division remained on the Corps phase line until 2000 when it was ordered to enter Palermo. Guards were placed on docks, banks, and other important buildings and utilities to prevent their destruction, active patrolling was conducted during the night. On arrival at Camporeale, CCB was directed to extend the envelopment to the northwest with the mission to clean out resistance in that area and to be prepared to assist CCA in the capture of Palermo. CCB, at that time, consisted of the 1/41-AIR; Charlie 66-AR; 3/67-AR (+ 2 Platoons of Easy Co attached); 78-FAB and Baker 17-ECB (+ one Plat 20-ECB attached).
Resistance was encountered during the early morning of the day near Partinico by CCB. This was overcome by prompt flanking action. After the first light, tanks were placed near the head of the advance guard which effectively reduced resistance at Terracini. Blown out roads, mines, roadblocks, and tank traps were encountered, slowing down the advance. At 1100, the leading elements arrived at the Corps restraining line. The division continued the occupation of the city to secure and maintain order.
Guard and police of the city were turned over to the 3-ID, and the 2-AD moved to a bivouac area located northwest of Palermo.
A The advance of the 2-AD from Campbello to the final attack and capture of Palermo divides itself into three natural phases as to the type of movement.
1. First, the displacement from Campobello to Agrigento, a distance of 37 miles while in the army reserve. This march was made by bounds from one assembly area to the next by relatively small march units. No unit, therefore, had an opportunity for maintenance of its vehicles or equipment or for much rest for its personnel. The march was accomplished immediately after the beachhead phase of the operation where a considerable part of the division had been parceled out in small increments to infantry Combat teams in support of their operations. Each hour saw the division moving further and further away from its source of supply of special weight oils, gasoline, rations, 75-MM gun ammunition, and heavy maintenance that had been landed at Gela and Licata. This was a serious problem particularly in view of the fact that administrative type vehicles in the form of 2-1/2 ton trucks had been cut down to less than a third of the actual requirements in the interest of transporting the maximum of combat equipment for the initial landing and shuttling infantry forward.
2. Second, the movement from Agrigento to assembly in the vicinity of Castelvetrano and the Belice Rive, preparatory to the actual envelopment. This distance was 54 miles and made across the rear of two divisions and on the same road with two Ranger Battalions and the 39-RCT. Defile after defile at which the enemy had effected demolitions was encountered, and which were passable with difficulty. Mines through this area had only been partially cleared. The advance along this road was very slow but still there was no opportunity to catch up on much needed maintenance and push forward supplies of oil that already were into the reserve carried by the organizations on combat vehicles.
3. Third, the attack north from the Belice River to Palermo, a distance of 60 miles covered in approximately 10 hours. During this advance the division encountered one defended roadblock or blovm bridge after another. AT guns were invariably found disposed in depth, well sited and concealed, and protected by infantry. Each of these positions had to be eliminated by fire and movement. The survivors of these defenses surrendered only after being hopelessly surrounded and cut off.
4. As a result of this advance on arrival in Palermo, the tanks of the 2-AD were almost completely inoperative. The stock of gasoline had become dangerously low, the rubber tracks that had been new on departing from Africa were worn down to the connectors and could last only a few more miles.
B It is important that all officers from the company grade up received training in civil affairs of the country to be invaded. It was found that there were insufficient AMGOTs’ to handle this problem of civil government immediately behind armored division troops. That in the interim between the surrender of the towns and the arrival of AMGOTs, considerable must be done to establish good order and discipline and protect civilians and their property against looting. It was found that this work must be done by commanders on the spot.
C PWI operators were found to be insufficiently trained for the work required. In many cases, it was found these operators were inclined to exaggerate information and due to lack of military background, fail to follow up leads that would have furnished valuable information.
D CIC operators must be carefully selected and highly trained in their work. Several officrrs attached to this division have donr most excellent work in this line, however, certain reports received from others have been so inaccurate that they did more harm than good.
E Experience in two amphibious operations in which ship to shore loading was used, has shown the positive necessity for closer control over the operation of small craft. The LCTs, LCVPs and LCMs do not have the means of communication to permit their control after once launched and enroute to shore with their first loads. This control must head up through the command post afloat and the senior comnander ashore through the beach master. The crows must be experienced, well trained, and have had considerable practice as a team.
F Approximately 75% of the tracks of tanks were completely ruined on arrival at Palermo. This rubber track block was of new synthetic type material and although had traveled less than 300 miles was completely worn out. Steel tracks were generally speaking, in good condition.
G Within an armored division, there is no provision for handling prisoners of war. Long sustained advances must be closely followed by line of communication troops to take over the guard and the processing of POWs and captured materiel. In many cases isolated groups of prisoners and materiel had to be loft with insufficient guard a considerable distance behind the division.
H In future operations of this nature, it is urgently recommended that MT ships carrying vehicles and combat equipment arrive in the transport area simultaneously with the troopships carrying the crews, that arriving as they did on D+1, and after the crews of the vehicles had landed on the shore, there was created a difficult problem in joining crows with their vehicles.
I The operation against Palermo served to emphasize the tremendous supply problem involved in sustaining an armored division on the move and in action. It is estimated that the organic vehicles within an armored division can keep the division supplied as long as the Army rail or truck head is within thirty miles of the combat elements and a reasonable road net exists. As this division landed with a very limited number of trucks due to shortage of shipping, it was able to maintain itself only by a close margin. All trucks hauled twenty-four hours a day, being forced to draw from beach dumps. Due to the rapid movement of the division the distance from these dumps increased until it reached one hundred forty miles. Fortunately, ammunition requirements for the operation were not heavy. Had the action been sustained and the demand for ammunition tonnage been heavy, it would have been impossible to have supplied the division with both gasoline and ammunition with the trucks available. The entire operation would have boon seriously impeded and might have been entirely jeopardized. For any operation of an armored division all classes of supplies must be pushed up within thirty (30) miles of the combat elements or if this is impossible at least three additional supporting truck companies must be made available to augment the organic transportation.
Hugh J. Gaffey
Major General US Army
Kool Force – Order of Battle
(1) HQ Kool – CG Maj Gen Hugh J Gaffey
142nd Signal Company (less det)
(2) 18-RCT – CO Col G. A. Smith
18th Infantry Regiment (-)
32nd Field Artillery Battalion (-)
2 Platoons, Item Co, 67th Armored Regiment
Baker Co, 1st Engineers Combat Battalion (-)
Baker Co, 1st Medical Battalion (-)
Able, Baker and Charlie Co, 540th Engrs (-) (support landing only)
(3) CCB – CO Col I. D. Whito
HQ CCB (-) plus detachment 142nd Sig Co
3/67th Armored Regiment (-)
Able Co, 41st Armored Infantr Regiment
78th Field Artillery Battalion (less Serv Btry, Dets HQ, firing Btry’s)
Charlie Co, 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion
Baker Co, 17th Armored Engineers Battalion (plus Det Easy Co)
(4) Beaoh Group – CO Col G. W. Marvin
540th Engrs (less one Bn)
107th AAA-AW Bn (SP) (less Btry’s A, B, Dets Det’s HQ Btry, Btry D and C)
Det 433rd AAA-AW Bn
Det 462nd Engineer Co (Dop)
Dog Co, 2637th Truck Battalion
Sect. Baker Co, 205th QM Bn (GS)
Platoon, 108th Quartermaster Co (RID)
Bn Team, 286th Sig Co (Amphibious)
603rd Ordnance Co (Ammunition)
3497th Ordnance Co (MM)(Q)(less Det)
Baker Co, 504th Military Police Bn
Able Co, 261st Medical Bn (Spec)
Detachment 401st Engineer Bn (WS)
Detachment 2658th Engineer Co (Map Dep) B
Clearing Platoon, Item Co, 51st Medical Bn
Platoon Able Co, 36th Ambulance Bn
Detachment 3rd Aux Surg Grp (3 teams)
Able Co, Naval Shore Bn N°4
(5) Reserve – CO – Col M. J. Morin, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment
1/41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less Able Co, and Serv Det) (Dismounted)
82nd Reconnaissance Battalion (less Able, Charlie, Dog Co’s, and Det HQ Co)