The strength of the enemy on this knob was unknown but patrol reports indicated that he had automatic weapons positioned on the dominating ground covering the only approach to his position. The dense vegetation afforded the enemy excellent concealment which, in conjunction with his ability to camouflage his positions, made it extremely difficult to be located. The company planned to attack in a single file with the 2nd Platoon in the assault closely followed by the command group and the 1st Platoon. As the distance from Red Top to Knob 2 was approximately four hundred yards the 3rd Platoon in support was ordered to remain in position and to take under fire any targets of opportunity that might arise. They were ordered specifically to observe for automatic weapons fire from Ridge T. The company’s machine-gun section was attached to the 2nd Platoon, while the 60 MM Mortar Section would support the attack from their primary position on Knob 1. They were to be prepared to displace forward to Knob 2 on order. Ten-minute artillery and 4.2 mortar preparation were to be placed on the objective from H-10 to H hour. H hour was designated as 0800, Apr 12.
The Third Day on Mount Mataba
The attack jumped off at 0800 as scheduled and the company advanced against relatively light sniper fire to point V at approximately two hundred yards north of Red Top. Point V consisted of a small rise along the ridge and as soon as the men crossed over it they immediately were exposed to enemy observation from Knob S. The scouts were immediately hit and the attack was stopped. Heavy mortar fire began to fall on the column and two men were seriously wounded as a result of a tree burst.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Platoon leader reported that a light machine gun was firing from the vicinity of Ridge T, but due to the heavy vegetation, he was unable to locate it. He further stated that he was searching for this area with machine-gun fire. At 1000, following another artillery preparation, the company attacked but was stopped again at Point V by enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire. As a result, the attack was called off and the company withdrew to its positions, on the perimeter. A little later, it was discovered that the 3d Platoon on Red Top had received some casualties as a result of the heavy mortar fire. One shell had scored a direct hit on a box of white phosphorous grenades, killing one man, and seriously burning two others. The former had been burned to a crisp when several of the grenades had fallen into his foxhole. The company was informed at this time that a supply road had been built from the southeast by the engineers and was approximately three hundred yards east of Knob 1. The casualties were to be evacuated by litter directly to the road and from there would be further evacuated by jeep ambulance. The company reorganized and the wounded were evacuated.
At 1535, the company commander of Charlie Co was informed that Able Co would make the attack the following morning to capture Knob 2. Charlie Co would be prepared to assist Able Co with the objective if needed. Meanwhile, four rounds of 150-MM mortar fell on the supply trail just in the rear of the carrying party bringing rations, water, and ammunition.
The carrying party arrived on the position at 1600, and doughnuts and hot sandwiches were relished by the men. Because of the acute shortage, water was rationed to the platoons according to their strength. At 1845, enemy artillery fell on Charlie Co positions on Red Top, without effect. With the arrival of darkness, the men went into their holes for the night. No patrolling was organized. Instead, everyone remained in his position on the perimeter. At 2515, the phone line to the battalion went out, and shortly thereafter the company line to the platoon on Red Top failed. The company commander was unable to contact this platoon on the SCR 536 radio.
The Fourth and Fifth Days on Mount Mataba
On April 13, Able Co attacked to the north following an artillery preparation but was stopped at Point V and withdrew to the perimeter. Baker Co relieved Able Co on the perimeter that afternoon and attacked Knob 2 the following morning, but was also repulsed at Point V and withdrew to the perimeter. During this period, Charlie Co continued patrol activities to the east and remained in position on the perimeter. During the night of April 13 to 14, the wire lines to the battalion were again cut by the enemy. Supplies were sent forward each day by vehicles over the road that had been completed to Knob 1 from the southeast.
Charlie Co was ordered to attack Knob 2 at 1020, April 15. The artillery and the 4.2 Mortars would fire a preparation on the objective from H-15 to H hour and increase their range to fire smoke on Mount Pacawagan. A self-propelled mount from Cannon Co would be attached to the company. The company plan was as follows: the 3rd Platoon with the self-propelled mount and light machine-gun section attached would lead the assault followed by the command group and 1st Platoon in that order. The 2nd Platoon would relieve the 3rd Platoon on Red Top at 0800, giving the latter sufficient time to assemble and prepare for the attack.
The company would again advance in a single file. Dog Co’s machine-gun section remained in position on Red Top. The mortars would support the attack from their position on Knob 1. The attack jumped off as scheduled, but was again stopped at Point V. The self-propelled mount drew fire as soon as it appeared and immediately withdrew when it was subjected to heavy Japanese 150-MM mortar fire. The officer commanding the mount refused to go forward, stating that the mortar bursts were liable to wound his men since the top of his mount was open and afforded no protection to the occupants. He made no comment when informed that all the infantrymen of Charlie Co had for protection was their skin. At 1120, no progress had been made; however, the company suffered only three casualties. The company commander ordered one squad to move around the left to attempt to flank the position and the balance of the platoon to build up a base of fire from the vicinity of Point V. The 2nd Squad of the 1st Platoon disappeared on the west side of the ridge. After proceeding approximately fifty yards by rushes from one crater to another, the squad came under heavy machine-gun fire. One man, endeavoring to continue to advance, was critically wounded. The squad was pinned down; not a man could expose himself without being subjected to accurate small arms and machine-gun fire. Meanwhile, the balance of the platoon had been unable to build up a base of fire as the least movement forward resulted in a preponderance of enemy missiles being brought to bear on Point V.
The inevitable heavy mortar fire began to fall in the area. At this time the squad leader of the 3rd Squad, on the left side of the ridge, contacted the company commander by the SCR-536 radio reporting two men wounded, his position untenable, and that he could neither advance nor withdraw. A 4.2 Mortar smokescreen concentration was requested and delivered on Knob 2. The 81-MM Mortar Platoon of Dog Co fired also smoke shells adjusted by the forward observer from that company on Ridge T while the 60-MM Mortar delivered high explosive that was adjusted by the squad leader of the 3rd Squad to his immediate front. This fire support enabled the 1st Squad to withdraw back to the main ridge. The squad leader informed the company commander that Knob 2 appeared to be alive with Japs. True, he had only seen a few but the entire knob appeared to be erupting with rifle fire. Further, he had observed one machine gun on Ridge T firing flanking fire on Point V, and another machine gun appeared to be located in the center of Knob 2. The latter position caused him the most trouble. Although it was less than one hundred fifty yards away he had not been able to locate it definitely. This information was forwarded to the battalion commander, who directed that George Co withdraw to their positions on Knob 1. The company commander was informed that Baker Co would seize the objective the following morning. At 2300, the enemy could be heard digging to the front and artillery fire was placed on Knob 2 with unobserved results. The digging continued during the night and speculation arose whether the enemy had received reinforcements, way improving his positions, or buried his dead resulting from the mortar and artillery fire.
Sixth Day on Mount Mataba
On April 16, Baker Co supported by mortar and artillery fire attempted to capture Knob 2 and was once again repulsed at Point V and withdrew to its position on the southern portion of the perimeter. Meanwhile, the regiment directed the engineers to extend the road around Red Top to Point V to enable a tank to get to the position. Charlie Co was notified by the battalion commander that they would take Knob 2 the following day. One Sherman tank would be in support of the operation and would arrive at Charlie Co’s position at 0800 the following morning. Information was also received at this time that a captured enemy document, dated April 14, had ordered the enemy to intensify infiltration on Americans for the next three days preceding the general counterattack. At 1330, the battalion commander notified Charlie Co of the supporting fires to be furnished. Two medium artillery battalions and 8 inches battery would fire a fifteen-minute preparation from H-15 to H hour. When the artillery fires lifted the 4.2 and 81-MM mortars would fire on the objective, to lift on the call of Charlie Co. Charlie Co’s attack order was given to the platoon leaders at 1500. The 1st platoon, with the tank attached, would lead the assault, followed by the command group and the 3rd Platoon, in that order. The 2nd Platoon would remain in position on Red Top Hill, prepared to displace on order to Knob 2 to assist in the reorganization of that position.
The 2nd Platoon was ordered to secure the attack position, just behind Point V, at daylight. The line of departure would be Point V. At this time the company commander sensed, for the first time, a feeling among the men that the objective would be taken. The mere fact that a tank would support the attack had a tremendous psychological effect on the men. The men were also carrying extra hand grenades, especially white phosphorous (M-15 WP), which was indicative of a new determination.
Capture of Knob 2
At 0620, April 17, the 2nd Platoon reported that the attack position was secured. No enemy resistance had been encountered. At 0815, the tank joined the company behind Red Top and at 0845, the artillery and mortar preparation commenced. Undercover this noise, the company moved out with the tank to a position one hundred yards in the rear of the attack position. Upon completion of the artillery and mortar fires, the company moved quickly to the attack position and called for the mortar fires to lift. The tank moved out over Point V with its 75-MM firing and machine guns spraying the area to its front. For the first time, the men could see the enemy. The preparatory fires had left the hill practically void of any vegetation. Enemy riflemen, apparently demoralized by the sight of the tank, fired excitedly as well as wildly. As the main ridge widened the second squad was deployed around the left side of the tank. The light machine guns were set up on the flanks of Point V and began to spray Ridge T with bullets. Japs, their torsos torn practically in half, continued to resist. One Jap, his leg blown off at the knee, manned a heavy machine gun until struck by one .30 caliber bullet. It was a suicidal defense, but once the attack gained momentum it bowled over the opposition. No words can express the magnificent job accomplished by the tank. The enemy was completely surprised and stunned by its appearance.
At 1050, the battalion was notified that the objective had been taken. Meanwhile, the men who had been mopping up on Knob 2 received sniper fire from Mount Pacawagan. This fire ceased when the 4.2 mortars blinded the enemy with smoke. A large cave was discovered on the north side of the Knob. This cave had apparently been used by the Japs to escape the devastating effects of the artillery and mortar fires. The entire Knob was found to consist of a series of mutually supporting foxholes connected by underground tunnels. Tunnels in several of the holes appeared to lead toward the large cave on the reverse slope of the Knob. White phosphorous grenades were thrown into all such tunnels. It soon became quite apparent why the Japs had made a last-ditch stand to hold this Knob. It afforded an excellent view of the Mango River Gorge and disclosed a number of trails leading up to Mount Pacawagan from this direction. A few Japs were occasionally seen moving to the east in the gorge and artillery was fired in these areas with unobserved results.
On the final assault of Knob 2 by Charlie Co, two light machine guns, one heavy machine gun, and a number of enemy rifles were captured. Approximately thirty-five dead Japs were counted on the Knob and an undetermined number were already buried. Several times the men, digging new foxholes, would dig into enemy graves. No time was lost in organizing a perimeter defense. Concertina wire and sandbags were used to strengthen the position. Booby traps were constructed and placed in critical areas to give early warning of any hostile approach. While the perimeter defense was being organized observation posts were established. At dark, all security elements withdrew to the perimeter and prepared for an expected counterattack that failed to materialize. The enemy was content to harass the position with mortar and artillery fire.
Charlie Co’s casualties for the final assault on Knob 2 were much less than expected, in that, only one man was killed and three men were wounded. On the other side of the ledger, thirty-five enemy dead were counted. An undetermined number had been killed and sealed in the spider-like network of tunnels and in the large cave. In summary, Charlie Co, 63rd Infantry, did accomplish its mission by assisting in the capture of Knob 1, by seizure and subsequent holding of Red Top, and, in the final phase, the capture of Knob 2 in an all-out assault. The seizure of this dominant and critical terrain feature in the heart of the Shimbu Line paved the way for the later capture of Mount Pacawagan and the ultimate destruction of the Shimbu Line. It denied to the enemy his most advantageous point of observation on the Marikina River Valley and the city of Manila, farther to the west. In turn, it provided observation for the American forces down the Mango River Gorge, one of the main communication routes of the Japs and the suspected location of many of his artillery and heavy mortar pieces.
Charlie Co’s losses during this operation amounted to three men killed and sixteen men wounded. Although the actual enemy casualties are not known they far exceeded those of Charlie Co. On Knob 2 alone, thirty-five enemy dead were counted while an undetermined number were destroyed in the numerous tunnels and caves. No prisoners of war were taken. Charlie Co, by their participation in this action, shared in a unit citation awarded to the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in the Shimbu line, Mount Mataba area.
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