PANZERFAUST
The Panzerfaust was a series of German anti-tank weapons developed and used extensively during World War II. It was designed as a disposable, single-use recoilless launcher that allowed infantry to combat tanks and armored vehicles effectively. Purpose: The Panzerfaust was developed as a response to the increasing presence and threat of Allied armored vehicles. Its simple design enabled untrained soldiers, including Volkssturm Militia and youth forces, to operate the weapon effectively. Operation: The Panzerfaust was a recoilless weapon. It launched a hollow charge (HEAT) warhead capable of penetrating thick armor by focusing explosive energy on a small area. The warhead was inserted into a steel tube pre-loaded during the manufacturing with a small propellant charge. Lightweight and portable, the aiming was accomplished using a flip-up sight with range markers for different distances. Effective range was limited, usually between 30 and 150 meters, depending on the model. The Panzerfaust evolved through several versions during the war, each with improvements in range, penetration, and usability.
Panzerfaust 30 (Klein) – The first production model was introduced in 1943, had an effective range of 30 meters, and an armor penetration capability of approximately 140 MM of steel. It was lightweight but limited in range, making it effective only in close combat.
Panzerfaust 60 – Introduced in mid-1944, this Panzerfaust was an improved version with an effective range of 60 meters, an armor penetration capability of about 200 mm due to the larger propellant charge, and an improved sighting system. This Panzerfaust was more versatile.
Panzerfaust 100 – Entered production in late 1944, this Panzerfaust had an effective range of nearly 100 meters and an armor penetration capability of 200 mm. This weapon was heavier and slightly bulkier but offered greater standoff capability.
Panzerfaust 150 – Designed in 1945, but only a few prototypes were made. With an effective range of around 150 meters, it had improved durability with a reusable firing mechanism, unlike earlier disposable models. This was meant to address the growing need for long-range engagement but was introduced too late for mass deployment.
Panzerfaust 250 – A planned version with a greater effective range (250 meters) and reusable launchers, but this was never produced due to the end of the war.
The Panzerfaust was developed by the German arms manufacturer Hugo Schneider AG (HASAG), headquartered in Leipzig. The chief designer was Heinrich Langweiler, working under the direction of HASAG. The design was influenced by earlier German anti-tank weapons like the Panzerschreck and the Faustpatrone. HASAG was the principal manufacturer, but production was subcontracted to various factories across Germany and the occupied territories. Factories produced millions of Panzerfaust units between 1943 and 1945. The production prioritized simplicity and cost-efficiency, allowing rapid mass production. The Panzerfaust proved highly effective against Allied tanks like the Sherman, T-34, and Churchill. It was used primarily by infantry in urban and defensive combat. The weapon’s simplicity made it a favorite among German forces and even Axis allies. Its proliferation during the final years of the war ensured its legacy as one of the most iconic anti-tank weapons of WWII.
The design philosophy of the Panzerfaust influenced post-war developments in anti-tank weaponry, such as the RPG series used by Soviet forces. The simplicity and efficiency of recoilless launchers became a standard in modern infantry tactics.
It might be appropriate at this point to say something about the manner in which operations were conducted. With certain exceptions, the fighting on both sides was invariably gallant and fair, at least in the 6.FR’s sector, both at Meautis and
(Note) The character of the forces is evidenced by the fact that in the battle of materiel during which men were massacred ruthlessy, they nevertheless succeeded in maintaining a gallant and fair attitude in man to man combat. (Pempel)
Aside from the above-described attack in the Sèves sector, it is probable that only one other major American attack was launched at this time in the sector of the 2.SS-PD; as I recall, this took place along the Carentan – Périers road and south of it. Otherwise, the Americans, according to the impression gained by the German lower commanders, made only cautious probing movements against the division’s positions with strong assault detachments. The situation seemed to be less stabilized on the right of the division in the area west of St Lo where the 2.SS-PD was joined by the 5.FD, the quality of whose officers was reputed to be extremely poor. They consisted for the most part of officers from the Air Force ground personnel, who had no infantry experience and no technical knowledge. The division commander was regarded by all the parachute troops as an ignoramus. When a battalion commander of the 6.FR was ordered by the LXXXIV Korps to take over for a short time a regiment of the 5.FD, whose previous commander had been killed at the front, reported through channels to the Parachute Army that conditions in the command setup of the 5.FD was absolutely shocking.
(Note) The Seventh Army was aware of the extremely low combat efficiency of the 5-FD. Owing to its poor composition, the operations staff of the division was committed at the front by the army for only a very short period, if at all. The army’s plan to withdraw the regiments of the 5-FD from the front after the first failure was not carried out because no replacements of any kind were available. This was particularly unfortunate because of the decisive importance of this front. (Pemsel)
During the night of July 12, the engineer battalion of the 17.SS-PGD surrendered Tribehou on the right wing of the 2.SS-PD, and a gap of about 2000 meters developed on the right, following which the Gebhardt Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr Division went into position at Le Hommet. During the night of July 12, the 3.Battalion of the 13.FR (5.FD) was placed in this gap. On July 13, Le Hommet was lost, and American tanks, pushing ahead toward the west, advanced on Les Champs de Losque. On July 13, and July 14, fluctuating battles took place around this locality, during which the above-mentioned parachute battalion was completely annihilated. On July 14, additional elements of the 5.FD were inserted. The German forces, up to and including the regimental commander, and probably even up to division level, were in general kept far too much in the dark concerning the situation of adjacent units. For information regarding the overall situation on the Normandy front, they had to depend on reports made by the Allied radio station Calais (which frequently broadcast surprisingly accurate information and was listened to regularly by all staff and probably by the troops as well, on the Allied Troop Information propaganda sheets, and on rumors. The 6.FR frequently detached officer reconnaissance patrols to adjacent sectors in order to keep informed about the situation there.
(3) Withdrawal From the Périers Area
A few days after the defensive victory of the 6.FR in the Sèves sector, strong American bomber formations, totaling about two thousand planes, attacked about noon the area on the right of the 2.SS-PD and west of St Lo. This raid lasted almost two hours, including the approach formation and the return flight, the latter over the sector of the 6.FR, the air attack being concentrated on the sector of the 14.FR. It provided an enormous, impressive picture. One or two hours later, the commander of the 6.FR inquired by telephone how this bombing attack, the heaviest thus far, had affected the 2.SS-PD. The reply was completely reassuring. He was informed that the forces in the forward line had been struck only lightly by the area bombing, which had been concentrated on the rear area occupied quite sparsely by combat trains; only a few artillery positions had been hit, though telephone communications had been disrupted to a considerable degree.
The commander of the 6.FR was all the more surprised when, on the afternoon of the same or the next day, the regimental adjutant was summoned to the division where he was given the following instructions and orientation concerning the situation: ‘Americans have effected a breakthrough in the sectors of the 5.FD and the Panzer Lehr Division. The front has collapsed in these sectors. American tanks have crossed the Périers – St Lo road and, advancing via Marigny, are approaching the St Lo – Coutances road. The 2.SS-PD will accordingly fall back this very night to a reconnoitered position south of Périers, near St Sauveur-Lendelin. The 6.FR will be committed at the northern edge and west of St Sauveur-Lendelin, with its greatest strength along the Périers – Coutances road.
The withdrawal of the regiment to St Sauveur-Lendelin was effected without enemy interference. The 16.Company, which had in the meantime been brought up to a strength of one hundred men by new replacements and men taken from other battalions, was instructed by the regiment to occupy the positions in the Sèves sector. It was to feign greater than actual strength and to fall back southward to the new positions of the regiment only after enemy pressure, while constantly maintaining contact with the enemy.
On the morning following this night withdrawal from the area of Périers the commander of the 2.SS-PD, the former commander of the regiment who, a few days previously, after the division commander had been wounded, had assumed command of the unit, arrived at the 6.FR’s command post and informed the regimental commander that it had not yet been possible to check the breakthrough of American tanks and that the new position of the 2.SS-PD had already been outflanked by American armored forces advancing from the east. He stated that if the division did not wish to be encircled then and there, it would have to withdraw immediately to the area of Coutances. Sobbing, the SS commander concluded by saying, ‘I am an old tank fighter, and this breakthrough has decided the issue. We have lost the war in France‘.
That these developments came as a surprise not only to the 2.SS-PD but also to the divisions on its left was demonstrated by the fact that the commander of the 6.FR, while trying to locate a proper site for a regimental command post in the vicinity of St Sauveur-Lendelin came across the troops of the supply section of an infantry division who were living in a chateau under real peacetime conditions, lolling in bed, and wearing pajamas. This was also evidenced by the fact that neither the supply officer nor the operations section of this division, when informed by telephone, gave credence to the regimental commander’s statements concerning the German withdrawal.
The commander of the 6.FR decided not to carry out the order of the 2.SS-PD which called for immediate withdrawal, while it was still daylight. He preferred to bring up the 16.Company, which he knew to be still in the Sèves sector, to grant the exhausted troops some rest after the long night march and to avoid any unnecessary losses from strafing planes. He therefore ordered the troops to remain in the vicinity of St Sauveur-Lendelin for the time being and he himself went ahead with only the absolutely necessary reconnaissance elements to the vicinity of Coutances in order to reconnoiter the new position in the Soulle sector extending from the bridge 2000 meters north of Ouville to the south of Courcy; the division sector ran from Cerisy to the eastern edge of Coutances. The 17.SS-PGD Kampfgruppe was to effect a junction with the 6-FR on its right and the motorized infantry regiments of the 2.SS-PD on the left.
(4) The Coutances Pocket
After another night march, the 6.FR occupied at dawn the positions which had been hastily reconnoitered by the regimental commander. Since the enemy situation was obscure, strong reconnaissance forces were committed at daybreak. By noon, they made a report approximately as follows: along the Périers – Coutances road, the Americans appear to be pursuing the withdrawing German troops only very cautiously and in small numbers. On the other hand, American tanks advancing from the St Lo area have apparently pushed far to the south; we must expect an armored attack along the St Lo – Coutances road and south of it. As a result of these reconnaissance operations, the regimental commander decided to have each of his two battalions pivot at a 90-degree angle on their own right flanks, so that these battalions, which had originally been committed side by side with the front facing northward, would now be echeloned one behind the other with their fronts facing east. The left flank of the former left battalion was now along the St Lo – Coutances road. Elements of the regiment of the 2.SS-PD were inserted between the two parachute battalions with their front facing northward; at the St Lo – Coutances road, the majority of the armored infantry units of the 2.SS-PD joined the parachute battalion stationed on the left, producing a stair step position. It was impossible to establish contact with the 17.SS-PGD Kampfgruppe, which was located somewhere to the right of the 6.FR.
Shortly after the two parachute battalions wheeled eastward, they were engaged by the enemy. The St Lo – Coutances road especially seems to have been the scene of heavy and costly fighting during which the 11ompany of the regiment was completely annihilated. The morale of the parachute troops as well as that of the SS forces began to deteriorate. The SS troops blamed the parachute elements for not holding out longer, while the latter accused the SS of fighting to the last parachutist. One battalion commander of the 6FR suffered a nervous breakdown. Even more alarming than the dispatches from the front were the reports received at the regimental command post from the rear. The regimental paymaster reported that he had been cut off from the baggage train by enemy tanks; the regimental surgeon reported that he was no longer able to evacuate the wounded because the division’s main dressing station had been surrendered to American units. The regimental commander now made plans for a speedy withdrawal, gave instructions to reconnoiter withdrawal routes, and sent his adjutant to the division command post with instructions to keep him informed about the situation. Toward the evening, it was reported that the commander of the 2.SS-PD had been killed by tank fire in the immediate vicinity of the division command post.
After nightfall, the adjutant returned to the front with an order from the Korps entitled ‘Order Concerning the Perimeter Defense of the LXXXIV Corps‘. The order specified that the regiment should shift its position a few kilometers to the right, an arrangement which, in view of the situation and the fact that the night was unusually dark, was not exactly welcomed by the regiment. The new position was to be set up in a semicircle around the town of Ouville, about 2000 meters from its outskirts. The regimental commander immediately set about reconnoitering the newly assigned position, as far as such reconnaissance was possible in the darkness, and while still in the field, he transmitted to the advance parties of the battalions which had accompanied him, the order concerning the movement planned by the LXXXIV Korps.
About 0100, when the regimental commander returned to the regimental command post, he was informed that an urgent radio message had been received from the division, which it was not possible for the regiment to decode because the division had used the code from the day before and the regiment’s decoding charts had been burned at midnight in accordance with the instructions. It was not until 0300 that the regimental commander obtained the clear text of this radio message, which read approximately as follows: ‘the 2.SS-Panzer-Regiment and the 6.FR, beginning immediately, will, under cover of darkness, effect a breakthrough in the direction of Percy via St Martin-de-Cenilly. After successfully accomplishing this mission, the 6.FR will assemble in the area of La Mancellière and await instructions from the division‘.
It was no simple matter to collect the battalions, which by companies and platoons were now moving into the new position, and to assemble them at a rendezvous point where the forces were to mount the armored vehicles of the 2.SS-Panzer-Regiment. This regiment apparently experienced similar difficulties in trying to assemble its individual units into a march column. It was not until dawn, about 0600, that it was possible for the long column of SS tanks, on which the parachute forces rode, to begin moving on the assigned road. In all, there may have been about two hundred armored vehicles of all kinds (including a number of assault guns of the 17.PGD Kampfgruppe and various Seventh Army battalions) and roughly 1500 parachute troops. The commander of the 6.FR rode behind the advance armored element in an armored personnel carrier which had been assigned to him.
It was too late for a breakthrough under cover of darkness, as ordered by the division. Fighting had to be done in daylight. At first, the weather seemed to be favorable for this undertaking, for during the early morning hours, a light fog provided cover for the column against air observation. At about 0800, the fog lifted, and the German armored column drove along in brilliant sunshine. All eyes nervously watched the cloudless sky; we all expected enemy strafing planes to attack at any moment. Throughout the previous days, American strafing planes had supported the ground attack from early morning until late at night and had kept all march routes under surveillance, but this morning, not a single American plane appeared in the sky. At about 0830, the German armored spearheads suddenly encountered at La Corbinière an American antitank obstacle covered by either tanks or antitank guns. The armored elements halted; one or perhaps two German tanks were put out of action; the rest came to a sudden stop so that in the front third of the column, the tanks were standing on the road one behind the other at intervals of barely five meters. The parachute troops jumped off the tanks, rushed forward, and gathered in the ditches on both sides of the road.
