Reviewed by Doc Snafu on June 3, 2026.
(Above) The FG-42, Fallschirmjägergewehr 42, or Paratrooper Rifle 42, is one of the most iconic and innovative firearms of World War II. Developed for the German Luftwaffe’s paratrooper units, it was a versatile weapon intended to give elite airborne troops both firepower and portability in a single package. German Fallschirmjäger faced challenges with existing firearms during operations. Their standard loadout included bolt-action rifles K-98 and light machine guns MP-38/40, which were cumbersome and inadequate for the demands of airborne combat. The FG-42 was designed to address this gap by combining the functions of a rifle and a light machine gun in one compact and lightweight weapon. The design work began in 1941 after the German invasion of Crete highlighted the need for an improved paratrooper weapon. Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krieghoff were the primary companies involved in its development.
The Early Models (First Pattern): These had a straight grip, a wooden foregrip, and a bipod mounted near the muzzle. The Late Models (Second Pattern): Featured design improvements like an angled pistol grip, stamped steel construction for easier mass production, and a bipod repositioned closer to the receiver. Chambered for the 7.92×57mm Mauser cartridge, a powerful rifle round widely used in the Wehrmacht. The FG-42 used a gas-operated, rotating-bolt action with a side-mounted magazine. It fired from a closed bolt in semi-automatic mode for accuracy and an open bolt in fully automatic mode to prevent overheating. Early models were machined from high-grade materials, making them expensive and time-consuming to produce, while the later models incorporated stamped steel components for efficiency. Equipped with iron sights and could be fitted with optics for long-range engagements. The sighting system was designed to account for the weapon’s dual role as a battle rifle and light machine gun.
Lightweight and compact, it was well-suited for airborne operations. However, the side-mounted magazine could interfere with handling, especially in tight spaces. The FG-42 had a high rate of fire, approximately 750-900 rounds per minute, which made it effective in suppressive fire roles but also prone to rapid ammunition depletion. Primarily issued to paratroopers and elite Luftwaffe units. Saw action in key battles, including the Eastern Front and Western Europe. Versatility as both a battle rifle and squad support weapon, and superior firepower compared to the standard infantry rifles like the Karabiner 98k.
High production costs limited its numbers; only around 7000 to 8000 units were manufactured. Recoil was strong, especially in fully automatic mode, making it difficult to control. The side-mounted magazine was unconventional and sometimes hindered usability. Today, modern reproductions have been made for enthusiasts by smggunsstore, often chambered in more common calibers like .308 Winchester. The FG-42 remains a fascinating example of German engineering during World War II, reflecting the Luftwaffe’s unique operational requirements and the innovative spirit of wartime weapon development.
Archive: A German Parachute Regiment in Normandy. Operations of the 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment, June 6, 1944, to August 15, 1944. Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte, Oberstleutnant, a.D. With Comments by Generalleutnant Max Pemsel, Former Chief of Staff of the German Seventh Army. Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, 1954.
Preface
This account of the fighting around Carentan, Periers, and St Denis-le-Gast by the commanding officer of a German parachute regiment was written early in 1948 as a part of the Allendorf phase of the Foreign Military Studies project of the US Army in Europe. At the time of writing, the German contributors had little or no access to official records, but they were able to reinforce their memories by comparing notes with other war prisoners at Allendorf. Many of the German contributions, which constitute the B-series manuscripts of the Foreign Military Studies Branch and are designed to supply German memoirs in lieu of missing documents, have been liberally used by US Army historians preparing the official histories of World War II. This particular manuscript, B-839, has been cited by Gordon A. Harrison in Cross-Channel Attack. However, the US Army histories can give little space to the German accounts of fighting, although the German version of what occurred is often of keen interest to Americans who fought in Normandy. Because of this and because Lt Col von der Heydte’s interesting relation may contain some thoughts valuable to troop commanders, this manuscript has been translated and prepared for limited distribution to units in USAREUR. There has been no attempt to check the author’s statements against official records or accounts, either American or German. It is offered for what it may be worth, just as prepared by the author. Comments by Generalleutnant Max Pemsel, former chief of staff of the German Seventh Army, appear as signed footnotes.
W. S. Nye
Colonel, Artillery
Chief, Historian Division
Karlsruhe, Germany
July 1, 1954.
The Author
Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, born March 30, 1907, joined the Reichswehr in April 1925. In 1927, he was released from military service to attend the Innsbruck University, receiving a degree in economics. In 1927, Heydte was awarded his degree in law at the Graz University. He joined the ‘Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei’ (National Socialist German Workers’ Party – NSDAP) on May 1, 1933. He entered the ‘Sturmabteilung’ (Storm Division – SA) the same year. In 1935, Heydte re-joined the Reichswehr, where he attended staff training. Meanwhile, Heydte had begun his academic career in international law in 1933 as a private assistant to Hans Kelsen in Koln on Alfred Verdross’s recommendation. Following Kelsen’s dismissal in the wake of the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, Heydte became Verdross’s assistant at the Consular Academy in Vienna (1933–1934). Because of his National Socialist activities, he had to leave the Consular Academy in 1934 and became an assistant to Karl Gottfried Hugelmann at the University of Münster. In 1940, as a captain, he was transferred from the Army to the Luftwaffe parachute service. During World War II, he served in North Africa, Italy, Russia, and France. In 1944, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to the command of the 6.Fallschirmjäger-Regiment, 2.Fallschirmjäger Division. He is now a professor of political science on the faculty of the University of Wuerzburg.
(1) Organization of the 6.Fallschirmjäger-Regiment
At the end of September or the beginning of October 1943, Hitler, influenced by the fact that elements of the 1/7. Fallshirmjäger-Regiment, had effected Mussolini’s liberation, approved a plan proposed to him by Goering, which called for a large-scale increase in the number of parachute troops. Until the fall of 1943, German parachute forces comprised one corps (XI Air Corps) consisting of two divisions. Goering’s plan called for increasing the parachute forces by the end of 1944 to the strength of two armies totaling 100.000 men, to be placed on a par with the Waffen-SS in regard to personnel replacements, weapons, equipment, and training. Goering probably had in mind the possibility of a future struggle for political power within the inner circle and intended to use the parachute forces to counteract the influence of the Waffen-SS, since he had failed in his plan to make such use of the Luftwaffe Field Divisions. In this connection, it is interesting to note that shortly after the order was issued to develop the parachute forces according to Goering’s plan, Himmler succeeded in inducing Hitler to approve the activation of a parachute regiment within the framework of the Waffen-SS.
Expansion of the airborne forces was begun without delay after approval by Hitler. The 3.Fallschirmjäger-Division and the 4.Fallschirmjäger-Division were to be activated immediately. The 1.Fallschirmjäger-Division and 4.Fallschirmjäger-Division were to constitute the 1.Fallschirmjäger-Korps, and the 2.Fallschirmjäger-Division and 3.Fallschirmjäger Division the 2.Fallschirmjäger-Korps. In October 1943, shortly before being transferred from Italy to Russia, the 2.Fallschirmjäger-Division assisted in the activation of the 3.Fallschirmjäger-Division by giving up the 6.Fallschirmjäger-Regiment, which was split into separate cadres and deactivated.
In November 1943, orders were given to activate a new 6.FR, with the former Ia5 (Staff) of the 2.FD as commander. Since the 2.FD was at that time committed to the Russian Front, and the new regiment was for the time being subordinated directly to the Parachute Army.
The initial organization of the new 6.FR was undertaken during the first days of January 1944 at the troop training grounds at Wahn. Activation, equipment, and training of the regiment were supposed to be completed by April 1, 1944. The regiment was organized along the general lines of an army infantry regiment. It was composed of three battalions, each consisting of three rifle companies and one heavy weapons (heavy machine gun and heavy mortar) company, one mortar company (the 13th), one antitank company (the 14th), one engineer platoon, and one bicycle reconnaissance platoon. In June 1944, the engineer and bicycle reconnaissance platoons were expanded to form the 15th and 16th Companies. In the summer of 1944, an antiaircraft defense company (the 17th), a motor transport company (the 18th), a supply and maintenance company (the 19th), and a replacement training company (the 20th) were added to the regiment, while the 13th to 17th companies inclusive were combined to form the 4th (heavy) Battalion. Each battalion had one signal communication platoon and one supply platoon in addition to the companies already mentioned. The supply platoon was responsible for the establishment of a battalion ammunition distribution point and the transportation of ammunition from this issuing center to the front line by means of carrier units. The regimental staff also had at its disposal a signal communication platoon, a motorcycle messenger platoon, and a parachute servicing platoon. The parachute servicing platoon packed the parachutes for the entire regiment and saw to it that they were kept in serviceable condition. The total wartime strength of the regiment was slightly more than 4500 officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men.
The personnel replacements of the regiment at the beginning of 1944 were of high quality. One third of the officers and about one fifth of the noncommissioned officers were battle-tried parachutists, some of whom had fought in the battalion of the regimental commander in Crete, in Russia, and in North Africa. The enlisted personnel consisted entirely of young volunteers averaging seventeen and a half years in age. Four months of training sufficed to weld the regiment into a unified whole adequately prepared for ground combat as well as airborne operations. The regimental commander, who was known to be opposed to the training methods used by the parachute schools, was given permission to complete the jump training of the men himself for this purpose, one squadron of Junker 52’s and one flight of Heinkel 112’s were assigned to him at Wahn and placed under his command during the four training months, with the result that every member of the regiment was enabled to make nine jump, including three night jumps. About 10 percent of the men were eliminated in the course of jump practice.
The regiment was, in general, better armed than the Army infantry regiments. Since each rifle squad was provided with two machine guns, in contrast to one in the Army, the fire power of the parachute companies was considerably greater than that of an Army rifle company, likewise, the fire power of the FS regiment’s heavy weapons companies, which had twelve heavy machine guns and six heavy mortars each, was somewhat greater than that of the Army heavy weapons companies. In contrast to the Army and Waffen-SS, the equipment and training of the regiment enabled it to employ all its heavy machine guns in concealed firing positions, a factor which proved effective in the subsequent fighting.
The 13th Company was at first equipped with twelve so-called chemical projectors, 105-MM mortars with a range of 3500 M. Unfortunately, these mortars were no longer being manufactured so it was impossible to obtain replacements, and it became necessary to substitute medium mortars in some cases and heavy mortars in others. The 14th Company comprised one 75-MM AT platoon with four guns and three Panzerschreck platoons with six rocket launchers each; later, heavy AT rocket launchers.
The Panzerschreck, officially designated as the Raketenpanzerbüchse 54 (RPzB 54), was an 88-MM reusable AT rocket launcher developed by Nazi Germany during World War II. Nicknamed ‘Panzerschreck’ (Tank’s Dread), it was also referred to as ‘Ofenrohr’ (Stove Pipe) due to its appearance.
Design and Features:
Caliber: 88-MM
Length: Approximately 164 CM
Weight: Around 9.25 Kg empty; 11 Kg with the blast shield
Effective Range: Up to 150 M
Penetration Capability: Capable of penetrating up to 210 MM of armor
Operational Use:
Introduced in 1943, the Panzerschreck was deployed by German infantry as a primary handheld AT weapon alongside the Panzerfaust. Its design was influenced by the American bazooka, with captured units studied and adapted by German engineers. The Panzerschreck’s larger caliber allowed it to penetrate thicker armor compared to its American counterpart. The weapon required a two-person crew: one to aim and fire, and another to load and carry additional rockets. Due to the backblast, operators had to be cautious about their surroundings, avoiding confined spaces to prevent injury (Once fired, the propelling charge of the rocket continued to burn for about 2 M after exiting the tube, necessitating the blast shield to protect the operator). The Panzerschreck was effective against Allied tanks, prompting countermeasures such as additional armor and protective skirts. The rockets used were 88-MM in diameter, weighing approximately 3.3 Kg, and featured a hollow-charge explosive capable of penetrating substantial armor thickness.
All personnel of the regiment were trained to use magnetic AT hollow charge’s and Panzerentwurfminen (AT grenades), as well as Panzerfausts (recoilless AT grenade launchers). The 15th Company, by way of experiment, was provided with several Einstoss-flammenwerfers (para-flamethrowers) which proved very effective.
The 17th Company, after its activation in the summer of 1944, was equipped with twelve 20-MM AA machine guns and four 20-MM triple-barreled guns. The regiment’s communications system was considerably better than that of an Army regiment. The signal communication platoon of each battalion had four telephone subsections and six radio sections each equipped with one ‘Dora’ (Torn.fu.d2 Dora radio) instrument (later called ‘Gustav’); the signal platoon of the regiment had four telephone subsections and switchboard team having a 12-line switchboard, and six radio sections with one ‘Berta’ (Torn.E.b. Field Receiver) each. In addition, there were two radio sections with one pack receiver each; each radio section also had one 35-watt instrument (for communicating with aircraft) and one 70-watt instrument (for communicating with ground forces during airlanding operations). The heavy weapons companies had their own communication sections, including telephone and pack radio subsections.
The regiment’s motor transport was inadequate. On average, each company had only two trucks. When the Allied invasion began, the regiment had a total of seventy trucks with a total capacity of slightly more than one hundred tons, but among them were more than fifty different types of manufacture—German, French, Italian, and British. The regimental commander, in his last operations report before the beginning of the invasion, evaluated the regiment’s combat efficiency as follows: ‘The regiment is completely fit for air landing operations, but only conditionally fit for ground combat because it does not have enough heavy antitank weapons and motor transport‘.
(Note)5It is not quite clear why the regimental commander evaluated his unit as being completely fit for air landing operations, but only conditionally fit for ground combat. One surely presupposes the other in the case of a systematic training, which the regiment had received. In matters of supply, the regiment was naturally always dependent on the support of Wehrmacht forces. (Pemsel)
(2) Situation on the Cotentin Peninsula Prior to the June 6, 1944, Invasion
On May 1, 1944, after barely four months of training, the regiment received orders from the Luftwaffe operations staff, bypassing the headquarters of the Fallschirmjäger Army, to move to the area of Army Group Rommel in France, bringing with it its entire air landing equipment. At army group headquarters, the regimental commander was informed that his regiment was being detached and assigned to the LXXXIV Corps at St Lo. He was, however, unable to learn why orders had been issued to bring the air landing equipment. General der Artillerie Erich Marcks was the commanding general of the LXXXIV Korps, and Lieutenant Colonel von Siegern was his chief of staff. Corps headquarters and the prearranged command post were located at the northern edge of St Lo on the road to Carentan. Corps was in charge of the coastal defense of the entire Cotentin Peninsula, and the area on both sides of the Vire Estuary; as far as the author can recall from a remark made by Gen Marcks, this covered a coastal strip of about five hundred Km. With the exception of the 91.Grenadier-Division and the 6.Fallschirmjäger-Regiment all divisions of the corps were committed to the defense of the coast at the time the invasion began.
The regiment received orders from Gen Marcks to assume responsibility for defense measures against parachute and air landing troops in the area of Lessay, Périers, Raids, St Georges-de-Bohon, Meautis, Baupte, Mont Castre, that is, the southern part of the Cotentin Peninsula. The area to be protected was over twenty Km in width and almost fifteen Km in depth. The road distance from the western to the eastern border of the area was almost thirty-five Km, and from the northern to the southern border, nearly twenty Km. The Korps advised the regimental commander that the defense measures, planned and directed by Army Group Rommel, required that the troops were to be scattered through the area, and that small strong points were to be established from which the surrounding country could be controlled. Allied parachute units, no matter where they landed, would encounter a handful of well-placed and combat-ready German soldiers. In view of the advantages which such an arrangement offered, the dispersion of the regiment and the difficulty or even impossibility of concentrating its scattered units for rapid redeployment had to be risked.
The regimental commander was under the impression that the commanding general of the LXXXIV Korps was not in complete accord with this order from Army Group Rommel. This was not the only case of disagreement between the army group and its units; such dissension was apparent during the first days in Normandy. The army group also differed with the army and corps on the conduct of operations in case of an invasion, or at least, such was the impression of the regimental commander at the time. During a visit to regimental headquarters, Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel, who had known me since the North African Campaign, summarized his views concerning the proper strategy approximately as follows: ‘The coast should be our main line of resistance for the following reasons, the enemy must be destroyed before he even sets foot on land. Once he has succeeded in establishing himself in a beachhead it will be very difficult for us to drive him out again; the invasion will have already been halfway successful‘.
This idea was at variance with the views of Generaloberst Friedrich Dollman, who expressed himself to the regimental commander as follows: ‘In view of the thin line of coastal defense, we will scarcely be able to prevent the enemy from establishing a beachhead. It must be our task to bring up all our forces as rapidly as possible to this beachhead. In order to crush the enemy during the first days while it is still weak and before the enemy has had a chance to extend and improve its position. Gen Marcks appeared to be of the same opinion.
(Note) The facts concerning the disagreements over fundamental problems of defense which existed between FM Rommel on the one hand and Gen Dollman and Gen Marcks on the other hand have been aptly presented. (Pemsel)
The various members of the German command group in the West also disagreed on the location of possible and probable points of Allied landings; Gen Marcks expected the landings to take place north of the Vire Estuary and on the eastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula (as the author recalls, in the Coutances area) and found support for this assumption in maps which were carefully kept up-to-date and which showed the focal points of enemy air reconnaissance in March 1944. At the top level, it was evidently expected that landings would be concentrated north of the Seine Estuary, approximately in the Boulogne area. Apparently, the members of the command group were in agreement only in completely underestimating the potentialities of the parachute and air landing forces. It was the general opinion that Paratroopers would prefer wide open spaces. When Generaloberst Kurt Student, the Commanding General of the German Parachute Army, objected to this conception on the grounds that modern paratroopers were also prepared to jump in wooded areas and villages, his objection was dismissed on the grounds that he was boasting. The obvious dissension prevailing among members of the higher command on questions of supply had the most disastrous effect. Two views were in conflict. Those who believed that the Allied air force would destroy all supply lines and railroad stations demanded that supply depots be established on a large scale in the rear of the forces. Others expected the attacks of the Allied air force to destroy immediately any depots set up prior to the start of the invasion, since their location would undoubtedly be betrayed to the Allies by the civilian population, and wanted the supply located as far as possible from any prospective front.
(Note) The statements with regard to the dissension on the question of supply existing among members of the higher command, and the explanation therefor, are not based on facts. In this case, everyone was completely aware of the fact that the decentralization of the depots was a matter of necessity. As far as the effectiveness of enemy espionage and enemy air raids was concerned, it was immaterial whether the depots were located at the coast or deep in the interior. The shifting of depots in the long run always involved a major problem of transportation facilities, which, of course, were never available in sufficient measure. (Pemsel)
